The economic crisis in Iran has weakened activism because individuals are increasingly preoccupied with financial survival and have fewer resources for civic engagement.
Revenue from oil and gas exports funded 60% of the Iranian budget and represented 80% of the country’s overall export revenue.
Foreign ownership in Iran is heavily restricted, and foreign investors typically rely on partnerships with regime insiders to operate, which entrenches economic favoritism.
The Supreme Leader of Iran exerts control over all branches of the state through a network of religious, state, and state-linked institutions, having dismantled the limited checks and balances originally built into the Islamic Republic's political system.
Rural poverty rates in Iran are rising faster than urban poverty rates, intensifying long-standing spatial divides.
Iran's defense doctrine is being questioned due to the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the fall of Bashar Assad in Syria, and direct Israeli military strikes on Iranian soil.
The funding and administrative structures of political parties or factions in Iran are typically opaque, lacking transparency and public accountability.
The Assembly of Experts in Iran is responsible for electing and removing the Supreme Leader, but candidates for the Assembly must first gain approval from the Guardian Council.
Government appointments in Iran are often based on loyalty to the regime rather than qualifications, leading incoming governments to make far-reaching personnel changes.
State services and institutions in Iran suffer from inefficiency and corruption, with frequent blackouts, water supply pressure, air pollution, and waste management issues indicating systemic shortcomings.
Multiple waves of privatization in Iran over the decades have primarily benefited state-linked entities, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
There is a strong correlation in Iran between poverty and regions inhabited by significant ethnic minority populations, particularly Baluchis in the southeast and Kurds in the northwest.
Iran entered a diplomatic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2023.
Persians constitute approximately two-thirds of the population in Iran.
The allocation of government funds in Iran is politicized, with resources frequently distributed based on political patronage.
No systematic mechanism exists in Iran to track or verify the assets of political elites, allowing them to amass wealth with impunity.
Civil society in Iran documents state crimes and advocates for victims, but the government typically responds with repression rather than support.
Most countries in the Middle East remain wary of Iran's intentions, balancing pragmatic cooperation with fears regarding Iran's pursuit of regional hegemony.
Successive Iranian governments have consistently failed to meet the development goals outlined in their five-year plans due to reactive policymaking, political infighting, and limited executive power.
Professional associations in Iran, such as those for engineers, lawyers, and state-recognized unions, have more operational space than other civil society groups, but they remain under close state monitoring which limits their political influence.
Iran’s Competition Council was established to promote competition and prevent monopolies, possessing broad powers including unlimited time to initiate reviews and nominal independence.
Currency control systems in Iran primarily benefit regime insiders who exploit arbitrage opportunities for personal gain rather than pursuing economic stability.
Since 2020, the Guardian Council in Iran has systematically sidelined moderate and reformist-leaning political forces by barring their candidates from parliamentary and presidential elections.
Iran's social protection system is insufficient to address the needs generated by poverty, health care requirements, and unemployment, leading to coverage gaps for vulnerable groups.
Gross enrollment rates in Iran are 104.5% for primary education, 87.1% for secondary education, and 60.7% for tertiary education.
Women in Iran face structural discrimination in legal matters such as testimony, marriage, and custody, and male guardians have the authority to restrict a woman's ability to work or travel.
The Islamic Republic of Iran promotes gender discrimination and reinforces traditional gender roles as part of a divide-and-rule strategy to exploit societal divisions.
The absence of foreign businesses in the Iranian domestic market entrenches the economic influence of hardliners and reduces incentives for meaningful economic reform.
Article 99 of the Iranian constitution grants the Guardian Council the power to oversee all elections except for local councils, ensuring candidate loyalty to the regime.
Iran prioritized good-neighborly relations since the beginning of the 2020s, which resulted in a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia in 2023.
The Iranian government intensified its crackdown on civil liberties following the 2022 nationwide uprising to achieve a temporary period of domestic calm.
State-owned and state-linked businesses in Iran distort competition and undermine transparency, which weakens investor confidence.
The Iranian government frequently expands the money supply to ease immediate economic pressures, which fuels inflation.
Iran signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Russia in January 2025.
Political parties in Iran are not central to the political process and do not function as mechanisms to shape political will, incorporate popular demands, implement policies, control the government, or recruit political personnel.
Iran has expanded international exchanges with other authoritarian regimes to share best practices for consolidating power and maintaining authoritarian rule.
Iran is under-represented in international forums for expert exchanges due to ongoing sanctions and the state's confrontational policies, which contributes to a gap between Iranian policies and global best practices.
According to 2022 WHO data, 97.7% of Iranian households have access to basic water sources, 94.2% have access to a safely managed water source, and 90.4% have access to at least basic sanitation.
The Guardian Council in Iran is responsible for approving or rejecting parliamentary bills and vetting candidates for presidential and parliamentary elections.
Iran's banking sector struggles with high levels of non-performing loans, extreme inflation rates, and politically driven or potentially corrupt lending practices.
Proposed Iranian legislation, such as the “hijab law,” seeks to tighten control, with punishments for dress code violations including imprisonment and the death penalty.
Environmental challenges in Iran, such as extreme temperatures, droughts, water scarcity, soil erosion, and biodiversity loss, have negatively impacted agriculture and food security, forcing increased imports and reducing employment for low-skilled workers.
Iran's annual trade volume declined from $60.7 billion in 2018 to $21 billion in 2020 following the reimposition of U.S. sanctions.
Freedom of the press in Iran is legally restricted when it is deemed detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public.
Iran's inflation rate averaged 42.2% from 2021 to 2023 and was projected to be 31.7% in 2024, according to IMF data.
The Iranian regime is failing to reconcile the majority of the population to its political system and leadership, leading to a decline in legitimacy and an increased reliance on brute force to maintain control.
The Supreme Leader of Iran, in concert with hard-line factions, has consolidated power by diminishing the roles of the presidency and parliament.
Reformists and moderates in Iran have historically favored closer ties with the West, whereas hardliners have prioritized relationships with non-Western powers, specifically China and Russia.
Highly qualified individuals in Iran, particularly university graduates, often seek employment abroad or in the private sector because opportunities within the state apparatus are limited by political considerations.
Iran possesses an institutional framework for policy evaluation that includes the Statistical Center, which tracks economic and political indicators, and the parliament's research service, which produces scientific reports.
Sustainable economic growth in Iran depends on empowering the private sector, which requires reforming the financial system to meet international standards, improving credit access for small and medium-size enterprises, and enhancing vocational training.
Private businesses in Iran face substantial barriers to entry and exit.
Iran's non-oil GDP grew at an average rate of 3.7% from 2021 to 2023 and was forecast to grow by 3.6% in 2024.
The Social Security Organization (SSO) in Iran, which operates under the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare, administers most welfare programs and is funded by contributions from the insured, employers, and the state.
International sanctions limit Iran's access to global financial networks, restrict foreign investment, and prevent participation in international banking forums, which undermines Iran's ability to adopt modern financial regulations.
Iran ranks first globally in per capita executions and second only to China in absolute numbers of executions.
Iranian government budgets often rely on overly optimistic assumptions about GDP growth, oil prices, and tax revenues, which are frequently driven by political considerations rather than realistic economic forecasting.
Reform in Iran's environmental sector is hindered by strong commercial interests tied to the state and state-linked businesses that are unwilling to relinquish their profitable positions.
Only political parties loyal to the Islamic Republic's system are permitted to operate in Iran.
According to 2020 World Bank data, Iran’s simple average tariff rate was 15.2%, which is significantly higher than the rates of key trading partners such as Türkiye, China, and Russia.
Since the early 2020s, Iranian hardliners have consolidated power in anticipation of the eventual succession to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Iran faces mounting environmental crises, including air pollution, desertification, biodiversity loss, droughts, water shortages, and sandstorms, which are exacerbated by climate change.
Following the 2022 protests, the Iranian government intensified public surveillance by utilizing cameras, cellphone tracking, and artificial intelligence tools.
The Iranian regime utilizes Islamic law flexibly to maintain power, employing vaguely defined religious offenses such as 'corruption on earth' (efsad-e fel arz) and 'enmity against God' (moharebeh) to prosecute political opponents and protesters, often with the death penalty.
As of the time of writing, the Iranian government had halted, but not ended, the implementation of the Hijab and Chastity Law to avoid escalating social tensions.
The Iranian regime maintains pervasive ethnic and religious discrimination, specifically targeting minorities such as Kurds, Baluchis, and Baha'is to entrench societal divisions.
Iran's administrative structure is highly centralized under the state government in Tehran, consisting of 31 provinces, cities, divisions, municipalities, and villages.
In Iran, the female-to-male enrollment ratio is approximately 1.1 at the primary education level, indicating that enrollment levels are approximately equal across all three educational levels.
Iran experienced a direct attack on its territory by another state for the first time since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, marking a dramatic escalation in the conflict with Israel.
Unelected institutions controlled by the Supreme Leader of Iran, specifically the Guardian Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, and the judiciary, interfere in the political process to block legislative and executive initiatives.
Strengthening the rule of law in Iran would require judicial reforms that enhance transparency, ensure due process, and curb arbitrary prosecutions to restore public trust and improve the business climate.
Civil society in Iran faces significant challenges due to the country's economic crisis, which limits the financial resources available to voluntary activists.
Since the 1979 revolution, opposition outside the narrow political spectrum of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been met with harsh repression.
Iran seeks active participation in non-Western multilateral institutions, including the BRICS+ group, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
The current five-year development plan in Iran, adopted in 2023, aims to reduce government debt and promote economic growth by strengthening the National Development Fund.
Nationwide protests occurred in Iran in 2017/18, 2019, and 2022, reflecting a growing disconnect between the Iranian state and large segments of the population.
Addressing gender, ethnic, and religious discrimination in Iran is an economic necessity because the country has an aging population and cannot afford to exclude women and marginalized communities from the workforce.
Widespread mistrust and government crackdowns have prevented the emergence of truly independent nationwide movements in Iran.
Entrenched clientelism in Iran continues to block meaningful reform across a broad range of policy challenges.
Iran experienced widespread energy shortages and severe blackouts for months during the winter of 2024/25, which exacerbated economic hardship.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is characterized by intense competition within its political class.
The rise in the poverty rate in Iran between 2017 and 2023 resulted in an additional 9.5 million Iranians falling into poverty.
The Iranian government has achieved limited success in fostering nation-building based on a blend of Islamist and nationalist ideologies, which helps the regime consolidate power and maintain control.
Religious minorities in Iran, including Baha’is, Christians, Sunni Muslims, Dervishes, and Jews, are systematically excluded from high-ranking positions and face discrimination such as arbitrary arrests, business closures, and restrictions on worship.
Iran imposes relatively high tariffs on many imported goods as a strategy to protect local industries.
Iran’s young and growing population requires significant public spending on education and health care.
The gap between the Iranian regime and large segments of society has widened due to intensified repression in recent years.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has repeatedly urged Iran's banking system to comply with global standards against money laundering and terrorist financing.
Self-organization at the local level in Iran emerges through civil society activism and volunteer work, largely stemming from local communities or extended family ties.
Under its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the 2015 Paris Agreement, Iran pledged to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 4% and as much as 12% by 2030.
U.S. sanctions restrict Iran's international banking ties and block access to key foreign currency reserves, exacerbating the country's economic challenges.
Geopolitical tensions deter foreign direct investment in Iran.
Iran's economy experienced relatively strong growth following a period of contraction caused by the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Total gross government debt in Iran was 34% of GDP in 2023, an improvement from 42.4% in 2021.
The Iranian government prioritizes regime survival above other policy objectives, which often leads to failures in meeting goals outlined in key strategy documents.
Iran operates a system of discrimination where legal structures and societal norms shape access to education, employment, and political representation based on gender, religion, ethnicity, political beliefs, and sexual orientation.
Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani made limited attempts to reform the political system or policy environment in Iran but failed due to opposition from the Supreme Leader.
In Iranian state institutions, political loyalty is frequently prioritized over technocratic expertise.
Privatization processes in Iran have concentrated economic power in the hands of the political establishment, reinforcing the ties between wealth and political influence.
The Iranian political system remains in paralysis due to the lack of a clear successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Women comprise 16.5% of Iran’s workforce according to 2024 World Bank data.
Oil exports remain the financial backbone of the Iranian government, despite some progress in diversifying the economy.
Iran operates as a highly centralized state, maintaining substantial control over political and economic affairs despite some local autonomy.
The most lucrative sectors in Iran, specifically energy, petrochemicals, and heavy industry, are dominated by state-controlled and state-linked enterprises that act as gatekeepers and constrain private sector growth.
The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the international community collapsed after the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2018, despite Iranian compliance.
State-linked entities in Iran enjoy privileges such as tax exemptions, the ability to avoid paying taxes without consequences, and exclusive access to lucrative government contracts.
Iran faces deep societal cleavages that threaten its stability.
Economic opportunities in Iran are highly politicized, with access often determined by political alignments rather than market principles.
All republican-inspired institutions in Iran are subject to religious and political oversight by bodies controlled by the supreme leader, who has increasingly interfered in the political process.
Ethnic minorities in Iran, including Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, and Baluchis, face marginalization, restrictions on cultural rights and language use, unequal access to resources, land confiscation, forced displacement, arbitrary arrests, and disproportionate application of the death penalty.
Civil society activism in Iran encompasses environmental protection, social justice, legal reform, labor rights, student movements, professional organizations, ethnic minority rights, and women’s rights.
Article 29 of the Iranian constitution guarantees social security as a universal human right, covering retirement, unemployment, disability, and health care.
The Expediency Discernment Council in Iran is tasked with bridging gaps between the parliament and the Guardian Council and ensuring policies and laws align with the principles of the Islamic Republic.
Iranian authorities have repeatedly drawn on the National Development Fund, which was originally intended to support long-term investments, to cover budget shortfalls.
The struggling economy in Iran prevents the absorption of the expanding youth labor force, leading to increased unemployment and pressure on public spending.
Iran has experienced border clashes with Afghanistan since the Taliban returned to power.
A return to the earlier model of controlled but genuine competition among regime loyalists, described as Islamist pluralism, appears highly unlikely in the foreseeable future in Iran.
Iran possesses the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves after Russia.
The consumer price inflation rate in Iran was 44.6% in 2023, following rates of 43.5% in 2022 and 43.4% in 2021.
The Supreme Audit Court in Iran has extremely limited powers in practice, despite being officially tasked with overseeing state spending and reporting to parliament.
Hardliners in Iran benefit from international sanctions by profiting from smuggling networks, controlling clandestine oil exports, and repatriating oil revenue.
Journalists and civil society actors in Iran who investigate corruption among the political elite face severe repression, including arrest and harassment, which limits public accountability.
The Iranian judicial system generally fails to investigate abuses by state security forces, particularly regarding crackdowns on protesters, or misconduct by public institutions.
The 'Look to the East' policy in Iran prioritizes the consolidation of authoritarian rule over economic development, focusing primarily on military and security matters such as diplomacy, internet control, and surveillance.
The Iranian constitution formally protects private ownership, but the state-controlled judiciary frequently violates these property rights in practice, particularly when targeting political dissidents and ethnic or religious minorities.
In 2022, the literacy rate in Iran was 84.9% for women and 93.0% for men, with an overall literacy rate of 89.0%.
The prospect of further escalation of tensions with Israel weighs on the stability of Iran.
The reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran in 2018 coincided with low global oil prices and rising public discontent with all factions of the Iranian regime, including reformists.
Most civil society efforts in Iran remain voluntary, with few professionalized organizations.
Iran's research and development system produces robust output in STEM fields, while government interference and societal norms cause the arts and social sciences to underperform.
Iran's security forces and judiciary regularly engage in physical and psychological torture, including rape, and the regime uses violence to suppress nationwide protests, such as those in 2017/18, 2019, and 2022.
U.S. secondary sanctions targeting Iran's trade with foreign countries have had harmful effects on Iran's foreign trade.
Iran's school enrollment rates were 104% at the primary level in 2020, 87% at the secondary level in 2020, and 61% at the tertiary level in 2022.
Masoud Pezeshkian became president of Iran following snap elections held after the death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May 2024.
The Iranian regime engages in systemic discrimination and state repression against ethnic and religious minorities, as well as LGBTQI+ individuals.
Iran is involved in a long-running, nonviolent territorial dispute with the United Arab Emirates regarding three Persian Gulf islands.
Policy learning in Iran is hampered by the politicization of academic and scientific endeavors, persistent political infighting, and the influence of entrenched interests within the political class.
The Iranian state interferes in the economy through massive subsidies, control of exchange rates, and investment policies, while directly controlling key sectors like energy and petrochemicals.
The Iranian government has failed to realize key objectives under its current five-year development plan, specifically regarding the reduction of government debt and the cessation of using the National Development Fund to finance the government budget.
The average consumer price inflation rate in Iran during the decade prior to 2021 was 18.4%, according to IMF data.
Strengthening environmental regulations and promoting international cooperation are critical for Iran to mitigate long-term environmental risks.
Iran faces significant trade barriers resulting from a combination of domestic regulations, market distortions, and international sanctions.
Approximately 99% of the Iranian population is Muslim.
Societal norms in Iran, including deep-seated prejudices against women, religious minorities, and marginalized communities, contribute to everyday discrimination in social and professional life.
Economic decline in Iran has created a sociocultural crisis, pitting a young, modernized, secular, and globalized society against an octogenarian, patriarchal, and exclusively Islamist elite that monopolizes economic and political power.
The Iranian regime actively exploits and aggravates ethnic and religious divisions, including discrimination against Baha’is, Christians, Baluchis, and Kurds, as a strategy to maintain its grip on power.
Iran's institutional mechanisms to combat corruption are weak and largely ineffective.
Regulations in Iran requiring elected officeholders and senior government officials to disclose their finances exist only on paper and are rarely enforced.
Government spending on education in Iran was 2.9% of GDP in 2023, a decline from the 4.7% peak recorded in 2007.
The historical tension between the Supreme Leader and the President of Iran, characterized by the Supreme Leader maintaining the upper hand while facing some pushback, has largely disappeared.
State-run screening mechanisms in Iran institutionalize systematic discrimination across the board.
Iran has not yet ratified its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) under domestic law, citing international sanctions as the justification.
Civil society activism in Iran often occurs at the local level within small communities.
Iran does not grant freedom of religion, and Muslims are forbidden from changing or abandoning their faith.
In the aftermath of the 2022 'Woman, Life, Freedom' protests, the Iranian regime attempted to delegitimize protesters by portraying them as criminals or foreign agents, utilizing harsh court rulings and repression to suppress future dissent.
The International Monetary Fund estimates Iran's break-even oil price to be $122 per barrel.
The combination of domestic mismanagement, inadequate legislation, and far-reaching U.S. sanctions has created extreme barriers to foreign investment and ownership in Iran.
Between 2023 and 2025, Iran experienced continued political repression and economic decline.
Iran maintains long-standing involvement in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
Iran maintains an existential-ideological animosity toward Israel, which nearly resulted in a larger war between the two nations in 2024.
The Iranian government's capacity to implement policy is constrained by a persistent power struggle between the government and entities controlled by the supreme leader, as well as the operation of state-linked institutions outside government oversight.
Economic life in Iran is dominated by state-owned companies, state-linked entities such as foundations and businesses affiliated with the IRGC, and nominally private enterprises run by regime elites.
Approximately 11% of Iranian adults, totaling about 9.8 million people, remain illiterate, with elderly and rural populations disproportionately represented in this group.
Iran's GDP expanded by an average of 4.5% per year from 2021 to 2023 and was projected to grow by 3.7% in 2024.
Extensive fossil fuel subsidies in Iran lead to massive overconsumption and lack of legal incentives for energy efficiency or renewable energy development.
State and state-linked enterprises in Iran benefit from informal preferential access to government contracts, financing, and tax exemptions, creating a distorted competitive environment for private companies.
Despite a rhetorical commitment to cross-country solidarity among ethnic and religious minorities following the 2022 protests, meaningful cross-community action has not yet materialized in Iran.
Iran's weak legal framework, compounded by corruption and nepotism, deters foreign direct investment.
Climate change and water scarcity disproportionately affect rural regions in Iran, which rely heavily on agriculture, compounding existing poverty.
Iran's regional strategy of 'forward defense' is a pursuit of regional hegemony, involving a network of militias in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria (until December 2024).
Baha’is in Iran experience severe persecution.
Rampant nepotism in Iran places private companies that lack political connections at a severe competitive disadvantage.
Iran uses non-Western multilateral institutions to evade Western isolation efforts and undermine the rules-based multilateral order.
The U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 marginalized Iranian reformists and moderates, facilitating the adoption of the 'Look to the East' foreign policy.
Iran's treaties with Beijing and Moscow symbolize growing ties, although the specific commitments under these treaties remain vague.
The Iranian middle class has shrunk substantially due to a combination of gross domestic mismanagement and international sanctions following two decades of relative economic prosperity in the 1990s and 2000s.
Successive rounds of privatization in Iran have primarily benefited politically connected individuals, transferring enterprises to insiders linked to the ruling elite through cronyism and nepotism rather than to independent private owners.
The share of Iranians living below the internationally recognized poverty line of $6.85 per person per day (purchasing power parity) rose from 20.0% to 28.1% between 2017 and 2023, according to a November 2023 World Bank report based on Iranian government data.
The Social Security Organization (SSO) in Iran provides coverage to approximately 70% of the urban population and 45% of the total population, including dependents.
State-linked entities in Iran, specifically those controlled by the supreme leader including Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated businesses and religious foundations, regularly escape regulatory scrutiny.
Transgender individuals in Iran encounter significant barriers to accessing health care, legal recognition, and social acceptance.
The Iranian oil sector expanded by an average of 11.6% from 2021 to 2023, with an expected growth rate of 3.1% in 2024, according to IMF data.
Women in Iran are under-represented in leadership positions and face structural barriers to education and employment.
Activism in Iran is largely local and community-focused, which limits the ability of activists to organize nationwide or cross-community movements.
Iran's regulatory framework for property ownership and transactions is characterized by opacity, inconsistency, and a lack of a stable legal environment, which creates significant uncertainty for private individuals.
In January 2025, the reformist-leaning newspaper Aftab estimated that approximately 50% of the Iranian population lives below a poverty threshold of $450 per month.
The inflation rate in Iran exceeded 40% in 2023.
Iran's per capita GDP growth was 4.2% in 2023, and the officially reported unemployment rate was 9.1%, though the report notes the actual rate was likely substantially higher.
Corruption and violations of the law are widespread in Iran, and anti-corruption cases against political or business figures are typically politically motivated tools used to weaken opponents.
Iran's policy landscape is fragmented, which weakens the state's ability to address policy challenges effectively.
Iran hosts more than 2.5 million registered Afghan migrants, which adds pressure to the country's public services and labor markets.
Women in Iran face a higher risk of poverty compared to men due to lower wages, higher unemployment risks, and systemic barriers.
International sanctions that forced Western and international businesses to exit Iran provided an economic boost to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its business conglomerates.
Iran's hard-line establishment opposes market-based reforms because it dominates the commanding heights of the economy through the Revolutionary Guards and religious-political foundations.
Following the 2022 country-wide uprisings, the Iranian regime increased repression of the population, including the expanded use of public surveillance through cameras and mobile phone tracking.
Iranian law provides no protection against marital rape or domestic violence, and women are barred from certain professions, such as serving as judges.
Iran's broader economic crisis is straining the welfare system, as inflationary pressures increase pension and health care costs while rising poverty increases the demand for social support.
International sanctions have empowered state-affiliated actors in Iran who control the clandestine export of oil, the repatriation of oil revenue, and smuggling routes for sanctions-evading trade.
Iran is blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
Iran was ranked 78th on the United Nations’ Human Development Index in 2022, reflecting educational achievements that have not translated into broad economic gains.
Iran's adult literacy rate was 89% in 2022.
The judiciary in Iran is politically controlled and fails to hold state officials or state-linked individuals accountable for misconduct.
Iran's economy will continue to operate below its potential and suffer from worsening socioeconomic pain without a sustainable resolution of tensions with the United States that leads to lasting sanctions relief.
The hydrocarbon sector remains dominant in Iran's economy, serving as a key source of export revenue and a provider of energy and feedstock for other industries.
Civil society activism in Iran gained momentum in the 1990s, the early 2000s, and during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021).
Frequent overlap between the responsibilities of government bodies in Iran leads to competition and undermines the effectiveness of public administration.
Iran manages relations with Türkiye and the UAE by compartmentalizing cooperation on mutual interests while managing tensions.
U.S. sanctions have restricted interactions with most Iranian banks and disconnected Iran from the SWIFT network.
The Iranian political elite rarely engages with independent civil society groups, preferring to interact only with regime-aligned organizations.
A 2020 Stanford University study found that one-third of Iranian and Iranian-origin researchers work abroad, indicating a significant brain drain.
The Supreme Leader of Iran maintains influence across all levels of the state by embedding representatives in public administration, security services, business, and education sectors.
Iran maintains a centralized government with minimal provincial autonomy, though tensions and occasional violent clashes persist between the state and ethnic minorities, specifically Ahvazi Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds.
The Guardian Council in Iran has practiced the exclusion of political candidates, a practice that has been applied in increasingly extreme ways since 2020.
The death of President Ebrahim Raisi in 2024, who was poised to become the next supreme leader, disrupted the succession plans of Iranian hardliners.
International sanctions severely limit Iran's access to advanced energy-efficient and renewable technologies.
The Iranian government frequently accuses ethnic minorities, specifically Ahvazi Arabs, Baluchis, and Kurds, of foreign-backed separatism and terrorism to justify crackdowns.
Activists and unionists in Iran who attempt to challenge the status quo or exceed limited constraints face harsh repression, including the issuance of death sentences against labor and ethnic minority rights activists.
The Iranian judicial system uses selective prosecution of corruption cases to target political opponents.
Economic misery served as either the initial cause or a compounding factor for mass protests in Iran during 2017–2018, 2019, and 2022.
State-sanctioned professional associations, trade unions, and student groups in Iran must operate within narrow confines permitted by the state to function as political organizations.
Policy coordination in Iran is often ad hoc, highly personalized, and dependent on the political networks and relative influence of the individuals involved rather than systematic or strategic processes.
The Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) in Iran is responsible for drafting five-year development plans and preparing the annual government budget.
Non-nationals in Iran, particularly Afghan migrants, face structural discrimination, including limited access to public services like health care and education and barriers to legal employment that force them into exploitative informal labor markets.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has blacklisted Iran due to concerns regarding money laundering.
U.S. secondary sanctions have had a stronger negative impact on the Iranian economy than general geopolitical tensions.
Iran maintains pragmatic relations with countries in the South Caucasus (specifically Armenia), Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
International sanctions have fostered the creation of powerful interest groups within the Iranian state that profit from shadow economies, such as clandestine oil exports and smuggling, and consequently resist reforms.
Iran risks further instability, economic stagnation, and a deepening divide between the state and its people if it does not implement a strategic shift in governance and economic policy.
Iran signed a 25-year Cooperation Program with China in 2021.
Iran's real effective exchange rate stood at 476.8 in 2023 (based on 100 = 2010), representing an almost threefold increase since 2020, when it was 167.3, according to World Bank data.
Creating a more productive economic system in Iran requires strengthening anti-corruption institutions, enforcing accountability, and promoting transparency in public procurement processes.
In the 1990s, the Iranian government under Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani opened the economy to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to leverage its wartime expertise for reconstruction and secure political support for reintegrating Iran into the global economy.
Iranians continue to engage in sporadic protests across the country due to profound dissatisfaction with the political and economic status quo.
The international community views Iran as neither a credible nor a reliable partner, though Iran retains the capacity for tactical cooperation on specific issues.
The government of Iran systematically violates civil rights by imposing an extreme interpretation of Islamic law, including strict dress codes and draconian punishments for alleged violations.
Activists working on LGBTQ+ issues or internet freedom in Iran must operate clandestinely, while other activists must partially operate in hiding due to state repression.
The Iranian judiciary imprisons dual nationals as political bargaining chips, a practice often described as 'hostage diplomacy'.
Dissatisfaction among unemployed or underemployed university graduates in Iran contributed to nationwide protests in 2017/18, 2019, and 2022.
Widespread corruption and clientelism in Iran erode the effectiveness of government policy.
The Iranian state maintains a deliberate lack of clear delineation of responsibilities among policymaking bodies, which contributes to inefficiencies, delays, and conflicting policy outcomes.
The Iranian state’s widespread human rights abuses have deepened the divide between the regime and society.
Iran has failed to adopt modern international business regulations, partly because international sanctions have isolated the country from the global economy.
Since the 1990s, Iran's attempted privatization campaigns have primarily benefited state-linked enterprises, particularly those affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), rather than creating a level playing field.
Environmental challenges, specifically water scarcity and desertification, pose existential threats to the future of Iran.
While Iran has elected councils responsible for administering local entities and selecting mayors, all candidates are vetted for loyalty to the system and the Supreme Leader.
The Iranian government regularly responds to social protests with significant violence, as evidenced by the crackdown on the 2022 uprising.
In 2024, Iran executed at least 975 people, according to the Norway-based Iran Human Rights (IHR) organization and the France-based Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM).
The Iranian regime uses welfare policies to reward its supporters, thereby securing their loyalty and reinforcing existing power structures.
Foreign direct investment in Iran remains negligible, projected at 0% of GDP throughout the decade, according to World Bank data.
Governors in Iran act as senior government representatives who report to the president and the cabinet, specifically the interior minister.
The Iranian regime does not seek reconciliation between victims and perpetrators of past injustices, and political repression remains a central feature of governance.
Policies aimed at increasing labor force participation among women and ensuring equal opportunities would contribute to Iran's economic resilience.
The Iranian legal system is marked by political interference and a lack of judicial independence, which undermines both governance and economic stability.
Iran's banking system is dominated by state-owned banks, while private banks play only a marginal role.
Iran’s 2007 Privatization Act prohibits practices such as exclusive dealing and price discrimination across most sectors, including government entities.
The International Monetary Fund projected Iran's fiscal deficit to be -3.1% of GDP for 2024.
Meaningful progress in Iran requires addressing domestic governance failures and external economic constraints resulting from years of economic isolation and authoritarian rule.
The Revolutionary Guards and religious-political foundations in Iran resist competition from private and international players to maintain their economic dominance.
Key areas of activism in Iran include women’s rights, human rights, political liberties, workers’ rights, and environmental issues.
Iran operates a voluntary, non-suspensory merger control regime where companies are not required to provide notifications when engaged in merger transactions.
The 2018 United States withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal sidelined reformist and moderate political factions in Tehran and facilitated the rise of extreme political factions seeking to reduce Western influence.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), 100% of the Iranian population had access to electricity in 2022.
Iran possesses a resilient civil society that continues to operate, often clandestinely, despite government restrictions on assembly and association.
The Supreme Leader of Iran holds a dominant role in governing the state, guided by the Islamic principle of guardianship of the jurist (velayat-e Faqih), which eclipses the republican aspects of the constitution.
Government crackdowns on civil society in Iran remain a significant barrier to meaningful public consultation, despite occasional protests and acts of civil disobedience.
Entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and state-linked foundations (bonyads) operate with impunity and are accountable only to the supreme leader of Iran.
The Assembly of Experts in Iran exercises no real control over the Supreme Leader, despite being nominally tasked with his oversight.
While extreme market concentration is formally prohibited in Iran, the criteria for other restrictions remain unclear.
The improvement in Iran's fiscal situation regarding public debt is largely a result of increased oil export revenue, which occurred amid weaker enforcement of sanctions by the United States.
Rising health care costs in Iran, particularly for medications, often exceed insurance coverage, rendering essential treatments unaffordable for many citizens.
State-affiliated actors in Iran who control clandestine trade routes oppose changes to the status quo and have obstructed diplomatic efforts and meaningful economic reforms.
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to persecute, imprison, and censor political dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and religious minorities, with penalties including lengthy prison terms and death sentences.
Iran maintains an extensive public health care system that is supplemented by private hospitals, clinics, and voluntary health care services.
Iran remains under stringent international sanctions due to its ideological hostility toward the West, specifically Israel and the United States.
Iran aims to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, with an intermediate goal of a 50% reduction by 2035.
Iran has a long history of civil society activism despite decades of repression both before and after the 1979 revolution.
Complex and opaque customs regulations, bureaucratic hurdles, inflation, and currency volatility create uncertainty for Iran’s trading partners.
In non-political cases, the Iranian legal system provides a greater degree of due process, though corruption and political connections still interfere with proceedings.
Since the late 2010s, repression of civil society in Iran has intensified, resulting in the closure of many NGOs and high-profile court cases against activists.
LGBTQ+ individuals in Iran face severe repression, with homosexuality being criminalized and potentially punishable by death.
Discriminatory policies and attitudes in Iran have hardened in recent years, reducing the reality of equal opportunity.
High-profile corruption cases in Iran are often politically motivated and used to discredit or sideline rival factions rather than being pursued as a genuine effort to enforce transparency.
Iran struggles to implement structural reforms in the areas of subsidies, foreign trade, and financial policy.
Iranian policymakers have avoided long-term economic reforms due to the country's volatile socioeconomic climate, which has been marked by nationwide protests in recent years.
Approximately 90% of Iran's population possesses health insurance, primarily provided by the Social Security Organization (SSO) and the Iran Health Insurance Organization (IHIO).