French-style European strategic autonomy is divisive in Estonia because it is perceived to overlap with NATO.
Because they limit the scope of European strategic autonomy to Europe’s neighborhood, Lithuanians believe that the military capacity they need most is highly deployable light equipment.
In 17 European Union member states, the implications of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) efforts for the relationship with the United States is a leading issue of debate, ranking higher than implications for foreign policy and defense capabilities.
European leaders' frequent allusions to a "European army" have not advanced the debate on European strategic autonomy in the public sphere because leaders remain evasive about the precise form and approach such an organization would take.
Slovak officials state that Europe is 'somewhat moving towards the goal' of European Strategic Autonomy in areas ranging from political awareness and budgetary matters to operational collaboration.
Estonian officials believe that European strategic autonomy efforts should involve not only Europe’s neighbourhood but also the rest of the world.
Spain views NATO as key to its security policy and believes European strategic autonomy should focus on post-conflict stabilisation and crisis management in the European Union’s neighbourhood, particularly the Mediterranean.
Hungary is one of eight EU member states—alongside the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK—that take American misgivings about European Strategic Autonomy seriously.
The transatlantic relationship is the dominant factor in the German debate regarding European strategic autonomy.
Zagreb believes that the main role of European strategic autonomy should be to address the causes of problems like the 2015 migrant crisis, and it welcomes increased European engagement with neighbouring regions.
Spain defines European strategic autonomy as encompassing the European Union’s capacity to protect its interests in economics, civilian capabilities, and technological innovation, rather than just military issues.
Austria opposes adding a nuclear dimension to European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) because it is a leading voice in the international campaign for global nuclear disarmament.
Greece's primary concerns regarding European strategic autonomy are Cypriot sovereignty in relation to Turkey and the protection of Greek rights on the Aegean continental shelf and in the Greek exclusive economic zone.
Respondents to an ECFR survey identified energy independence as a key criterion for European Strategic Autonomy (ESA), particularly regarding Russia.
Respondents to an ECFR survey identified air-to-air refuelling, civilian capabilities, medical support and evacuation, interoperability, military mobility, drones, and increased coordination in implementing the European Defence Fund and PESCO as the most important capabilities for achieving European strategic autonomy.
Most Bulgarian policymakers and policy experts conceive of European strategic autonomy primarily as the capacity to conduct operations.
More than one-third of European Union member states define the acquisition of military and civilian capabilities as their priority, despite declaring uncertainty about whether to pursue European Strategic Autonomy.
Sweden fears that European Strategic Autonomy initiatives will duplicate the efforts of NATO, as Sweden maintains that territorial defence is not a task for the European Union.
The Left Bloc and the Communist Party in Portugal oppose European strategic autonomy efforts, characterizing them as the militarization of the European Union.
Poland is expected to continue viewing the United States and NATO as pillars of its security policy even if a new government takes power, though it may adopt a more positive approach to European strategic autonomy than it does under the current leadership.
There are significant geographical and functional divergences in EU member states' conceptions of European Strategic Autonomy.
France is the only EU member state that believes there has been significant progress towards European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) goals across all areas, including budgetary issues, general awareness, operational cooperation, and capability-related projects.
Poland believes that involving nuclear deterrence in European strategic autonomy is out of the question, due to its reliance on the United States security guarantee and its perception that French and British nuclear arsenals are too small, alongside uncertainty regarding Paris's and London's willingness to Europeanise their deterrence capabilities.
Maltese politicians avoid commenting on the military capabilities Europe needs for strategic autonomy due to a reluctance to engage in joint military operations, though they consider energy, information manipulation, and limiting European arms exports as elements of European strategic autonomy.
Estonian officials believe that territorial defence and post-conflict stabilisation should be common aims in European strategic autonomy efforts.
Slovenia believes European strategic autonomy (ESA) initiatives should be limited to the European Union's neighborhood, specifically the western Balkans, followed by eastern Europe and the Middle East.
In its 2017 Strategic Review, France shifted its focus from 'EU strategic autonomy' to an extended concept of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) following the Brexit referendum.
Twenty-four European Union member states believe that European Strategic Autonomy efforts should focus on Europe and its neighbourhood, including the Middle East and North Africa.
Romania would be concerned if European Strategic Autonomy efforts served as a substitute for NATO or distanced Romania from NATO and the United States.
Dutch officials believe European strategic autonomy initiatives should focus on Europe's neighbourhood and potentially sub-Saharan Africa, while reserving territorial defence as a task for NATO.
France views European Strategic Autonomy as compatible with NATO membership because it strengthens European countries' credibility as security actors and allies capable of contributing to collective defence.
Germany does not view the achievement of real European autonomy as a realistic goal.
The Croatian government believes European Strategic Autonomy could enable the European Union to assume a larger share of the defense burden, addressing United States requests.
Hungarian foreign policy and defence officials assert that the European Union should not attempt to rival NATO, and therefore Hungary advocates for a modest level of ambition regarding European Strategic Autonomy (ESA).
During its EU presidency in the second half of 2018, Austria supported European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) and emphasized the need to build up Europe’s defense technological and industrial base.
Slovakia believes that nuclear deterrence is beyond the scope of ambition that European strategic autonomy (ESA) efforts should address.
Italy is strongly committed to the transatlantic alliance and does not view European strategic autonomy efforts as a form of emancipation from United States hegemony.
Spain regards investment in strategic deployment and intelligence capabilities as necessary to achieving European strategic autonomy, with a priority on research and development in new technologies.
Croatian officials prefer to exclude the topic of nuclear deterrence from the European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) agenda.
Seventeen European Union member states, including France, Germany, and Italy, regard European strategic autonomy (ESA) as an important or somewhat important goal.
Italy's 2015 white paper on defence and 2018 plurennial document on defence state that European strategic autonomy is complementary to NATO, which should act with the European Union to reinforce Europe’s role as a security provider.
French President Emmanuel Macron is viewed as the champion of European strategic autonomy due to his Sorbonne speech and subsequent proposals, such as the European Intervention Initiative.
Estonia, Luxembourg, and Poland criticize the pursuit of European strategic autonomy because they perceive it as weakening the transatlantic relationship and desire to maintain a close relationship with the United States.
President Emmanuel Macron has promoted the concepts of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) and 'European sovereignty' as part of a larger project to create a 'Europe that protects'.
Seven European Union member states view European Strategic Autonomy as 'autonomy from' outside powers, while seven other member states view it as 'autonomy to' pursue national or European goals, with the remainder viewing it as both.
Italy holds that European strategic autonomy efforts are the best response to United States calls for Europe to take up a greater share of the defence burden.
Spanish officials characterize European strategic autonomy (ESA) as a somewhat important goal.
There is no extensive debate on European Strategic Autonomy in Ireland, and the term is rarely used outside of academic circles.
Romanian officials argue that collective defense should remain the responsibility of NATO, while European Strategic Autonomy initiatives should prioritize military and civilian capabilities and readiness.
Italian policymakers prioritize pursuing European strategic autonomy through investment in information and decision-making autonomy, as well as autonomy of action.
Portugal views European strategic autonomy efforts as an opportunity to integrate and strengthen the European defense industry.
European strategic autonomy, along with concepts like European sovereignty and strategic sovereignty, seeks to promote a more capable and independent European Union during a period of increasing geopolitical competition.
Europe needs to think strategically and holistically about its challenges, such as energy independence and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, to determine if European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) is the appropriate vehicle for addressing them.
France is the leading proponent of European strategic autonomy, viewing it as a continuation of its concept of national strategic autonomy.
Of the 12 European Union member states that joined the 16+1 framework, eight declared in an ECFR survey that China was not part of their discussion of European strategic autonomy.
Slovakia prioritizes establishing decision-making autonomy and maintaining the political support of France and Germany in its pursuit of European Strategic Autonomy.
Hungary includes non-military autonomy, specifically regarding foreign policy, energy, and civilian capabilities, in its approach to European Strategic Autonomy.
Poland advocates for better management of existing military capabilities and remains sceptical about the need to develop new military capabilities as part of European strategic autonomy.
Slovakia supports increased investment in technological innovation, specifically in artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology, and quantum computing, as part of European strategic autonomy efforts.
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, and Romania perceive European Strategic Autonomy primarily as autonomy of action, which requires military and civilian capabilities and operational readiness.
Cooperation with the United Kingdom on matters central to European strategic autonomy is essential for the European Union, particularly due to the perceived unreliability of the United States president.
A group of countries including Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK view United States concerns regarding European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) as strange, based on a misunderstanding, or economically motivated.
Slovenian policymakers and experts frame the debate on European strategic autonomy (ESA) in terms of the need for the European Union to make a greater contribution to NATO.
Bulgarian officials believe that collective territorial defence and post-conflict stabilisation are suitable ambitions for European strategic autonomy (ESA).
Four European Union member states regard information autonomy as their top priority for European Strategic Autonomy, while seven member states prioritize decision-making autonomy.
Experts in Estonia view European Strategic Autonomy as unnecessary and damaging to NATO, while experts in Lithuania view it as potentially delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between NATO and European Union activities.
Slovenian officials view European strategic autonomy (ESA) and NATO as perfectly compatible, allowing for a division of tasks between the two entities.
Eight European Union member states are concerned about criticism from Washington regarding European defense efforts, though only Cyprus regards United States complaints as a direct threat to European Strategic Autonomy.
Maltese officials believe European strategic autonomy efforts and NATO can be compatible, provided NATO avoids delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities, and they view American concerns about European strategic autonomy as a misunderstanding that Europe needs to resolve.
Spanish officials view information autonomy, autonomy of action, and decision-making autonomy as equally important components of European strategic autonomy.
Austria, as a neutral country, looks to France and Germany to lead efforts regarding European Strategic Autonomy (ESA).
The European Union Global Strategy provides limited definition regarding the content of European Strategic Autonomy, creating an ambiguity that has led to confusion within the union and criticism from the United States.
European strategic autonomy efforts aim to strengthen the capacity of Europeans to act together and utilize comparative advantages when allies are unwilling to assist.
Greek officials believe United States concerns about European strategic autonomy stem from a misunderstanding that can be resolved through clear explanation.
Romania believes that European Strategic Autonomy and NATO are compatible as long as Europe avoids decoupling, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities.
Romanian officials believe that European decision-makers should take United States concerns about European Strategic Autonomy more seriously than they currently do.
In Romania, debate regarding European strategic autonomy is limited to political elites and policy experts, with the general public not participating.
The Croatian government advocates for making European Strategic Autonomy and NATO compatible with each other.
Spanish officials believe that nuclear deterrence should not be part of European strategic autonomy efforts.
Greek officials view cooperation on capability-related projects like PESCO and joint deployments like the European Intervention Initiative as significant progress toward European strategic autonomy.
Ireland views the inclusion of any nuclear component in European strategic autonomy as highly problematic because the country regards global nuclear disarmament as a foreign policy goal.
There is an ongoing debate among the authors of the ECFR paper regarding whether the concept of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) should focus exclusively on security and defence or encompass a broader foreign policy project to protect core interests.
Latvia believes that the European Union should take United States concerns about European strategic autonomy seriously in order to sustain the transatlantic partnership.
Slovakia, along with Bulgaria, France, Italy, and Slovenia, considers United States concerns regarding European strategic autonomy (ESA) initiatives to be strange, arguing that these initiatives address Washington's demands for Europe to contribute more to the defense burden.
Spain defines European strategic autonomy as the freedom to both conduct operations and to operate independently of other powers.
Austria, Croatia, Estonia, and Malta perceive European Strategic Autonomy primarily as information autonomy, which involves intelligence, analysis, and data collection.
Latvian officials perceive NATO and European strategic autonomy as compatible, provided that Europe avoids delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between the activities of the two frameworks.
There is significant disagreement between European Union member states over whether progress has been made towards European strategic autonomy (ESA), partly due to the ambiguity of the concept.
Sweden avoids using the term “European strategic autonomy” and maintains a complex position on the concept.
Bulgaria is concerned about its immediate neighborhood regarding the geographical focus of European strategic autonomy, while remaining relatively uninterested in the Middle East and North Africa.
Cyprus believes the initial military steps for European strategic autonomy should include improving European Union defense capabilities, specifically by enhancing autonomous analysis capacity and intelligence sharing among member states.
Lithuanian policymakers believe that European strategic autonomy efforts should extend to regions neighboring Europe and sub-Saharan African countries, focusing on post-conflict stabilization, crisis management, and first-entry missions.
For France, European Strategic Autonomy is based on freedom of decision-making, which requires an integrated process and autonomy of action in conducting operations.
Hungary's attitude toward European strategic autonomy will depend on an assessment of the concept's impact on Hungarian national sovereignty.
The publication of the EU Global Strategy did little to help the concept of European Strategic Autonomy gain traction in European capitals.
European strategic autonomy is a goal for Germany, which feels obligated to assist France in providing leadership in this area.
European strategic autonomy is not intended to replace the relationship between the European Union and the United States.
The Polish government perceives the current push for European strategic autonomy as resulting from some European Union member states' ambitions to end their dependence on the United States.
European strategic autonomy initiatives involve closer security cooperation between European Union member states and a focus on threats to Europe that are not addressed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
It is unclear whether European Strategic Autonomy can advance through incremental changes to institutions like PESCO and the European Defence Fund, or if it requires a fundamental revolution in EU procedures.
European strategic autonomy encompasses nuclear deterrence, the transatlantic relationship, NATO, and various forms of strategic autonomy, areas in which the United Kingdom will continue to play a crucial role post-Brexit.
Most European Union member states view European strategic autonomy efforts as a means to build Europe's capacity for action rather than a way to gain autonomy from the United States.
The Czech government views European strategic autonomy efforts and NATO as compatible, provided that Europe avoids delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities.
Hungary believes that European Strategic Autonomy efforts and NATO can be compatible, provided that Europe avoids delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between the activities of the two organizations.
Bulgarian officials are surprised by United States opposition to European strategic autonomy, as they view it as a way for Europe to take up a greater share of the defence burden.
Debates regarding European strategic autonomy within European Union member states are largely a response to recent criticism of the European Union by the United States.
Portugal believes the European Union must utilize a combination of military, political, economic, technological, and civilian tools rather than relying solely on soft power and normative leadership, due to rising international tensions.
Slovenian officials are surprised by United States concerns regarding European strategic autonomy (ESA), viewing ESA as the best way to answer Washington's calls for Europe to take up a greater share of the defense burden.
The role the United Kingdom can play in European strategic autonomy remains unclear due to diverging views among European Union member states.
Seventeen European Union member states define the discussion of European Strategic Autonomy in their countries as being entwined with their relationship with the United States.
Greek officials are optimistic about the progress EU member states have made toward European strategic autonomy.
By improving Europe's strategic autonomy, France aims to ensure that the continent can protect its security interests even if the United States and NATO do not or cannot act.
The United Kingdom frames the debate on European strategic autonomy primarily through the lens of its relationship with the United States.
The Netherlands considers non-military areas, such as the economy and energy, to be elements of European strategic autonomy.
The Netherlands delegates nuclear deterrence to NATO and views European strategic autonomy as useful only for post-conflict stabilisation and crisis management in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Italy's concept of European strategic autonomy is limited to the complementarity between national and European priorities.
Zagreb believes that Europe has made some progress towards achieving European strategic autonomy goals.
European strategic autonomy is not a prominent topic in Austrian public debate, though Austrian policymakers and experts are aware of the issue and intend to support its strengthening.
The German media and public have developed an interest in European strategic autonomy due to the tense relationship with the United States, even if they do not explicitly use that specific term.
In Greece, discussion of European strategic autonomy remains limited to a small group of policy experts and policymakers.
The Swedish government's approach to European strategic autonomy (ESA) aligns with the 1998 Anglo-French St Malo declaration, which emphasizes that the European Union should act with partners whenever possible, but on its own if necessary in operational matters.
The United Kingdom has little confidence that the European Union’s efforts to strengthen its defence capabilities, including through European Strategic Autonomy initiatives, will be successful.
The drafting process of the EU Global Strategy, which introduced the concept of European strategic autonomy, initially received little interest from Berlin.
Romanian officials do not see value in adding a nuclear component to European Strategic Autonomy but favor greater cooperation on intelligence matters.
Spain believes that United States objections to European strategic autonomy initiatives are driven purely by economic concerns, specifically the potential for these initiatives to help establish an autonomous European defence technological and industrial base.
Spain is among the one-third of European Union member states that see NATO and European strategic autonomy as compatible with each other.
Sweden fears that the pursuit of European strategic autonomy could damage its bilateral relationship with the United States and threaten the European Union’s intergovernmental decision-making system.
Austria prefers to allow other European capitals to shape the debate on European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) and strengthen European capabilities, provided the process does not disrupt Austrian domestic politics.
Hungary is less ideologically opposed to European strategic autonomy than Poland.
Denmark has been engaged in a discussion about European strategic autonomy since the 1990s, when the country received an opt-out from European Union cooperation on military and defense-related decisions and activities.
French President Emmanuel Macron, in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech, referred to 'Europe’s autonomous operating capabilities,' thereby anchoring the concept of European strategic autonomy more explicitly in defense and security matters.
Romania is among the few European countries that view European Strategic Autonomy efforts as having a major role in first-entry missions and high-tech operations.
Luxembourg's leaders invoke the principle of European strategic autonomy in the context of recent United States political developments, such as the election of President Donald Trump, which have cast doubt on the NATO security guarantee.
Slovakia advocates for European strategic autonomy (ESA) to focus on non-military areas, including foreign policy, economic autonomy, civilian capabilities, and energy security.
European Union member states that include China in their strategic autonomy discussions cite China's inroads into Europe regarding political influence, technology, and economic interests as the primary reasons.
Ten European Union member states prioritize autonomy of action over information autonomy and decision-making autonomy in their efforts to develop European Strategic Autonomy.
Discussions on European strategic autonomy in Estonia have been mostly restricted to academics and military experts, though the national media has covered the topic several times.
Mainstream Portuguese political parties, including the governing Socialists, the Social Democrats, and the Christian Democrats, accept the political value of European strategic autonomy.
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) conducted a study on European strategic autonomy by utilizing a network of researchers in all 28 European Union member states to interview more than 100 policymakers and analysts, while also reviewing policy documents, academic discourse, media analysis, and opinion polls.
Portugal considers European strategic autonomy and NATO compatible, provided Europe avoids delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities.
The ideological alignment between the Trump administration and the Polish government is a factor in Poland's concerns regarding European strategic autonomy.
Slovenia desires European strategic autonomy (ESA) efforts to focus on research and development, viewing this as an opportunity for Slovenian companies.
The concept of European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) generates little interest in Belgium, with discussions primarily limited to think-tanks and academia.
Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are the six European Union member states where diplomats and defence experts regard European strategic autonomy as a contentious issue.
Most Italian experts believe that Italy has a limited leadership role in European strategic autonomy, while France and Germany hold crucial roles.
Lithuanians see autonomy of action as more important than decision-making autonomy or information autonomy within the context of European strategic autonomy.
Maltese officials and experts prioritize increases in information autonomy over decision-making autonomy or autonomy of action when pursuing European strategic autonomy.
The Netherlands maintains that NATO should remain the cornerstone of Dutch and European security, and that the pursuit of European strategic autonomy must not weaken NATO or delink European security from American security.
The Polish government will subscribe to European strategic autonomy efforts only if they complement NATO and avoid delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities.
Slovakia is concerned that prioritizing military purchases from European firms could lead to overpricing, and therefore does not view this prioritization as essential for achieving European strategic autonomy.
Slovakia supports the pursuit of European strategic autonomy (ESA) primarily because it recognizes the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.
The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers European strategic autonomy an important goal.
Belgian political leaders transfer responsibility for European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) to the European level to avoid addressing the issue domestically.
Italy's engagement with European strategic autonomy efforts began in 2016 when it contributed to the launch of the EU Global Strategy.
US criticism of EU defence initiatives has increased uncertainty among Europeans regarding whether and how to pursue strategic autonomy, while simultaneously causing the debate on European Strategic Autonomy to gain momentum in EU member states.
Greece advocates for European strategic autonomy to become a framework for territorial defence.
Latvia's public discourse does not treat European strategic autonomy as an independent topic, despite efforts by experts to initiate a debate on the subject.
German policy experts and policymakers discuss European strategic autonomy primarily in response to criticism from the United States.
Discussions of European strategic autonomy in Lithuania are often limited to the issues of a proposed European army or the initiative’s potential to clash with NATO.
Leadership from France and Germany is considered necessary but insufficient to ensure the continuation of European strategic autonomy efforts following the departure of the United Kingdom, one of Europe’s two major defence and security powers, from the European Union.
Portugal advocates that European strategic autonomy should enhance intergovernmental cooperation among member states rather than promoting new areas of supranational integration.
German policymakers view European strategic autonomy as a mechanism to foster a shared strategic culture in Europe and to improve efficiency and interoperability in national defense capabilities.
Sweden emphasizes operational autonomy in its conception of European Strategic Autonomy, stating that the European Union should act with partners whenever possible, but on its own if necessary.
Greek officials follow the 'single set of forces' principle, which aims to complement European strategic autonomy with NATO.
Czech policymakers expect European strategic autonomy efforts to serve as a framework for post-conflict stabilization, crisis management, first-entry missions, and higher-end operations.
The Croatian government views European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) as an opportunity for its domestic defense sector.
Romanian elites view European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) as a mechanism for Europe's consolidation and coordination of defense policies, but they consider NATO the only means to protect national security.
Belgian policymakers and policy experts define European strategic autonomy as the European Union's capacity to complete specific tasks in cooperation with international partners, focusing on territorial defense, counter-terrorism, migration policy, and new technologies.
The European Union intentionally leaves the exact content of major ideas like European Strategic Autonomy ambiguous to inspire support and allow potential backers to project their own interpretations onto the concept.
The Netherlands identifies strategic transport, medical evacuation capacity, and improvements to military training as necessary components to achieve European strategic autonomy.
Slovenia views European strategic autonomy (ESA) as a useful framework for post-conflict stabilization and crisis management, and advocates for developing European military capabilities in areas such as airlift.
There is almost no public or expert discussion of European strategic autonomy in Croatia, and the country's prime minister, defence minister, and foreign minister have rarely mentioned the concept in public.
Greek officials consider nuclear deterrence to be within the scope of European strategic autonomy, although there is little domestic debate on the topic.
Bulgarians emphasize that cooperation on European strategic autonomy does not require the creation of a European army or an alternative to NATO.
French defence strategists view European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) as important due to the emergence of new hybrid threats and the advent of a US administration that has strained transatlantic ties.
Discussions regarding European strategic autonomy are infrequent in Hungary.
Lithuania opposes any attempts to delink, duplicate, or discriminate between European strategic autonomy efforts and NATO activities, viewing the United States as a key partner in defending against Russia.
Lithuanian officials perceive European strategic autonomy as a pragmatic tool for managing Europe's neighborhood, but they explicitly reject it as a substitute for NATO.
Lithuania believes that Europe should make a greater effort to consider United States sensitivities when developing European strategic autonomy.
Portugal views European strategic autonomy as complementary to NATO, provided it enhances transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and considers NATO paramount in its foreign and security policy.
Slovakia defines European Strategic Autonomy primarily as the autonomy to conduct operations, a view influenced by the European Union's inability to resolve the conflict in Ukraine.
The German discourse on European strategic autonomy became prominent only after the election of Donald Trump as US President.
German policy experts note that the concept of European strategic autonomy remains vague and is currently focused primarily on defense issues.
Most European Union member states define the level of ambition required for European strategic autonomy based on the post-conflict stabilisation and crisis management missions outlined in the Lisbon Treaty.
The Danish government feared that the pursuit of European strategic autonomy through the creation of an European Union army would have disrupted the transatlantic relationship and altered the position of NATO within the European security architecture.
Maltese officials and experts generally view the immediate European neighbourhood, particularly Mediterranean states, as the appropriate area for European strategic autonomy initiatives.
The Netherlands views European strategic autonomy initiatives as opportunities to assist NATO in areas where the alliance has fewer capabilities or less experience, such as counter-terrorism and civilian border patrol.
Slovenia regards NATO as a collective defense system protecting the European Union from external threats, and believes European strategic autonomy (ESA) initiatives can enable Europe to play a stronger role within the alliance and become a security actor in its neighborhood.
Hungary has chosen to wait for other European Union member states to develop a common understanding of European strategic autonomy before clarifying its own position.
German voters have gained interest in European strategic autonomy due to US criticism of European defense capability efforts and US President Donald Trump's specific focus on Germany.
Romanian elites believe the European Union has made significant progress toward European Strategic Autonomy by raising political awareness and fostering collaboration on capability-based projects like Permanent Structured Cooperation.
The pursuit of European strategic autonomy could appeal to Estonians because they view security guarantees as an important part of Europe’s geopolitical framework.
Hosting discussions on European strategic autonomy in Nordic, Baltic, and central and eastern European states would broaden the debate beyond the Franco-German perspective and incorporate the positions of those countries.
Denmark faces a dilemma regarding European strategic autonomy because it wants to protect its security relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom, which have been its main allies for decades, while simultaneously recognizing that these countries may no longer be reliable partners.
Estonia is the only European Union member state where officials explicitly characterize current European strategic autonomy efforts as unnecessary and damaging to NATO.
Bulgarian officials view European strategic autonomy and NATO as compatible, provided that member states avoid delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities.
Most EU countries view European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) efforts as having mixed results, with Slovenia and Malta seeing little progress, and Croatia believing the EU is further away from achieving ESA than it previously was.
Cyprus has engaged in limited domestic discussion regarding European Strategic Autonomy (ESA).
Estonian officials view the development of conventional military capabilities as the most vital aspect of European strategic autonomy.
Eleven European Union member states, including Denmark, Poland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, view European strategic autonomy (ESA) as an unimportant or contested goal.
Finland views European strategic autonomy as fully compatible with and complementary to NATO, believing that a more capable and integrated Europe makes for a more valuable partner for the United States.
Austria considers European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) important for the European Union because it expects the United States will eventually turn away from Europe.
European strategic autonomy consists of three main components: information autonomy, decision-making autonomy, and autonomy of action.
Lithuania is supportive of European integration and does not oppose collaboration within the framework of European strategic autonomy.
Croatia prioritizes information autonomy over decision-making autonomy or autonomy of action in its approach to European strategic autonomy efforts.
The Netherlands views European strategic autonomy as a contested idea that lacks clarity, prompting the country to discuss the term's meaning at an informal meeting of the EU’s Council of Ministers in Bucharest in January 2019.
No European Union member state considers China's military build-up or the growing strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region as reasons to include China in the debate on European strategic autonomy.
Ireland believes that United States criticism of European strategic autonomy efforts is motivated by economic concerns rather than a genuine belief that these efforts threaten NATO.
Implementing qualified majority voting instead of unanimity in EU foreign and security policy decision-making is a potential requirement for European Strategic Autonomy.
The United Kingdom views European Strategic Autonomy as a contentious goal, influenced by the uncertainty surrounding Brexit and the country's future role in Europe.
Greece considers foreign policy, energy, and civilian capabilities to be issues relevant to European strategic autonomy.
From the Romanian perspective, the European Union should pursue European Strategic Autonomy in its southern and eastern neighborhoods and sub-Saharan Africa, provided the EU has the capacity to do so.
The Croatian government perceives United States concerns regarding European Strategic Autonomy as a misunderstanding that Europe needs to resolve.
The domestic debate in Bulgaria regarding European strategic autonomy is described as chaotic, with the topic gaining relevance since Bulgaria held the European Union presidency in 2018.
The Netherlands adopts a pragmatic, capability-related approach to European strategic autonomy, prioritizing autonomy of action over decision-making and information autonomy.
According to an ECFR survey, 15 European Union member states do not include China in their discussions regarding European strategic autonomy.
The Polish government believes European strategic autonomy should focus on post-conflict stabilisation and crisis management rather than war-fighting and deterrence.
Spain is one of only seven European Union countries that view greater solidarity on defence and security as necessary to achieving European strategic autonomy.
In Slovakia, the goal of achieving European Strategic Autonomy is considered only 'somewhat important' to foreign and defense policy, with the Ministry of Defense attaching more importance to it than the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.
The revival of the debate on European strategic autonomy is highly contentious in Denmark.
Slovakia views European strategic autonomy (ESA) efforts as compatible with NATO, provided that Europe avoids delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between the activities of the two.
The Netherlands views European strategic autonomy (ESA) as a contested goal due to the ambiguity of the concept and concerns among some Dutch experts and policymakers that it could lead to the creation of a European army.
Several European Union member states are skeptical of European Strategic Autonomy because they perceive it as being focused on capabilities for territorial defense.
It is necessary to distinguish between 'EU strategic autonomy' and 'European strategic autonomy' in the context of post-Brexit security cooperation.
Lithuanian officials conceive of European strategic autonomy as Europe’s freedom to conduct operations, but they are skeptical about framing it as autonomy in relation to other powers.
The European Union could potentially reverse international trends toward nationalism and become a significant power by leveraging its economic resources and single market influence in the pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Latvian officials perceive energy and the information sphere as important aspects of European strategic autonomy.
The debate regarding European strategic autonomy is currently overly focused on criticism from the United States toward the European Union.
Because Turkey prevents Cyprus from joining NATO, the government of Cyprus believes that European strategic autonomy efforts and NATO should avoid delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities to ensure the European Union can rely on NATO's command structure.
Estonia views the concept of European strategic autonomy as inefficient and vague, and believes it emphasizes independence from other powers more than the freedom to conduct operations.
Bulgarians primarily discuss the concept of European strategic autonomy in the context of defense rather than economic or energy issues.
European strategic autonomy would facilitate larger-scale and more diverse security cooperation between the European Union and the United Kingdom compared to EU strategic autonomy.
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) asserts that Europeans must demonstrate leadership and unity in pursuing strategic autonomy to avoid struggling to wield influence domestically and internationally.
Slovakia believes that European Strategic Autonomy efforts should focus on post-conflict stabilization and crisis management, and that the EU should develop capabilities to intervene in crises near its borders, particularly in the Balkans and eastern Europe.
Almost all European Union member states consider European Strategic Autonomy to be compatible with their NATO commitments, provided they avoid delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between NATO and European Union activities.
Hungary considers nuclear deterrence to be outside the scope of European Strategic Autonomy due to its assessment of Europe’s reliance on the United States' nuclear arsenal.
Sweden is reluctant to support European strategic autonomy (ESA) due to the country's neutrality and the perceived risk that the concept could threaten the European Union's intergovernmental decision-making system or decouple Europe from the United States.
Discussions in Romania regarding European strategic autonomy focus on implications for foreign policy, the relationship with the United States, and Romanian defense capabilities.
Romanian officials worry that the pursuit of European Strategic Autonomy will lead Europe to delink or decouple from the United States in fields other than defense.
Eight European Union member states believe that European Strategic Autonomy should enable the European Union to conduct first-entry missions and higher-end operations, such as coordinating diverse capabilities and fighting in high-intensity situations.
Hungary argues that European Strategic Autonomy should be geographically limited to Europe’s neighbourhood and functionally focused on crisis management, with potential inclusion of cyber security.
Twenty-two European Union member states view European Strategic Autonomy as concerning post-conflict stabilization and crisis management.
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) research indicates that France considers European strategic autonomy (ESA) to be an important goal of its foreign and defence policies.
Greece aims to pursue European strategic autonomy initiatives while maintaining a strong link to NATO.
If European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) develops further, Austria may be forced to re-evaluate its neutrality and military capabilities to fulfill Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, which is the European Union's collective defense clause.
Portugal debates the political and operational impact of European strategic autonomy primarily at governmental and military levels, with limited discussion in parliament, media outlets, or other forums.
Czech officials worry that the United States misunderstands European strategic autonomy and believe that Europe needs to explain the concept more clearly to ease tension in the transatlantic relationship.
Malta's constitutional commitment to neutrality leads the country to prioritize national sovereignty in security matters and view European strategic autonomy through the lens of national interest and regional crisis management.
Portuguese leaders define European strategic autonomy not as a pursuit of self-sufficiency, but as the capacity for the European Union and its member states to decide and act when and where necessary.
Denmark has opted out of European Union defence cooperation since 1992, which prevents the country from participating in new initiatives designed to develop European strategic autonomy (ESA).
Lithuanian policymakers and policy experts define European strategic autonomy as encompassing a wide range of non-military issues, including foreign policy, the threat of secondary sanctions, civilian capabilities, energy security, and hostile information operations.
Denmark worries that the pursuit of European Strategic Autonomy will lead to the establishment of a supranational EU army.
Latvians generally view NATO as a more natural and credible framework than European strategic autonomy efforts for addressing their primary military concern, which is territorial defense against Russia.
Latvian officials believe that European strategic autonomy efforts should play a role in both collective defense and post-conflict stabilization.
In an ECFR survey, Estonia and Lithuania expressed concern about the compatibility of NATO and European Strategic Autonomy, citing risks of delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities.
France, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Slovakia perceive European Strategic Autonomy primarily as decision-making autonomy, which relies on political will and the decision-making process.
Differences in geopolitical outlooks among European countries threaten efforts toward European Strategic Autonomy.
Differences between European countries’ strategic cultures are a major hurdle to European Strategic Autonomy and the formation of a European army.
Bulgaria's approach to European strategic autonomy is similar to Germany's, as it supports efforts to strengthen autonomy and views the involvement of all European Union members as fundamental to this process.
EU member states prioritize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; cyber defence; conventional capabilities; missile defence; and strategic deployment capabilities as important for European strategic autonomy.