A strong US focus on the Indo-Pacific and competition with China may lead the United States to treat crises in Europe and the European periphery as secondary priorities.
Hilpert argues that the global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms is codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China, even in regions like Europe where it may appear to be an internal debate.
Both Republican and Democratic lawmakers in the United States criticize the Trump Administration's use of unilateral import tariffs and threats, arguing that these measures alienate American allies in Europe and Asia and weaken the United States' position against China.
The European Investment Bank provides significant funding for infrastructure projects in Africa as part of Europe's engagement strategy.
Europe has assumed the primary role of protecting liberal Western values and the rules-based multilateral order.
The authors of the SWP Berlin report argue that it is in the interest of Germany and Europe for US critics of a purely confrontational China policy to have more influence in Washington.
The global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms is codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China, affecting internal debates in other regions like Europe.
The American and Chinese spheres of influence overlap, particularly in Europe, where services from both nations are present.
France advocates for Europe to assume some of its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific region, such as through the deployment of EU flotillas that include the United Kingdom.
Establishing a third technopolitical sphere of influence would require Europe to invest in developing home-grown alternatives for all key technologies.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current conflict of values, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
Europe's understanding of multilateralism and international rules is fundamentally different from China's approach of Sinocentric multi-bilateralism.
A balanced US policy toward China that weighs both cooperation and confrontation would alleviate pressure on European capitals to choose sides between the United States and China.
Europe is largely dependent on the United States and China for core digital technologies.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current conflict of values, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
The United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies, despite Europe's dependence on them for digital technologies.
The US-China rivalry has global consequences, affecting relationships with other powers, regional dynamics in Europe, and the functioning of international organizations like the G20 and the United Nations.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens', which may lead the United States to prioritize competition in the Indo-Pacific and treat crises in Europe and its periphery as secondary.
Growing mistrust between the United States and Europe is evidenced by Donald Trump's reaction to European Commission fines imposed on Google for competition law violations.
Europe is currently developing policy instruments to manage its relationship with China, specifically focusing on foreign investment screening and complementary national legislation.
Germany and Europe have a vital interest in upholding liberal values internally and preserving a liberal order internationally, and therefore must prioritize these values in their relations with China.
China regards Europe as a useful entity that presents little obstacle to its own development, unlike the United States.
Germany and Europe have a vital interest in upholding liberal values internally and preserving a liberal order internationally in the context of systemic competition with China.
Both Republicans and Democrats in the United States Congress criticize the Trump Administration's use of tariff threats, arguing that these measures alienate allies in Europe and Asia and weaken the United States' position against Beijing.
Europe's understanding of multilateralism and international rules differs fundamentally from Sinocentric multi-bilateralism.
Internal political debates in regions like Europe are codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China.
The European Investment Bank provides considerable funds for African infrastructure as part of Europe's engagement strategy.
Establishing a third technopolitical sphere of influence for Europe would require significant financial investment and the development of home-grown alternatives for all key technologies.
Xuewu Gu argued in a Handelsblatt commentary on December 22, 2019, that Europe must pursue a 'third way' and act independently.
The United States and China have overlapping spheres of influence, particularly in Europe, where services from both nations are present.
Europe has limited ability to contain the status conflicts between the United States and China, which have intensified following the end of the collective leadership model in China and the concentration of power under Xi Jinping.
While Europe is largely dependent on the United States and China for digital technologies, the United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies.
Leading Democrats in the United States Congress and most Democratic candidates for the 2020 presidential election advocated for China policies similar to those of President Donald Trump, despite criticizing his political style and his approach to allies in Asia and Europe.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens,' prioritizing competition with China in its foreign policy.
Germany and Europe must treat systemic competition with China as a serious matter rather than a trivial opinion.
China views Europe as useful and as presenting little obstacle to its own development, in contrast to the United States.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current ideological conflict, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert argue that Europe must develop a China policy that is part of a comprehensive European strategy of self-assertion, rather than a standalone country strategy.
Europe has assumed the primary role of protecting liberal Western values and the rules-based multilateral order, while future US administrations may reclaim a normative leadership role.
Trade practices of the US and China and welfare losses from their conflict affect Germany and Europe.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens,' which may lead the United States to prioritize competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and treat crises in Europe and its periphery as secondary.
China observes that Europe works to preserve multilateralism and the liberal world order, while also experiencing its own political and economic problems with the Trump Administration.
China views Europe as presenting little obstacle to its own development and as a useful entity, unlike the United States, which China views as a significant obstacle.
Germany and Europe have a vital interest in upholding liberal values internally and preserving a liberal order internationally in the context of systemic competition with China.
Europe has assumed the primary role of protecting liberal Western values and the rules-based multilateral order.
Europe is likely to pursue a strategy of relying on technologies from both the United States and China, but requires a review of its dependencies to make this bi-directional interdependence truly strategic.
China observes that Europe works to preserve multilateralism and the liberal world order, while also experiencing political and economic problems with the Trump Administration.
Leading Democrats in Congress and nearly all Democratic candidates in the 2020 presidential primaries advocated for China policies similar to those of President Donald Trump, despite criticizing his political style and his approach to allies in Asia and Europe.
The American and Chinese spheres of influence overlap in Europe, where services from both nations are present.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert advocate for 'supranational geopolitics' in Europe's approach to China, requiring increased supranationality.
The volume published by the SWP examines the repercussions of US-China rivalry on international institutions and on Europe, as well as the influence of both the United States and China on other states, regions, and societies.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert advocate for the adoption of 'supranational geopolitics' as a necessary component of Europe's approach to China.
European states may need to expand their engagement in the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to fill gaps created by the withdrawal or disinterest of the United States administration.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert argue that Europe must develop a China policy based on self-assertion and strategic autonomy rather than treating it as a simple country-specific strategy.
Europe is the world's largest exporter but holds market leadership in only a small number of digital technologies.
Europe is likely to pursue a strategy of selectively relying on technologies from both the United States and China, but must review its dependencies to determine which are acceptable.