Economically focused governments are generally less likely to pursue ambitious climate policy, though they may be more willing to utilize market-based instruments if they deem climate action necessary.
The author analyzed 21 OECD countries with implemented carbon pricing policies between 1990 and 2022 to determine how government positions influence climate policy measures.
The author applied heterogeneous time lags to first-difference estimation models to account for country-specific delays in the translation of independent variables into climate policies.
The book 'Carbon Captured: How Business and Labor Control Climate Politics' (MIT Press, 2020) analyzes the influence of business and labor groups on climate policy outcomes.
Empirical evidence regarding the impact of left-wing governments on climate policy is mixed, as numerous studies have failed to find a robust effect.
In corporatist arrangements, industrial polluters can voice their interests and soften climate policy proposals through institutionalized access to the political decision-making process.
The hypothesis that ambitious climate policy becomes less likely if the least environmentally friendly veto player moves further away from the government position is not supported by the study's results.
Meckling and Jenner (2016) analyzed varieties of market-based policy and instrument choice in climate policy.
The author analyzes within-case variance to understand the causal mechanisms that drive climate change policymaking.
The debate on partisan theory in climate policy is primarily driven by the economic left-right dimension of political contestation, which originates from the historical cleavage between labor and capital.
The hypothesis that ambitious climate policy becomes less likely if the least environmentally friendly veto player moves further away from the government position is not supported by the regression results.
In corporatist political structures, industrial polluters can soften climate policy proposals through institutionalized access to decision-making processes, as their interests are typically bundled in peak organizations.
Carbon pricing policies are part of a broader climate policy portfolio that includes voluntary programs, subsidies, R&D investment, and regulatory approaches.
The author analyzed 21 OECD countries with implemented carbon pricing policies between 1990 and 2022 to determine how government positions influence climate policy measures.
The translation of a government's position into climate policy depends on the number and preferences of veto players in the political system, with policy change being less likely when veto players are strong and ideologically distant from each other.
Current literature provides no empirical evidence for a decoupling of the economy and the environment, which supports the use of an environmental-productionist dimension to measure government positions for climate policy.
The existence of partisan effects on carbon pricing implies that voters can have a direct impact on climate policy by electing parties that prioritize environmental issues over economic growth.
Governments that exclude polluter interests from decision-making processes may be able to enforce far-reaching climate policies, though they risk policy failure due to the mobilization of polluters.
Partisan theory in the field of climate policy is primarily debated due to a focus on the economic left-right dimension of political contestation, which originates from the historical cleavage between labor and capital.
Economically focused governments are generally less likely to pursue ambitious climate policy, but they may be more willing to utilize market-based instruments if they determine climate action is necessary.
The validity of partisan theory is debated in environmental and climate policy due to the traditional cleavage between labor and business interests.
It is frequently argued that left-wing governments are more willing to implement ambitious environmental and climate policies.
The main research literature on partisan effects in environmental and climate policy is limited to policy outcomes because quantifying policy outputs or portfolios is difficult.
The intensity of carbon pricing policy decreases as the number of recently adopted climate policies increases.
The author argues against using the traditional left-right dimension to measure party positions in the context of climate policy, proposing instead a continuum ranging from prioritizing the economy to focusing on environmental issues.
The need for intensive carbon pricing policies may be reduced if a government has recently implemented many other climate policy measures.
High carbon dependence in an economy is expected to generate strong opposition to ambitious climate policy from interest groups and the public, as such policies are associated with high costs.
The diffusion of climate policies has a positive impact on a government's decision to price carbon more intensively.
Political interests regarding climate policy should be measured on a continuum ranging from exclusively prioritizing the economy to an exclusive focus on environmental issues, referred to as an environmental-productionist dimension.
The author proposes that political party interests in climate policy should be measured on a continuum ranging from exclusively prioritizing the economy to exclusively focusing on environmental issues.
Steinebach, Y., Fernández-i-Marín, X. & Aschenbrenner, C. (2021) published 'Who puts a price on carbon, why and how? A global empirical analysis of carbon pricing policies' in Climate Policy.
Meckling and Jenner (2016) analyzed varieties of market-based policy and instrument choice within climate policy.
Skovgaard, J., Ferrari, S. S. & Knaggård, Å. (2019) published 'Mapping and clustering the adoption of carbon pricing policies: what polities price carbon and why?' in Climate Policy.
Carbon dependence of an economy can generate strong opposition to ambitious climate policy from well-organized interest groups or the general public.
Research results indicate that a government's political position is a decisive element for climate policy measures, alongside institutional frameworks, economic conditions, and situational pressures that limit or expand a government's ability to act.
The author applies heterogeneous time lags in political output analysis to address country-specific delays in the translation of independent variables into climate policies.
The author asserts that economic and environmental interests are currently incompatible in climate policy and represent opposing interests.
There is limited existing literature regarding the specific choices governments make when selecting instruments for climate change policy, indicating a need for further research.
Recent adoption of climate policies is associated with less intensive carbon pricing policies.
A government's political position is a decisive element for climate policy measures, alongside institutional frameworks, economic conditions, and situational pressures that limit or expand a government's ability to act.