Secretary of State Rex Tillerson engaged with the Iranian government on the margins of the UN meetings in September 2017 to resolve implementation issues and demonstrate U.S. oversight of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The United States should not discourage allies and partners from engaging in civil nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as in safety, security, regulation, and nuclear medicine, provided such cooperation is permitted under the JCPOA.
Ilan Goldenberg wrote an article in Fortune on December 17, 2016, discussing how James Mattis could potentially prevent Donald Trump from withdrawing the United States from the Iran nuclear deal.
Russia maintains that issues regarding Iranian compliance with the JCPOA should be addressed diplomatically with the participation of all P5+1 countries on an equal basis.
The United States must fully comply with its JCPOA commitments to ensure that the potential restoration of sanctions would effectively impact Iran's economy.
Donald Trump's hostile rhetoric and refusal to recertify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) caused Iranian pragmatists to distance themselves from Washington and align with Iranian hardliners.
Under the JCPOA, the United States is committed to lifting secondary sanctions and allowing non-U.S. entities to conduct business with Iran, with specific exceptions for U.S. industries in aviation, agriculture, and medicine.
Jarrett Blanc served as the deputy lead coordinator and State Department coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation at the U.S. Department of State under President Barack Obama, where he was responsible for the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The JCPOA functions by Iran accepting verifiable limits on its nuclear program in exchange for the United States and the European Union lifting sanctions that targeted the nuclear program.
The Near Eastern Affairs Bureau should act as the primary lead and coordinator for JCPOA implementation activities, provided it is appropriately staffed, has an interagency mandate, and maintains a direct line to the Secretary of State and other senior policymakers.
While President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif would oppose abandoning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may view such a move as a necessary response to United States pressure.
The United States would risk undermining its position by imposing sanctions on Iran without first establishing multilateral groundwork, even if such re-listing does not technically breach the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The United States should scrutinize transfers of nuclear or dual-use items through the Procurement Channel established by the JCPOA and approve them only when consistent with the deal's limitations on Iran's nuclear program.
Iran is currently complying with its core commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) temporarily diminished the acuteness of the Iranian nuclear threat for Israel, but also expanded Iran's income and capacity to increase its struggle against Israel through proxies and the development of long-range, accurate missiles.
The Oman channel, which was used to facilitate contact between U.S. and Iranian officials during the Obama administration, remains a reliable option for communication despite being strained by its association with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
There is a fundamental disagreement regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Washington and Tehran: Washington officials argue it is permissible to sanction Iran for non-nuclear behavior, while Tehran believes any additional sanctions constitute a violation of the agreement.
Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, warned on June 15, 2016, that if the United States tears up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will torch the agreement.
Effective implementation of the JCPOA requires a coordinated interagency process involving the U.S. Departments of State, Energy, and Treasury, as well as the intelligence community.
If the United States breaches the JCPOA, it risks losing its leadership role in the Joint Commission, which would result in outcomes reflecting other participants' interests rather than those of the United States.
Absent unprovoked massive United States nuclear sanctions, Iran's nuclear response to a combined coercion and pressure campaign would likely be designed to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) itself and to split the P5+1.
The United States should ensure the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is prepared to expeditiously investigate any credible and specific information regarding Iran's compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including conducting inspections at any necessary sites, such as military sites.
Option 1 for constraining Iran's nuclear capabilities involves building a case around current and future challenges to the implementation of the JCPOA and related UN Security Council resolutions to deny Iran the legitimacy to expand nuclear activities as restrictions expire.
The United States should closely monitor Iran’s nuclear program in collaboration with friendly partners to detect any indication of activity to acquire nuclear weapons or otherwise violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The Joint Commission is the discussion and dispute resolution body established by the JCPOA to address issues related to the agreement.
If the United States takes significant steps beyond non-certification to abrogate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and unilaterally reimpose nuclear-related sanctions, it will foreclose the policy option of engagement and the ability to use diplomacy to engineer outcomes.
Russia would likely oppose a U.S. initiative to conclude a follow-up nuclear agreement to the JCPOA if the terms of the agreement are too stringent.
The 'snapback' mechanism, which involves the threat to reapply lifted sanctions, serves as the United States' essential leverage for encouraging Iran's continued compliance with the JCPOA.
The United States should work with international counterparts to pre-plan for a coordinated, proportional response to an evident Iranian breach of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Iranian agreement to any follow-on to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is likely to depend on a mix of U.S.-led pressure and gestures, forcing Iran to choose between restraining its nuclear program for international benefits or facing isolation, sanctions, covert actions, and potential use of force.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under economic duress and never offered a strong endorsement of the agreement.
In a meeting with a group of Iranian poets, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei suggested they write "to-the-point poetry . . . expressing the Americans’ instances of treason in the issue of JCPOA" in order to sour popular views about the deal.
The Joint Commission, which oversees the JCPOA, meets at the political director or ministerial level, and the United States should maintain that level of participation.
The United States' ability to maintain containment efforts and secure cooperation from third countries is contingent upon the perception that the United States is acting in good faith, which for many nations begins with the continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei regularly complains about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) unmet economic expectations, blaming the United States for scaring away foreign business while denouncing foreign investment as a Trojan horse for Western imperialism.
Carnegie nuclear expert Mark Hibbs stated: “If Tehran aimed to divide the P5+1 and aggravate Israel and Western countries, it might do things not expressly forbidden by the JCPOA but that would not be in the spirit of the accord. Iran’s scientists might do theoretical studies suggesting they are interested in nuclear weapons, enriching uranium with lasers, and plutonium metallurgy; Iran’s diplomats might get suddenly tougher in negotiations with the IAEA over access to places inspectors want to visit.”
The United States sought to sustain non-nuclear restrictions in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 because missile-related issues were not resolved by the JCPOA.
Nuclear sanctions against Iran should be snapped back only in the event of an Iranian violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that is not satisfactorily addressed through the Joint Commission.
A proposed policy option for the United States is to negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) before the expiry of the JCPOA's uranium enrichment clauses, committing Iran not to scale up its infrastructure for developing nuclear weapons capabilities.
Russia believes that a U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) due to Iranian actions unrelated to the nuclear program would be unjustified.
Avner Golov, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Ellie Maruyama, Ilan Goldenberg, and Nicholas Heras authored the report 'After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A Game Plan for the United States' for the Center for a New American Security on October 19, 2015.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) permits Iran to maintain a limited nuclear program, which the United States supports as a means to gain insight and influence over Iran's nuclear activities.
Ayatollah Khamenei stated in an October 21, 2015, press release from the Office of the Supreme Leader that the snapback of sanctions would constitute a violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Intelligence collection on Iran’s nuclear program should remain a national priority to monitor compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to detect any Iranian attempt at a covert nuclear breakout.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) extends Iran’s nuclear breakout time to one year, providing a window for potential military action if the agreement fails.
Russia would stand by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and considers any U.S. move to withdraw from the agreement as destabilizing.
If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) fails, the United States must be prepared to take military action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal.
A challenge to the U.S. strategy of building a case against Iran's nuclear program is that Iran is unlikely to blatantly violate the JCPOA in a manner that would justify the snapback of all nuclear sanctions.
In response to greater United States efforts to counter Iran in the region and expose its malign behavior, senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and hardline clerics may publicly threaten to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or reduce cooperation with the IAEA.
The United States should sharpen its sanctions to respond if Iran violates the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to target Iran’s destabilizing regional activities, but this requires bringing along partners that have economic leverage over Iran.
The U.S. State Department previously established a special office under the Secretary of State to oversee early implementation efforts of the JCPOA.
The Trump administration ceased certifying that the sanctions relief provided under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was appropriate and proportionate to Iran's actions.
The JCPOA contains specific ambiguities and disputes regarding the interpretation of the cap on Iran’s heavy water stockpiles, accounting for nuclear waste products, Iran’s permitted R&D program on enrichment, and verification of the JCPOA’s Section T.
The U.S. administration's strategy should focus on constraining Iran's nuclear activity after key JCPOA provisions expire, as agreed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program will slowly lift over time.
Ending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) without clear evidence of significant Iranian violations would weaken the United States' ability to contest Iran's destabilizing regional actions because the U.S. would be blamed for the deal's failure, hindering multilateral cooperation.
United States sanctions officials should impose sanctions in response to Iranian provocations immediately rather than waiting for JCPOA reporting or certification deadlines to avoid the perception that sanctions are intended to undermine the nuclear deal.
In an August 2015 letter to President Hassan Rouhani, Ayatollah Khamenei warned that “Any imposition of sanctions at any level and under any pretext (including repetitive and fabricated pretexts of terrorism and human rights) . . . will constitute a violation of the JCPOA and the [Iranian] government would be obligated to take the necessary action . . . and stop its activities committed under the JCPOA.”
President Donald Trump's refusal to recertify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) vindicates Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's cynicism regarding the deal.
Under the JCPOA, Iran is obligated to implement the Additional Protocol and ratify it within eight years.
If there is evidence that an Iranian entity de-listed under the JCPOA is conducting sanctionable activity, U.S. officials should work quietly and directly with Iranian officials and security allies to address the concerns, or consider other means such as covert action and law enforcement interdiction.
Excessive U.S. hostility toward the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is likely to discourage other participants in the deal and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from assertively monitoring Iran's nuclear program due to fears of triggering conflict within the IAEA Board of Governors or with Iran.
Pushing the IAEA to test its monitoring authorities under the JCPOA without legitimate information risks signaling to other participants that U.S. monitoring efforts are motivated by politics and ideology.
The United States serves its short- to medium-term strategic interests by maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) because scrapping the deal would remove existing constraints on Iran's nuclear program and weaken the U.S. position for future negotiations.
Russia rejects any linkage between the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran’s regional activism.
Publicizing details of illicit Iranian activity and sharing information with allies will bolster the credibility of U.S. foreign policy and demonstrate that the United States is pursuing its concerns in a manner consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).