Iran is likely to remain defiant about constraining its development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon, though it may remain cautious about testing intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The United States should support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring Iran's nuclear activities by providing diplomatic and financial support, technical resources, and information sharing.
Mohammad Javad Zarif intends to dissuade European and Asian countries from pressuring Iran and aims to prevent consensus within the IAEA and the UN to penalize Iran for nuclear misconduct or missile testing.
The animosity between Iran and Saudi Arabia is driven primarily by geopolitical differences and the pursuit of regional primacy, rather than solely by ethnic and sectarian divisions.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson engaged with the Iranian government on the margins of the UN meetings in September 2017 to resolve implementation issues and demonstrate U.S. oversight of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The United States should not discourage allies and partners from engaging in civil nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as in safety, security, regulation, and nuclear medicine, provided such cooperation is permitted under the JCPOA.
Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights analyzed the future of Iran's militant proxies in Iraq, specifically focusing on 'mini-Hizballahs' and Revolutionary Guard-affiliated groups, in a May 9, 2017, War on the Rocks article.
Iranian pragmatists, led by President Hassan Rouhani, prioritize economic interests over revolutionary ideology.
Russia maintains that issues regarding Iranian compliance with the JCPOA should be addressed diplomatically with the participation of all P5+1 countries on an equal basis.
Thomas Erdbrink reported in the New York Times on July 25, 2017, that Iran is central to China's global ambitions.
Exposing Iranian activities has historically resulted in diplomatic damage to Iran, such as the 2011 exposure of an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington and the exposure of an Iranian arms network in The Gambia, which caused a break in diplomatic relations.
The United States must fully comply with its JCPOA commitments to ensure that the potential restoration of sanctions would effectively impact Iran's economy.
Iranian arms shipments to groups in Yemen, Gaza, and the Gulf violate United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and destabilize the region.
Unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran are insufficient to moderate Iranian behavior and could trigger an Iranian response and a process of escalation.
Russia works in unison with Iran in Syria, Iran is central to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Europe fears that conflict with Iran would exacerbate regional unrest and increase the number of refugees.
The objective of a regional or subregional nuclear regime would be to displace indigenous Iranian nuclear fuel-cycle activity and restrict Iran's development and testing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
Iran was forced to the nuclear negotiating table in large part because the United States designed and coordinated a broad multilateral coalition to sanction Iran.
Under the JCPOA, the United States is committed to lifting secondary sanctions and allowing non-U.S. entities to conduct business with Iran, with specific exceptions for U.S. industries in aviation, agriculture, and medicine.
The cornerstone of U.S. strategy regarding Iran should be to dissuade and prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state or a threshold state capable of acquiring nuclear weapons within a matter of weeks.
Coercion, including military operations, intelligence activities, and targeted sanctions, should serve as the backbone of the U.S. strategy to address Iranian nuclear and regional challenges.
The author argues that the United States can help strengthen independent Iranian economic activity to undermine opaque, regime-controlled economic conglomerates that facilitate the IRGC’s economic reach.
The author notes that it will be legally and politically difficult for U.S. policymakers to certify that Iran has made the substantial progress necessary to allow limited U.S. commercial ties, and that private U.S. companies may avoid the Iranian market due to the high-risk business environment and due diligence costs.
The JCPOA functions by Iran accepting verifiable limits on its nuclear program in exchange for the United States and the European Union lifting sanctions that targeted the nuclear program.
The United States should maintain the possibility of future corporate involvement with Iran, despite the current political climate.
The International Monetary Fund published a report on the Islamic Republic of Iran in February 2017.
Iran should be amenable to creating de-escalation zones and spheres of influence in Syria to stop the fighting, given the exhaustion on all sides of the conflict.
Israel's threat assessment regarding Iran has evolved to include Iran's buildup of Hezbollah as a sophisticated proxy on Israel's northern border, as well as Iranian support for Islamic Jihad and Hamas.
Transfers of ballistic missile items to and from Iran are prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, and the United States should prioritize resources to work with international partners to interdict these shipments.
Increasing commercial ties with the United States is a polarizing topic in Tehran, where pragmatists welcome such ties, but hardliners are skeptical of U.S. motivations and prefer working with Asian and European partners who impose fewer restrictions and do not criticize Iran's domestic behavior.
Saudi-Iranian tensions have persisted for forty years, evidenced by events such as the 1990s Khobar Towers bombing and Saudi concerns regarding Iranian support for Shia minorities in eastern Saudi Arabia and Shia majorities in Bahrain.
If American-supported forces retake the border crossing between Anbar and Deir Ezzor Provinces from the Islamic State, they would cut off Iranian transit options, though the terrain remains inhospitable for Shia militia groups regardless of who holds it.
The United States should maintain a channel for dialogue with Iran despite active counter-efforts, because Iranian cooperation is necessary to end civil wars and the two nations share common interests.
Iran may retaliate against increased international pressure by utilizing non-nuclear and non-regional avenues, specifically through cyber warfare.
The United States should prioritize keeping Iran out of the Golan Heights and Israel's border areas over limiting Iranian control of lines of communication in Syria and Iraq.
Iran views cyber warfare as a credible retaliatory threat against the political and economic institutions of the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.
Iranian pragmatists view détente with the United States as a critical prerequisite for sustained economic growth in Iran.
Russia's primary regional concern regarding Iran is finding a balance between Iranian and Israeli interests in Syria, where Iran acts as a situational ally and Israel as a conditional friend.
J. Matthew McInnis authored the report 'The Future of Iran’s Security Policy: Inside Tehran’s Strategic Thinking' for the American Enterprise Institute on May 31, 2017.
Iranian pragmatists believe that revolutionary slogans adopted in 1979, such as "death to America," do not serve the current interests of Iran.
The United States should use its influence in Baghdad to weaken the Popular Mobilization Units, which are Shia militia groups often supported by Iran, and press the Iraqi government to decommission them or integrate them into the Iraqi security forces.
Iran's rivalry with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council members has escalated from a simmering feud to a significant feature of the regional landscape in the last several years.
A small, enduring U.S. military presence in Iraq provides political influence that the United States can use to check Iran's policies and seek negotiated political outcomes.
The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush attempted to intimidate Iran militarily and support Iranian democracy activists between 2000 and 2008, yet during this period, Iran attacked U.S. forces in Iraq, causing approximately 1,000 U.S. casualties, and the Iranian reform movement withered.
Iran is more likely to be amenable to regional or global nuclear initiatives than to approaches that single it out, though Iran frequently cites double standards regarding the United States and Israel.
The effective use of engagement by the United States aims to: 1) provide a reliable and low-cost vehicle to issue warnings, clarify intentions, underscore bottom lines, and emphasize choices available to Iran’s leadership and the costs of those choices; 2) offer a mechanism for de-confliction and de-escalation, particularly in acute scenarios driven by miscalculation or inadvertent accidents; 3) demonstrate to U.S. partners, particularly those in Europe and Asia, that the United States is willing to engage constructively on issues of shared interests.
Russia acts as a significant check on United States efforts to counter Iran's nuclear and regional challenges, and even an improvement in U.S.-Russia bilateral relations would not fully eliminate tensions regarding Iran policy.
Russia assesses Iran's policies in the Middle East on a case-by-case basis and generally prefers pragmatists over radicals and ideologues.
Russia condemns U.S. military actions against Iranian interests but maintains a higher tolerance for Israeli military actions.
The United States should actively encourage the respect of human rights in Iran.
The United States should scrutinize transfers of nuclear or dual-use items through the Procurement Channel established by the JCPOA and approve them only when consistent with the deal's limitations on Iran's nuclear program.
The most effective U.S. engagement strategy with Iran may require utilizing multilateral mechanisms and working in concert with international partners.
The author suggests considering limited options to allow direct U.S. corporate involvement with Iran in exchange for the moderation of Iran’s nuclear, missile, and regional policies.
Since the U.S. drawdown from Iraq in 2011, the United States has maintained a force presence of roughly 30,000–40,000 troops in the Middle East to conduct missions such as operations against the Islamic State, ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, and deter destabilizing Iranian behavior.
Iran is currently complying with its core commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) temporarily diminished the acuteness of the Iranian nuclear threat for Israel, but also expanded Iran's income and capacity to increase its struggle against Israel through proxies and the development of long-range, accurate missiles.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has warned that compromising on revolutionary principles could weaken the Islamic Republic, citing Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts at perestroika as a factor that hastened the collapse of the USSR.
Joint Commission meetings serve as important opportunities for the United States to pass messages to Iran on sensitive issues, given the restricted direct communications between the two nations.
The Oman channel, which was used to facilitate contact between U.S. and Iranian officials during the Obama administration, remains a reliable option for communication despite being strained by its association with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is estimated to control between approximately 20 and 40 percent of the formal Iranian economy, in addition to potentially controlling a significant portion of the informal economy.
The government of Gambia severed diplomatic ties with Iran and ordered Iranian diplomats to leave the country on November 23, 2010.
The United States should utilize its alliance with Syrian Kurds to prevent Iranian weapons shipments in northern Syria.
Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, warned on June 15, 2016, that if the United States tears up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will torch the agreement.
The success of U.S. policy options toward Iran depends on smart diplomatic leadership, vigilant intelligence gathering and analysis, and a credible deterrence posture backed by military capacity.
The United States faces a balancing act in its relationship with Saudi Arabia because it shares concerns about Iran but often disagrees with Saudi tactics, strategy, and threat perceptions.
Ayatollah Khamenei instructed Iranian poets to uncover what he characterized as United States treason in a meeting held on June 21, 2016.
U.S. policy efficacy is enhanced by providing Iran a path to develop a peaceful nuclear program while ensuring the United States retains sufficient warning time and evidence to respond to any Iranian attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.
The IAEA's ability to address concerns about Iran's nuclear program is maximized by focusing on real information rather than political pressure, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Russia has no compelling interests regarding Iranian activism in Iraq, the Gulf, and Yemen.
The United States should ensure the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is prepared to expeditiously investigate any credible and specific information regarding Iran's compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including conducting inspections at any necessary sites, such as military sites.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in conjunction with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), will evaluate Iran’s financial system for safety, soundness, and the adequacy of controls for money laundering and terrorist financing following a period of reform and IMF technical assistance.
The United States can reinforce its case against Iran by focusing on Iranian testing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and arms sales that violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran fundamentally transformed Iran's attitude toward Israel from partnership and cooperation to visceral enmity, rivalry, and confrontation.
Karim Sadjadpour analyzed the potential for the United States to inadvertently enter into a war with Iran in an article published in The Atlantic on February 9, 2017.
Iran has become increasingly adept at conducting cyber espionage and disruptive attacks against domestic and foreign critics as a result of being a target of destructive cyber attacks by the United States and its allies.
Since the early 2000s, Iran has become Israel's preeminent security threat, characterized by rhetoric challenging Israel's right to exist, an aggressive nuclear weapons program, and active support for proxy wars against Israel.
Sanctions circumvention by Iran is a significant risk without the support of U.S. allies, as partners may refuse to comply with or enforce sanctions if they perceive the United States is acting based on politics or ideology rather than evidence of an Iranian nuclear breach.
The Trump administration has exacerbated tensions with Iran, contrasting with the unsuccessful attempts by previous Iranian and American presidents, such as Hassan Rouhani and Barack Obama, to change the dynamics of the U.S.-Iran relationship.
Israel's perception of the Iranian threat has escalated due to Iran's intervention in the Syrian civil war, the deployment of Iranian troops in Syria capable of opening a new front against Israel, and efforts to upgrade Hezbollah's armaments.
The United States should closely monitor Iran’s nuclear program in collaboration with friendly partners to detect any indication of activity to acquire nuclear weapons or otherwise violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and Holocaust denial helped the Obama administration isolate Iran by convincing the international community that Tehran was the primary obstacle to diplomacy.
Hezbollah's wartime strategy objectives involve tying together the Lebanese and Iranian fronts while simultaneously surviving militarily and politically within Lebanon.
The United States should support targeted maritime interdiction operations to intercept Iranian arms shipments to groups such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
Russia would not support Iran if Iran initiated unprovoked military action against the United States or Israel.
Hezbollah's funding did not decrease during the period of intensive sanctions pressure on Iran between 2010 and 2015.
The 'snapback' mechanism, which involves the threat to reapply lifted sanctions, serves as the United States' essential leverage for encouraging Iran's continued compliance with the JCPOA.
The United States should work with international counterparts to pre-plan for a coordinated, proportional response to an evident Iranian breach of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Iranian agreement to any follow-on to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is likely to depend on a mix of U.S.-led pressure and gestures, forcing Iran to choose between restraining its nuclear program for international benefits or facing isolation, sanctions, covert actions, and potential use of force.
The author recommends reinstating the U-turn license to allow foreign businesses to use U.S. banks to conduct dollar-denominated transactions relating to Iranian entities as an incentive for Iran to make further nuclear commitments or other concessions.
President George W. Bush stated on June 19, 2007, that all options remained on the table regarding Iran.
Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in a regional competition for influence and American support that predates the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Washington should collaborate with European and Asian partners who have commercial relations with Iran to ensure their investments do not strengthen Iranian government monopolies, cronies, and IRGC entities.
The application of a strategy to normalize Iran's nuclear program faces domestic opposition within the Iranian regime, resistance from U.S. domestic political actors, skepticism from U.S. regional allies in the Middle East, and opposition from Russia, which views such rapprochement as a threat to its influence and nuclear market share in Iran.
In Yemen, which is of lesser strategic importance to Iran, efforts to limit Iranian influence, including via naval interdictions, are likely to have a greater impact.
Exposing Iranian support for radical groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda, is damaging for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the eyes of the Iranian public, the Rouhani government, and the international community.
Emanuele Ottolenghi and Saeed Ghasseminejad analyzed the control of Iran's economy in a National Interest article published on May 20, 2015.
Ehud Yaari analyzed Iran's regional ambitions in the Levant in an article published by Foreign Affairs on May 1, 2017.
U.S. military and intelligence activities should focus on three objectives: (1) optimizing force posture and presence to deter problematic Iranian behavior, especially regarding the nuclear program and freedom of navigation; (2) light military deployments, especially in Iraq and Syria, to build political leverage and prevent Iran from achieving objectives that threaten the United States and its partners; (3) direct covert actions and maritime interdictions to directly counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior.
Tepid compliance with U.S. sanctions, particularly from Iran’s core energy customers, enables circumvention and undermines U.S. leverage and credibility.
Nuclear sanctions against Iran should be snapped back only in the event of an Iranian violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that is not satisfactorily addressed through the Joint Commission.
The concept of an Iranian land bridge is often misunderstood, as transporting large numbers of Iranian forces or materiel 1,000 miles across treacherous Middle Eastern terrain is impractical given Iran's existing air routes into Damascus and its assistance in building domestic weapons production capabilities for Hezbollah in Lebanon.
A proposed policy option for the United States is to negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) before the expiry of the JCPOA's uranium enrichment clauses, committing Iran not to scale up its infrastructure for developing nuclear weapons capabilities.
Increased bilateral ties between the United States and Iran have historically represented a double-edged sword for Iran.
The Swiss government has served as the U.S. protecting power in Iran since 1980 and could act as an interlocutor for U.S.-Iran communications beyond traditional consular duties.
The United States should undermine Iranian asymmetric activities globally by publicizing them to embarrass and isolate Iran.
Containment efforts by the United States and its partners cannot prevent Iran from developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, but these efforts can slow the program and increase its costs.
Diplomatic engagement provides the United States with intelligence and insight into Iran's calculations, decision-making, and behaviors.
Washington argues that Iran must be penalized for violating the nuclear agreement, whereas Beijing, Moscow, and most of Europe advocate for preserving the deal through diplomacy rather than increased pressure.
Petroleum sales accounted for almost 90 percent of Iran’s GDP growth in the first half of the 2016–2017 fiscal year.
The author recommends that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide additional technical support and guidance on market reform to Iran.
For the issue of American citizens detained in Iran, the United States must maintain direct communication using established mechanisms.
The United States holds Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on ships in the Bab al-Mandeb strait because the capability for such attacks is not indigenous to the Houthis.
Anti-Americanism is described as one of the main features of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama attempted to improve relations with Iran between 2009 and 2016, including through numerous letters written by Obama to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, yet Iran and its regional policies remained hostile toward the United States and U.S. interests.
Iran and Saudi Arabia are on opposing sides in the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, and their involvement, including the provision of weapons and money, has exacerbated these conflicts.
Russia believes that a U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) due to Iranian actions unrelated to the nuclear program would be unjustified.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) permits Iran to maintain a limited nuclear program, which the United States supports as a means to gain insight and influence over Iran's nuclear activities.
The U.S. administration should consider enlisting a prominent international statesperson, such as former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, to act as a neutral interlocutor in U.S.-Iran relations.
Barack Obama's early efforts to engage Iran helped convince Brussels, Beijing, and Moscow that the obstacle to negotiations was Tehran, not Washington.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated on April 27, 2016, that the United States had lifted sanctions against Iran only on paper.
Intelligence collection on Iran’s nuclear program should remain a national priority to monitor compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to detect any Iranian attempt at a covert nuclear breakout.
Israel is preparing for a potential direct military confrontation with Iran and its proxies if Iran resumes its pursuit of nuclear weapons, establishes a permanent military presence in Syria, or provides strategically destabilizing capabilities to Hezbollah, particularly if Israel perceives it is acting alone.
The United States and Iran have a bilateral maritime communication hotline, but it is rarely used by Iranian forces, particularly those operating in close proximity to U.S. and partner naval assets.
The United States should maintain cordial and private contact with Iranian officials on the margins of multilateral forums to address pressing issues.
The United States should utilize national authorities to sanction Iranian human rights abusers and companies that provide technology designed to support human rights abuses in Iran.
Track 2 engagements between American policy analysts, former administration officials, congressional staff, and their Iranian counterparts provide insight into current Iranian dynamics and offer a vehicle to test policy ideas.
Enabling partnerships between U.S. companies and independent Iranian firms could create learning opportunities that make Iranian firms more skilled, efficient, and profitable, which would over time undercut the IRGC’s economic position within Iran.
Israel's current response to the Iranian threat consists of deterrence (supported by long-range force projection and multilayered missile defenses), intelligence and covert actions, low-key military interdictions, and diplomacy.
The United States has limited military leverage to prevent the buildup of Iranian influence in Syria without risking a significant and unwise escalation.
Russia acknowledges Israeli security interests but recognizes that Iran will not accept being excluded from Syria or allow its supply line to Hezbollah to be severed.
The United States should pursue four non-mutually exclusive options to constrain Iran's long-term nuclear capabilities, all of which rely on assertive diplomacy supported by carrots and sticks.
The United States has utilized educational and cultural exchanges with Iran to support initiatives including internet freedom, culture, health, education, science, the environment, public diplomacy, and broadcasting.
Russia would condemn Hezbollah's actions as aggravating regional stability but would not hold Iran publicly responsible for those actions.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) extends Iran’s nuclear breakout time to one year, providing a window for potential military action if the agreement fails.
Iranian politics are authoritarian but not monolithic, with competing political factions holding different views on how to sustain the Islamic Republic.
The United States will gain credibility and authority among its allies if it demonstrates a willingness to accept positive outcomes in its discourse with Iran.
If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) fails, the United States must be prepared to take military action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal.
It is a fundamental U.S. interest to deny Iran the discretion to acquire nuclear weapons, both for nonproliferation purposes and for managing regional security and relations with Arab states and Israel.
The United States should make public details of illicit Iranian activity and share information about prior U.S. efforts to address this activity with security allies when sanctions are necessary.
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 calls on Iran to refrain from launching ballistic missiles designed to be capable of carrying a nuclear weapon.
During his confirmation hearing, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis stated: “I think to publicly display what Iran is up to with their surrogates and proxies, their terrorist units that they support, to recognize the ballistic missile threat, to deal with their maritime threat, and to publicly make clear to everyone what they are doing in the cyber realm all helps to constrain Iran.”
The United States could strengthen its diplomatic position regarding Iran by highlighting Iranian failures to ratify and properly implement the IAEA Additional Protocol and to secure a robust Broader Conclusion from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirming that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
The United States and Iran could find common ground in Iraq regarding political arrangements that maintain a strong central government while preventing Sunni alienation that could lead to renewed armed conflict.
A challenge to the U.S. strategy of building a case against Iran's nuclear program is that Iran is unlikely to blatantly violate the JCPOA in a manner that would justify the snapback of all nuclear sanctions.
Maintaining a U.S. voice on human rights issues, particularly in multilateral forums, is a crucial component of a comprehensive diplomatic strategy regarding Iran.
The effectiveness of sanctions against Iran relied on multilateral cooperation and compliance, particularly from the European Union, importers of Iranian oil, and the UN Security Council, which converted unilateral U.S. sanctions into a more effective multilateral effort.
Unilateral U.S. pressure is likely to fail if Iran perceives escape routes in Europe, Russia, and Asia.
In response to greater United States efforts to counter Iran in the region and expose its malign behavior, senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and hardline clerics may publicly threaten to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or reduce cooperation with the IAEA.
The United States should sharpen its sanctions to respond if Iran violates the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to target Iran’s destabilizing regional activities, but this requires bringing along partners that have economic leverage over Iran.
Multilateral efforts are more effective than unilateral U.S. pressure because Iran demonstrates more flexibility when facing a broad international front.
Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East.
Iran did not seriously engage in nuclear negotiations with the Obama administration until it faced a global economic embargo.
The potential establishment of an Iranian naval base in Syria or the deployment of high-end conventional forces could fundamentally reshape the strategic balance in the Levant and threaten Israel.
Russia considers Iran a situational ally in Syria and a candidate for joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Expanding people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Iran will empower Iranian constituencies that favor connectivity with the West and help mitigate mutual enmity fueled by restrictive travel prohibitions.
U.S. officials should aggressively identify, sanction, and counter Iranian missile procurement activities while coordinating with international counterparts to urge them to match U.S. sanctions designations.
Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, and S. R. Bohandy assessed the domestic roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in a 2009 RAND Corporation monograph titled 'The Rise of the Pasdaran'.
Iran's regional strategy centers on countering the United States and Israel, but it has increasingly focused on competition with Saudi Arabia, which Iran blames for the rise of Sunni radical groups like the Islamic State.
The JCPOA contains specific ambiguities and disputes regarding the interpretation of the cap on Iran’s heavy water stockpiles, accounting for nuclear waste products, Iran’s permitted R&D program on enrichment, and verification of the JCPOA’s Section T.
Russia insists that any differences regarding Iran's nuclear program be settled through negotiations and consultations.
The United States' posture toward Iran requires making it clear that any Iranian decision to pursue nuclear weapons acquisition would be detected early and resisted powerfully.
Most major countries, excluding the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, view Iran as a stable regional power and a tactical ally against radical Sunni jihadists like the Islamic State.
Mark Gregory reported on the expanding business empire of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in a BBC article published on July 26, 2010.
The United States should coordinate with the European Union and E3 partners, as well as Russia and China, to build consensus and maintain tools for addressing nuclear and related challenges involving Iran.
U.S. administration officials should work to shrink the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the Iranian economy by aggressively sanctioning IRGC front companies, banks, properties, and administrative leadership ranks to create financial constraints and signal macroeconomic incentives for a private sector.
The U.S. administration's strategy should focus on constraining Iran's nuclear activity after key JCPOA provisions expire, as agreed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program will slowly lift over time.
Ending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) without clear evidence of significant Iranian violations would weaken the United States' ability to contest Iran's destabilizing regional actions because the U.S. would be blamed for the deal's failure, hindering multilateral cooperation.
For a coercion-based strategy against Iran to succeed, the United States would need the firm backing of the P5+1 and a strong consensus to penalize Iranian noncooperation, paired with positive incentives such as trade, investment, nonlethal equipment transfers, and peaceful nuclear cooperation.
United States sanctions officials should impose sanctions in response to Iranian provocations immediately rather than waiting for JCPOA reporting or certification deadlines to avoid the perception that sanctions are intended to undermine the nuclear deal.
Sanctions enforcement against Iranian petroleum is difficult without robust cooperation from Iran’s customers, who are often reluctant to accept the inconvenience and price spikes associated with halting crude purchases.
Rosatom, a Russian state-run nuclear company, views Iran as an important customer, and the Russian government does not want to limit Rosatom's operations in Iran.
U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia is complicated by the fact that pulling back can provoke Saudi Arabia to act more aggressively, while reassuring Saudi Arabia can make the United States appear complicit in Saudi actions, thereby increasing tensions with Iran.
The United States should coordinate with international partners to ensure that any potential snapback of sanctions against Iran is multilateral, as a unilateral U.S. response would likely fail to generate sufficient economic leverage and would signal a fractured international coalition.
The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) should be adopted by the broader Combined Task Force 150—which covers the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Oman—rather than just the Gulf states and Iran, to increase the likelihood of Iranian acceptance.
Constructive engagement allows the United States to communicate positions to the Iranian government, demonstrate that the United States is not the enemy of the Iranian people, and build the multilateral support necessary to address nuclear and regional challenges.
The United States can leverage incidents of Iranian malfeasance to signal deterrence and reassurance more effectively than in the past by moving beyond low-profile USCENTCOM press releases to high-profile news conferences where senior officials stand in front of intercepted Iranian weapons.
The United States and China jointly chair a working group focused on modernizing the Arak heavy water reactor in Iran to prevent it from producing weapons-grade plutonium.
Generating international support to prevent a significant Iranian military buildup in Syria is more realistic than achieving the demobilization of Shia militias and the withdrawal of Hezbollah from western Syria.
The United States aims to make the Iranian economy less susceptible to malign actors such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 restricts transfers of arms, ballistic missile components, and nuclear material to and from Iran, and imposes targeted financial and travel sanctions on designated persons for a limited duration.
Implementing a regional or subregional nuclear regime could help defuse concerns about Iran's nuclear activity while serving broader US regional and global nonproliferation interests.
A combination of pressure and engagement is the most effective strategy for changing Iran's calculus regarding nuclear and regional issues.
The United States should conduct contingency planning and joint exercises with regional allies to deter Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, particularly as enrichment restrictions expire and breakout times narrow.
The U.S. administration’s September 24 travel proclamation suspends and limits entry by Iranians to the United States, but stipulates exceptions for valid student and exchange visitor visas, provided they undergo enhanced screening and vetting.
Iran's reactions to increased United States efforts to counter and expose Iranian power and influence in the Middle East will likely vary based on the geopolitical importance of the specific area to Iran.
Under the JCPOA, Iran is obligated to implement the Additional Protocol and ratify it within eight years.
In the face of serious pushback and a willingness to accommodate its interests, the Iranian government may be willing to tone down some of its ambitions and accept political settlements that the United States can accept.
Principlists in Iran, led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, define themselves by loyalty to the principles of the 1979 revolution, including strict Islamic mores domestically and a resistance-based foreign policy.
Russia opposes any U.S. military intervention in Iran, although Russia is unlikely to respond to such an intervention with force.
Iranian foreign policy actions, ranging from activities in Syria to Venezuela, are framed by the Iranian government as efforts to resist the United States and Israel, while domestic unrest is frequently attributed to American and Zionist plots.
President Donald Trump delivered remarks regarding the United States' strategy on Iran on October 13, 2017.
Karim Sadjadpour authored the article 'The Sources of Iranian Conduct' for Foreign Policy on October 12, 2010.
The United States and Iran have a history of working together to bring the post-Taliban government to power in Afghanistan and share an interest in stopping the opium trade and stabilizing the country.
In Syria and Iraq, which are core areas of Iranian influence, the Iranian government is unlikely to be deterred or persuaded to curtail its investments.
Excessive U.S. hostility toward the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is likely to discourage other participants in the deal and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from assertively monitoring Iran's nuclear program due to fears of triggering conflict within the IAEA Board of Governors or with Iran.
Hanin Ghaddar argued in a November 23, 2016, Washington Institute for Near East Policy analysis that Iran may be utilizing Iraq and Syria as a bridge to reach Lebanon.
Iran is likely to acquiesce to a long-term American military presence in Iraq if Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Iraqi leadership privately press the case in Tehran, provided the force levels are low enough that Iran does not perceive them as a threat.
The enmity toward the United States held by Iranian hardliners is driven by both the ideology of the 1979 revolution and the need for self-preservation, as the regime seeks external antagonism for internal political expediency.
The second Gulf War diminished the threat Iraq posed to Iran and removed the buffer Iraq provided against Iranian force and influence projection into the Levant.
Iran has not ratified four specific international treaties or conventions regarding nuclear safety, the handling of spent and irradiated fuel, the physical protection of nuclear materials, and nuclear liability, whereas all other countries with purely peaceful nuclear programs have done so.
The U.S. administration should maintain the policy allowing U.S. diplomats to meet with their Iranian counterparts at international meetings.
The United States should aggressively identify and sanction individuals and entities that Iran uses to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to prevent banks and companies from inadvertently facilitating Assad's aggression.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls Iran’s ballistic missile program and a significant portion of its regional force projection.
The United States serves its short- to medium-term strategic interests by maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) because scrapping the deal would remove existing constraints on Iran's nuclear program and weaken the U.S. position for future negotiations.
To counter Iran’s regional threats, U.S. military and intelligence efforts should aim to detect and deter Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, limit the regional influence of Iranian forces and their surrogates (most notably Hezbollah), and protect the freedom of navigation and U.S. forces deployed in the region.
Security vacuums in eastern Syria will persist for years, providing Iran with opportunities to increase its influence and move materiel and personnel despite U.S. efforts to limit such movement.
“If pro-American tendencies come to power in Iran, we have to say goodbye to everything.”
Russia supports U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the future.
Iran's primary objective regarding lines of communication in Syria and Iraq is to maintain control over as many routes as possible to facilitate the movement of the IRGC Quds Force, Hezbollah, and other Shia militias, while ensuring battlefield flexibility and developing diversified supply routes.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated in July 2014: "reconciliation between Iran and America is possible, but it is not possible between the Islamic Republic and America."
The United States should oppose Iranian conventional military buildups in Syria by interdicting weapons shipments, exposing Iranian behavior, assisting Israel in countering Iranian actions, and pressing Russia to diplomatically prevent such a buildup.
Russia rejects any linkage between the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran’s regional activism.
The United States maintains forces at al-Tanf in Syria, which has successfully cut off Iranian use of the southern and most direct route from Baghdad to Damascus.
Publicizing details of illicit Iranian activity and sharing information with allies will bolster the credibility of U.S. foreign policy and demonstrate that the United States is pursuing its concerns in a manner consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).