The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the two years preceding April 2020.
Sino-American competition over power and status includes growing threat perceptions and an increasingly important political and ideological component.
The US-China trade conflict is politically instrumental and closely bound up with the development of the world order.
The technological dimension of US-China competition centers on geopolitical power projection through 'technopolitical spheres of influence' rather than merely setting standards.
The Sino-American rivalry undermines multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation.
The United States has withdrawn from a number of multilateral institutions, while China is expanding its influence in contexts like the United Nations.
The European Union needs to develop a China policy for its drive towards strategic autonomy to escape the bipolar logic that demands it choose between American and Chinese economic and technological spheres.
The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the two years preceding 2020.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China shapes strategic debates and real political, military, and economic dynamics.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China has replaced the 'War on Terror' as the dominant paradigm for the United States, which had prevailed since 2001.
The rivalry between the United States and China does not determine all international problems and conflicts, but it increasingly forms the lens through which other actors view important developments and events.
The rivalry between the United States and China is expected to remain a defining issue in international relations for the foreseeable future, regardless of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global governance.
The Chinese political elite believes that the United States is attempting to prevent any further expansion of Chinese influence.
While trade policy and trade balance disputes are prominent in US President Donald Trump's statements, they represent only one aspect of the multidimensional rivalry between the United States and China.
The conflict between the United States and China encompasses security-related, economic, technological, ideological, and personality dimensions.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Gudrun Wacker state that from the Chinese perspective, the United States will never voluntarily cede significant international influence to China.
The escalation of hard security challenges between the United States and China has led to the emergence of a classical security dilemma.
The United States perceives China's growing military capabilities as a threat to US military bases in the Pacific, the US system of partnerships and alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and the US nuclear deterrent.
Economic competition and conflicts over trade, economic, and financial policy between the United States and China predate the protectionist policies adopted by the United States under President Donald Trump.
European nations widely share the United States' criticisms regarding Chinese trading practices, unfair competition, and rule violations.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Laura von Daniels argue that the US-China trade conflict is deeply connected to questions of world order, particularly regarding the future of multilateral trade rules and institutions.
Hanns Günther Hilpert argues that the material benefits of economic cooperation between the United States and China have declined compared to the period between 1990 and 2015.
Bilateral trade between the United States and China no longer functions as a stabilizing factor capable of reducing political conflicts between the two nations.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China will continue to exert decisive influence on international politics for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether Washington and Beijing resolve trade issues or conclude a trade agreement before upcoming US presidential elections.
Technological competition between the United States and China runs deeper than trade disputes and will outlast any resolution of those disputes, as it involves securing long-term economic advantages and defining technical standards.
Technological competition between the United States and China is linked to security concerns, which has restricted exchange and cooperation in the technological sphere.
Technological development and usage in the US-China rivalry are increasingly connected to political and ideological aspects, forming a systemic competition regarding the internal order and the relationship between state and society.
The global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms is codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China, affecting internal debates in other regions like Europe.
The political debate in the United States regarding China is characterized by a fear of China's rise and the possibility of the United States being overtaken.
The transactional leadership style of Donald Trump and the transformative leadership style of Xi Jinping are incompatible, which undermines trust, restricts diplomacy, and exacerbates bilateral conflicts between the United States and China.
The European Union and other powers must focus on upholding international rules and institutions, which are being harmed by both the United States and China.
The US-China rivalry has global consequences, affecting relationships with other powers, regional dynamics in Europe, and the functioning of international organizations like the G20 and the United Nations.
Both the United States and China have violated World Trade Organization rules, and the Trump Administration has sought to impair the function of the World Trade Organization.
The Trump administration withdrew the United States from the UN Human Rights Council.
The European Union and its member states are directly and indirectly affected by the rivalry between the United States and China.
The European Union opposes a broad 'decoupling' or severing of technological and economic ties with China, a strategy that has been discussed and partially prepared in the United States.
Equidistance between China and the United States is not a viable option for the European Union due to significant gaps regarding values, political systems, and the rules-based international order.
The ties binding the Euro-American community of values and security are likely to remain significantly closer than the relationships either the United States or European states have with any other international partner.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China risks spiraling into a multi-layered world conflict that presents economic and military dangers.
The rivalry between the United States and China is beginning to structure international relations and has the potential to create a new 'geo-economic world order'.
In the United States, the rise of China is widely regarded as a danger to America's own dominant position in the international system.
China is the only country with the potential to threaten the status of the United States, although the notion of unstoppable Chinese economic and military expansion is based on questionable assumptions.
The 'Thucydides Trap' serves as an interpretive framework in the United States and China that highlights the risks of power transition and suggests that individual regional conflicts could coalesce into a global hegemonic conflict.
The US-China conflict syndrome is based on a regional and increasingly global status rivalry, with China's growing power causing American fears regarding its status as the sole international superpower.
Skeptics argue that China could acquire dominant global political, economic, and technological influence, allowing it to set international rules and establish an 'illiberal sphere of influence' that would prevent the United States from guaranteeing its current level of security and prosperity.
The systemic conflict between the United States and China is sometimes interpreted as a clash between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism.
Highlighting ideological conflict may be used by the United States to mobilize domestic support for a power clash with China that involves economic costs.
The security dilemma between the United States and China has been shaped by the fact that both sides have viewed each other as potential military adversaries since the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96.
The United States and China both perceive themselves as defensive, peaceful powers while suspecting the other of having aggressive offensive intentions, which creates a security dilemma.
The relationship between the United States and China is a complex strategic rivalry because they are potential military adversaries rather than merely systemic antagonists competing over status.
In the South China Sea, the United States insists on unhindered access and freedom of navigation, which conflicts with China's efforts to create a security zone and counter American intervention capabilities.
China appears to be utilizing the South China Sea as a protected bastion for nuclear-armed submarines to safeguard its second-strike capability against the United States.
The United States government is convinced that China's growing global economic and political presence comes at the expense of the United States.
The United States is applying pressure and incentives to dissuade other states from expanding their economic relations with China.
Technological leadership in the digital age is crucial to the US-China rivalry because it creates global competitive advantage and secures the basis for military superiority.
The United States government's campaign against Huawei reflects a shift away from positive-sum logic in economic relations with China.
Historically, the United States prioritized economic logic in relations with China as long as Washington did not fear the rise of a strategic rival, operating under the expectation that economic interdependence would promote cooperation and stability.
Under the Trump administration, security logic has come to dominate US rhetoric and practice regarding China, driven by concerns over the relative distribution of economic gains and the belief that economic interdependence negatively impacts the technological basis of US military superiority.
A consolidated, lasting global strategic rivalry between the United States and China could trigger deglobalization, potentially resulting in two parallel world orders dominated by the United States and China respectively.
The sharpening of the US-China conflict and the resulting bipolarization of the international system threatens the foundation of global multilateralism.
The US-China strategic rivalry will shape US foreign policy regardless of whether Donald Trump is reelected or a Democrat enters the White House in January 2021.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens', which may lead the United States to prioritize competition in the Indo-Pacific and treat crises in Europe and its periphery as secondary.
Washington is expected to increase pressure on its allies to take a clear position and side with the United States in the sharpening US-China conflict.
The Thucydides Trap, a concept describing how the rise of a power (Athens) makes war with an established power (Sparta) inevitable, is viewed by some observers as a real risk in the current relationship between China and the United States.
Beijing views the United States as a frustrated power attempting to maintain its supremacy by geopolitically containing China and hindering its economic, technological, and military development.
Chinese views of the United States are ambivalent, characterized by respect and admiration for American innovation, economic strength, universities, military capabilities, and political system, alongside mistrust stemming from historical negative experiences.
China presents itself as the trailblazer and advocate for emerging economies and developing countries rather than as a systemic adversary of the United States and the West.
China views the United States as a paradigm for modernization and believes it must reduce the development gap with the United States to make the world a fairer and more just place.
Beijing has historically suspected the United States of seeking to internally corrupt and transform China and the Communist world through 'peaceful evolution,' which China interprets as infiltration and subversion.
The 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire confirmed Chinese fears regarding American attempts at subversion.
Chinese leaders concluded that open competition with the United States, such as an arms race or direct confrontation, must be avoided to prevent the same fate as the Soviet Union.
In response to perceived American containment, Chinese leaders adopted rhetoric of cooperation, such as 'win-win' and the concept of a 'new type of great power relations' where each side respects the other's 'core national interests'.
Realistic Chinese analysts view the relationship between rising and declining powers as an unavoidable zero-sum game, yet they believe the Chinese and US governments have a responsibility to prevent conflict and war.
Beijing's fears that Washington seeks regime change in China were deepened by the 'colour revolutions' of the 2000s and the Arab Spring of 2011.
China questions whether the United States would accept China's rise and leading role in new technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G if China were a democracy based on the Western model.
Chinese leadership believes the Western liberal system is a manifestation of American hegemony.
Beijing does not expect the United States to grant China a voice commensurate with its economic and political weight.
Chinese leaders believe the United States and the West will not voluntarily grant China greater international influence.
In 2005, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick demanded that China act as a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system.
Donald Trump's 2016 election as US President was officially welcomed by China, with scholarly assessments expressing cautious optimism.
US presidential candidates Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all presented China as a competitor and adversary during their election campaigns.
Most Chinese observers believed Donald Trump's anti-China campaign rhetoric was a familiar pattern similar to previous US presidential candidates.
Historically, newly elected US administrations have eventually returned to pragmatic and cooperative policies toward Beijing after taking office.
The Chinese state-affiliated newspaper Global Times asserts that the United States has adopted a policy of containment against China, which is manifested in the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Global Times asserts that China can no longer be contained by the United States and that any attempt to do so would harm the United States more than China.
Official and published Chinese statements suggest that both the United States and China need to seek compromise in their economic disputes to avoid mutual harm.
Chinese observers interpret the United States' actions regarding Hong Kong as an attempt to weaken the Chinese system and achieve regime change in Beijing, citing threats to China's "core national interests" such as territorial integrity.
One camp of Chinese America analysts hopes that the United States and China will return to pragmatic and constructive relations, either through a trade agreement with President Donald Trump or his loss in the next election.
One camp of Chinese America analysts interprets the shift in United States policy towards China as permanent and structural, believing a bipartisan consensus in the United States will determine the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future.
Chinese observers note that the United States' technology boycott could accelerate China's efforts to achieve technological autonomy.
The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations as of 2020.
China regards Europe as a useful entity that presents little obstacle to its own development, unlike the United States.
The rivalry between the United States and China shapes strategic debates and real political, military, and economic dynamics.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is politically instrumental and closely bound up with the development of the world order.
The United States perceives China's activities in the South China Sea as aggressive, and views China's mercantilist trade practices and hardening authoritarian tendencies as negative factors.
The Sino-American rivalry undermines multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, with the United States withdrawing from institutions while China expands its influence in contexts like the United Nations.
The United States' engagement policy with China, which began with Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to Beijing, is widely considered to have failed.
The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the past two years, shaping strategic debates and real political, military, and economic dynamics.
The hope that China would become a 'responsible stakeholder' was formulated by then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in 2005.
For the United States, strategic rivalry with China has replaced the 'War on Terror' as the prevailing paradigm for viewing international developments and events, a paradigm that had been dominant since 2001.
The United States increasingly views the rise of China as a danger to its own dominant position in the international system.
The rise of China and its increasing influence across various policy areas and world regions has strengthened fears and rejection within the United States.
The publication 'Strategic Rivalry between United States and China' was written before the COVID-19 pandemic began.
President Xi Jinping's political course of authoritarianism and nationalism has contributed to increased American rejection of China.
Donald Trump utilized China as a political tool for his agenda and election slogans, while other political actors in the United States blamed China for deindustrialization and domestic economic problems.
The rivalry between the United States and China is expected to remain a defining issue in international relations for the foreseeable future, regardless of cooperation in other policy fields.
Human rights groups in the United States have gained traction in their criticism of China due to Beijing's expansion of its surveillance state and the construction of reeducation camps in the Xinjiang autonomous region.
Chinese businesses and individuals listed on the United States Department of Commerce’s 'Entity List' are prohibited from making purchases in the United States or from US companies.
China has responded to US trade measures with reciprocal retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States, while simultaneously reducing tariffs on imports from third-party countries to disadvantage US imports.
Intensifying confrontation between the United States and China generates increased friction and pressure due to strategic interdependence.
Chinese businesses are actively seeking suppliers capable of substituting imports from the United States.
The United States and China are exerting pressure on third-party states, such as Germany, regarding the use of Huawei technology.
China announced the creation of an 'Unreliable Entities List' to target businesses, organizations, and individuals that comply with US boycotts against Chinese companies like Huawei, subjecting them to disadvantages in the Chinese market.
On 13 December 2019, the United States and China agreed on a partial Phase One trade agreement.
Under the Phase One agreement, the United States and China renounced announced increases in special tariffs, and China promised additional imports from the United States amounting to $200 billion for the years 2020 and 2021.
Economic competition and conflicts over trade, economic, and financial policy between the United States and China predate the protectionist course adopted by the United States under President Donald Trump.
The Phase One agreement between the United States and China left previous special tariffs in place and failed to resolve controversies regarding subsidies, state enterprises, and technology.
It is unlikely that the United States and China will resolve outstanding trade points in a second partial agreement before the US presidential elections.
The material benefits accruing to both the United States and China from their economic cooperation have declined in comparison to the period between 1990 and 2015.
Bilateral trade between the United States and China is no longer a stabilising factor capable of ameliorating political conflicts.
Trade conflicts between the United States and China are politically instrumentalized, though they represent the most easily resolvable aspects of the broader strategic rivalry.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China will continue to exert decisive influence on international politics for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether Washington and Beijing resolve trade issues or conclude a trade agreement before the upcoming US presidential elections.
The technological dimension of the rivalry between the United States and China runs deeper than trade disputes and will outlast any resolution of those disputes.
The US-China trade, economic, and technology conflict has caused economic harm to both the United States and China, as well as third-party nations.
Technological competition between the United States and China involves both absolute and relative gains, such as the ability to define technical standards, and is inherently linked to national security.
The imposition of extraordinary tariffs by the United States and China has reduced bilateral trade and increased import costs.
Hilpert argues that the global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms is codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China, even in regions like Europe where it may appear to be an internal debate.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current conflict of values, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
The political debate in the United States regarding China is characterized by a fear of China's rise and the possibility of the United States being overtaken.
The United States administration under President Donald Trump shifted away from the post-1945 foreign policy tradition of acting as the guardian of a liberal world order, prioritizing the defense of American interests instead.
The United States has damaged the World Trade Organization (WTO) through repeated violations of core treaty terms and the imposition of punitive tariffs.
The United States and Western nations are concerned about losing their interpretative dominance of international politics and the stability of multilateral institutions established in the liberal spirit of the West.
The disregard for World Trade Organization (WTO) rules by the United States and China threatens the future viability and legitimacy of the WTO as a multilateral system.
The United States aims to preserve its global supremacy in power politics, including in the sphere of soft power.
A trade environment governed by arbitrary political power may benefit the United States and China while harming other nations.
The United States is likely to impose further sanctions and supplier boycotts against Chinese companies and pressure third-party states to do the same as part of a struggle over techno-political spheres of influence.
Companies in third-party nations may face a choice between conducting business with either the United States or China.
The European Union and other powers must focus on upholding international rules and institutions, which are being harmed by both the United States and China.
The US-China rivalry has global consequences, affecting relationships with other powers, regional dynamics, and the functioning of international organizations like the G20 and the United Nations.
Both the United States and China have violated the rules of the World Trade Organization.
China and the United States may be tempted to use currency devaluation to stimulate their domestic economies in the event of declining economic growth or recession.
China has threatened to sell off its US treasuries.
China holds US treasuries worth more than $1 trillion.
Selling off US treasuries would put pressure on US interest rates.
The Trump administration withdrew the United States from the United Nations Human Rights Council.
Chinese state-controlled media characterizes Western democracies, particularly the United States, as dysfunctional while promoting China's own economic, social, and political progress.
The European Union and its member states are directly and indirectly affected by the rivalry between the United States and China.
Washington is exploring ways to exclude Chinese businesses from US financial markets.
The European Union opposes a broad decoupling or severing of technological and economic ties with China, a policy approach that has been discussed and partially prepared in the United States.
The European Union rejects the option of equidistance between the United States and China due to significant differences regarding values, political systems, and the rules-based international order.
Trade practices of the US and China and welfare losses from their conflict affect Germany and Europe.
The ties binding the Euro-American community of values and security are likely to remain significantly closer than the relationships either the United States or European states have with any other international partner.
China and the United States threaten the European Union and European businesses with disadvantages if they do not align with their respective demands.
The European Union should maintain an independent position in trade disputes and defend rules-based multilateralism, despite foreign policy and security reasons preventing equidistance between the US and China.
The European Union is engaged in bilateral talks with the United States regarding trade and tariffs and with China regarding an investment agreement.
The European Union must demand adequate concessions in its bilateral talks with the United States and China.
European states may need to expand their engagement in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to fill gaps created by the withdrawal or disinterest of the United States administration.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China risks escalating into a multi-layered world conflict that poses both economic and military dangers.
The United States and China both view technological superiority as a fundamental prerequisite for their respective economic and military strength and their standing in world politics.
The United States is consistently undermining the normative foundations of the liberal order through its actions at home and abroad.
The rivalry between the United States and China is beginning to structure international relations and has the potential to create a new geo-economic world order.
The United States currently maintains the leading position in numerous technological areas.
Current international relations are increasingly defined by concerns over who gains more from economic exchange and the security implications of economic interdependence between the United States and China.
The emergence of a Chinese technopolitical sphere of influence creates political challenges for states that are technologically dependent on the United States or China.
In the United States, the rise of China is widely perceived as a threat to America's dominant position in the international system.
China is the only country with the potential to threaten the status of the United States as the predominant international power.
The 'Thucydides Trap' is an interpretive framework used in public debate in both the United States and China to discuss the implications of power transition theory.
The United States has treated technological superiority as a key element of national security since the 1940s.
The US-China conflict syndrome is based on a regional and increasingly global status rivalry.
The strong personalization of politics under President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump shapes relations between China and the United States.
The United States identified the Soviet Union as its greatest technological threat in the mid-20th century, followed by the rapid rise of the Japanese computer industry in the 1980s.
In the United States, President Donald Trump minimized the influence of the State Department, while in China, the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping took control of foreign policy decisions.
China's growing power has caused American concerns regarding the United States' status as the sole international superpower.
During the first wave of digitization in the 1990s, the United States secured a dominant role in many core technologies, leading to widespread dependence on American market leaders by other states and businesses.
China is pursuing a twofold goal of becoming independent from the United States in core digital technologies and subsequently disseminating its own technologies globally.
China threatens the United States' status as the leading power, as well as the privileges and economic advantages associated with that status.
Skeptics argue that China could acquire dominant global political, economic, and technological influence, set international rules and standards, and establish an 'illiberal sphere of influence', potentially preventing the United States from guaranteeing its current level of security and prosperity.
The United States diplomatic apparatus has little chance of moderating or correcting Donald Trump's transactional foreign policy approach.
The United States' sphere of influence is designed to enable the maximum number of states and companies to utilize the products and services of American companies.
The United States did not perceive China as an ideological antagonist as long as China's rise was not viewed as a global challenge and there was hope that China would eventually liberalize.
The United States generally opens its markets to foreign firms while simultaneously employing targeted instruments to restrict foreign investment and control exports.
The systemic conflict between the United States and China is increasingly interpreted by the American side as a clash between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism.
Highlighting ideological conflict is a strategy used to mobilize domestic support in the United States for a power competition with China, despite the associated economic costs.
The future development of US and Chinese spheres of influence depends on domestic factors and the future relationship between the two states, with the potential for intensified conflict if the relationship is viewed as a zero-sum game.
Ideological differences between the United States and China intensify mutual threat perceptions and strengthen the security dilemma between the two nations.
Technological dependency is considered unproblematic when all involved parties view it as a desirable interdependence that increases welfare, but becomes problematic when actors like the United States and China leverage these dependencies to further their own interests.
Since the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96, the United States and China have viewed each other as potential military adversaries and have aligned their military planning accordingly.
Spheres of influence allow central actors like the United States and China to exert political and economic influence over dependent states and businesses.
The United States and China both perceive themselves as defensive, peaceful powers while suspecting the other of having aggressive offensive intentions, which creates a security dilemma.
Central actors can conduct "politics by default" by defining normative standards through their technologies, as technologies are not value-neutral and contain embedded political ideas, values, and norms.
The rivalry between the United States and China in East Asia is dominated by perceptions of military threats and the American belief that China is seeking to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in the region.
In the South China Sea, the United States' insistence on unhindered access and freedom of navigation conflicts with China's efforts to create a security zone and counter American intervention capabilities.
China is reportedly turning the South China Sea into a protected bastion for nuclear-armed submarines to safeguard its second-strike capability against the United States.
The United States government is convinced that China's growing global economic and political presence comes at the expense of the United States.
The United States is applying pressure and incentives to dissuade other states from expanding their economic relations with China.
The United States' campaign against Huawei reflects a shift away from positive-sum logic in economic relations with China, moving toward a security-focused logic.
Weak compliance regarding the implementation of agreements, such as in the trade sector, prevents the development of a viable relationship between the United States and China.
The United States previously prioritized economic logic in relations with China because it profited from economic exchange in absolute terms, regardless of whether China derived relatively larger benefits.
The United States' previous economic logic regarding China was based on the expectation that economic interdependence would promote cooperation and stabilize peace.
Under the Trump administration, security logic dominates US rhetoric and practice regarding China, driven by concerns over the relative distribution of economic gains and the belief that economic interdependence negatively impacts the technological basis of US military superiority.
A consolidated, lasting global conflict between the United States and China could trigger deglobalization, potentially resulting in two parallel international orders dominated by the United States and China respectively.
If the US-China conflict continues to sharpen and accelerates the bipolarization of the international system, the foundation for global multilateralism could disappear.
Many major internet service providers, including Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, are based in the United States, leading to the storage of non-US customer data in US data centers.
Regardless of whether Donald Trump was reelected or a Democrat entered the White House in January 2021, the strategic rivalry with China will shape United States foreign policy.
US intelligence services exploit the fact that a significant portion of global internet communication passes through servers and fiber-optic cables located in the United States to conduct surveillance.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens,' which may lead the United States to prioritize competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and treat crises in Europe and its periphery as secondary.
US security agencies can access cloud data of global enterprises stored in US-based data centers under court orders.
China has responded to US dominance in internet infrastructure by enhancing its ability to monitor important fiber-optic internet exchange points.
Washington's pressure on its allies to take a clear position and side with the United States in the US-China conflict is likely to increase.
The United States' fear that China harbors expansionist intentions leads to the reinterpretation of concrete agreements, such as those involving Huawei, which erodes mutual predictability and trust.
China, Russia, and the European Union are pursuing data localization initiatives to repatriate their citizens' data from the United States as a means of regaining control.
The historical process described by Thucydides, where the rise of Athens made war with Sparta inevitable, is considered a real risk in the current relationship between China and the United States.
Beijing views the United States as a frustrated power attempting to preserve its global supremacy by geopolitically containing China and hindering its economic, technological, and military development.
The United States demonstrated the ability to disrupt production processes within digital enterprises by interrupting global supply chains through export restrictions placed on Huawei.
Third-party states have three primary options for navigating the technological rivalry between the United States and China: aligning fully with one sphere of influence, selectively relying on technologies from both spheres, or attempting to maintain independence.
The 'Five Eyes' intelligence alliance, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, engages in close cooperation regarding technological methods of espionage.
Chinese views of the United States are ambivalent, characterized by respect and admiration for American innovation, economic strength, universities, military capabilities, and political system, alongside mistrust stemming from historical negative experiences.
The European Union must consider compensating for its dependency on the United States and China in core digital technologies by leveraging its strengths in other economic sectors.
While Europe is largely dependent on the United States and China for digital technologies, the United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies.
The European Union could utilize its expertise in non-digital sectors as a bargaining chip during times of escalating political conflict with the United States and China.
A strategic policy could aim to shape economic interdependence between the European Union, the United States, and China to incentivize all parties to avoid escalation, conflict, and the severance of relations.
Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping is willing to take risks in international relations, including standing up to the United States.
China presents itself as a trailblazer and advocate for emerging economies and developing countries rather than a systemic adversary of the United States and the West.
China views the United States as a paradigm for modernization and believes it must reduce the development gap with the United States to make the world a fairer place.
Beijing suspects the United States of seeking to internally corrupt and transform China through 'peaceful evolution,' defined as infiltration and subversion from within.
China identifies mutual respect as the central value in its relationship with the United States, specifically regarding territorial integrity and the recognition of different development models.
Since 1989, Chinese discourse has consistently perceived the United States as an obstacle to China's goal of restoring its lost greatness.
Strategic interdependence generates increased friction and pressure if the confrontation between the United States and China intensifies.
Both the United States and China are exerting strong pressure on third states, such as Germany, regarding the use of Huawei technology.
The collapse of the Soviet Union influenced Chinese leaders to avoid open competition with the United States, such as arms races or direct confrontation.
Future conflicts over digital technologies between the United States and China are expected to include technologies for intelligent traffic management, smart cities, and smart grids.
The strategic competition between the United States and China is framed as 'consultation and cooperation,' but is driven by the unspoken model of governance China claims for itself.
Chinese observers question whether the United States would accept China's rise and leadership in new technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G if China were a Western-style democracy.
The clash between the person-centered leadership styles of the United States and China deepens bilateral conflicts and erodes trust between the two nations.
The conflict between United States and Chinese leadership styles creates opportunities for third-party states to gain influence by balancing their relationships with both powers.
Chinese observers question whether the United States prioritizes maintaining American supremacy or if it would concede leadership in specific areas if China fundamentally democratized.
Russia is working to become more autonomous by establishing domestic equivalents to dominant United States services, specifically Yandex for Google and vKontakte for Facebook.
The competition between United States and Chinese leadership styles hinders the resolution of global issues such as climate protection and arms control.
Russia's plan to place its entire internet infrastructure under state control is driven by the goal of escaping dependency on the United States.
Europe has limited capacity to contain the status conflicts between the United States and China, which have intensified following the end of China's collective leadership model and the concentration of power under Xi Jinping.
The United States and China, as evidenced by the Huawei case, categorize status conflicts within their broader, conflict-laden bilateral relationship.
China believes the Western liberal system is a manifestation of American hegemony and that the United States will not voluntarily concede the international influence that China's economic and political weight merits.
The multilateral order is in crisis in the early 2020s due to the collision between China's rise as a global power and the 'America First' political approach in the United States.
US President Donald Trump has threatened to withdraw from multilateral organizations, characterizing them as useless, hostile, and anti-American.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current ideological conflict, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
Both the United States and China undermine the global order by flouting multilateral rules and using institutions for displays of power.
The United States maintained unchallenged dominance of multilateral organizations since the Second World War by leading the establishment of the international order and bearing significant financial burdens.
The 2008 global financial crisis restricted the United States' ability to maintain dominance in central multilateral organizations due to the resulting costs to the public budget.
The Global Times asserts that the United States has adopted a policy of containment against China, which is manifested in the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.
The US Administration under President Donald Trump shifted from acting as the guardian of the liberal world order to prioritizing the defense of American interests, breaking with post-1945 foreign policy traditions.
The Global Times asserts that China can no longer be contained by the United States and that any attempt to do so would harm the United States more than China.
Europe has assumed the primary role of protecting liberal Western values and the rules-based multilateral order, while future US administrations may reclaim a normative leadership role.
The Global Times expresses cautious optimism that a solution to the US-China trade dispute can be found and characterizes the idea of a new Cold War as unrealistic.
Differing worldviews regarding political order and principles present a greater challenge for China than for the United States.
Official and published statements in China suggest that both the United States and China need to seek compromise in their economic relations to avoid mutual harm.
The United States and Western nations perceive that the global geostrategic center of gravity has shifted toward Asia, specifically China, over the past decade.
The United States and the West are concerned about losing their interpretative dominance in international politics and the stability of multilateral institutions established in the liberal spirit.
Skeptics in China warn that a lasting and dependable trade peace between the United States and China is not possible under the administration of President Donald Trump.
The growing rivalry between the United States and China is prominently displayed in the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.
The United States aims to preserve its global supremacy, including in the sphere of soft power.
Chinese official narratives claim that the United States is seeking to weaken the Chinese system and achieve regime change in Beijing by intervening in Hong Kong, which China views as a core national interest involving territorial integrity.
The conflict between the United States and China involves a dispute over participation in global decision-making, with origins dating back to the early 2000s.
One group of Chinese America analysts hopes that the United States and China will return to pragmatic and constructive relations, either through a trade agreement with President Donald Trump or his loss in the next election.
A second group of Chinese America analysts believes that the shift in United States policy towards China is permanent and structural, driven by a bipartisan consensus in the United States that precludes a return to previous relations.
The United States, with support from G7 states, blocked a significant expansion of China's influence within the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Official Chinese media state that ongoing trade disputes have bolstered China's determination to resist American pressure and defend its rights and interests.
Chinese observers of the economic conflict suggest that the United States' technology boycott could accelerate China's efforts to achieve technological autonomy.
China views Europe as presenting little obstacle to its own development and as a useful entity, unlike the United States, which China views as a significant obstacle.
The United States, the European Union, Japan, and Canada accuse China of systematically stealing intellectual property and imposing competition-distorting requirements on Western companies operating in the Chinese market.
The United States perceives China's activities in the South China Sea as aggressive, objects to its mercantilist trade practices, and is concerned by the hardening of authoritarian tendencies in China.
The United States' engagement policy toward China, pursued since Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, is widely considered to have failed.
The Trump administration blocked a joint initiative by the European Union, Canada, and Norway to create an interim appeal arbitration arrangement for the WTO that would operate without United States participation.
The United States increasingly views the rise of China as a danger to its own dominant position in the international system, transitioning from a regional to a global challenge.
The World Trade Organization operates under a consensus principle, which allowed the United States to prevent appointments to the Appellate Body and paralyze the Appellate Body Secretariat.
The rise of China and its increasing influence across various policy areas and global regions have intensified fears and rejection within the United States.
For more than half of its trade, including with the United States, China, and India, the European Union lacks the possibility of binding rules-based dispute resolution comparable to the WTO framework.
Critics outside of the Trump administration attribute American deindustrialization and economic problems to China, though these issues are also linked to policy failures and technological change.
The rivalry between the United States and China obstructs vital decision-making processes within the United Nations.
Over the past decade, China has quadrupled its financial contributions to United Nations organizations, while the United States has gradually scaled back its contributions.
The normative dimension of American criticism regarding China's threat to human rights and democratic values has been central to the US debate since the 1989 suppression of the student movement on Tiananmen Square.
Human rights groups in the United States feel their concerns about China are validated by Beijing's expansion of its surveillance state and the construction of reeducation camps in the Xinjiang autonomous region.
The United States is consistently undermining the normative foundations of the liberal order through its actions at home and abroad.
Many segments of the United States private sector agree with the Trump Administration's criticism of Chinese economic practices, specifically citing state subsidies for Chinese firms, forced technology transfers, and intellectual property theft as primary concerns.
United States business sectors that have faced intense competition, such as steel and aluminum producers, support President Donald Trump's protectionist tariffs and hard economic stance against China.
United States companies negatively impacted by import tariffs on semi-finished goods or retaliatory tariffs from China and other trading partners oppose the escalation of trade sanctions.
The United States withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018.
United States retail importers, the farm sector, car manufacturers, and IT and communications companies are among the sectors that oppose the escalation of trade sanctions due to negative impacts.
Following President Donald Trump's threat to increase tariffs in two stages by the end of 2019, significant criticism from United States businesses, Congressional Republicans, and trade unions led the Trump Administration to agree to a limited 'Phase One Deal' with China instead of implementing new tariffs.
The United States government views China as a threat to United States and Western interests in regions beyond the Indo-Pacific, specifically including Africa, the Middle East, and the Arctic.
A United States bill banned American companies from selling crowd control software to the Chinese government.
The strong personalization of politics under Xi Jinping and Donald Trump shapes the relations between China and the United States.
In the United States, President Donald Trump minimized the influence of the State Department, while in China, the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping took control of foreign policy decisions.
The United States withdrew from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) after nearly seventy years of membership.
The Trump Administration repeatedly threatened to make significant cuts to United States financial contributions to the United Nations in 2019.
China-critical statements by politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States significantly influenced public opinion prior to the election of Donald Trump.
The United States' arrears at the United Nations amounted to more than €950 million at the beginning of December 2019.
Both Republican and Democratic lawmakers in the United States criticize the Trump Administration's use of unilateral import tariffs and threats, arguing that these measures alienate American allies in Europe and Asia and weaken the United States' position against China.
The United Nations was forced to initiate spending cuts due to payment delays from the United States, despite the United States eventually transferring more than half of its outstanding debt.
The private sector and both major political parties in the United States are concerned that the trade conflict with China will negatively impact American consumers and the agricultural sector.
Both China and the United States bypass multilateral organizations and rules, prioritizing bilateral negotiations to resolve conflicts.
The tendency of China and the United States to prioritize bilateral negotiations harms international organizations by leaving them outmaneuvered.
Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that the trade conflict with China could harm the United States.
The power rivalry between China and the United States is increasingly affecting the interests of the European Union and Germany.
Concerns have emerged in the United States regarding Chinese influence spreading through Confucius Institutes and Chinese grants or investments in think-tanks, universities, media, and business.
The European Union member states fear the consequences of escalating trade disputes and geopolitical confrontation between the United States and China.
Some observers argue that fears of China replacing the United States as the global leader are exaggerated and that it is unclear if China views this goal as necessary or feasible.
The European Union's relationship with China is not focused on geostrategic containment and decoupling, unlike the United States' approach.
Proponents of 'smart competition' in US-China relations advise against ending all cooperation with China or attempting to block all increases in Chinese influence.
Proponents of 'smart competition' believe that US policy toward China, characterized by a mix of cooperation, deterrence, and pressure, has been successful over the past decades.
Proponents of 'smart competition' advocate for a shift in US policy toward increased pressure and deterrence to counter China's mercantilist economic policies and assertive foreign policy.
The authors of the SWP Berlin report argue that it is in the interest of Germany and Europe for US critics of a purely confrontational China policy to have more influence in Washington.
A balanced US policy toward China that weighs both cooperation and confrontation would alleviate pressure on European capitals to choose sides between the United States and China.
Weak compliance between the United States and China regarding agreements, such as those in the trade sector, makes it impossible to develop a viable relationship.
A military conflict between the United States and China would result in significant regional and global consequences.
Both the United States and China claim their own intentions are defensive while accusing the other of being aggressive.
Poland signed bilateral treaties with the United States regarding missile defense and committed to excluding Chinese technology from its 5G network.
The European Union shares a broad range of economic, security, and normative interests with the United States, while maintaining a fundamental distance from China.
European Union policy towards China can no longer rely on the transatlantic relationship as it did in the past, as it now exists within a system of coordinates determined by the conflict between the United States and China.
The Chinese government accuses the United States of attempting to suppress China's development and impede its progress.
The US-China relationship functions as a classical security dilemma, where efforts by each side to increase its own security result in increased insecurity for both.
The security dilemma between the United States and China is intensified by the dynamic of a rising power encountering an established power.
China faces a difficult geopolitical environment and lacks the 'insular' security enjoyed by the United States.
China has over 18,000 kilometers of coastline, and its waters border six neighboring states, some of which host US military bases.
The United States government regards China as a 'revisionist power' and a 'rival' seeking to 'shape a world antithetical to US values and interests' in order to displace the United States and restructure the world order.
Donald Trump's uninhibited communication style and emotional political appeal are incompatible with Chinese etiquette and cause disconcertion among the Beijing leadership, particularly when China is involved in United States election campaigns.
The European Union and the United States share an interest within the NATO context in protecting critical infrastructures and defending them against attack.
The European Union is China's largest trade partner, and China is the European Union's second-largest trade partner after the United States.
The European Union experiences direct negative impacts from the United States' policy of punitive tariffs towards China in the aluminium and steel sectors, and indirect impacts through the diversion of trade flows, such as soybeans.
The United States' imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum forced the European Union to implement import quotas for steel products from third countries, which negatively impacted the European car industry due to its reliance on imported steel.
Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, President Xi Jinping is willing to take risks in international relations, including standing up to the United States.
In July 2018, United States President Donald Trump and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker agreed that the European Union would prioritize American trade interests over those of Brazil regarding soybean imports as a concession to Washington.
Euro-American trade disputes hinder the ability of the European Union and the United States to utilize World Trade Organization (WTO) mechanisms to enforce free trade principles, such as intellectual property protections and market access reciprocity, against China.
Both China and the United States are concerned with protecting strategically important routes to safeguard supplies in the event of a crisis.
The European Union reformed its foreign investment control regime to strengthen state intervention rights against market participants, modeling the changes after United States legislation.
China identifies mutual respect regarding territorial integrity and the recognition of different development models as the central value in its relationship with the United States.
The 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, during which the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to force China to back down, served as the trigger for China's military capability-building process and exposed the weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces at that time.
The Trump Administration views Huawei as a 'Trojan horse' sent by a hostile government whose policies are irreconcilable with United States security interests.
China will not be able to match the United States on the high seas and in complex operations involving carrier groups until long after the conclusion of the Chinese military modernisation programme in 2035.
The strategic competition between the United States and China is driven by the model character China claims for itself, despite being framed as "consultation and cooperation."
The United States views China's ongoing naval expansion as a challenge to its role as a world power.
The strategic competition between the United States and China is influenced by a collision of leadership styles, which are determined by the person-centeredness of foreign policy action and formal authority.
The United States considers unhampered navigation of the oceans to be a global common good, similar to the skies, outer space, and cyberspace.
The clash of contrary leadership styles between the United States and China deepens conflicts and erodes trust between the two nations.
The conflict between US and Chinese leadership styles creates potential openings and opportunities for third-party states to gain influence by balancing between the two protagonists.
The United States believes that as China upgrades its armed forces, it is increasingly able to restrict US Navy access to the Asia-Pacific region, thereby challenging America's status as a global power.
The competition of leadership styles between the United States and China hinders the ability to find solutions for global problems such as climate protection and arms control.
The United States views China’s growing military capabilities as a threat to American military bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam.
The Trump Administration withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia partly in the hope that the withdrawal would enable the United States to better counter the Chinese military threat.
Europe has limited ability to contain the status conflicts between the United States and China, which have intensified following the end of the collective leadership model in China and the concentration of power under Xi Jinping.
The European Union's efforts to implement rules for the Digital Single Market face limitations when dealing with China and the United States.
The United States and China categorize status conflicts, such as the Huawei case, within their conflict-laden bilateral relationship model.
Growing mistrust between the United States and Europe is evidenced by Donald Trump's reaction to European Commission fines imposed on Google for competition law violations.
The United States maintains a system of alliances and partnerships with countries that perceive China as a threat.
The multilateral order is in crisis in the early 2020s due to the collision between China's rise as a global power and the "America First" political approach in the United States.
The United States has declared that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China, fall under the bilateral defense agreement between the United States and Japan.
Regulatory philosophies between the United States and the European Union are becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile.
Both the United States and China undermine the global order by flouting multilateral rules and using institutions for displays of power.
The United States views China’s military capabilities in space and cyberspace as an imminent danger.
The United States maintained almost unchallenged dominance of multilateral organizations since the Second World War by leading the establishment of the international order and bearing significant financial burdens.
The 2008 global financial crisis restricted the United States' ability to maintain dominance in central multilateral organizations due to public budget costs.
China uses its nuclear arsenal to deter the United States from military intervention or direct threats to the Chinese mainland.
China fears that US missile defense initiatives and the expansion of conventional US forces threaten its second-strike capability and its nuclear deterrent against the United States.
The global geostrategic center of gravity has shifted toward Asia, specifically China, over the past decade according to the United States and Western perspectives.
The United States maintains intentional ambiguity regarding the principle of mutually assured destruction with respect to China, which increases Chinese threat perceptions.
The growing rivalry between the United States and China is prominently displayed in the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.
The United States uses the nuclear threat from North Korea as justification for establishing missile defenses in North-East Asia.
The United States, supported by G7 states, blocked a significant expansion of China's influence in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The Chinese leadership believes that the United States uses the threat of North Korean missiles as a pretext to install missile defense systems capable of neutralizing Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents.
The European Union should approach China with confidence and avoid joining the United States' strategies of containment or the decoupling of entire economic spaces.
The United States government considers the threat posed by North Korean long-range missiles to be a central security concern.
The United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada accuse China of systematically stealing intellectual property and imposing competition-distorting requirements on Western companies operating in the Chinese market.
China and Russia share a threat perception regarding US, South Korean, and Japanese radar systems, believing that if these systems can track North Korean missiles, they can also track Chinese missiles.
The US Prompt Global Strike programme involves the development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) capable of conducting conventional strikes anywhere in the world within one hour.
Chinese experts suspect that the US Prompt Global Strike programme is actually intended to target China's nuclear arsenal, fearing the United States could launch a preemptive disarming attack in the event of a conflict.
The European Union's collective Asia diplomacy should expand in the areas of rule of law, democracy, and human rights, ideally in coordination with the United States.
Because the World Trade Organization operates under a consensus principle, the United States was able to prevent appointments to the Appellate Body and paralyze its Secretariat.
The European Union lacks binding rules-based dispute resolution mechanisms for more than half of its trade, specifically regarding trade with the United States, China, and India, which differs from the existing WTO framework.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China obstructs vital decision-making processes within the United Nations.
The United States is concerned about the ongoing modernization of the Chinese nuclear arsenal.
China has quadrupled its financial contributions to United Nations organizations over the decade preceding 2020, while the United States has gradually reduced its contributions.
The United States is prioritizing the flexibilization of its own military options over arms control regarding North Korea.
The United States' reliance on flexibilizing its own military options increases the danger of an arms race.
United States businesses historically generated profits from exports to and investments in China while transferring capital, management expertise, and technology to the Chinese market.
China historically accumulated surpluses by exporting to the United States and reinvested those funds into United States treasury bonds, thereby co-financing the American consumption-driven economic boom.
The symbiotic economic relationship between the United States and China, known as "Chimerica," no longer exists.
The rivalry between the United States and China is currently most openly confrontational at the economic level.
The acronym CIA stands for the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States.
The United States withdrew from the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018.
Both the United States and China utilize trade policy as an instrument for technology competition, foreign policy, and security purposes.
The economic advantages derived from cooperation between the United States and China have diminished.
The United States withdrew from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) after nearly seventy years of membership.
China's economic and technological rise has caused economic relations between the United States and China to become less complementary and more competitive.
United States companies face increased difficulty in increasing sales and profits in the Chinese market due to rising administrative restrictions and the closure of service sectors where United States businesses hold competitive advantages.
At the beginning of December 2019, the United States' arrears at the United Nations amounted to more than €950 million.
The United States has become reluctant to transfer technology to China.
Chinese savings no longer significantly contribute to financing the United States domestic economy because China's purchases of United States treasury bonds have declined due to shrinking current account surpluses.
Both China and the United States bypass multilateral organizations and rules, prioritizing bilateral negotiations for resolving pressing conflicts, which harms international organizations.
The power rivalry between the United States and China is increasingly impinging on the interests of the European Union and Germany.
Economic competition between the United States and China has intensified, particularly within the manufacturing sector.
China's rise as the world's leading industrial manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural economic change in the United States and triggered social upheavals in the American "Rust Belt" region.
Unlike the United States, the European Union does not treat China as an arch-enemy in a structural global conflict, nor does it focus its relationship on geostrategic containment and decoupling.
The economic impact of the "China shock" was felt more strongly in the United States than in Germany.
A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that imports from China accounted for approximately 25% of the decline in manufacturing jobs in the United States between 1990 and 2007.
United States and Chinese companies are currently competing for leadership in the development and standard-setting of communications technology and artificial intelligence.
The United States accuses China of unfair competition, specifically citing the closure of markets through protectionist measures, discrimination against foreign suppliers, and direct, arbitrary influence on markets and businesses.
The United States exploits the lack of unity among European Union states regarding foreign policy toward the United States.
If current growth trends continue, China is projected to replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030.
Poland signed bilateral treaties with the United States regarding missile defense and committed to excluding Chinese technology from its 5G network.
The European Union shares broad economic, security, and normative interests with the United States, while maintaining a fundamental distance from China.
Official Chinese representatives argue that US accusations of unfair trade practices are a pretext for a foreign policy of containment against the People's Republic of China.
European policy toward China can no longer rely on the transatlantic relationship as it did in the past, but must instead operate within a new system of coordinates defined by the conflict between the United States and China.
The United States questions whether the Chinese economic model, characterized as a politically authoritarian, interventionist, and mercantilist state capitalism, is compatible with a world trade and finance system based on liberal principles.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is increasingly understood as a system-to-system conflict.
United States trade policy has undergone a paradigmatic and political shift toward protectionism.
The guiding principle for United States trade policy under the Donald Trump administration shifted from free trade to a focus on 'fair and reciprocal' trade, with bilateral trade balances serving as the decisive criterion.
The 'America First' policy of the Donald Trump administration prioritizes United States interests over obligations derived from international treaties and multilateral rules, often utilizing unilateral protectionist measures.
The Donald Trump administration views the protection of national security as a primary driver of trade policy, necessitating that United States strategic industries possess supply chains independent of China.
The United States National Security Strategy published in December 2017 identifies China's trade and economic policies as a central foreign policy and security challenge and threat to the United States.
The United States Trade Representative's investigation report under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, published in March 2018, characterizes China's industrial and technology policy as 'unfair and inequitable'.
The Donald Trump administration imposed incremental and escalating extraordinary tariffs of up to 25 percent on approximately half of United States imports from China.
The United States government tightened state controls on foreign direct investment in security-relevant sectors through administrative measures and legislation, resulting in a significant decline in Chinese investment in the United States.
The United States Department of Commerce implemented controls on the export and licensing of security-relevant technologies to China.
The United States government has restricted the use of specific Chinese telecommunications and visual surveillance products in the area of public procurement.
The United States Department of Commerce’s 'Entity List' prohibits listed Chinese businesses and individuals from making purchases in the United States or from US companies.
The European Union and the United States share an interest within the NATO context in protecting and defending critical infrastructures against attacks.
The United States government added the Chinese technology supplier Huawei to the Entity List in mid-May 2019.
China has maintained a comparatively restrained response to US trade measures, likely to avoid further economic escalation that would harm the Chinese economy.
China imposed reciprocal retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States while simultaneously reducing tariffs on imports from third-party states, which disadvantages US imports.
Chinese businesses are actively seeking suppliers capable of substituting imports from the United States.
The European Union shares many of the United States' criticisms regarding unfair Chinese competition practices.
Disagreements between the European Union and the United States regarding trade questions and World Trade Organization (WTO) principles complicate the formation of a unified transatlantic policy toward Beijing.
In response to Huawei's inclusion on the US Entity List, the Chinese government announced it would create an 'Unreliable Entities List' of businesses, organizations, and individuals that comply with US boycotts, subjecting them to disadvantages in the Chinese market.
The European Union is China's largest trade partner, and China is the European Union's second-largest trade partner, following the United States.
Chinese consumers have launched campaigns calling for boycotts of American goods.
On 13 December 2019, the United States and China agreed on a partial Phase One trade agreement in which both sides renounced announced increases in special tariffs.
Under the Phase One agreement, China promised additional imports from the United States amounting to $200 billion for the years 2020 and 2021.
The European Union experiences direct and indirect negative impacts from the United States' policy of punitive tariffs against China, specifically regarding aluminum and steel directly, and diverted trade flows such as soybeans indirectly.
The United States imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium, which forced the European Union to introduce import quotas for steel products from third countries.
The Sino-American trade, economic, and technology conflict has caused economic harm to both the United States and China, as well as third-party nations.
The United States and China imposed tit-for-tat tariffs, which reduced bilateral trade and increased import costs, leading importers to switch to alternative suppliers like Vietnam, Mexico, and the European Union.
The United States and China have damaged the World Trade Organization (WTO); China by disregarding non-discrimination and transparency principles, and the United States by violating core treaty terms and imposing punitive tariffs.
The United States and China may be tempted to stimulate their domestic economies through currency devaluation if economic growth declines or a recession develops.
The struggle over techno-political spheres of influence may lead the United States to impose further sanctions and supplier boycotts against Chinese companies, potentially forcing third-party companies to choose between US and Chinese business standards.
Washington is exploring methods to exclude Chinese businesses from United States financial markets and to impose financial sanctions against specific Chinese companies and individuals.
The Trump Administration regards Huawei as a Trojan horse sent by a hostile government whose policies are irreconcilable with United States security interests.
The European Union should maintain an independent position in trade disputes between the United States and China to uphold the principles of the European Single Market, such as non-discrimination and rules-orientation.
Donald Trump described EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager as a "tax lady [who] hates the US" in response to the European Commission imposing fines on Google for violations of European competition law.
The United States and China both view technological superiority as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving economic and military strength and maintaining their respective positions in world politics.
The United States currently maintains the leading position in numerous technological areas.
Peter Rudolf authored the SWP Research Paper 'The Sino-American World Conflict', which examines the strategic conflict between the United States and China.
The emergence of a Chinese technopolitical sphere of influence creates new political challenges for states that are technologically dependent on the United States or China.
The United States has treated technological superiority as an important element of national security since the 1940s.
The United States identified the Soviet Union as its greatest technological threat starting in the 1940s, followed by the rapid rise of the Japanese computer industry in the 1980s.
The European Union, as the world's largest internal market, should avoid joining the United States' strategy of containment or the decoupling of entire economic spaces in its approach to China.
During the first wave of digitization in the 1990s, the United States secured a dominant role in many core technologies, causing numerous states and businesses to become dependent on American market leaders.
China is pursuing a twofold goal of becoming independent from the United States in core digital technologies and subsequently disseminating its own technologies globally.
China utilizes the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative as a primary instrument to create a technopolitical sphere of influence that serves as a counterweight to the United States.
The United States' sphere of influence is designed to enable the maximum number of states and companies to utilize the products and services of American companies.
The United States generally opens its markets to foreign firms, though it employs targeted instruments to restrict foreign investment and control exports.
The United States and China have overlapping spheres of influence, particularly in Europe, where services from both nations are present.
The European Union should expand its collective Asia diplomacy in the fields of rule of law, democracy, and human rights, ideally in coordination with the United States.
The future development of US and Chinese spheres of influence depends on domestic factors and the future relationship between the two states, specifically whether they view their relationship as a zero-sum game.
Alastair I. Johnston's 2019 article, 'The Failures of the Failure of Engagement with China', challenges the prevailing United States interpretation that engagement with China has failed.
The German government, in collaboration with France, the European Commission, and Eurozone states, should explore a transatlantic trade agreement to remove industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers to increase bargaining power against Beijing regarding investment protection agreements.
Central actors like the United States and China can leverage technological dependencies to exert political and economic influence over dependent states and businesses.
Social networks like Facebook (US-based) and WeChat (China-based) are influenced by the values and legal frameworks of their respective home countries, particularly regarding freedom of expression and personal data protection.
On December 14, 2018, the New York Times reported that United States lawmakers were pressuring President Donald Trump to take action against China regarding the detention of Uighurs.
Marco Overhaus and Michael Paul analyze the security dimension of the Sino-American conflict in their contribution to the volume 'Strategic Rivalry between United States and China'.
The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States is abbreviated as CIA.
On December 25, 2019, the Global Times reported that experts dismissed negative media coverage regarding the 'Phase One' trade deal between the United States and China.
Major internet service providers including Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are based in the United States, which often results in the storage of non-US customer data in US data centers.
Edward Snowden revealed that US intelligence services exploit the fact that most of the world’s internet communication passes through servers and fiber-optic cables located in the United States to conduct eavesdropping.
US security agencies can access the cloud data of global enterprises stored in US-based data centers under court orders.
Political conflicts arise when European law enforcement authorities seek access to data stored in the United States for their investigations.
China, Russia, and the European Union are pursuing data localization initiatives to repatriate their citizens' data from the United States as a step toward regaining control.
The Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans grant the United States a level of security that can only be threatened by a rival of equal strength located on the opposite side of the Atlantic or Pacific.
The United States demonstrated the ability to disrupt production processes within digital enterprises by restricting exports to Huawei, thereby interrupting global supply chains.
No other state is expected to match the technological prowess of the United States and China in the foreseeable future.
The United States and China are both attempting to expand their technopolitical influence, which increases economic pressure and reduces political space for technologically dependent states.
Third-party states have the option to align fully with either the United States or China, relying exclusively on the technologies of that specific sphere of influence.
The "Five Eyes" alliance, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, cooperates on technological methods of espionage.
Third-party states have the option to utilize existing interdependencies by selectively relying on technologies from both the United States and China.
Shahryar Pasandideh, in his 2019 article 'The End of the INF Treaty and the US-China Military Balance', raises the question of where the United States could station ground-launched intermediate-range missiles on the territory of alliance partners and which targets in China could be reached from those locations.
Europe is likely to pursue a strategy of relying on technologies from both the United States and China, but requires a review of its dependencies to make this bi-directional interdependence truly strategic.
Europe is largely dependent on the United States and China for core digital technologies.
The United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies.
Michael Paul and Elisabeth Suh authored the SWP Comment 32/2017 titled 'North Korea’s Nuclear-Armed Missiles: Options for the US and its Allies' in August 2017.
The European Union could utilize its expertise in non-digital economic sectors as a bargaining chip during times of escalating political conflict with the United States and China.
C. Fred Bergsten published the article 'China and the United States: The Contest for Global Economic Leadership' in the journal China and World Economy in 2018.
The United States and China are exerting strong pressure on third states, such as Germany, regarding the use of Huawei technology.
Feng Lu published the article 'China-US Trade Disputes in 2018: An Overview' in the journal China and World Economy in 2018.
Chi Hung Kwan published the article 'The China-US Trade War: Deep-Rooted Causes, Shifting Focus and Uncertain Prospects' in the Asian Economic Policy Review in 2019, which references the People's Daily from 2018.
C. Fred Bergsten authored the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) Policy Brief 18–21 titled 'China and the United States: Trade Conflict and Systemic Competition' in October 2018.
Russia has attempted to become more autonomous from the United States by establishing domestic equivalents to US services, such as Yandex for Google and vKontakte for Facebook.
Clemens Fuest authored the ifo Standpunkt 200 titled 'Der dritte Systemwettbewerb' (The Third System Competition) in 2018, which provides a European perspective on the US-China trade conflict.
Russia has planned to place its entire internet infrastructure under state control to escape dependency on the United States.
Rana Foroohar argued in the Financial Times that globalized business is a security issue for the United States.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current conflict of values, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb published a timeline and guide regarding the trade war between the United States and China.
Xue Li questioned whether China and the United States are rivals or enemies in an article published in the Global Times on August 20, 2019.
The United States administration under President Donald Trump shifted away from the post-1945 foreign policy tradition of acting as the guardian of a liberal world order, prioritizing the defense of American interests instead.
The Global Times reported on October 13, 2019, that the impeachment probe against Donald Trump was impacting US politics.
The United States and Western nations are concerned about losing their interpretative dominance of international politics and the stability of multilateral institutions established in the liberal spirit of the West.
The United States aims to preserve its global supremacy in power politics, including in the sphere of soft power.
An Gang argued that it was time for China to forge a new strategy toward the United States in an article for China-US Focus on June 4, 2019.
Alastair I. Johnston argues in 'The Failures of the “Failure of Engagement” with China' that while the interpretation of 'failed engagement' with China predominates in the United States, alternative perspectives exist.
A new bipartisan consensus on China policy has emerged in the United States, as discussed by David Shambaugh, Zack Cooper, Annie Kowalewski, Richard C. Bush, and Ryan Hass.
United States lawmakers are pushing President Donald Trump to take action against China regarding the detention of Uighurs.
Majid Sattar reported on concerns regarding a potential recession and the status of free traders in the United States in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
Larry Diamond and Orville Schell edited a report titled 'China’s Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance' for the Hoover Institution, which details new sensitivities regarding Chinese influence activities in the United States.
State-controlled media in China characterizes Western democracies, particularly the United States, as dysfunctional while promoting China's own economic, social, and political progress.
The United States derives a level of security from the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans that can only be threatened by a rival of equal strength located on the opposite side of the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, according to Michael Paul's 2017 analysis.
Gabriel B. Collins authored the chapter 'China’s Dependence on the Global Maritime Commons' in the 2010 book 'China, the United States, and 21st Century Seapower.'
The United States faces a strategic question regarding which alliance partner territories could host ground-launched intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching targets in China.
C. Fred Bergsten argues that the United States and China are engaged in a contest for global economic leadership.
Feng Lu provided an overview of the trade disputes between China and the United States that occurred in 2018.
A US-led diplomatic campaign successfully blocked China's attempt to lead the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in early 2020, resulting in the election of a Singaporean national as head of the organization.
The United States is consistently undermining the normative foundations of the liberal order through its actions both domestically and internationally.
C. Fred Bergsten characterizes the relationship between China and the United States as one of trade conflict and systemic competition.
Rana Foroohar argues that globalized business is a US security issue in her article 'Globalised Business Is a US Security Issue', published in the Financial Times on 16 July 2018.
The strong personalization of politics in the era of Xi Jinping and Donald Trump shapes relations between China and the United States.
In the United States, President Donald Trump minimized the influence of the State Department, while in China, the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping took control of foreign policy decisions.
Chad P. Bown, Eujn Jung, and Eva Zhang published 'Trump Has Gotten China to Lower Its Tariffs, Just toward Everyone Else' on 12 June 2019, which analyzes China's tariff adjustments toward countries other than the United States.
The United States government approved a multi-billion dollar missile defense deal with Poland in December 2017.
Poland decided to pursue a separate path regarding 5G technology implementation in cooperation with the United States.
Mario Daniels published 'Von ‘Paperclip’ zu CoCom: Die Herausbildung einer neuen US-Technologie- und Wissenspolitik in der Frühzeit des Kalten Krieges (1941–1951)' in 2013, which examines the development of US technology and knowledge policy during the early Cold War.
Weak compliance between the United States and China regarding the implementation of agreements, such as in the trade sector, makes it impossible to develop a viable relationship.
Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping is willing to take risks in international relations, including standing up to the United States, as part of a clear change in foreign policy course.
China under Xi Jinping prioritizes mutual respect in its relationship with the United States, specifically regarding territorial integrity and the recognition of different development models.
Donald Trump views good personal relations as a necessary precondition for addressing the bilateral agenda between the United States and China.
China frames its strategic competition with the United States as 'consultation and cooperation' while simultaneously promoting its own model of governance.
The clash between the leadership styles of the United States and China erodes trust between the two nations and complicates the resolution of global issues like climate protection and arms control.
The European Union has limited ability to bilaterally contain status conflicts between the United States and China, which have intensified following the end of the collective leadership model in China and the concentration of power under Xi Jinping.
The United States and China frequently categorize status conflicts, such as the Huawei case, within their broader, conflict-laden bilateral relationship model.
The multilateral order is in crisis as China's rise as a global power collides with the 'America First' political approach in the United States.
A US-led diplomatic campaign successfully blocked China's attempt to lead the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in early 2020.
Daren Tang, a national of Singapore and the US-backed candidate, was elected head of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) by a large majority in early March 2020.
The United States and China both undermine the global order by flouting multilateral rules and using institutions to display power.
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, American decision-makers became increasingly concerned that China's economic success would create a geopolitical challenge.
The United States maintained almost unchallenged dominance of multilateral organizations from the end of the Second World War until the 2008 financial crisis.
The 2008 financial crisis restricted the United States' ability to maintain dominance in central multilateral organizations due to public budget constraints.
The rivalry between the United States and China is prominently displayed in the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.
A conflict over global decision-making participation between the United States and China dates back to the early 2000s, when China began demanding a larger say in Bretton Woods institutions commensurate with its economic importance.
The United States, supported by G7 states, blocked a significant expansion of China's influence in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Poland is pursuing a separate path regarding 5G technology implementation in cooperation with the United States, as reported on September 3, 2019.
The Chinese political elite believes the United States is attempting to prevent the further expansion of Chinese influence.
The volume published by the SWP examines the repercussions of US-China rivalry on international institutions and on Europe, as well as the influence of both the United States and China on other states, regions, and societies.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Gudrun Wacker report that from the Chinese perspective, the United States will never voluntarily cede significant international influence to China.
The United States views China as a revisionist power with the long-term goal of achieving global supremacy.
Political debate within the United States regarding China is primarily focused on the methods of conducting the conflict rather than the nature of the rivalry itself.
The escalation of hard security challenges between the United States and China has led to the emergence of a classical security dilemma.
The United States perceives China's growing military capabilities as a threat to U.S. military bases in the Pacific, the U.S. system of partnerships and alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Economic competition and conflicts over trade and financial policy between the United States and China predate the protectionist policies adopted by the United States under President Donald Trump.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Laura von Daniels argue that the U.S.-China trade conflict is linked to questions of world order that are vital from a European perspective, including the future of binding multilateral trade rules and institutions.
Trade and economic conflicts between the United States and China have domestic political relevance in both nations, possessing mobilising potential that is not solely dependent on the impact of global developments on specific employment sectors.
Politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States influenced public opinion regarding China prior to the election of Donald Trump.
Hanns Günther Hilpert argues that the material benefits of economic cooperation between the United States and China have declined compared to the period between 1990 and 2015.
Bilateral trade between the United States and China no longer functions as a stabilizing factor capable of ameliorating political conflicts.
Both Republicans and Democrats in the United States Congress criticize the Trump Administration's use of tariff threats, arguing that these measures alienate allies in Europe and Asia and weaken the United States' position against Beijing.
Trade conflicts between the United States and China are politically instrumentalized, though they represent the most easily resolvable aspects of the broader strategic rivalry.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China will continue to influence international politics for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether Washington and Beijing resolve trade disputes or conclude a trade agreement before the upcoming US presidential elections.
The United States private sector and both major political parties are concerned about the negative economic impacts of the trade conflict with China, particularly regarding American consumers and the agricultural sector.
The technological dimension of the US-China rivalry is deeper than trade disputes and will persist even if trade issues are resolved.
Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that the trade conflict with China could harm the United States.
Technological competition between the United States and China is driven by security concerns, which has resulted in restricted exchange and cooperation in the technological sphere.
Concerns exist in the United States regarding Chinese influence spreading through Confucius Institutes and Chinese investments in think-tanks, universities, media, and businesses.
The competition between the United States and China involves a systemic opposition regarding internal order, specifically the relationship between state and society, and between government and governed.
Hilpert identifies a global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms as a key dimension of the US-China rivalry.
Concerns regarding Chinese influence in the United States are associated with fears of espionage.
Internal political debates in regions like Europe are codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China.
The political debate within the United States regarding China is characterized by a fear of China's rise and the possibility of the United States being overtaken.
Some observers argue that fears of Beijing replacing the United States as the global leader are exaggerated and that it is unclear if Beijing views this goal as necessary or feasible.
German and European interests would benefit if US critics of a one-sidedly confrontative China policy gained more influence in Washington, as a balanced US policy would reduce pressure on European capitals to choose between the United States and China.
Any military conflict between the United States and China would have enormous regional and global impacts.
The US Administration and Congress view China as a 'revisionist power' that seeks to challenge the dominance of the United States and undermine the rules-based international order.
Beijing accuses the United States of attempting to suppress China and impede its progress.
The relationship between the United States and China exhibits characteristics of a classical security dilemma, where efforts to increase security generate insecurity for both sides, exacerbated by the dynamic of a rising power encountering an established one.
The US-China rivalry has global consequences, affecting relationships with other powers, regional dynamics in Europe, and the operations of international organizations like the G20 and the United Nations.
Both the United States and China have violated the rules of the World Trade Organization.
China's waters adjoin those of six neighboring states, some of which host US military bases.
China views its geopolitical environment as one of the most difficult in the world, noting it lacks the 'insular' security enjoyed by the United States.
The Trump administration withdrew the United States from the UN Human Rights Council.
The European Union opposes a 'decoupling' strategy that would involve a broad severing of technological and economic ties with China, a strategy discussed and partially prepared by the United States.
The European Union rejects the option of equidistance between China and the United States due to significant differences regarding values, political systems, and the rules-based international order.
The ties binding the Euro-American community of values and security are closer than the relationships of either the United States or European states to any other international partner.
European states should increase their engagement in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to fill gaps created by the withdrawal or disinterest of the United States administration.
Peter Rudolf asserts that the strategic rivalry between the United States and China risks escalating into a multi-layered world conflict with significant economic and military dangers.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China is beginning to structure international relations and may lead to a new 'geo-economic world order'.
Concerns regarding who benefits more from economic exchange and the security implications of economic interdependence have become increasingly important in the relationship between the United States and China.
If economic and security interests between the United States and China are re-evaluated, the level of global integration could decline to a point that resembles deglobalization.
Both China and the United States are concerned with protecting strategically important routes to safeguard supplies in the event of a crisis.
In the United States, the rise of China is widely perceived as a threat to the dominant position of the United States in the international system.
China is the only country with the potential to threaten the status of the United States.
The 'Thucydides Trap' is an interpretive framework discussed in the United States and China that highlights the risks of power transitions and the potential for regional conflicts to coalesce into a global hegemonic conflict.
The power transition theory is viewed by some as problematic and its explanatory value is contested, yet it influences perceptions in both the United States and China.
The 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, during which the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to force China to back down, served as the trigger for China's military capability-building process.
China's growing power has caused American concerns regarding the United States' status as the sole international superpower.
China's rise threatens the United States' status as the leading power and the associated material privileges and economic advantages.
If China acquires dominant global influence, the United States would lose its ability to guarantee its current level of security and prosperity.
China will not be able to match the United States on the high seas and in complex operations involving carrier groups until long after the conclusion of the Chinese military modernisation programme in 2035.
The competition for influence between the United States and China is combined with an ideological antagonism.
The United States views China's ongoing naval expansion as a challenge to its role as a world power.
The United States did not perceive China as an ideological antagonist as long as China's rise was not viewed as a global challenge and there was hope for China's eventual liberalization.
The United States considers unhampered navigation of the oceans a global common good, comparable to the skies, outer space, and cyberspace.
The systemic conflict between the United States and China is increasingly interpreted by the American side as a clash between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism.
Highlighting ideological conflict between the United States and China may be used to mobilize domestic support in the United States for a power clash that incurs economic costs.
The United States views China's increasing military capabilities as a threat because they may allow China to close down the US Navy's access to the Asia-Pacific region.
The ideological difference between the United States and China intensifies threat perceptions and strengthens the security dilemma between the two nations.
The United States views China's growing military capabilities as a threat to its military bases in Japan, South Korea, and the US territory of Guam.
Since the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96, the United States and China have viewed each other as potential military adversaries and have aligned their military planning accordingly.
The United States and China both perceive themselves as defensive, peaceful powers while suspecting the other of having aggressive, offensive intentions, which creates a security dilemma.
The relationship between the United States and China is a complex strategic rivalry because they are potential military adversaries rather than merely systemic antagonists competing over status.
The United States believes that China is seeking to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in East Asia.
In the South China Sea, the United States' insistence on unhindered access and freedom of navigation conflicts with China's efforts to create a security zone and counter American intervention capabilities.
China is using the South China Sea as a protected bastion for nuclear-armed submarines to safeguard its second-strike capability against the United States.
The United States government is convinced that China's growing global economic and political presence comes at the expense of the United States.
The United States maintains a system of alliances and partnerships with countries that perceive China as a threat.
The United States is applying pressure and incentives to dissuade other states from expanding their economic relations with China.
The United States' campaign against Huawei reflects a shift away from positive-sum logic in economic relations with China.
The United States considers the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to be covered by the US-Japan bilateral defense agreement.
Historically, the United States prioritized economic logic in relations with China as long as it did not fear China as a strategic rival, focusing on absolute gains rather than relative benefits.
The United States previously operated under the expectation that economic interdependence with China would promote cooperation and stabilize peace.
Under the Trump administration, security logic replaced economic logic in US-China relations due to concerns about relative gains and the impact of economic interdependence on military technological superiority.
A consolidated strategic rivalry between the United States and China could lead to deglobalization and the creation of two parallel international orders, one dominated by the United States and the other by China.
The United States views China's developing military capabilities in space and cyberspace as an imminent danger.
China views its nuclear weapons as symbols of great power status and as a deterrent against military intervention or threats from the United States.
The US-China conflict forces Germany and the European Union to determine the extent and terms of their support for the United States against China.
The strategic rivalry with China is expected to shape US foreign policy regardless of whether Donald Trump was reelected or a Democrat assumed the presidency in January 2021.
China fears that US missile defense initiatives and conventional force expansion threaten its second-strike capability and nuclear deterrent.
A strong US focus on the Indo-Pacific and competition with China may lead the United States to treat crises in Europe and the European periphery as secondary priorities.
The United States maintains ambiguity regarding the principle of mutually assured destruction in relation to China.
Washington is likely to increase pressure on its allies to take a clear position and side with the United States in the US-China conflict.
The power of the United States is a source of both fascination and insecurity for China's political elites.
The United States uses the nuclear threat from North Korea as justification for deploying missile defenses in North-East Asia.
The Chinese leadership believes that United States assertions regarding North Korean missiles are a pretext to install missile defense systems capable of neutralizing Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents.
The Thucydides Trap, a historical process described by Thucydides where the rise of Athens made war with Sparta inevitable, is considered a real risk in the current relationship between China and the United States.
North Korea's successful tests of long-range missiles have not altered the Chinese assessment that US missile defense systems are primarily aimed at China and Russia.
Beijing views the United States as a frustrated power seeking to preserve its own supremacy by geopolitically containing China and hindering its economic, technological, and military development.
China's threat analysis centers on the expandability of the US missile defense system, specifically regarding flexibly deployable Aegis vessels and land-based systems.
Beijing and Moscow share a threat perception regarding US, South Korean, and Japanese radar systems, which serves as a foundation for the 'comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination' between China and Russia.
Assessing how the United States is perceived in China is difficult because official statements and public media are closely controlled, and academic publications are subject to self-censorship or intended to convey specific political messages.
Chinese views of the United States are ambivalent; there is respect and admiration for American innovation, economic strength, universities, military capabilities, and political system, but also mistrust due to historical negative experiences.
The US Prompt Global Strike program proposes the development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) capable of conducting conventional strikes anywhere in the world within an hour.
The reputation of the West in China has been eroded by the global financial crisis, United States military interventions in the Middle East, and the political style of Donald Trump.
Chinese experts suspect that the US Prompt Global Strike program's hypersonic glide vehicles are intended to target China's nuclear arsenal rather than North Korea's air defenses.
China characterizes itself as an advocate for emerging economies and developing countries rather than as a systemic adversary of the United States and the West.
Chinese leadership views the United States as the paradigm for modernization and believes China must reduce the development gap with the United States to create a fairer world.
Beijing's narrative of a rising China and a declining America is tempered by its self-assessment regarding the need to modernize and catch up to the United States.
Beijing views the United States with mistrust, suspecting the U.S. of attempting to corrupt and transform China through 'peaceful evolution,' defined as internal infiltration and subversion.
The Chinese government's fears of U.S.-led subversion were reinforced in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square massacre and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union.
Chinese discourse consistently portrays the United States as an obstacle to China's goal of restoring its historical greatness.
The United States is prioritizing the flexibilization of its own military options over arms control in response to North Korea's development of long-range nuclear missiles, which increases the danger of an arms race.
Chinese leaders concluded after the collapse of the Soviet Union that they must avoid open competition with the United States, including arms races or direct confrontation.
Historically, Sino-American economic and finance relations acted as a stabilizing factor in the bilateral relationship, providing mutual benefits through US business profits from the Chinese market and China's accumulation of surpluses reinvested in US treasury bonds.
In response to perceived U.S. containment efforts, Chinese leadership adopted rhetoric of 'win-win' cooperation and the concept of a 'new type of great power relations' based on mutual respect for core national interests.
While some Chinese analysts view the relationship between rising and declining powers as a zero-sum game, they maintain that both the Chinese and U.S. governments have a responsibility to prevent conflict.
The symbiotic economic relationship between the United States and China, sometimes referred to as 'Chimerica', no longer exists.
Beijing's fear that the United States seeks regime change in China intensified following the 'colour revolutions' of the 2000s and the 2011 Arab Spring.
Both the United States and China are currently instrumentalizing trade policy for technology competition, foreign policy, and security purposes.
Chinese observers question whether the United States would accept China's rise and leadership in technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G if China were a Western-style democracy.
Chinese discourse questions whether the United States' primary interest is maintaining American supremacy or if the U.S. would cede influence in specific areas if China underwent fundamental democratic change.
Economic relations between the United States and China have shifted from cooperation to confrontation due to objective economic causes, status competition in the context of great power rivalry, and increasingly critical perceptions on both sides.
US companies face increasing difficulty in increasing sales and profits in the Chinese market due to rising administrative restrictions and the continued closure of service branches where US businesses possess competitive advantages.
Chinese leadership believes the Western liberal system remains a manifestation of American hegemony.
The United States has become reluctant to transfer technology to China.
Beijing does not expect the United States to concede the international voice that China's economic and political weight would merit.
Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States and the West will never voluntarily grant China greater influence at the international level.
Chinese savings have ceased to contribute significantly to financing the United States' domestic economy because China's purchases of US treasury bonds have fallen following shrinking current account surpluses.
In 2005, then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick demanded that China act as a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system.
The United States accuses China of engaging in unfair competition.
China's rise as the world's foremost industrial manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural change in the United States and triggered social upheavals in America's 'Rust Belt' regions and sectors.
Donald Trump was elected US President in 2016.
The impact of the 'China shock' on manufacturing was felt more strongly in the United States than in Germany.
A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that imports from China accounted for approximately 25% of the decline in manufacturing jobs in the United States between 1990 and 2007.
The Chinese state-affiliated newspaper Global Times asserts that the United States has adopted a policy of containment against China, which is manifested in the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.
The Global Times asserts that China can no longer be contained by the United States and that any attempt to do so would harm the United States more than it would harm China.
The Global Times describes the prospect of a new Cold War between the United States and China as "unrealistic."
Chinese official and published statements suggest that both the United States and China need to seek compromise in their economic disputes to avoid mutual harm.
If current growth trends continue, China is projected to replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030.
Official Chinese representatives argue that US accusations of unfair trade practices are a pretext for a foreign policy of containment against China.
Chinese observers interpret the United States' involvement in Hong Kong as an attempt to weaken the Chinese political system and achieve regime change in Beijing, citing that China's territorial integrity is at stake.
One camp of Chinese America analysts hopes that the United States and China will return to pragmatic and constructive relations, either through a trade agreement with President Donald Trump or through his defeat in the next election.
The United States questions whether the Chinese economic model, characterized as a politically authoritarian, interventionist, and mercantilist state capitalism, is compatible with a world trade and finance system based on liberal principles.
A camp of Chinese America analysts believes that the shift in United States policy towards China is permanent and structural, driven by a bipartisan consensus in the United States that will determine the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future.
Chinese observers note that the United States' technology boycott could accelerate China's efforts to achieve technological autonomy.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is understood as a system-to-system conflict.
China views Europe as useful and as presenting little obstacle to its own development, in contrast to the United States.
United States trade policy has undergone a paradigmatic and political shift toward protectionism.
The guiding principle for United States trade policy under the Donald Trump administration shifted from free trade to a focus on 'fair and reciprocal' trade, with bilateral trade balances serving as the decisive criterion.
United States President Donald Trump prioritizes United States interests over obligations from international treaties and multilateral rules under the 'America First' policy.
The United States administration believes that protecting national interests requires United States strategic industries to possess supply chains that are independent of China.
The United States perceives China's activities in the South China Sea as aggressive, views its trade practices as mercantilist, and observes a hardening of authoritarian tendencies in China.
The United States believes that the engagement policy pursued since Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to Beijing has failed.
The United States uses tariffs, investment controls, and supplier boycotts as trade policy instruments to achieve economic decoupling from China.
In 2005, then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick formulated the hope that China would become a "responsible stakeholder," a hope that is now considered dashed by the Washington consensus.
The United States increasingly views the rise of China as a danger to its own dominant position in the international system and as a global challenge.
A fundamental China-critical mood has consolidated within the United States political system in recent years due to multiple converging factors.
The Trump administration imposed incremental and escalating extraordinary tariffs of up to 25 percent on approximately half of United States imports from China.
China's rise and its increased power and influence across various policy areas and regions have strengthened fears and rejection within the United States.
The United States government tightened state controls on foreign direct investment in security-relevant sectors using administrative measures and legislation, resulting in a significant decline in Chinese investment in the United States.
Critics outside the Trump administration blame China for deindustrialization and other economic and social problems in the United States, though these issues are also attributed to policy failures and technological change.
The United States Department of Commerce’s 'Entity List' prohibits listed Chinese businesses and individuals from making purchases in the United States or from US companies.
Human rights groups in the United States feel their concerns regarding China are validated by Beijing's expansion of its surveillance state and the construction of reeducation camps in the Xinjiang autonomous region.
The Chinese government has maintained a restrained response to US trade measures to avoid economic harm from further escalation.
The Chinese government imposed reciprocal retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States.
The security dimension of the rivalry between the United States and China began attracting growing attention by the early 2000s.
The Chinese government unilaterally reduced tariffs on imports from third-party countries, which disadvantages imports from the United States.
The primary security concern regarding China has shifted from the potential intimidation of United States allies in the region, such as South Korea and Japan, to a perceived global security threat.
The perceived convergence of economic and security components in the rivalry between the United States and China has contributed to the view of China as a global security threat.
Large segments of the United States private sector criticize Chinese economic practices, specifically citing state subsidies for Chinese firms, forced technology transfer from foreign companies, and the theft of intellectual property.
The United States and China agreed to a partial Phase One trade agreement on December 13, 2019.
United States producers of steel and aluminium support the protectionist tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration against China due to intense competition.
Under the Phase One trade agreement, the United States and China renounced announced special tariff increases, and China committed to purchasing $200 billion in additional US imports during 2020 and 2021.
United States companies in the retail, farm, car-making, and IT and communications sectors oppose trade sanctions against China because they are negatively affected by import tariffs on semi-finished products or counter-tariffs.
Washington regards China as a threat to United States and Western interests in regions outside the Indo-Pacific, specifically in Africa, the Middle East, and the Arctic.
It is unlikely that the United States and China will resolve outstanding trade disputes in a second partial agreement before the US presidential elections.
Even if a second trade agreement occurs, the fundamental political conflict between the United States and China will likely persist, leaving the possibility of further trade policy escalation.
China's commitment to increase imports from the United States is likely to reduce imports from other regions like Brazil, the European Union, and Japan, potentially causing new trade controversies.
Politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States influenced public opinion regarding China prior to the election of Donald Trump.
The Sino-American trade, economic, and technology conflict has caused economic harm to both the United States and China, as well as to third-party nations.
The tit-for-tat extraordinary tariffs imposed by the United States and China have resulted in significant reductions in bilateral trade and increased costs for imports.
The United States private sector and both major political parties are concerned about the negative economic repercussions of the trade conflict with China, specifically regarding the impact on American consumers and the agricultural sector.
Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that the trade conflict with China could harm the United States.
Concerns in the United States regarding Chinese influence extend beyond security and economic policy to include activities involving Confucius Institutes and Chinese investments in think-tanks, universities, media, and business.
Concerns regarding Chinese influence in the United States are associated with fears of espionage.
The United States has damaged the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the multilateral trading system through repeated violations of core treaty terms and the imposition of punitive tariffs.
Foreign policy specialists and China experts in the United States who advocate against a purely confrontational policy toward China are currently marginalized in the political discourse.
Some observers argue that the fear of Beijing replacing the United States as the global leader is exaggerated and that it is unclear if Beijing views this goal as necessary or feasible.
A US China policy that balances cooperative and confrontative approaches would reduce the pressure on Berlin and other European capitals to choose between the United States and China.
The conflict between the United States and China is causing a retreat in world trade and the global division of labor, negatively impacting global production, income, and innovation.
The trade practices of the United States and China, along with the resulting welfare losses, negatively affect Germany and the European Union.
The relationship between the United States and China exhibits characteristics of a classical security dilemma, where each side's striving for greater security generates more insecurity on both sides, exacerbated by the constellation of a rising power encountering an established one.
Both China and the United States have threatened the European Union and European businesses with disadvantages if they do not align with their respective demands.
The author argues that the European Union should maintain an independent position in trade disputes and defend rules-based multilateralism, despite security reasons preventing equidistance between the United States and China.
The author argues that if the European Union takes a side in the United States-China conflict, it would lose trade policy credibility, weaken its position as an honest broker, and become a junior partner.
The author argues that the European Union must ensure future United States-China trade agreements do not create discriminatory disadvantages for the European Union.
The author argues the European Union must demand adequate concessions in bilateral talks with the United States regarding trade and tariffs, and with China regarding investment.
The United States and China both consider technological superiority to be a fundamental prerequisite for their economic and military strength and their standing in world politics.
The United States currently holds the leading position in numerous areas of technology.
Both China and the United States are concerned with protecting strategically important routes to safeguard supplies in the event of a crisis.
States that are technologically dependent on the United States or China face new political challenges due to the emergence of technopolitical spheres of influence.
The 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, during which the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to force China to back down, served as the trigger for China's military capability-building process.
The United States has treated technological superiority as an important element of national security since the 1940s.
China is not expected to match the United States on the high seas and in complex operations involving carrier groups until long after the conclusion of the Chinese military modernisation programme in 2035.
The United States identified the Soviet Union as its greatest technological threat initially, followed by the rapid rise of the Japanese computer industry in the 1980s.
The United States has historically dominated the world's oceans to secure the freedom of the seas, similar to the role previously held by Great Britain.
During the first wave of digitization in the 1990s, the United States secured a dominant role in many core technologies, leading to widespread dependency on American market leaders.
China is currently pursuing a twofold goal: first, to become independent from the United States in core digital technologies, and second, to disseminate its own technologies globally.
The United States relies on oceans and sea routes for economic strength, as they account for more than 90 percent of its long-distance international trade and secure supplies of raw materials and industrial products.
The United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada accuse China of systematically stealing intellectual property and imposing competition-distorting requirements on Western companies operating in the Chinese market.
The Trump Administration shifted US policy by demanding that China implement economic reforms that would have fundamentally altered its economic model, contrasting with the Obama Administration's approach of criticizing China's neo-mercantilist policies while maintaining multilateral rules.
The Trump Administration weakened the World Trade Organization (WTO) by imposing unilateral import tariffs on steel and aluminum and threatening further protectionist tariffs, thereby overriding agreed-upon multilateral rules.
The Trump Administration blocked a joint initiative by the European Union, Canada, and Norway to establish an interim appeal arbitration arrangement for the World Trade Organization without United States participation.
The European Union lacks binding rules-based dispute resolution mechanisms for more than half of its trade, specifically regarding trade with the United States, China, and India, as these relationships currently lack the framework that exists within the World Trade Organization.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China obstructs vital decision-making processes within the United Nations.
China has quadrupled its financial contributions to United Nations organizations over the decade preceding 2020, while the United States has gradually scaled back its contributions.
Legislation signed by President Donald Trump in late November 2019 banned American companies from selling crowd control software to the Chinese government.
The United States' delay in transferring financial contributions to the United Nations forced the organization to initiate spending cuts.
The power rivalry between the United States and China is negatively impacting the interests of the European Union and Germany.
The European Union risks being negatively impacted by the US-China rivalry, with member states fearing the consequences of escalating trade disputes and geopolitical confrontation in the Pacific.
The European Union's foreign policy exists within a new system of coordinates determined by the axis of conflict between the United States and China, requiring the European Union to find and hold its own position.
Shoshana Zuboff posits that major internet platforms, whether American or Chinese, potentially enable surveillance capitalism.
The European Union shares many of the United States' criticisms regarding unfair Chinese competition practices, though Brussels and Washington maintain disagreements over trade questions and WTO principles.
An Gang argued that it is time for China to forge a new strategy towards the United States.
The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States asserts that the policy of engagement with China has failed.
A bipartisan consensus on China policy emerged in the United States by 2018, as noted by David Shambaugh, Zack Cooper, Annie Kowalewski, Richard C. Bush, and Ryan Hass.
Paul Sonne reported in the Washington Post that economic ties between the United States and China are losing their ability to act as a stabilizing force in national security matters as the Trump administration escalates trade disputes.
Experts cited in the Global Times dismissed negative media reports concerning the 'Phase One' trade deal between the United States and China.
The United States views China's ongoing naval expansion and military upgrades as a threat to its security because these developments could allow China to restrict United States Navy access to the Asia-Pacific region and challenge America's status as a global power.
The Trump Administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia partly in the hope that the withdrawal would allow the United States to better counter the Chinese military threat.
The United States' sphere of influence is designed to maximize the global adoption of American products and services by as many states and companies as possible.
The United States maintains a network of alliances and partnerships with nations that perceive China as a security threat.
The United States generally maintains open markets for foreign firms but employs targeted instruments to restrict foreign investment and control exports.
The United States has declared that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China, are covered under the bilateral defense agreement between the United States and Japan.
The American and Chinese spheres of influence overlap in Europe, where services from both nations are present.
The future development of US and Chinese spheres of influence is uncertain, with the potential for trade barriers to make them more closed and exclusive.
The United States views China's development of military capabilities in space and cyberspace as an imminent danger.
The future development of US and Chinese spheres of influence depends on domestic factors and the bilateral relationship between the two nations.
China views its nuclear arsenal primarily as a deterrent against military intervention or direct threats from other nuclear-armed states, specifically the United States.
If the United States and China view their relationship as a zero-sum game, the struggle for technopolitical influence is likely to intensify and cause further conflict.
Beijing fears that United States missile defense initiatives and the expansion of conventional US forces threaten China's second-strike capability and its nuclear deterrent.
The United States does not openly recognize the principle of mutually assured destruction regarding China, maintaining intentional ambiguity on the subject.
Technological dependency becomes problematic when central actors like the United States and China leverage it to advance their own interests.
The United States justifies the establishment of its own missile defenses in North-East Asia by citing the nuclear threat posed by North Korea.
The Chinese leadership believes that the United States uses the threat of North Korean missiles as a pretext to install missile defense systems intended to neutralize Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents during a military conflict.
Beijing and Moscow share a congruent threat perception regarding US, South Korean, and Japanese radar systems, which they believe can track the trajectories of Chinese and Russian missiles.
The US Prompt Global Strike programme proposes the development of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) capable of conducting conventional strikes anywhere in the world within an hour, ostensibly to prevent the launch of intercontinental missiles from North Korea.
Chinese experts suspect that the US Prompt Global Strike programme and its hypersonic glide vehicles are actually targeting China's nuclear arsenal, fearing a preemptive disarming attack by the United States in the event of a conflict.
The United States is prioritizing the flexibilization of its own military options over arms control in response to North Korea's development of long-range nuclear missiles, which increases the risk of an arms race.
The historical economic relationship between the United States and China, often called 'Chimerica', was characterized by a symbiotic exchange where US businesses exported goods and transferred capital, management expertise, and technology to China, while China accumulated surpluses from exports to the US and reinvested them in US treasury bonds to finance American consumption.
The symbiotic economic relationship between the United States and China, known as 'Chimerica', no longer exists.
The United States and China are currently using trade policy as an instrument for technology competition, foreign policy, and security purposes.
Economic relations between the United States and China have shifted from complementary to competitive due to China's economic and technological rise, status competition, and increasingly critical perceptions on both sides.
The United States has become reluctant to transfer technology to China.
Chinese savings no longer contribute significantly to financing the US domestic economy because China's purchases of US treasury bonds have fallen as a result of shrinking current account surpluses.
The United States accuses China of engaging in unfair competition.
China's rise as the world's leading industrial manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural economic change in the United States and triggered social upheavals in the American 'Rust Belt'.
The impact of the 'China shock' on manufacturing was felt more strongly in the United States than in Germany.
A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that imports from China accounted for approximately one-quarter of the decline in manufacturing jobs in the United States between 1990 and 2007.
Major internet service providers including Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are based in the United States, which results in the data of their non-US customers often being stored in US data centers.
Edward Snowden revealed that US intelligence services exploit the fact that most global internet communication passes through servers and fiber-optic cables located in the United States to conduct eavesdropping.
United States and Chinese companies are currently competing in the fields of communications technology and artificial intelligence for leadership in development, standard-setting, and systems.
The United States accuses China of unfair competition, specifically citing the closure of markets through protectionist measures, discrimination against foreign suppliers, and direct, arbitrary influence on markets and businesses.
European law enforcement authorities experience political conflicts when attempting to access data stored in the United States for their investigations.
China, Russia, and the European Union are pursuing data localization initiatives to repatriate their citizens' data from the United States as a step toward regaining control.
If current growth trends continue, China is projected to replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030.
Official Chinese voices argue that US accusations of unfair trade practices are merely a pretext for a foreign policy of containment against the People's Republic of China.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is understood as a system-to-system conflict.
United States trade policy has undergone a paradigmatic and political turn toward protectionism.
The guiding principle for United States trade policy is no longer free trade, but rather a focus on "fair and reciprocal" trade with bilateral trade balances serving as the decisive criterion.
The United States demonstrated the ability to disrupt digital enterprise production processes by interrupting global supply chains through export restrictions placed on Huawei.
United States President Donald Trump prioritizes United States interests over obligations from international treaties and multilateral rules under the motto "America First."
No state other than the United States and China is expected to match their technological prowess in the foreseeable future.
The 'Five Eyes' intelligence alliance, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, cooperates on technological methods of espionage.
Third-party states have two primary strategic options regarding the technological competition between the United States and China: they can align fully with one sphere of influence to increase dependency in one direction while gaining influence within that relationship, or they can strategically utilize existing interdependencies by selectively relying on technologies from both spheres.
The Trump Administration imposed incremental and escalating extraordinary tariffs of up to 25 percent on approximately half of United States imports from China.
The United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies, despite Europe's dependence on them for digital technologies.
The European Union could utilize its expertise in sectors like chemical and medical research as a bargaining chip during times of escalating political conflict with the United States and China.