Following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, the Middle East experienced an escalation of direct and proxy wars involving Israel, Iran, Türkiye, and armed groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Syrian factions.
Türkiye's ability to shape the emerging Middle Eastern order depends on its ability to harmonize partnerships with regional powers and balance competing interests.
Following the 2011 uprisings and the rise of political Islam movements, the Turkish government under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP viewed the situation as a strategic opportunity for Türkiye to become a regional leader of Islamist movements and a mediator between Islamists and the West.
Following the 2011 uprisings, regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, and Iran took actions to secure their interests in the unstable environment.
The expansionist policies pursued by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP drained Türkiye's military, financial, political, and diplomatic resources, undermining the country's economic growth.
Before 2011, Türkiye, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), maintained strong relations with regional neighbors, including a cooperative partnership with Syria and President Bashar al-Assad centered on a shared stance of 'resistance' to Israel.
The post-October 2023 conflict has disrupted the regional agendas of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite their shared interest with Egypt and Türkiye in conflict resolution.
Türkiye coordinated with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to pressure the Israeli government to halt military operations and end the war.
Iraq's diplomatic relationship with Türkiye deteriorated due to persistent Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq.
Türkiye supports armed militias and allied groups aiming to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus to reshape the balance of power and safeguard Turkish security interests.
Türkiye's support for Islamist movements in Libya, Syria, and Yemen caused its diplomatic, political, trade, and investment relations with most Gulf countries, Iraq, and Iran to shift into tensions and conflict.
Türkiye seeks to redefine its regional role by balancing assertive military actions in Syria with diplomatic efforts to foster stability in Palestine and the Middle East.
The Hamas attacks on October 7, 2023, and Israel's subsequent military response recentered the Middle East's conflicts on Palestine and led to an escalation of direct and proxy wars involving Israel, Iran, Türkiye, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Syrian factions.
Türkiye tasked the Syrian National Army with increasing military pressure on Kurdish groups in northeastern Syria.
Türkiye aligned itself with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and provided refuge to members of the group fleeing Egypt following their overthrow in 2013.
The post-October 2023 conflict has disrupted the regional agendas of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, despite their shared interest with Egypt and Türkiye in conflict resolution.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran recalibrated their foreign policies in response to the instability and shifting landscape caused by the Arab Spring.
Türkiye's support for Islamist groups in Libya, Syria, and Yemen caused its diplomatic, political, and trade relations with most Gulf countries, Iraq, and Iran to deteriorate into tensions and confrontation.
Türkiye scaled back its military operations in Iraq and reduced financial and military support for Islamist groups across the Middle East and North Africa, which improved relations with Gulf countries, Iraq, and Iran.
The Arab Spring uprisings caused radical changes to the foreign policies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran, similar to how previous conflicts like the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the American invasion of Iraq reshaped the region.
Türkiye tasked the Syrian National Army with increasing military pressure on Kurdish groups located in northeastern Syria.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye have rejected Israeli plans for the displacement of Palestinians, settlement expansion, and the violation of Lebanese sovereignty.
Türkiye directed the militia group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to intensify military operations against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.
Regional actors are currently involved in direct or proxy conflicts: Israel is in tension with Iran; Türkiye is intervening in Syria and Iraq; the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are militarily involved in Yemen; and Egypt is involved in Libya, Sudan, and the Horn of Africa.
Türkiye has engaged in successful diplomatic coordination with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt.
Türkiye participated in regional and international conferences to promote a ceasefire in Palestine and Lebanon, advocate for a two-state solution, and mitigate hostilities across the Middle East.
Türkiye scaled back military operations in Iraq and reduced financial and military support for Islamist groups across the Middle East and North Africa, leading to improved relations with Gulf countries, Iraq, and Iran.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye have rejected Israeli plans for displacement, settlement expansion, and the systematic violation of Lebanese sovereignty, while emphasizing the need to protect the Palestinian cause.
Türkiye engaged in regional and international conferences to promote a ceasefire in Palestine and Lebanon, advocate for a two-state solution, and mitigate hostilities across the Middle East.
The government of Egypt perceived Türkiye's involvement in the Libyan civil war as a direct threat to Egyptian vital interests and national security, leading to escalated tensions between the two nations.
Türkiye participated in the Astana negotiation process alongside Russia and Iran, aiming to find political solutions to stabilize Damascus.
Türkiye's decision to support regionally unpopular Islamist groups damaged its international reputation as a progressive, secular, and civil state, a projection it had cultivated throughout the 20th century.
Benjamin Netanyahu failed to secure a definitive victory in the protracted conflict despite Israel's apparent rise in regional influence, which was buoyed by the weakening of the Iranian axis, Türkiye’s redirection of its priorities, and the strategic disarray among Arab states.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye have provided humanitarian relief to affected Palestinian and Lebanese populations and coordinated diplomatically to press global powers to intervene in the violence across the Middle East.
The Egyptian government employed military and diplomatic strategies to prevent Turkish incursions into western Libya and collaborated with the United Nations to develop a roadmap for political, legislative, executive, and judicial institution building.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye have collectively called for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Gaza and Lebanon and an end to all military operations in the region since October 2023.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned Israeli war crimes, occupation policies, and settlement expansion, while asserting Türkiye's readiness to act as a stabilizing force in Palestine and the Arab Levant following the conflict.
Türkiye has achieved strategic gains in Syria by capitalizing on Iran's diminishing influence in the Arab Mashreq.
Türkiye directed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to intensify military operations against the Bashar al-Assad regime.
Before October 7, 2023, regional actors pursued different security strategies: Saudi Arabia sought to ease tensions with Iran, the UAE deepened cooperation with Israel, Egypt prioritized national security, and Türkiye reduced its regional conflict engagement.
Türkiye seeks to redefine its regional role by balancing assertive military actions in Syria with diplomatic efforts to foster stability in Palestine and the wider Middle East.
Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait City, and Manama distanced themselves from Ankara, citing Türkiye's perceived hostility and interference in Arab affairs.
Türkiye coordinated with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to exert pressure on the Israeli government to halt military operations and end the war.
Prior to October 7, 2023, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan extended diplomatic overtures to Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, leading to the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Israel.
Türkiye oscillated between Ottomanist aspirations and Islamist policies from 2011 to 2020, before shifting its regional approach between 2020 and 2023.
Türkiye's dual-pronged military strategy in Syria aimed to eliminate Iranian influence in Damascus and address Turkish concerns regarding the existential threat of Kurdish militancy.
Iran expressed anger toward Türkiye due to Turkish threats against the Iranian-backed Assad regime in Syria.
To achieve long-term objectives in Syria, such as integrating Turkish-backed militias into governance, pressuring Kurdish factions, returning Syrian refugees, and spearheading reconstruction, Türkiye must coordinate with Iran, Israel, Egypt, and Gulf States.
The AKP-led government of Türkiye supported Islamist groups in Libya, Syria, and Yemen during the popular uprisings that evolved into civil wars in those countries.
The government of Türkiye aligned itself with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and provided refuge to members of the group who fled Egypt following the organization's overthrow in 2013.
Bashar al-Assad rejected diplomatic outreach from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan because of Türkiye's ongoing support for Islamist groups and the continued presence of Turkish military forces in northern Syria.
In late 2024, Türkiye shifted to an assertive, proxy-based military strategy in Syria, focusing on supporting armed militias to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus.
Between 2020 and 2023, Türkiye shifted its foreign policy away from expansionist ambitions rooted in its Ottoman and Islamist past to rebuild constructive relations with neighbors and reduce involvement in regional conflicts.
The expansionist policies pursued by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP drained Türkiye's military, financial, political, and diplomatic resources, which undermined the country's economic growth.
In late 2024, Türkiye shifted to an assertive, proxy-based military strategy in Syria as the second dimension of its post-October 2023 policy.
Türkiye's diplomatic engagement following the October 2023 crisis was part of a broader national policy to reduce regional tensions and prioritize peaceful solutions.
Türkiye has achieved strategic gains in Syria by capitalizing on Iran’s diminishing influence in the Arab Mashreq and coordinating diplomatically with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.
Egypt perceived Türkiye's involvement in the Libyan civil war as a direct threat to Cairo's vital interests and security, leading Egypt to become a vocal critic of Turkish actions.
Türkiye's diplomatic engagement regarding the October 2023 crisis is part of a broader policy to reduce tensions and prioritize peaceful solutions.
Regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, and Iran actively sought to secure their national interests during the instability following the 2011 uprisings.
Between 2020 and 2023, Türkiye began a partial retreat from its unilateral support for armed Islamist groups in Syria and took steps to revive trade, investment, and diplomatic relations with Arab governments and Iran.
The government of Iran expressed anger toward Türkiye due to Turkish threats against the Iranian-backed Assad regime in Syria, while the government of Iraq's relationship with Türkiye deteriorated due to persistent Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq.
Between 2020 and 2023, the government of Türkiye recalibrated its Middle East policies, taking steps to rebuild diplomatic and economic ties with Arab governments and Iran, and initiated a partial retreat from its unilateral support for armed Islamist groups in Syria.
Prior to October 7, 2023, Israel established security alliances with major Arab states including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Türkiye.
Before 2011, Türkiye maintained positive relations with Iraq and Iran while fostering trade, economic, and political collaborations with Gulf states, Egypt, and North African Arab countries.
Türkiye maintains a dual approach toward Israel, characterized by public condemnation of Israeli actions alongside covert military and operational cooperation in Syria.
Current regional policies often entangle Middle Eastern states in direct or proxy conflicts, such as Israel’s tensions with Iran, Türkiye’s intervention in Syria and Iraq, and the military involvement of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia's ability to shield itself from regional fallout is threatened by direct and proxy conflicts between Israel, Iran, and Türkiye, necessitating a robust collective security arrangement to achieve its domestic and strategic priorities.
Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is likely aware that regional powers such as Türkiye, which is focused on curtailing Iranian influence in Syria, are not invested in overthrowing the Islamic Republic or dismantling Iran as a state.
Following the October 2023 outbreak of regional violence, Türkiye provided humanitarian and political support to Palestinian and Lebanese populations.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemned Israeli war crimes, occupation policies, and settlement expansion, while emphasizing Türkiye’s readiness to play a stabilizing role in securing peace in Palestine and the broader Arab Levant after the conflict.
Türkiye participated in the Astana negotiation process alongside Russia and Iran to pursue political solutions for stabilizing the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Before 2011, Türkiye maintained positive relations with Iraq and Iran and actively fostered trade, economic, and political collaborations with Gulf states, Egypt, and Arab countries in North Africa.
Between 2011 and 2020, the government of Türkiye armed Islamist opposition groups in Syria and Libya and conducted various military interventions in both countries.
Abu Dhabi is concerned about the potential fallout from the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, the resurgence of Islamist groups in Syria, and the geopolitical competition among Türkiye, Iran, and Israel in the Arab Mashreq.
Egypt employed military and diplomatic strategies and collaborated with the United Nations to prevent Turkish incursions into western Libya and to build unified legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in Libya.
Türkiye eased its hostile stance toward Egypt, which led to joint security arrangements in Libya that resulted in relative stability.
Türkiye unilaterally backed new governments led by Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Egypt and Tunisia, despite apprehension from significant factions within those societies regarding the election of those leaders.
The feasibility of a collective regional security endeavor involving Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran depends on overcoming mutual distrust, conflicting strategic goals, and divergent government policies.
Abu Dhabi is concerned about the potential fallout from the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, the resurgence of Islamist groups in Syria, and the geopolitical competition among Türkiye, Iran, and Israel in the Arab Mashreq.
Türkiye maintains a dual approach toward Israel, characterized by public condemnation of Israeli actions alongside covert military and operational cooperation in Syria.
Türkiye's military strategy in Syria was intended to facilitate the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees currently residing within Turkish borders.
Türkiye's military strategy in Syria in late 2024 was enabled by the weakening of Iranian deterrence and Hezbollah, Russia's distraction with the war in Ukraine, and the diminished capabilities of pro-Iranian forces.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran possess significant political, military, economic, and diplomatic influence that allows them to impact regional stability in the Middle East.
The Arab Spring uprisings, occurring between 2011 and 2023, caused radical changes to the foreign policies of six influential regional powers: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye have collectively called for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Gaza and Lebanon and an end to all military operations in the region.
Bashar al-Assad rejected diplomatic outreach from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan because of Türkiye's ongoing support for Islamist groups and the continued presence of Turkish military forces in northern Syria.
Israel, Iran, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates continue to wield military capabilities in ways that perpetuate cycles of violence and delay meaningful collective action in the Middle East.
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Türkiye have provided humanitarian relief to affected Palestinian and Lebanese populations and coordinated diplomatic efforts to press global powers to intervene in the Middle East.
Benjamin Netanyahu failed to secure a definitive victory in the protracted conflict despite Israel's apparent rise in regional influence, which was supported by the weakening of the Iranian axis, Türkiye’s redirection of priorities, and strategic disarray among Arab states.
Benjamin Netanyahu's government is likely aware that regional powers like Türkiye are focused on curtailing Iranian influence in Syria rather than overthrowing the Islamic Republic or dismantling Iran as a state.
Türkiye engaged in security and diplomatic dialogue with Egypt, which led to the restriction of Muslim Brotherhood propaganda against the Egyptian government.
Israel, Iran, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates continue to wield military capabilities in ways that perpetuate cycles of violence and delay meaningful collective action in the Middle East.
Before 2011, Türkiye, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), maintained strong relations with regional neighbors, including a cooperative partnership with Syria and President Bashar al-Assad centered on a shared stance of "resistance" to Israel.
Türkiye's military strategy in Syria aims to facilitate the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees currently residing in Türkiye.
Türkiye's ability to assert influence and shape the emerging Middle Eastern order depends on its ability to harmonize partnerships with regional powers and balance competing interests.
Recognizing the unsustainable costs of a conflict-driven regional policy, Iran began recalibrating its approach between 2020 and 2023 to restore calm in the region, a shift similar to an earlier pivot by Türkiye.
Türkiye shifted its regional policy between 2020 and 2023 after oscillating between Ottomanist aspirations and Islamist policies from 2011 to 2020.
Following the 2011 uprisings, the Turkish government under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) viewed the success of political Islam movements as a strategic opportunity for Türkiye to become a regional leader of Islamist movements and a mediator between Islamists and the West.
The Turkish government under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recognizes the difficulty of converting short-term strategic victories into sustainable long-term objectives.
Türkiye executed its 2024 Syria strategy by capitalizing on the weakening of Iranian deterrence and Hezbollah, Russia's distraction with the war in Ukraine, and the diminished organizational capabilities of pro-Iranian forces.
Türkiye's dual-pronged military approach in Syria aims to eliminate Iranian influence in Damascus and address concerns regarding the threat of Kurdish militancy.
Following Syria's return to the Arab League, Türkiye explored diplomatic relations with the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Türkiye engaged in security and diplomatic dialogue with Egypt, which resulted in the restriction of Muslim Brotherhood propaganda against the Egyptian government.
Before October 7, 2023, regional actors adopted varied strategies to increase security: Saudi Arabia sought to ease tensions with Iran, the United Arab Emirates focused on deepening cooperation with Israel, Egypt prioritized national security amidst domestic challenges, and Türkiye reduced its engagement in regional conflicts.
Between 2020 and 2023, Türkiye shifted its foreign policy away from expansionist ambitions to rebuild constructive relations with neighbors and reduce involvement in regional conflicts.
The governments of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh), the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi), Kuwait (Kuwait City), and Bahrain (Manama) distanced themselves from Türkiye, citing the country's perceived hostility and interference in Arab affairs.
Following the October 2023 outbreak of regional violence, Türkiye extended humanitarian and political support to Palestinian and Lebanese populations.
The feasibility of a collective regional security endeavor led by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Türkiye, Israel, and Iran is contingent on overcoming significant obstacles, including mutual distrust, conflicting strategic goals, and the divergent policies of their respective governments.
Türkiye's 2024 military strategy in Syria was designed to reshape the balance of power in Damascus to protect Turkish security interests.
Türkiye improved its relations with Egypt by easing its hostile stance and fostering joint security arrangements in Libya, which resulted in relative stability in the region.
Middle Eastern countries including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, Israel, and Iran wield significant influence beyond their borders through political, military, economic, and diplomatic domains.