China is expanding its military capabilities to enable the projection of power through and beyond the first and second island chains.
China and Russia have acquired hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) technologies, which China views as advantageous because they cannot be detected or destroyed by currently available defense systems.
China has quadrupled its financial contributions to United Nations organizations over the decade preceding 2020, while the United States has gradually scaled back its contributions.
The United States questions whether the Chinese economic model, characterized as a politically authoritarian, interventionist, and mercantilist state capitalism, is compatible with a world trade and finance system based on liberal principles.
The development and export of surveillance and social control technologies by Chinese high-tech firms assists authoritarian regimes and promotes the spread of illiberal governance concepts.
Poland and Hungary have prevented European Union member states from presenting a united front at the United Nations regarding China.
Chinese observers question whether the United States prioritizes maintaining American supremacy or if it would concede leadership in specific areas if China fundamentally democratized.
Europe has limited ability to contain the status conflicts between the United States and China, which have intensified following the end of the collective leadership model in China and the concentration of power under Xi Jinping.
Both China and the United States have threatened the European Union and European businesses with disadvantages if they do not align with their respective demands.
President Xi Jinping's political course of authoritarianism and nationalism has contributed to increased American rejection of China.
In the United States, the rise of China is widely regarded as a danger to America's own dominant position in the international system.
The symbiotic economic relationship between the United States and China, known as "Chimerica," no longer exists.
The United States government has officially classified China as a 'long-term strategic competitor' in strategy documents since 2017.
Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, advocates for a hard economic course against China, including the implementation of import tariffs, based on human rights concerns.
The publication 'Strategic Rivalry between United States and China' was written before the COVID-19 pandemic began.
Susan L. Shirk argues that China has returned to personalistic rule under Xi Jinping in her 2018 article 'China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: The Return to Personalistic Rule'.
The security dimension of the rivalry between the United States and China began attracting growing attention by the early 2000s.
Excluding Huawei from the European Union Single Market would accelerate the European Union's efforts to achieve digital sovereignty relative to China.
Legislation signed by President Donald Trump in late November 2019 banned American companies from selling crowd control software to the Chinese government.
North Korea's successful tests of long-range missiles have not altered the Chinese assessment that US missile defense systems are primarily aimed at strategic stability rather than just North Korean threats.
Politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States influenced public opinion regarding China prior to the election of Donald Trump.
China emerged from the 2008 financial crisis largely unscathed and invested significant fiscal resources into expanding its influence within multilateral organizations.
Since 2013, China has held leadership roles in four of the fifteen specialized agencies of the United Nations: the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).
The European Union should maintain an independent position in trade disputes between the United States and China to uphold the principles of the European Single Market, such as non-discrimination and rules-orientation.
Poland signed bilateral treaties with the United States regarding missile defense and committed to excluding Chinese technology from its 5G network.
M. Taylor Fravel and other authors published an article titled 'China Is Not an Enemy' in the Washington Post on July 3, 2019.
Realistic Chinese analysts view the relationship between rising and declining powers as an unavoidable zero-sum game, yet they believe the Chinese and US governments have a responsibility to prevent conflict and war.
American criticism of China is categorized into three dimensions: normative (human rights and democratic values), security, and economic.
China views its nuclear weapons as symbols of great power status and as a deterrent against military intervention or threats from the United States.
The United States government views the expansion of Chinese military capabilities as a direct threat to American military bases located in Japan, South Korea, and Guam.
Some observers argue that fears of China replacing the United States as the global leader are exaggerated and that it is unclear if China views this goal as necessary or feasible.
In March 2019, Italy became the first G7 state to sign onto China's Belt and Road Initiative, subverting the desire of other European Union member states to negotiate participation in the initiative as a unified European bloc.
The United States government accuses China of engaging in unfair competition.
China ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling in its territorial dispute with the Philippines.
The United States Congress responded to concerns about Chinese influence by holding hearings and introducing legislative proposals, including the Foreign Influence and Transparency Act and the Countering Foreign Propaganda Act.
China has enhanced its ability to monitor important fiber-optic internet exchange points in response to US surveillance capabilities.
States that are technologically dependent on the United States or China face new political challenges due to the emergence of technopolitical spheres of influence.
The United States and China are exerting strong pressure on third states, such as Germany, regarding the use of Huawei technology.
The European Union derives its strength in dealings with China and other great powers from the democratic disposition of its member states, its supranational institutional order, its autonomous legal order, the size and potential of the Single Market, the common currency area, and its common trade and competition policy.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China risks escalating into a multi-layered world conflict that poses both economic and military dangers.
The United States maintains a network of alliances and partnerships with nations that perceive China as a security threat.
Chinese observers believed Donald Trump was merely replicating a familiar pattern of US presidential candidates presenting China as a competitor and adversary during campaigns, similar to Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and Bush Jr.
China aims to control the 'second island chain', an area extending from the Kurils through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, and the Carolines, to secure East Asian sea routes.
The tendency of China and the United States to prioritize bilateral negotiations harms international organizations by leaving them outmaneuvered.
International partners perceive China's strategic narratives as being closely tied to Xi Jinping's concentrated power, leading to the assumption that China seeks hegemony and exerts pressure on societal forces in partner countries.
The 1989 Tiananmen massacre and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire confirmed Chinese fears regarding American attempts at subversion.
China views nuclear weapons as symbols of great power status and as deterrents against other nuclear-armed states.
The European Union's connectivity strategy serves as a counter-approach to the one-sided dependencies that many Asian and African nations fear from China's Belt and Road Initiative.
China is reportedly turning the South China Sea into a protected bastion for nuclear-armed submarines to safeguard its second-strike capability against the United States.
On 13 December 2019, the United States and China agreed on a partial Phase One trade agreement in which both sides renounced announced increases in special tariffs.
An Gang argued that it is time for China to forge a new strategy towards the United States.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens,' prioritizing competition with China in its foreign policy.
Germany and Europe must treat systemic competition with China as a serious matter rather than a trivial opinion.
The strategic narrative of China's 'Belt and Road' initiative applies to third states, subjecting them to the logic and imperatives of that narrative.
China views Europe as useful and as presenting little obstacle to its own development, in contrast to the United States.
The United States government has restricted the use of specific Chinese products, including telecommunications and visual surveillance equipment, in the area of public procurement.
The Global Times asserts that China can no longer be contained by the United States and that any attempt to do so would harm the United States more than China.
The United States government is convinced that China's growing global economic and political presence comes at the expense of the United States.
The United States administration believes that protecting the national interest requires that America’s strategic industries possess supply chains that are independent of China.
China has maintained a comparatively restrained response to US trade measures, likely to avoid further economic escalation that would harm the Chinese economy.
United States and Chinese companies are currently competing for leadership in the development and standard-setting of communications technology and artificial intelligence.
The normative dimension of American criticism toward China, focusing on threats to human rights and democratic values, has been central to the American debate since the 1989 suppression of the student movement on Tiananmen Square.
The Thucydides Trap, a historical process described by Thucydides where the rise of Athens made war with Sparta inevitable, is considered a real risk in the current relationship between China and the United States.
The calls for reform in China during the spring of 1989 were Western-inspired, and the individuals who raised them were suppressed on Tiananmen Square.
In 2005, then US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick demanded that China act as a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system.
C. Fred Bergsten authored the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) Policy Brief 18–21 titled 'China and the United States: Trade Conflict and Systemic Competition' in October 2018.
While Europe is largely dependent on the United States and China for digital technologies, the United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies.
The ideological difference between the United States and China intensifies threat perceptions and strengthens the security dilemma between the two nations.
Chinese businesses and individuals listed on the United States Department of Commerce’s 'Entity List' are prohibited from making purchases in the United States or from US companies.
The United States Trade Representative published 'Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practises Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974' in March 2018.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert advocate for 'supranational geopolitics' as a necessary approach for European policy towards China.
The European Union views China as an economic competitor because China is strategically attempting to acquire stakes in European high-tech research and manufacturing sectors, specifically artificial intelligence, robotics, and biotechnology.
The United States' campaign against Huawei reflects a shift away from positive-sum logic in economic relations with China.
The United States and China both view technological superiority as a fundamental prerequisite for achieving economic and military strength and maintaining their respective positions in world politics.
North Korea's successful tests of long-range missiles have not altered the Chinese assessment that US missile defense systems are primarily aimed at China and Russia.
Washington regards China as a threat to United States and Western interests in regions outside the Indo-Pacific, specifically in Africa, the Middle East, and the Arctic.
Reform-oriented Chinese academics argue that the pressure applied by the Trump Administration is counterproductive because it hardens the defensive stance of the Chinese leadership and harms pro-reform forces within China.
In China, successful economic development has strengthened the power vertical and serves as a narrative component of identity-building Chinese nationalism.
Bilateral trade between the United States and China no longer functions as a stabilizing factor capable of reducing political conflicts between the two nations.
A Chinese technopolitical sphere of influence is emerging as China intensifies its pursuit of technological leadership.
The strategic competition between the United States and China is driven by the model character China claims for itself, despite being framed as "consultation and cooperation."
Peter Rudolf authored the SWP Research Paper 'The Sino-American World Conflict', which examines the strategic conflict between the United States and China.
Companies and organizations in Germany and France, which maintain significant economic relations with China, have advocated for a strong and assertive European Union policy against China's unfair economic practices.
Rigid internal procedures in China designed to secure Communist Party control negatively impact external relations by discouraging cooperation.
Beijing and Moscow share a threat perception regarding US, South Korean, and Japanese radar systems, which serves as a foundation for the 'comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination' between China and Russia.
China is expanding its military capabilities to project power through and beyond the first and second island chains.
The United States government is convinced that China's growing global economic and political presence comes at the expense of the United States.
Scholars studying Chinese activities in the United Nations observe that China utilizes specialized UN agencies to influence political debates and insert its own political terminology into official documents, which subsequently impacts general UN discourse on peace and development.
Foreign-controlled social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google are effectively inaccessible in China.
China provided US$ 2.35 million to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to support food assistance in Gaza.
Legislative proposals and initiatives in the United States Congress reflect a shift in sentiment within the United States business community and society regarding China.
The Donald Trump administration pursues a strategy of economic decoupling from China to throttle the modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, utilizing tariffs, investment controls, and supplier boycotts as instruments.
A security incident involving critical infrastructure could trigger a race between Western nations and China to eliminate social and technical vulnerabilities, potentially leading to a military arms race and significant economic losses.
Xi Jinping seeks greater international visibility and enhanced status for both China and himself.
The United States views China’s growing military capabilities as a threat to American military bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam.
The security dilemma between the United States and China is intensified by the dynamic of a rising power encountering an established power.
The European Union and its member states view China as a 'systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance' in addition to being a negotiating partner and economic competitor.
The United States faces a strategic question regarding which alliance partner territories could host ground-launched intermediate-range missiles capable of reaching targets in China.
Xi Jinping prioritizes concrete improvements for China over personal relationships with his American counterparts.
Donald Trump views good personal relations as a necessary precondition for addressing the bilateral agenda between the United States and China.
North Korea's successful long-range missile tests have not altered the Chinese assessment that US missile defense systems are intended to threaten strategic stability.
China has established and promoted institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICS Development Bank), and the Belt and Road Initiative.
China views the Belt and Road Initiative not as a counter-model to the Western global order, but as a necessary complement to it.
China influences foreign decision-makers through a spectrum of instruments ranging from attractive invitations and the intermediation of lucrative business deals to intimidation, bribery, and blackmail.
Economic competition and conflicts over trade, economic, and financial policy between the United States and China predate the protectionist policies adopted by the United States under President Donald Trump.
Proponents of 'smart competition' warn against abandoning all cooperation with China and seeking to prevent any increases in Chinese influence.
One camp of Chinese America analysts interprets the shift in United States policy towards China as permanent and structural, believing a bipartisan consensus in the United States will determine the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future.
Ideological differences between the United States and China intensify mutual threat perceptions and strengthen the security dilemma between the two nations.
Donald Trump views China as both a strategic adversary on trade questions and a useful factor in specific situations like North Korea, with US domestic politics serving as the decisive yardstick for his approach.
If the US-China conflict continues to sharpen and accelerates the bipolarization of the international system, the foundation for global multilateralism could disappear.
Hanns Günther Hilpert argues that the material benefits of economic cooperation between the United States and China have declined compared to the period between 1990 and 2015.
Technological competition between the United States and China involves both absolute and relative gains, such as the ability to define technical standards, and is inherently linked to national security.
Andrew S. Erickson authored the article 'Numbers Matter: China’s Three ‘Navies’ Each Have the World’s Most Ships,' published in The National Interest on February 26, 2018.
In China, successful economic development has strengthened the power vertical and serves as a narrative component of identity-building Chinese nationalism.
Chinese experts suspect that the US Prompt Global Strike programme is actually intended to target China's nuclear arsenal, fearing the United States could launch a preemptive disarming attack in the event of a conflict.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China will continue to exert decisive influence on international politics for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether Washington and Beijing resolve trade issues or conclude a trade agreement before the upcoming US presidential elections.
European policy toward China can no longer rely on the transatlantic relationship as it did in the past, but must instead operate within a new system of coordinates defined by the conflict between the United States and China.
In a strategy paper published in March 2019, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, defined China as an important partner in international cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival.
The Trump Administration agreed to a limited 'Phase One Deal' with China in late 2019 to avoid imposing new tariffs, following significant criticism from United States businesses, Republicans in Congress, and trade unions.
Bilateral trade between the United States and China is no longer a stabilising factor capable of ameliorating political conflicts.
The Chinese regime may reinforce its resilience by using digitalization to expand social control and mitigate the systematic deficits of state economic planning.
President Donald Trump signed legislation supporting Hong Kong democracy on November 27, 2019, an action that angered the Chinese government.
Both political parties in the United States Congress generally support and seek to intensify the United States Administration's hard-line policy toward China rather than moderating it.
The United States is applying pressure and incentives to dissuade other states from expanding their economic relations with China.
The systemic conflict between the United States and China is increasingly interpreted by the American side as a clash between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism.
The European Union's connectivity strategy towards Asia is a sensible approach to address concerns about one-sided dependencies on China.
The creation of an ocean-going navy by China is considered the maritime continuation of the reform policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current ideological conflict, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
A military conflict between the United States and China would result in significant regional and global consequences.
The United States government's fear of Chinese expansionist intentions causes concrete agreements, such as those involving Huawei, to be interpreted with suspicion, which erodes mutual trust and predictability.
China’s development model has been successful, and liberal values remain attractive to young, well-educated, and mobile members of Chinese society.
China has acquired the world's largest navy in numerical terms, possessing more than three hundred warships.
Donald Trump views China as both a strategic trade adversary and a useful partner in specific situations like North Korea, while prioritizing US domestic politics as the primary decision-making factor.
Xi Jinping prioritizes concrete improvements for China over personal relationships with American counterparts.
China under Xi Jinping expects its national importance to be adequately acknowledged by other nations.
Until the late eighteenth century, China's per capita income exceeded that of Western Europe or North America, and China was the leading power in Asia.
Chinese observers of the economic conflict suggest that the United States' technology boycott could accelerate China's efforts to achieve technological autonomy.
China seeks to establish its own political terms and values within the language of the United Nations.
The technological dimension of the US-China rivalry is deeper than trade disputes and will persist even if trade issues are resolved.
The Global Times asserts that China can no longer be contained by the United States and that any attempt to do so would harm the United States more than China.
Western governments are concerned that China could use the Chinese technology company Huawei to sabotage new 5G mobile networks.
The United States government has officially classified China as a 'long-term strategic competitor' in its government strategy documents since 2017.
China fears that US missile defense initiatives and conventional force expansion threaten its second-strike capability and nuclear deterrent.
Human rights groups in the United States have gained traction in their criticism of China due to Beijing's expansion of its surveillance state and the construction of reeducation camps in the Xinjiang autonomous region.
China views its nuclear arsenal primarily as a deterrent against military intervention or direct threats from other nuclear-armed states, specifically the United States.
The European Union, as the world's largest internal market, should avoid joining the United States' strategy of containment or the decoupling of entire economic spaces in its approach to China.
The European Union considers China a vital cooperation partner for addressing global challenges, particularly regarding climate protection.
The Chinese industrial policy strategy known as 'Made in China 2025' outlines Beijing's intention to achieve global market leadership in ten key high-value-added sectors.
To effectively pursue its interests regarding China, the European Union requires unity, conflict-capability, legitimacy, and industrial/technological resilience.
The Chinese leadership’s nervousness over Hong Kong and fear of colour revolutions drives their efforts to secure power and establish a harmonious society through technological means.
The security threat posed by China is now regarded as global, whereas the initial concern was that China would intimidate US allies in the region, specifically South Korea and Japan.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert argue that Europe needs a China policy based on a comprehensive strategy of self-assertion and strategic autonomy rather than a simple 'country strategy'.
China supports the international activities of Chinese enterprises while simultaneously strictly regulating and often limiting access to its own domestic markets.
China regards Western advocacy for a liberal world order and universal human rights as a hegemonic discourse.
China supports repressive regimes through loans, investments, arms, surveillance technology, and the use of its veto in the United Nations Security Council, while undermining constitutional and civil society structures during commercial engagement abroad.
China is establishing new international forums and organizations that align with its own Sinocentric concepts of order, particularly within its regional environment.
The European Union aims to develop a reciprocal economic and technological interdependency with China based on jointly agreed principles and rules.
As of March 3, 2020, China leads 4 of the 15 United Nations specialized agencies and is aiming to lead a 5th.
China flouts fundamental principles of the World Trade Organization, specifically the principles of non-discrimination and transparency.
The United States and China both consider technological superiority to be a fundamental prerequisite for their economic and military strength and their standing in world politics.
The Chinese government has considered placing an export embargo on rare earths, which are crucial for high-tech manufacturing.
China positions itself as a defender of multilateralism against the Trump Administration's attacks on the international order and offers itself as an alliance partner to other states.
Companies and organizations in Germany and France are calling for a strong and assertive stance against China's unfair economic practices.
As Donald Trump escalates the trade dispute with China, economic ties are losing their role as a stabilizing force in matters of national security, according to reporting by Paul Sonne.
The US-China strategic rivalry will shape US foreign policy regardless of whether Donald Trump is reelected or a Democrat enters the White House in January 2021.
The Pentagon's annual report on China's military strength reviews Chinese investments in security-relevant areas and identifies these investments as a matter of great concern.
China's 'Great Firewall' utilizes IP range bans and keyword filtering to censor the internet and suppress information deemed undesirable by the regime.
International politics perceives the Belt and Road Initiative as a 'grand strategy' that causes numerous actors to orient themselves toward China.
China, under President Xi Jinping, claims to be a champion of multilateralism while simultaneously subverting the work of multilateral institutions.
The Chinese armed forces currently possess the capability to control waters within the first island chain, at least on a temporary basis.
Politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States influenced public opinion regarding China prior to the election of Donald Trump.
The post-1945 liberal world order and the globalization process enabled China to industrialize, modernize, eliminate absolute poverty, and acquire international power and prestige.
The European Union's political impact and ability to formulate coherent policies toward China, particularly regarding human rights, are weakened by member states' sensitivity to dependencies on imported technologies and resources, which delays decision-making in the Council.
Trade practices of the US and China and welfare losses from their conflict affect Germany and Europe.
The Donald Trump administration views the protection of national security as a primary driver of trade policy, necessitating that United States strategic industries possess supply chains independent of China.
Chinese discourse consistently portrays the United States as an obstacle to China's goal of restoring its historical greatness.
The United States Department of Defense is concerned about the strategic benefits China gains from investing in foreign infrastructure projects, such as port facilities, which are part of the Belt and Road Initiative.
The conflict between the United States and China encompasses security-related, economic, technological, ideological, and personality dimensions.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China has replaced the 'War on Terror' as the dominant paradigm for the United States, which had prevailed since 2001.
In 2019, China ranked tenth among all countries in terms of personnel contributed to United Nations peacekeeping missions.
The United States accuses China of engaging in unfair competition.
At the April 2019 EU-China summit, certain European Union member states opposed a common stance on China due to fears of economic reprisals or sanctions from Beijing in response to human rights criticisms.
Chinese experts suspect that the US Prompt Global Strike programme and its hypersonic glide vehicles are actually targeting China's nuclear arsenal, fearing a preemptive disarming attack by the United States in the event of a conflict.
China views the post-1945 liberal world order and the values and institutions upon which it is built with ambivalence.
Xue Li authored the article 'China and US: Are They Rivals or Enemies?' in the Global Times.
Strategic interdependence, rather than decoupling, is the more promising approach for the European Union to deal with China.
China undermines the Western order and delegitimizes multilateral institutions when given the opportunity, despite not actively working to supersede the Western system.
The European Union should communicate to China that EU member states are united behind principle-based policies and reciprocity across all levels and policy areas.
The political debate in the United States regarding China is characterized by a fear of China's rise and the possibility of the United States being overtaken.
China presents itself as the trailblazer and advocate for emerging economies and developing countries rather than as a systemic adversary of the United States and the West.
Europe has limited capacity to contain the status conflicts between the United States and China, which have intensified following the end of China's collective leadership model and the concentration of power under Xi Jinping.
A camp of Chinese America analysts believes that the shift in United States policy towards China is permanent and structural, driven by a bipartisan consensus in the United States that will determine the bilateral relationship for the foreseeable future.
Donald Trump's use of trade sanctions to force compliance violates the fundamental principles of status recognition and respect in Chinese foreign policy and self-image, necessitating a harsh response from China.
China is transitioning its naval strategy from coastal defence to 'active defence', which involves controlling space within the 'first island chain' and potentially the 'second island chain'.
If current growth trends continue, China is projected to replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030.
President Donald Trump signed China-critical legislation in late November 2019 because a two-thirds majority in the US Congress would have overturned a presidential veto.
Donald Trump's 2016 election as US President was officially welcomed by China, with scholarly assessments expressing cautious optimism.
The normative dimension of American criticism regarding China's threat to human rights and democratic values has been central to the US debate since the 1989 suppression of the student movement on Tiananmen Square.
The European Union benefits from the fact that China operates primarily in the geo-economic arena, which is the same arena where the European Union's power resources lie.
Both China and the United States are concerned with protecting strategically important routes to safeguard supplies in the event of a crisis.
China views Europe as presenting little obstacle to its own development and as a useful entity, unlike the United States, which China views as a significant obstacle.
The United States is applying pressure and incentives to dissuade other states from expanding their economic relations with China.
United States companies in the retail, farm, car-making, and IT and communications sectors oppose trade sanctions against China because they are negatively affected by import tariffs on semi-finished products or counter-tariffs.
Chinese leadership views the United States as the paradigm for modernization and believes China must reduce the development gap with the United States to create a fairer world.
China undermines the Western order by refusing to recognize the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague regarding its dispute with the Philippines and by flouting World Trade Organization principles such as non-discrimination and transparency.
The European Union must demand adequate concessions in its bilateral talks with the United States and China.
The European Union views China as a 'systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance' in addition to being a negotiating partner and economic competitor.
The European Union could utilize its expertise in non-digital sectors as a bargaining chip during times of escalating political conflict with the United States and China.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China shapes strategic debates and real political, military, and economic dynamics.
Technological dependency becomes problematic when central actors like the United States and China leverage it to advance their own interests.
Trade between China and the European Union grew by a factor of 250 between 1975 and 2018, reaching a total volume of $680 billion in 2018.
China strictly observes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and refrains from actively promoting authoritarian regimes.
The rivalry between the United States and China shapes strategic debates and real political, military, and economic dynamics.
Japan regards China’s regional policy as “incompatible with [the] existing international order” and as a “serious security concern for the region”.
China, Russia, and the European Union are pursuing data localization initiatives to repatriate their citizens' data from the United States as a step toward regaining control.
China views hypersonic glide vehicles as advantageous because they cannot be detected or destroyed by any currently available defense system.
The strong personalization of politics under Xi Jinping and Donald Trump shapes the relations between China and the United States.
In the spring of 1989, calls for reform in China were Western-inspired, and those who raised them were suppressed on Tiananmen Square.
China is establishing new international forums and organizations that align with its own Sinocentric concepts of order, particularly within its regional environment.
The symbiotic economic relationship between the United States and China, known as 'Chimerica', no longer exists.
The United States private sector and both major political parties are concerned about the negative economic impacts of the trade conflict with China, particularly regarding American consumers and the agricultural sector.
China's rise and its increased power and influence across various policy areas and regions have strengthened fears and rejection within the United States.
Skeptics in China warn that a lasting and dependable trade peace between the United States and China is not possible under the administration of President Donald Trump.
China has damaged the World Trade Organization (WTO) by disregarding principles of non-discrimination and transparency.
The Trump Administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia partly in the hope that the withdrawal would allow the United States to better counter the Chinese military threat.
Official and published Chinese statements suggest that both the United States and China need to seek compromise in their economic disputes to avoid mutual harm.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens,' which may lead the United States to prioritize competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and treat crises in Europe and its periphery as secondary.
The 'Made in China 2025' strategy articulates China's approach to establishing a technopolitical sphere of influence.
Both the United States and China are exerting strong pressure on third states, such as Germany, regarding the use of Huawei technology.
China's commitment to increase imports from the United States is likely to reduce imports from other regions like Brazil, the European Union, and Japan, potentially causing new trade controversies.
For more than half of its trade, including with the United States, China, and India, the European Union lacks the possibility of binding rules-based dispute resolution comparable to the WTO framework.
Europe is likely to pursue a strategy of relying on technologies from both the United States and China, but requires a review of its dependencies to make this bi-directional interdependence truly strategic.
Chinese observers question whether the United States would accept China's rise and leadership in new technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G if China were a Western-style democracy.
The Thucydides Trap, a concept describing how the rise of a power (Athens) makes war with an established power (Sparta) inevitable, is viewed by some observers as a real risk in the current relationship between China and the United States.
Proponents of 'smart competition' believe US policy toward China has been broadly successful over the past decades but requires a correction toward more pressure and deterrence to respond to China’s mercantilist economic policy and foreign policy assertiveness.
China observes that Europe works to preserve multilateralism and the liberal world order, while also experiencing political and economic problems with the Trump Administration.
The Chinese government has lost confidence in the reliability and integrity of the American president, making it unlikely that China will be prepared to make concessions.
There is almost unanimous agreement in Washington that the hope that China would become a “responsible stakeholder” has been dashed.
Michael Paul authored the SWP-Studie 17/2018 titled 'Chinas nukleare Abschreckung: Ursachen, Mittel und Folgen der Stationierung chinesischer Nuklearwaffen auf Unterseebooten' (China's Nuclear Deterrence: Causes, Means and Consequences of the Deployment of Chinese Nuclear Weapons on Submarines) in August 2018.
China is the only country with the potential to threaten the status of the United States as the predominant international power.
The United States and China both undermine the global order by flouting multilateral rules and using institutions to display power.
The United States perceives China's growing military capabilities as a threat to US military bases in the Pacific, the US system of partnerships and alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and the US nuclear deterrent.
In the Phase One agreement, China promised better protection of intellectual property, an end to forced technology transfer, and better market access in financial services.
The United States and China are currently using trade policy as an instrument for technology competition, foreign policy, and security purposes.
The United States government's campaign against Huawei reflects a shift away from positive-sum logic in economic relations with China.
Following the arrival of Western colonialism and imperialism, China experienced a century of decline, economic exploitation, political humiliation, and military invasion, a period referred to as the 'century of humiliation'.
China supports the international activities of Chinese enterprises while strictly regulating and often limiting access to its own domestic markets.
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer called for a solution to the trade dispute with China in May 2019.
In May 2019, Democratic Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer stated: 'We have to have tough, strong policies against China or they’ll continue to steal millions of American jobs and trillions of American dollars.'
Political stability in China depends heavily on maritime trade routes that require security provided by an expanded navy.
United States companies negatively impacted by import tariffs on semi-finished goods or retaliatory tariffs from China and other trading partners oppose the escalation of trade sanctions.
The Trump Administration's strategy documents characterize China as a revisionist power that seeks regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and long-term global supremacy.
The European Union is China's largest trade partner, and China is the European Union's second-largest trade partner, following the United States.
China's threat analysis centers on the expandability of the US missile defense system, specifically regarding flexibly deployable Aegis vessels and land-based systems.
A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that imports from China accounted for approximately one-quarter of the decline in manufacturing jobs in the United States between 1990 and 2007.
Over the past decade, China has quadrupled its financial contributions to United Nations organizations, while the United States has gradually scaled back its contributions.
Differing worldviews regarding political order and principles present a greater challenge for China than for the United States.
The systemic conflict between the United States and China is increasingly interpreted by the American side as a clash between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism.
The multilateral order is in crisis in the early 2020s due to the collision between China's rise as a global power and the "America First" political approach in the United States.
There are indications of closer technological cooperation between Russia and China, which can be interpreted as a form of alignment similar to the Five Eyes alliance.
Many states and societies in Asia and Africa value China's economic engagement and the Belt and Road Initiative, but they also fear the development of one-sided dependencies.
Chinese discourse prioritizes the North/South global development gap over the East/West ideological divide when framing international relations.
Strategic interdependency with China involves standing up to Beijing over World Trade Organization (WTO) rules while simultaneously engaging in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects.
Germany and Europe have a vital interest in upholding liberal values internally and preserving a liberal order internationally in the context of systemic competition with China.
Donald Trump utilized China as a political target for his agenda and election slogans.
China leads four of the fifteen United Nations specialized agencies and is aiming to lead a fifth, according to Courtney J. Fung and Shing-Hon Lam.
China has expanded its data localization and access requirements to include encrypted communications from Western companies that utilize Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).
The conflict between the United States and China involves a dispute over participation in global decision-making, with origins dating back to the early 2000s.
A US-led diplomatic campaign successfully blocked China's attempt to lead the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in early 2020.
The technological dimension of US-China competition centers on geopolitical power projection through 'technopolitical spheres of influence' rather than merely setting standards.
Conducting 'Operational Code' analyses for China is difficult due to the problematic situation with available sources.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert advocate for 'supranational geopolitics' in Europe's approach to China, requiring increased supranationality.
The power rivalry between the United States and China is increasingly impinging on the interests of the European Union and Germany.
Trade conflicts between the United States and China are politically instrumentalized, though they represent the most easily resolvable aspects of the broader strategic rivalry.
Samuel Bendett and Elsa B. Kania analyzed a new high-tech partnership between China and Russia.
China is currently pursuing a twofold goal: first, to become independent from the United States in core digital technologies, and second, to disseminate its own technologies globally.
The escalation of hard security challenges between the United States and China has led to the emergence of a classical security dilemma.
Strategic interdependence generates increased friction and pressure if the confrontation between the United States and China intensifies.
China's land border spans 22,000 kilometres and touches fourteen neighbouring states, four of which possess nuclear arms (Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).
Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has failed to implement several reforms promised in its accession protocol, particularly regarding market opening, market-distorting subsidies, and intellectual property protection.
China views its geopolitical environment as one of the most difficult in the world, noting it lacks the 'insular' security enjoyed by the United States.
Peter Rudolf asserts that the strategic rivalry between the United States and China risks escalating into a multi-layered world conflict with significant economic and military dangers.
Economic relations between the United States and China have shifted from complementary to competitive due to China's economic and technological rise, status competition, and increasingly critical perceptions on both sides.
The volume published by the SWP examines the repercussions of US-China rivalry on international institutions and on Europe, as well as the influence of both the United States and China on other states, regions, and societies.
The European Union needs to develop a China policy for its drive towards strategic autonomy to escape the bipolar logic that demands it choose between American and Chinese economic and technological spheres.
Chinese businesses are actively seeking suppliers capable of substituting imports from the United States.
If current growth trends continue, China is projected to replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030.
Since 1989, Chinese discourse has consistently perceived the United States as an obstacle to China's goal of restoring its lost greatness.
The United States views China's increasing military capabilities as a threat because they may allow China to close down the US Navy's access to the Asia-Pacific region.
China has acquired the world's largest navy in numerical terms, possessing more than three hundred warships.
The tit-for-tat extraordinary tariffs imposed by the United States and China have resulted in significant reductions in bilateral trade and increased costs for imports.
The United States' campaign against Huawei reflects a shift away from positive-sum logic in economic relations with China, moving toward a security-focused logic.
Axel Dorloff reported on the EU-China summit in an article titled 'EU-China-Gipfel: Auf der Suche nach Gemeinsamkeiten' published on tagesschau.de on April 9, 2019.
Germany and the European Union face concerns regarding the potential impact of Chinese technology investments on the European model of state and society, specifically regarding the protection of individual rights and the potential outflow of personal data.
China imposed reciprocal retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States while simultaneously reducing tariffs on imports from third-party states, which disadvantages US imports.
Technological competition between the United States and China is driven by security concerns, which has resulted in restricted exchange and cooperation in the technological sphere.
Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Students’ and Scholars’ Association serve as channels for China to expand its influence abroad.
Third-party states have the option to utilize existing interdependencies by selectively relying on technologies from both the United States and China.
China has over 18,000 kilometers of coastline, and its waters border six neighboring states, some of which host US military bases.
Bilateral trade between the United States and China no longer functions as a stabilizing factor capable of ameliorating political conflicts.
The author argues that the European Union must ensure future United States-China trade agreements do not create discriminatory disadvantages for the European Union.
China has expanded its data storage requirements to include encrypted communications from Western companies that utilize Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).
While trade policy and trade balance disputes are prominent in US President Donald Trump's statements, they represent only one aspect of the multidimensional rivalry between the United States and China.
Chinese experts suspect that the US Prompt Global Strike program's hypersonic glide vehicles are intended to target China's nuclear arsenal rather than North Korea's air defenses.
China possesses three distinct 'navies,' each of which contains the world's largest number of ships.
Annegret Bendiek and Barbara Lippert advocate for the adoption of 'supranational geopolitics' as a necessary component of Europe's approach to China.
One camp of Chinese America analysts hopes that the United States and China will return to pragmatic and constructive relations, either through a trade agreement with President Donald Trump or through his defeat in the next election.
The Global Times describes the prospect of a new Cold War between the United States and China as "unrealistic."
China aims to secure pro-China media coverage and policy outcomes in foreign countries.
The American and Chinese spheres of influence overlap in Europe, where services from both nations are present.
Approximately fifty thousand censors are employed in China to monitor discussions in chatrooms and social networks, intervening when individual complaints appear to be coalescing into collective dissatisfaction.
Foreign companies operating in China, including United Airways, Christian Dior, Daimler, Leica, Cathay Pacific, and the National Basketball Association, have faced pressure to align with Chinese political positions, such as depicting Taiwan as part of China, removing sensitive advertising, restricting staff participation in protests, or avoiding critical political statements.
The European Union shares many of the United States' criticisms regarding unfair Chinese competition practices.
The human rights situation in China has prompted bipartisan initiatives in the US Congress, including proposals for sanctions against Chinese officials for the repression of the Uigurs.
Historically, the United States prioritized economic logic in relations with China as long as it did not fear China as a strategic rival, focusing on absolute gains rather than relative benefits.
China currently heads more United Nations specialised agencies than any other member state.
Chinese savings no longer contribute significantly to financing the US domestic economy because China's purchases of US treasury bonds have fallen as a result of shrinking current account surpluses.
Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has failed to implement promised reforms regarding market opening, market-distorting subsidies, and the protection of intellectual property.
The United States previously operated under the expectation that economic interdependence with China would promote cooperation and stabilize peace.
Beijing plans to introduce a digital currency intended to challenge the international dominance of the United States dollar and the euro.
The human rights situation in China has prompted bipartisan initiatives in the United States Congress to urge the Administration to respond more forcefully to the repression of the Uigurs, including through sanctions against Chinese officials.
Economic competition between the United States and China has intensified, particularly within the manufacturing sector.
The conflict between US and Chinese leadership styles creates potential openings and opportunities for third-party states to gain influence by balancing between the two protagonists.
Despite its economic success and great power status, the Chinese political leadership continues to classify China as the world's largest developing country and identifies it as part of the Global South.
In July 2019, China’s delegates to the Human Rights Council disrupted a dialogue with opposition activists from Hong Kong.
The United States government regards China as a 'revisionist power' and a 'rival' seeking to shape a world antithetical to US values and interests, with the goal of displacing the United States and restructuring the world order.
China opened its first foreign military base in the Horn of Africa in August 2017.
China rejects political dissent and regional autonomy strivings, sometimes using imprisonment and re-education as repressive measures.
The relationship between the United States and China exhibits characteristics of a classical security dilemma, where efforts to increase security generate insecurity for both sides, exacerbated by the dynamic of a rising power encountering an established one.
China is not expected to match the United States on the high seas and in complex operations involving carrier groups until long after the conclusion of the Chinese military modernisation programme in 2035.
China holds US treasuries worth more than $1 trillion.
China has quadrupled its financial contributions to United Nations organizations over the decade preceding 2020, while the United States has gradually reduced its contributions.
The clash between the person-centered leadership styles of the United States and China deepens bilateral conflicts and erodes trust between the two nations.
Marco Overhaus, Peter Rudolf, and Laura von Daniels state that viewing China as a revisionist power is a broad consensus across both major U.S. political parties, business, politics, and society.
The US-China conflict syndrome is based on a regional and increasingly global status rivalry.
The United States and Western nations perceive that the global geostrategic center of gravity has shifted toward Asia, specifically China, over the past decade.
Marco Overhaus, Peter Rudolf, and Laura von Daniels assert that the view of China as a revisionist power is a broad consensus across both major US political parties, business, politics, and society.
In response to perceived American containment, Chinese leaders adopted rhetoric of cooperation, such as 'win-win' and the concept of a 'new type of great power relations' where each side respects the other's 'core national interests'.
China utilizes a diaspora policy to mobilize approximately sixty million ethnic Chinese living abroad to support China's positions and interests, regardless of their citizenship.
The Chinese government requires foreign companies to store customer data within Chinese territory, which grants Chinese security authorities access to that data.
Until the late eighteenth century, China was the uncontested leading power in Asia and possessed a per capita income that exceeded that of Western Europe or North America.
On December 14, 2018, the New York Times reported that United States lawmakers were pressuring President Donald Trump to take action against China regarding the detention of Uighurs.
China is pursuing a twofold goal of becoming independent from the United States in core digital technologies and subsequently disseminating its own technologies globally.
The imposition of extraordinary tariffs by the United States and China has reduced bilateral trade and increased import costs.
China is modernizing its nuclear arsenal by introducing new intercontinental missiles, developing a new air-launched ballistic missile, and establishing a missile early warning system with Russian support.
China and the United States threaten the European Union and European businesses with disadvantages if they do not align with their respective demands.
No state other than the United States and China is expected to match their technological prowess in the foreseeable future.
The European Union is China's largest trade partner, and China is the European Union's second-largest trade partner after the United States.
Paul Sonne reported in the Washington Post that economic ties between the United States and China are losing their ability to act as a stabilizing force in national security matters as the Trump administration escalates trade disputes.
China's rigid internal procedures designed to secure party control harm external relations by disincentivising cooperation.
Trade between China and the European Union expanded by a factor of 250 between 1975 and 2018, reaching a volume of $680 billion in 2018.
The European Union opposes a broad decoupling or severing of technological and economic ties with China, a policy approach that has been discussed and partially prepared in the United States.
The clash of contrary leadership styles between the United States and China deepens conflicts and erodes trust between the two nations.
American criticism of China is categorized into three dimensions: normative (human rights and democratic values), security, and economic.
China has responded to US trade measures with reciprocal retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States, while simultaneously reducing tariffs on imports from third-party countries to disadvantage US imports.
Since 2013, China has assumed leadership roles in four of the fifteen specialized agencies of the United Nations: the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).
The European Union's policy towards China is most effective when it is embedded in a comprehensive strategy for European self-assertiveness rather than being conceived as a purely country-based strategy.
A United States bill banned American companies from selling crowd control software to the Chinese government.
China frames its strategic competition with the United States as 'consultation and cooperation' while simultaneously promoting its own model of governance.
China contradicts the liberal expectation that growing economic prosperity will automatically lead to political liberalisation towards democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law.
The United States' fear that China harbors expansionist intentions leads to the reinterpretation of concrete agreements, such as those involving Huawei, which erodes mutual predictability and trust.
China and the West use their differing ideas about values and order to create internal identity, legitimize power, and support their respective soft power.
US companies face increasing difficulty in increasing sales and profits in the Chinese market due to rising administrative restrictions and the continued closure of service branches where US businesses possess competitive advantages.
The European Union should communicate to China that its member states are united behind priorities of principle-based policies and reciprocity across all policy areas.
Following the arrival of Western colonialism and imperialism, China experienced a century of decline, economic exploitation, political humiliation, and military invasion, a period referred to as the 'century of humiliation'.
While some Chinese analysts view the relationship between rising and declining powers as a zero-sum game, they maintain that both the Chinese and U.S. governments have a responsibility to prevent conflict.
The European Union's relationship with China is characterized by a mix of cooperation, competition, and conflict.
China threatens the United States' status as the leading power, as well as the privileges and economic advantages associated with that status.
Large segments of the United States private sector criticize Chinese economic practices, specifically citing state subsidies for Chinese firms, forced technology transfer from foreign companies, and the theft of intellectual property.
China's commitment to additional US imports is likely to lead to lower imports from other regions like Brazil, the European Union, and Japan, potentially triggering new controversies.
The European Union should approach China with confidence and avoid joining the United States' strategies of containment or the decoupling of entire economic spaces.
The United States increasingly views the rise of China as a danger to its own dominant position in the international system, transitioning from a regional to a global challenge.
China demonstrates its shift toward greater international visibility through its participation in multilateral organizations, specifically the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank).
The rivalry between the United States and China is expected to remain a defining issue in international relations for the foreseeable future, regardless of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global governance.
President Donald Trump previously indicated that he regarded the treatment of the opposition in Hong Kong as an internal matter for China.
China's strategic culture and nationalism are shaped by the historical experience of vulnerability and the 'century of humiliation' (1840–1949).
International partners perceive China's strategic narratives as being tied to Xi Jinping's concentrated power, which supports the assumption that China seeks sweeping hegemony and exerts pressure on societal forces in prospective partner countries.
The United States has withdrawn from a number of multilateral institutions, while China is expanding its influence in contexts like the United Nations.
Highlighting ideological conflict between the United States and China may be used to mobilize domestic support in the United States for a power clash that incurs economic costs.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China risks spiraling into a multi-layered world conflict that presents economic and military dangers.
Chinese views of the United States are ambivalent; there is respect and admiration for American innovation, economic strength, universities, military capabilities, and political system, but also mistrust due to historical negative experiences.
The 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, during which the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to force China to back down, served as the trigger for China's military capability-building process and exposed the weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces at that time.
Chi Hung Kwan published the article 'The China-US Trade War: Deep-Rooted Causes, Shifting Focus and Uncertain Prospects' in the Asian Economic Policy Review in 2019, which references the People's Daily from 2018.
Leading Democrats in the United States Congress and almost all Democratic candidates in the 2020 presidential primaries propagated policies on China similar to those of the Trump Administration, despite criticizing his political style and his treatment of allies.
China is the second-largest individual contributor to the United Nations in terms of both the regular budget and funding for peacekeeping missions.
The Chinese leadership attributes China's economic success over the past four decades to the hard work and ingenuity of the Chinese people, the commercial aptitude of its businesses, and the policies of the state and party leadership.
Technological competition between the United States and China is linked to security concerns, which has restricted exchange and cooperation in the technological sphere.
The United States views China's ongoing naval expansion as a challenge to its role as a world power.
The future development of US and Chinese spheres of influence depends on domestic factors and the future relationship between the two states, specifically whether they view their relationship as a zero-sum game.
Chinese leadership believes the Western liberal system is a manifestation of American hegemony.
The Donald Trump administration imposed incremental and escalating extraordinary tariffs of up to 25 percent on approximately half of United States imports from China.
Max J. Zenglein and Anna Holzmann published 'Evolving Made in China 2025: China’s Industrial Policy in the Quest for Global Tech Leadership' in July 2019, which examines China's industrial policy.
The Chinese armed forces are currently capable of controlling the waters within the first island chain, at least temporarily.
China is utilizing hypersonic glide vehicle technology to counter the challenge posed to its nuclear deterrent by US missile defense systems.
Donald Trump's use of trade sanctions to force compliance violates the fundamental principles of status recognition and respect in Chinese foreign policy, which necessitates a harsh response from China.
The European Union views strategic interdependence with China, rather than decoupling, as the more promising approach to managing the relationship.
Chinese savings no longer significantly contribute to financing the United States domestic economy because China's purchases of United States treasury bonds have declined due to shrinking current account surpluses.
A group of China experts, including individuals who worked on China policy in earlier US Administrations, signed an open letter to the President and Congress advising against treating China as an economic enemy or an existential national security threat.
The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations as of 2020.
Sino-American competition over power and status includes growing threat perceptions and an increasingly important political and ideological component.
The security dilemma between the United States and China has been shaped by the fact that both sides have viewed each other as potential military adversaries since the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96.
George Magnus authored the book 'Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy', published by Yale University Press in 2018.
State-controlled media in China characterizes Western democracies, particularly the United States, as dysfunctional while promoting China's own economic, social, and political progress.
Chinese leaders concluded that open competition with the United States, such as an arms race or direct confrontation, must be avoided to prevent the same fate as the Soviet Union.
China is the largest contributor to world economic growth, the largest exporter, and the largest trading nation in absolute terms.
The economic advantages derived from cooperation between the United States and China have diminished.
China experienced a 'century of humiliation' following the arrival of Western colonialism and imperialism, characterized by economic exploitation, political humiliation, and military invasion.
Marco Overhaus and Michael Paul analyze the security dimension of the Sino-American conflict in their contribution to the volume 'Strategic Rivalry between United States and China'.
The United States increasingly views the rise of China as a danger to its own dominant position in the international system and as a global challenge.
China attempts to shape the economic affairs of other states by leveraging the global reach of platforms such as the Alibaba Group and the marketplace functions of WeChat.
Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, advocates for a hard economic course against China, including the implementation of import tariffs based on human rights concerns.
Regional states, including Japan, are pursuing "hard balancing" in maritime and territorial disputes, which challenges China's rhetoric of partnership and cooperation.
In the United States, President Donald Trump minimized the influence of the State Department, while in China, the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping took control of foreign policy decisions.
The European Union opposes a 'decoupling' strategy that would involve a broad severing of technological and economic ties with China, a strategy discussed and partially prepared by the United States.
Beijing suspects the United States of seeking to internally corrupt and transform China through 'peaceful evolution,' defined as infiltration and subversion from within.
China's development model demonstrates that a system combining authoritarian rule and oligarchical capitalism can produce significant results in income growth, productivity, political stability, and international status.
China views the United States as a paradigm for modernization and believes it must reduce the development gap with the United States to make the world a fairer and more just place.
China has more than 18,000 kilometers of coastline.
The United States previously prioritized economic logic in relations with China because it profited from economic exchange in absolute terms, regardless of whether China derived relatively larger benefits.
The power transition theory is viewed by some as problematic and its explanatory value is contested, yet it influences perceptions in both the United States and China.
Strategic interdependency with China involves standing up to Beijing over WTO rules while simultaneously engaging in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Belt and Road Initiative projects.
China is politically and economically integrated into the Western-inspired international system and does not present itself as a systemic alternative.
China officially maintains a policy of no first use (NFU) regarding nuclear weapons.
In an open letter to the United States President and Congress, a group of China experts advised against treating China as "an economic enemy or an existential national security threat."
Emily S. Chen analyzed the first five years of Xi Jinping’s presidency (2013–2017) in the paper 'Is China Challenging the Global State of Democracy?', published by the Pacific Forum in June 2019.
The European Union experiences direct negative impacts from the United States' policy of punitive tariffs towards China in the aluminium and steel sectors, and indirect impacts through the diversion of trade flows, such as soybeans.
The European Union shares many of the United States' criticisms regarding unfair Chinese competition practices, though Brussels and Washington maintain disagreements over trade questions and WTO principles.
Donald Trump utilized China as a political tool for his agenda and election slogans, while other political actors in the United States blamed China for deindustrialization and domestic economic problems.
The Chinese state-affiliated newspaper Global Times asserts that the United States has adopted a policy of containment against China, which is manifested in the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.
C. Fred Bergsten argues that the United States and China are engaged in a contest for global economic leadership.
China is the only country with the potential to threaten the status of the United States.
The United States Congress, across both political parties, tends to support and intensify the Trump Administration's hard line on China rather than moderating it.
The systemic conflict between the United States and China is sometimes interpreted as a clash between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism.
Chad P. Bown, Eujn Jung, and Eva Zhang published 'Trump Has Gotten China to Lower Its Tariffs, Just toward Everyone Else' on 12 June 2019, which analyzes China's tariff adjustments toward countries other than the United States.
Euro-American trade disputes hinder the ability to use World Trade Organization (WTO) mechanisms to enforce free trade principles, such as intellectual property protections and reciprocity of market access and investment terms, against China.
The European Union could utilize its expertise in sectors like chemical and medical research as a bargaining chip during times of escalating political conflict with the United States and China.
China believes the Western liberal system is a manifestation of American hegemony and that the United States will not voluntarily concede the international influence that China's economic and political weight merits.
The Chinese government characterizes its increasing economic and political importance as a natural resurgence rather than a threat, contradicting the narrative of a 'peaceful rise'.
China provided US$ 2.35 million to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to support food assistance in Gaza.
China's economic rise has challenged the Western self-image that a democratic market economy is the most successful and humane system.
The United States government fears that China may attempt to establish a military presence in the Arctic in addition to competing for resources in the region.
Highlighting ideological conflict may be used by the United States to mobilize domestic support for a power clash with China that involves economic costs.
China is utilizing its response to the COVID-19 pandemic to highlight the advantages of its authoritarian governance system.
The competition between United States and Chinese leadership styles hinders the resolution of global issues such as climate protection and arms control.
China positions itself as a defender of multilateralism against the Trump Administration's attacks on the international order and offers itself as an alliance partner to other states.
China is the world's largest economy when measured in terms of purchasing power parity.
The rivalry between the United States and China is expected to remain a defining issue in international relations for the foreseeable future, regardless of cooperation in other policy fields.
The European Union is engaged in bilateral talks with the United States regarding trade and tariffs and with China regarding an investment agreement.
The United States' previous economic logic regarding China was based on the expectation that economic interdependence would promote cooperation and stabilize peace.
China shares 22,000 kilometers of land borders with fourteen neighboring states, four of which (Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) possess nuclear weapons.
European nations widely share the United States' criticisms regarding Chinese trading practices, unfair competition, and rule violations.
Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that the trade conflict with China could harm the United States.
The United States and China agreed to a partial Phase One trade agreement on December 13, 2019.
China under Xi Jinping prioritizes mutual respect in its relationship with the United States, specifically regarding territorial integrity and the recognition of different development models.
Scholars studying Chinese activities in the United Nations assert that China uses specialized agencies to influence political debates and establish its own political terms in official documents, which then influence general UN discourse on peace and development.
The European Union should offer third states alternatives to Chinese direct investment through cooperation that is lucrative for the recipient nations.
Michael Paul and Marco Overhaus observe that China is transitioning its military doctrine from coastal defense to maritime 'active defense' as it expands its radius of action.
The strategic competition between the United States and China is influenced by a collision of leadership styles, which are determined by the person-centeredness of foreign policy action and formal authority.
The European Union's connectivity strategy towards Asia is a proposed approach to address concerns about one-sided dependencies on China.
The Chinese government's fears of U.S.-led subversion were reinforced in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square massacre and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Trump Administration and the United States Congress both maintain a hard-line policy toward China, but they disagree on the specific methods and means to conduct the competition.
Human rights groups in the United States feel their concerns regarding China are validated by Beijing's expansion of its surveillance state and the construction of reeducation camps in the Xinjiang autonomous region.
China faces a difficult geopolitical environment and lacks the 'insular' security enjoyed by the United States.
Technological development and usage in the US-China rivalry are increasingly connected to political and ideological aspects, forming a systemic competition regarding the internal order and the relationship between state and society.
The European Union risks being negatively impacted by the US-China rivalry, with member states fearing the consequences of escalating trade disputes and geopolitical confrontation in the Pacific.
China is establishing new international forums and organizations that align with its own Sinocentric concepts of order, particularly within its regional environment.
The development of an ocean-going navy by China is considered the maritime continuation of the reform policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s.
China regards the Western advocacy of a liberal world order and universal human rights as a hegemonic discourse.
Beijing views the United States as a frustrated power attempting to preserve its global supremacy by geopolitically containing China and hindering its economic, technological, and military development.
The European Union needs to develop a China policy for its drive towards strategic autonomy to escape the bipolar logic that demands it choose between American and Chinese economic and technological spheres.
China utilizes the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative as a primary instrument to create a technopolitical sphere of influence that serves as a counterweight to the United States.
The reputation of the West in China has been eroded by the global financial crisis, American military interventions in the Middle East, and the political style of Donald Trump.
Beijing's fears that Washington seeks regime change in China were deepened by the 'colour revolutions' of the 2000s and the Arab Spring of 2011.
A US-led diplomatic campaign successfully blocked China's attempt to lead the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in early 2020, resulting in the election of a Singaporean national as head of the organization.
Weak compliance between the United States and China regarding the implementation of agreements, such as in the trade sector, makes it impossible to develop a viable relationship.
China has enhanced its ability to monitor important fiber-optic internet exchange points in response to US technopolitical influence.
President Xi Jinping's policies of authoritarianism and nationalism have contributed to increased American rejection of China.
The relationship between the United States and China is a complex strategic rivalry because they are potential military adversaries rather than merely systemic antagonists competing over status.
The European Union and its member states are directly and indirectly affected by the rivalry between the United States and China.
The European Union and other powers must focus on upholding international rules and institutions, which are being harmed by both the United States and China.
A group of China experts, including many who worked on China policy in earlier administrations, signed an open letter to the President and Congress advising against treating China as an economic enemy or an existential national security threat.
China's growing power has caused American concerns regarding the United States' status as the sole international superpower.
China officially maintains a policy of no first use (NFU) regarding nuclear weapons.
Chinese observers note that the United States' technology boycott could accelerate China's efforts to achieve technological autonomy.
Assessing how the United States is perceived in China is difficult because official statements and public media are closely controlled, and academic publications are subject to self-censorship or intended to convey specific political messages.
United States and Chinese companies are currently competing in the fields of communications technology and artificial intelligence for leadership in development, standard-setting, and systems.
China regards the Western advocacy of a liberal world order and universal human rights as a hegemonic discourse.
China maintains an official policy of 'no first use' (NFU) regarding nuclear weapons.
The Global Times asserts that China can no longer be contained by the United States and that any attempt to do so would harm the United States more than it would harm China.
China appears to be utilizing the South China Sea as a protected bastion for nuclear-armed submarines to safeguard its second-strike capability against the United States.
The author argues that if the European Union takes a side in the United States-China conflict, it would lose trade policy credibility, weaken its position as an honest broker, and become a junior partner.
The European Union lacks binding rules-based dispute resolution mechanisms for more than half of its trade, specifically regarding trade with the United States, China, and India, as these relationships currently lack the framework that exists within the World Trade Organization.
The European Union's policy towards China is most effective when it is embedded in a comprehensive strategy for the European Union's self-assertiveness rather than being conceived as a purely country-based strategy.
Japan regards China’s regional policy as incompatible with the existing international order and as a serious security concern for the region.
Both the United States and China have violated the rules of the World Trade Organization.
Historically, Sino-American economic and finance relations acted as a stabilizing factor in the bilateral relationship, providing mutual benefits through US business profits from the Chinese market and China's accumulation of surpluses reinvested in US treasury bonds.
Under the Phase One agreement, China promised additional imports from the United States amounting to $200 billion for the years 2020 and 2021.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Gudrun Wacker state that from the Chinese perspective, the United States will never voluntarily cede significant international influence to China.
China works to establish its own ideas within the United Nations Human Rights Council, such as relativizing the importance of individual human rights.
European Union policy towards China can no longer rely on the transatlantic relationship as it did in the past, as it now exists within a system of coordinates determined by the conflict between the United States and China.
China leads 4 of the 15 United Nations specialized agencies and is aiming to lead a 5th agency.
China has peacefully resolved many of its border conflicts in recent decades.
Reform-oriented Chinese academics argue that pressure applied by the Trump Administration is counterproductive because it hardens the defensive stance of the Chinese leadership and harms pro-reform forces within China.
Chinese observers interpret the United States' involvement in Hong Kong as an attempt to weaken the Chinese political system and achieve regime change in Beijing, citing that China's territorial integrity is at stake.
The author argues the European Union needs to expand trade and investment defense instruments to protect European businesses from Chinese state-owned enterprises and excessive subsidies.
The human rights situation in China has historically caused intermittent friction in US-China relations, but China was not perceived as an ideological antagonist in the United States as long as it was not viewed as a global challenge and there was hope for its liberalization.
The competition of leadership styles between the United States and China hinders the ability to find solutions for global problems such as climate protection and arms control.
China attributes its economic success over the past four decades to the hard work and ingenuity of the Chinese people, the commercial aptitude of its businesses, and the policies of the state and party leadership in Beijing, rather than American weakness.
Political debate within the United States regarding China is primarily focused on the methods of conducting the conflict rather than the nature of the rivalry itself.
On December 25, 2019, the Global Times reported that experts dismissed negative media coverage regarding the 'Phase One' trade deal between the United States and China.
Many segments of the United States private sector agree with the Trump Administration's criticism of Chinese economic practices, specifically citing state subsidies for Chinese firms, forced technology transfers, and intellectual property theft as primary concerns.
Beijing accuses the United States of attempting to impede China's progress and keep China down.
The Chinese leadership's nervousness over Hong Kong and fear of 'colour revolutions' drives their efforts to secure power and establish a 'harmonious society' through technological means.
China faces a potential systemic crisis if it fails to address internal debt, industrial overcapacity, growing inequality, pollution, and corruption.
The BRICS group consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
The sharpening of the US-China conflict and the resulting bipolarization of the international system threatens the foundation of global multilateralism.
China is the only country with the potential to threaten the status of the United States, although the notion of unstoppable Chinese economic and military expansion is based on questionable assumptions.
The US Administration and Congress view China as a 'revisionist power' that seeks to challenge the dominance of the United States and undermine the rules-based international order.
The Trump Administration and the United States Congress both maintain a hardline stance on China but disagree on the methods to use for competition.
The 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, during which the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to force China to back down, served as the trigger for China's military capability-building process.
The United States is applying pressure and incentives to dissuade other states from expanding their economic relations with China.
From the Chinese perspective, Donald Trump's political style is disrespectful to international customs and personally disrespectful toward Xi Jinping.
The security threat posed by China is now regarded as global, whereas initial concerns in the early 2000s focused on the potential intimidation of US allies South Korea and Japan.
The historical economic relationship between the United States and China, often called 'Chimerica', was characterized by a symbiotic exchange where US businesses exported goods and transferred capital, management expertise, and technology to China, while China accumulated surpluses from exports to the US and reinvested them in US treasury bonds to finance American consumption.
Both the United States and China are currently instrumentalizing trade policy for technology competition, foreign policy, and security purposes.
Concerns regarding Chinese influence in the United States are associated with fears of espionage.
China currently holds the largest gross fixed capital formation and the largest industrial value creation at market prices.
The European Union faces a threat of global digital commons collapse if it fails to establish permanent security- and confidence-building measures with major powers, including China, regarding cybersecurity and Industry 4.0.
China has expanded the international presence of its state media, including newspapers and international programming from China Global Television Networks (CGTN), to influence foreign media coverage and policy.
Under the Phase One trade agreement, the United States and China renounced announced special tariff increases, and China committed to purchasing $200 billion in additional US imports during 2020 and 2021.
Proponents of 'smart competition' advocate for a shift in US policy toward increased pressure and deterrence to counter China's mercantilist economic policies and assertive foreign policy.
President Xi Jinping has stated that the fate of China is dependent on the use of the seas.
China utilized the post-1945 liberal world order and globalization to industrialize, modernize, eliminate absolute poverty, and acquire international power.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Laura von Daniels argue that the US-China trade conflict is deeply connected to questions of world order, particularly regarding the future of multilateral trade rules and institutions.
In the South China Sea, the United States' insistence on unhindered access and freedom of navigation conflicts with China's efforts to create a security zone and counter American intervention capabilities.
China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank), and the Belt and Road Initiative.
International partners perceive China's strategic narratives as being closely tied to Xi Jinping, whose position has been strengthened by a concentration of power.
One group of Chinese America analysts hopes that the United States and China will return to pragmatic and constructive relations, either through a trade agreement with President Donald Trump or his loss in the next election.
US presidential candidates Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush all presented China as a competitor and adversary during their election campaigns.
Trade conflicts between the United States and China are politically instrumentalized, though they represent the most easily resolvable aspects of the broader strategic rivalry.
The United States National Security Strategy officially labeled China as a strategic competitor in December 2017.
The United States, the European Union, Japan, and Canada accuse China of systematically stealing intellectual property and imposing competition-distorting requirements on Western companies operating in the Chinese market.
The US Congress, across both political parties, tends to support and intensify the Trump Administration's hard-line policy toward China rather than moderating it.
If the United States and China view their relationship as a zero-sum game, the struggle for technopolitical influence is likely to intensify and cause further conflict.
The European Union and its member states are directly and indirectly affected by the rivalry between the United States and China.
Under the Trump administration, security logic dominates US rhetoric and practice regarding China, driven by concerns over the relative distribution of economic gains and the belief that economic interdependence negatively impacts the technological basis of US military superiority.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China obstructs vital decision-making processes within the United Nations.
China announced the creation of an 'Unreliable Entities List' to target businesses, organizations, and individuals that comply with US boycotts against Chinese companies like Huawei, subjecting them to disadvantages in the Chinese market.
As part of the Phase One trade agreement, China committed to improving intellectual property protection, ending forced technology transfers, and increasing market access for financial services.
Anne-Marie Brady presented a paper titled 'Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping' at the Conference on 'The Corrosion of Democracy under China’s Global Influence' in Arlington, Virginia, on September 16–17, 2017.
If economic and security interests between the United States and China are re-evaluated, the level of global integration could decline to a point that resembles deglobalization.
Among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China provides the highest number of personnel for peacekeeping missions, with 2,500 soldiers and police deployed, primarily in Africa.
The United States perceives China's activities in the South China Sea as aggressive, views its trade practices as mercantilist, and observes a hardening of authoritarian tendencies in China.
Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of US forces in the Indo-Pacific, stated in a 2019 congressional hearing that 95 percent of Chinese ballistic missiles would be prohibited under the terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
The United States government regards China as a 'revisionist power' and a 'rival' seeking to 'shape a world antithetical to US values and interests' in order to displace the United States and restructure the world order.
The competition between the United States and China involves a systemic opposition regarding internal order, specifically the relationship between state and society, and between government and governed.
China has disproven the Western expectation that economic development and growing prosperity would automatically lead to the emergence of democracy and the rule of law in China.
The primary security concern regarding China has shifted from the potential intimidation of United States allies in the region, such as South Korea and Japan, to a perceived global security threat.
China's waters adjoin those of six neighboring states, some of which host US military bases.
Third-party states have the option to align fully with either the United States or China, relying exclusively on the technologies of that specific sphere of influence.
The European Union must strengthen its capabilities for supranational geopolitics, ideally with transatlantic coordination, to effectively stand up to China in the long term.
The Global Times asserts that the United States has adopted a policy of containment against China, which is manifested in the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.
China is actively working to expand its influence within the United Nations and its various agencies and programs, rather than withdrawing from them.
Evan S. Medeiros authored the RAND Project Air Force report 'China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification', which analyzes China's international conduct.
Technological leadership in the digital age is crucial to the US-China rivalry because it creates global competitive advantage and secures the basis for military superiority.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Laura von Daniels argue that the U.S.-China trade conflict is linked to questions of world order that are vital from a European perspective, including the future of binding multilateral trade rules and institutions.
The United States and China, as evidenced by the Huawei case, categorize status conflicts within their broader, conflict-laden bilateral relationship.
The United States and China may be tempted to stimulate their domestic economies through currency devaluation if economic growth declines or a recession develops.
Trade and economic conflicts between the United States and China have domestic political relevance in both nations, possessing mobilising potential that is not solely dependent on the impact of global developments on specific employment sectors.
The European Union views China as a vital cooperation partner for tackling global challenges, particularly regarding climate protection.
The US-China rivalry has global consequences, affecting relationships with other powers, regional dynamics, and the functioning of international organizations like the G20 and the United Nations.
China ignores fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination and transparency in its external economic policy and ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in its territorial dispute with the Philippines.
The perceived convergence of economic and security components in the rivalry between the United States and China has contributed to the view of China as a global security threat.
China emerged from the 2008 global financial crisis largely unscathed and utilized significant fiscal resources to expand its influence within multilateral organizations.
Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that the trade conflict with China could harm the United States.
China forces religions, including Christianity and Islam, to Sinicize their symbolism, liturgy, and language.
The European Union should expand its collective Asia diplomacy in the fields of rule of law, democracy, and human rights, ideally in coordination with the United States.
Liberal Western values likely continue to exert fascination and appeal among Chinese intellectuals and society, despite a lack of reliable empirical research.
Beijing's narrative of a rising China and a declining America is tempered by its self-assessment regarding the need to modernize and catch up to the United States.
Donald Trump views China as both a strategic adversary on trade and a useful factor in specific situations like North Korea, while prioritizing US domestic politics as the decisive yardstick for foreign policy.
The United States Department of Commerce implemented controls on the export and licensing of security-relevant technologies to China.
Between 2004 and 2010, China implemented a school and textbook reform that promoted less favorable views of Western democracy and liberal capitalism.
China fears that US missile defense initiatives and the expansion of conventional US forces threaten its second-strike capability and its nuclear deterrent against the United States.
The calls for reform in China during the spring of 1989 were Western-inspired, and the individuals who raised them were suppressed on Tiananmen Square.
The Sino-American rivalry undermines multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation.
China attributes its economic success over the past four decades to the hard work and ingenuity of the Chinese people, the commercial aptitude of its businesses, and the policies of the state and party leadership in Beijing, rather than to American weakness.
Under the Phase One agreement, the United States and China renounced announced increases in special tariffs, and China promised additional imports from the United States amounting to $200 billion for the years 2020 and 2021.
China demonstrates its shift toward greater international visibility through its participation in multilateral organizations, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank).
Foreign companies operating in China, including United Airways, Christian Dior, Daimler, Leica, Cathay Pacific, and the National Basketball Association, have faced pressure to align with Chinese political positions, such as displaying Taiwan as part of China, removing sensitive advertising, restricting staff, or avoiding critical political statements.
The Chinese leadership believes that United States assertions regarding North Korean missiles are a pretext to install missile defense systems capable of neutralizing Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents.
China is actively working to expand its influence within the United Nations and its various agencies and programs, rather than withdrawing from them.
Economic competition and conflicts over trade, economic, and financial policy between the United States and China predate the protectionist course adopted by the United States under President Donald Trump.
The Sino-American rivalry undermines multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organisation, with the United States withdrawing from institutions while China expands its influence in contexts like the United Nations.
The relationship between the United States and China exhibits characteristics of a classical security dilemma, where each side's striving for greater security generates more insecurity on both sides, exacerbated by the constellation of a rising power encountering an established one.
Beijing fears that United States missile defense initiatives and the expansion of conventional US forces threaten China's second-strike capability and its nuclear deterrent.
Intensifying confrontation between the United States and China generates increased friction and pressure due to strategic interdependence.
The most competitive and largest exporters within the European Union are the primary drivers of the European Union's China policy.
George Magnus authored "Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy", published by Yale University Press in 2018.
In the South China Sea, the United States insists on unhindered access and freedom of navigation, which conflicts with China's efforts to create a security zone and counter American intervention capabilities.
The power rivalry between the United States and China is negatively impacting the interests of the European Union and Germany.
Both China and the United States are concerned with protecting strategically important routes to safeguard supplies in the event of a crisis.
Proponents of 'smart competition' believe that US policy toward China, characterized by a mix of cooperation, deterrence, and pressure, has been successful over the past decades.
US business sectors that have faced intense competition, such as producers of steel and aluminium, support President Donald Trump's protectionist tariffs and hard economic stance against China.
Companies in third-party nations may face a choice between conducting business with either the United States or China.
The economic bloc consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa is abbreviated as BRICS.
China operates a pilot project for smart city technology in Duisburg, Germany.
The perception that China's strategic narratives are tied to Xi Jinping's concentrated power supports the assumption that China seeks sweeping hegemony by exerting influence or pressure on societal forces in partner countries.
In the South China Sea, the United States' insistence on unhindered access and freedom of navigation conflicts with China's efforts to create a security zone and counter American intervention capabilities.
A strong US focus on the Indo-Pacific and competition with China may lead the United States to treat crises in Europe and the European periphery as secondary priorities.
Hilpert argues that the global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms is codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China, even in regions like Europe where it may appear to be an internal debate.
The European Union opposes a broad 'decoupling' or severing of technological and economic ties with China, a strategy that has been discussed and partially prepared in the United States.
Jessica Chen Weiss authored the article 'A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics', published in Foreign Affairs in 2019.
China and Russia share a threat perception regarding US, South Korean, and Japanese radar systems, believing that if these systems can track North Korean missiles, they can also track Chinese missiles.
China's authoritarian state capitalism produces outstanding results in terms of income and productivity growth, political stability, and international status.
Third-party states have two primary strategic options regarding the technological competition between the United States and China: they can align fully with one sphere of influence to increase dependency in one direction while gaining influence within that relationship, or they can strategically utilize existing interdependencies by selectively relying on technologies from both spheres.
In American domestic politics, China serves as a political target for Donald Trump's agenda and election slogans.
The United States, supported by G7 states, blocked a significant expansion of China's influence in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The European Union rejects the option of equidistance between the United States and China due to significant differences regarding values, political systems, and the rules-based international order.
Historically, the United States prioritized economic logic in relations with China as long as Washington did not fear the rise of a strategic rival, operating under the expectation that economic interdependence would promote cooperation and stability.
China ignores fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination and transparency in its external economic policy when it serves its interests.
Both China and the United States bypass multilateral organizations and rules, prioritizing bilateral negotiations to resolve conflicts.
The Trump Administration pursues a strategy of economic decoupling from China to throttle the modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
China's threat analysis focuses on the expandability of US missile defense systems, specifically flexibly deployable Aegis vessels and land-based systems.
United States business sectors that have faced intense competition, such as steel and aluminum producers, support President Donald Trump's protectionist tariffs and hard economic stance against China.
The US-China conflict syndrome is based on a regional and increasingly global status rivalry, with China's growing power causing American fears regarding its status as the sole international superpower.
The United States uses tariffs, investment controls, and supplier boycotts as trade policy instruments to achieve economic decoupling from China.
The United States private sector and both major political parties are concerned about the negative economic repercussions of the trade conflict with China, specifically regarding the impact on American consumers and the agricultural sector.
The European Union has limited ability to bilaterally contain status conflicts between the United States and China, which have intensified following the end of the collective leadership model in China and the concentration of power under Xi Jinping.
Both Republican and Democratic lawmakers in the United States criticize the Trump Administration's use of unilateral import tariffs and threats, arguing that these measures alienate American allies in Europe and Asia and weaken the United States' position against China.
The Sino-American trade, economic, and technology conflict has caused economic harm to both the United States and China, as well as to third-party nations.
The symbiotic economic relationship between the United States and China, sometimes referred to as 'Chimerica', no longer exists.
To effectively manage its relationship with China, the European Union needs to be united, conflict-capable, legitimate, and possess industrial and technological resilience.
The development of an ocean-going navy by China is considered the maritime continuation of the reform policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s.
China increases its influence in UN peacekeeping operations by assuming greater responsibility and a larger share of the associated costs.
China is transitioning its naval strategy from coastal defence to 'active defence', which involves controlling the space within the 'first island chain'.
The European Union views Asia as a region encompassing more than just China.
Dennis Shea delivered a statement titled 'China’s Trade-disruptive Economic Model and Implications for the WTO' at the WTO General Council on July 26, 2019.
The United States and China are exerting pressure on third-party states, such as Germany, regarding the use of Huawei technology.
The United States Trade Representative published an investigation report under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 in March 2018, which describes China’s industrial and technology policy as "unfair and inequitable."
The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the two years preceding April 2020.
Nuclear weapons are a significant component of Chinese foreign and security policy.
Regardless of whether Donald Trump was reelected or a Democrat entered the White House in January 2021, the strategic rivalry with China will shape United States foreign policy.
China has established or promoted several international economic initiatives, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICS Development Bank), and the Belt and Road Initiative.
Under the Trump administration, security logic replaced economic logic in US-China relations due to concerns about relative gains and the impact of economic interdependence on military technological superiority.
Washington believes that China possesses the political, economic, and military means to expand its influence globally, unlike Russia.
The power of the United States is a source of both fascination and insecurity for China's political elites.
Alastair I. Johnston's 2019 article, 'The Failures of the Failure of Engagement with China', challenges the prevailing United States interpretation that engagement with China has failed.
China's coastline spans more than 18,000 kilometres and its waters adjoin those of six neighbouring states, some of which host United States military bases.
The United States government has restricted the use of specific Chinese telecommunications and visual surveillance products in the area of public procurement.
Experts cited in the Global Times dismissed negative media reports concerning the 'Phase One' trade deal between the United States and China.
The collapse of the Soviet Union influenced Chinese leaders to avoid open competition with the United States, such as arms races or direct confrontation.
Paul Sonne reported in the Washington Post on May 19, 2019, that as President Donald Trump escalated the trade dispute with China, economic ties between the two nations lost their role as a stabilizing force in matters of national security.
On 13 December 2019, the United States and China agreed on a partial Phase One trade agreement.
China's rise threatens the United States' status as the leading power and the associated material privileges and economic advantages.
The United States and China imposed tit-for-tat tariffs, which reduced bilateral trade and increased import costs, leading importers to switch to alternative suppliers like Vietnam, Mexico, and the European Union.
The European Union's foreign policy exists within a new system of coordinates determined by the axis of conflict between the United States and China, requiring the European Union to find and hold its own position.
Technological dependency is considered unproblematic when all involved parties view it as a desirable interdependence that increases welfare, but becomes problematic when actors like the United States and China leverage these dependencies to further their own interests.
The United States government fears that China harbors expansionist intentions, which causes concrete agreements, such as those involving Huawei, to be interpreted with suspicion, eroding mutual predictability and trust.
The United States maintains a system of alliances and partnerships with countries that perceive China as a threat.
US companies face increasing difficulty in increasing sales and profits in the Chinese market due to rising administrative restrictions and the continued closure of service sectors where US businesses have competitive advantages.
The future development of US and Chinese spheres of influence is uncertain, with the potential for trade barriers to make them more closed and exclusive.
Rush Doshi and Robert D. Williams published an article on the Lawfare blog titled 'Is China Interfering in American Politics?' on October 1, 2018.
The US-China rivalry has global consequences, affecting relationships with other powers, regional dynamics in Europe, and the operations of international organizations like the G20 and the United Nations.
The United States maintains a system of alliances and partnerships with countries that perceive China as a threat.
The United States and China categorize status conflicts, such as the Huawei case, within their conflict-laden bilateral relationship model.
Xi Jinping stated on July 30, 2013, that the ability to solve ocean problems is related to the existence and development of China, and that China must adhere to a development path of becoming a rich and powerful state by utilizing the sea.
The United States views China as a revisionist power with the long-term goal of achieving global supremacy.
C. Fred Bergsten characterizes the relationship between China and the United States as one of trade conflict and systemic competition.
China ranked tenth among all countries in terms of total personnel contributed to United Nations peacekeeping missions in 2019.
The escalation of hard security challenges between the United States and China has led to the emergence of a classical security dilemma.
A second group of Chinese America analysts believes that the shift in United States policy towards China is permanent and structural, driven by a bipartisan consensus in the United States that precludes a return to previous relations.
Foreign policy specialists and China experts in the United States who advocate against a purely confrontational policy toward China are currently marginalized in the political discourse.
The United States, with support from G7 states, blocked a significant expansion of China's influence within the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The Trump Administration withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia partly in the hope that the withdrawal would enable the United States to better counter the Chinese military threat.
The United States National Security Strategy published in December 2017 identifies China's trade and economic policies as one of America's central foreign policy and security challenges and threats.
The European Union accuses China of systematically subsidizing Chinese private and state-owned enterprises to provide them with competitive advantages on a global scale.
Carsten Schäfer authored an article titled 'The Body Overseas, But the Heart Remains in China? – China’s Diaspora Politics and Its Implications', published in Border Crossing in 2019.
China began demanding a larger say in the Bretton Woods institutions commensurate with its economic importance in the early 2000s.
Skeptics argue that China could acquire dominant global political, economic, and technological influence, set international rules and standards, and establish an 'illiberal sphere of influence'.
China mandates that foreign companies store customer data within Chinese territory, granting Chinese security authorities access to that data.
The United States and China both perceive themselves as defensive, peaceful powers while suspecting the other of having aggressive offensive intentions, which creates a security dilemma.
China's development demonstrates that a combination of authoritarian rule and oligarchical capitalism can produce significant results in income growth, productivity, political stability, and international status.
Chinese state-controlled media characterizes Western democracies, particularly the United States, as dysfunctional while promoting China's own economic, social, and political progress.
NATO's London Declaration of December 2019 acknowledged the challenges and opportunities presented by China's influence and international policies.
The strong personalization of politics in the era of Xi Jinping and Donald Trump shapes relations between China and the United States.
China is the largest contributor to world economic growth, the largest exporter, and the largest trading nation in absolute terms.
Donald Trump's uninhibited style of communication and the emotional appeal of his politics are incompatible with Chinese etiquette and cause disconcertion among the Beijing leadership, particularly when China is involved in US election campaigns.
Euro-American trade disputes hinder the ability of the European Union and the United States to utilize World Trade Organization (WTO) mechanisms to enforce free trade principles, such as intellectual property protections and market access reciprocity, against China.
The United States and China both view technological superiority as a fundamental prerequisite for their respective economic and military strength and their standing in world politics.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current conflict of values, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
China, Russia, and the European Union are pursuing data localization initiatives to repatriate their citizens' data from the United States as a step toward regaining control.
The human rights situation in China has historically been a cause of intermittent friction in US-China relations.
Current international relations are increasingly defined by concerns over who gains more from economic exchange and the security implications of economic interdependence between the United States and China.
China uses its nuclear arsenal to deter the United States from military intervention or direct threats to the Chinese mainland.
The United States has become reluctant to transfer technology to China.
The United States has declared that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China, are covered under the bilateral defense agreement between the United States and Japan.
The multilateral order is in crisis in the early 2020s due to the collision between China's rise as a global power and the 'America First' political approach in the United States.
The European Union views Asia as a region encompassing more than just China.
The trade practices of the United States and China, along with the resulting welfare losses, negatively affect Germany and the European Union.
Chinese savings have ceased to contribute significantly to financing the United States' domestic economy because China's purchases of US treasury bonds have fallen following shrinking current account surpluses.
The European Union aims to develop a reciprocal economic and technological interdependency with China based on jointly agreed principles and rules.
China refused to recognize the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague regarding its territorial dispute with the Philippines.
The US Administration and Congress generally view China as a 'revisionist power' that aims to challenge US dominance and undermine the rules-based international order.
No other state is expected to match the technological prowess of the United States and China in the foreseeable future.
Skeptics argue that China could acquire dominant global political, economic, and technological influence, allowing it to set international rules and establish an 'illiberal sphere of influence' that would prevent the United States from guaranteeing its current level of security and prosperity.
Western governments have expressed concerns that China could sabotage new 5G mobile networks, a debate reflected in discussions regarding the role of the Chinese technology company Huawei.
The United States and China are both attempting to expand their technopolitical influence, which increases economic pressure and reduces political space for technologically dependent states.
The trajectory and outcome of systemic competition between China and the West are fundamentally open, with it being unlikely that two different systems can coexist in a networked global economy in the long run.
China holds an ambivalent view of the post-1945 liberal world order and the values and institutions upon which it is built.
The conflict between the United States and China is causing a retreat in world trade and the global division of labor, negatively impacting global production, income, and innovation.
President Donald Trump previously indicated that he regarded the treatment of the opposition in Hong Kong as an internal matter for China.
The United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada accuse China of systematically stealing intellectual property and imposing competition-distorting requirements on Western companies operating in the Chinese market.
Susan L. Shirk argues that China under Xi Jinping has returned to personalistic rule in her 2018 article 'China in Xi’s New Era: The Return to Personalistic Rule'.
China's model of economic growth combined with authoritarian political stability offers developing countries and emerging economies an alternative to the Western model of democratic market economies.
Gabriel B. Collins authored the chapter 'China’s Dependence on the Global Maritime Commons' in the 2010 book 'China, the United States, and 21st Century Seapower.'
Washington believes that China possesses the political, economic, and military means to expand its influence globally, distinguishing it from Russia.
Donald Trump labeled China a 'currency manipulator' and a 'rule breaker' regarding trade rules and intellectual property rights.
The European Union lacks binding rules-based dispute resolution mechanisms for more than half of its trade, specifically regarding trade with the United States, China, and India, which differs from the existing WTO framework.
The political debate within the United States regarding China is characterized by a fear of China's rise and the possibility of the United States being overtaken.
Europe's understanding of multilateralism and international rules is fundamentally different from China's approach of Sinocentric multi-bilateralism.
Both the United States and China undermine the global order by flouting multilateral rules and using institutions for displays of power.
Concerns in the United States regarding Chinese influence extend beyond security and economic policy to include activities involving Confucius Institutes and Chinese investments in think-tanks, universities, media, and business.
The United States accuses China of unfair competition, specifically citing the closure of markets through protectionist measures, discrimination against foreign suppliers, and direct, arbitrary influence on markets and businesses.
China increased its annual contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) from approximately €300,000 to more than €2 million in 2018.
Chinese observers question whether the United States would accept China's rise and leadership in technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G if China were a Western-style democracy.
The 'Thucydides Trap' is an interpretive framework discussed in the United States and China that highlights the risks of power transitions and the potential for regional conflicts to coalesce into a global hegemonic conflict.
Feng Lu published the article 'China-US Trade Disputes in 2018: An Overview' in the journal China and World Economy in 2018.
China is modernizing its nuclear arsenal by introducing new intercontinental missiles, developing a new air-launched ballistic missile, and establishing a missile early warning system with Russian support.
The 'Thucydides Trap' serves as an interpretive framework in the United States and China that highlights the risks of power transition and suggests that individual regional conflicts could coalesce into a global hegemonic conflict.
The relationship between the United States and China is a complex strategic rivalry because they are potential military adversaries rather than merely systemic antagonists competing over status.
A military conflict between China and a US alliance partner would create a difficult situation for the United States, assuming the Trump Administration continues to value the credibility of American security guarantees.
From the Chinese perspective, China's gain in economic and political importance is a natural and inevitable resurgence rather than a threat.
China identifies mutual respect regarding territorial integrity and the recognition of different development models as the central value in its relationship with the United States.
China increases its influence in United Nations peacekeeping operations by assuming greater responsibility and a larger share of the associated costs.
The United States government does not currently view China as a direct threat to the continental United States.
United States producers of steel and aluminium support the protectionist tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration against China due to intense competition.
Despite its economic success and status as a great power, China identifies as part of the Global South and refers to itself as the 'world's largest developing country'.
The United States National Security Strategy officially labeled China a 'strategic competitor' in December 2017.
The United States Treasury Department accused China of currency manipulation in August 2019 following a significant devaluation of the renminbi.
Despite its economic success and status as a great power, China identifies as part of the Global South and its political leadership refers to the country as the 'world's largest developing country'.
Economic factors are the dominant element in the increasingly conflictual relationship between the European Union and China.
If current growth trends continue, China is projected to replace the United States as the world's largest economy by 2030.
The European Union member states fear the consequences of escalating trade disputes and geopolitical confrontation between the United States and China.
The United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada accuse China of systematically stealing intellectual property and imposing competition-distorting requirements on Western companies operating in the Chinese market.
The global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms is codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China, affecting internal debates in other regions like Europe.
The European Union should maintain an independent position in trade disputes and defend rules-based multilateralism, despite foreign policy and security reasons preventing equidistance between the US and China.
Official and published statements in China suggest that both the United States and China need to seek compromise in their economic relations to avoid mutual harm.
A group of China experts, including individuals who worked in earlier United States Administrations, sent an open letter to the President and Congress expressing discomfort with the current trend in United States policy toward China.
An Gang argued that it was time for China to forge a new strategy toward the United States in an article for China-US Focus on June 4, 2019.
The Chinese leadership believes that the United States uses the threat of North Korean missiles as a pretext to install missile defense systems capable of neutralizing Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents.
The technological dimension of the rivalry between the United States and China runs deeper than trade disputes and will outlast any resolution of those disputes.
China and Russia have acquired hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) technologies, which China views as advantageous because they cannot be detected or destroyed by currently available defense systems.
China's economic and technological rise has caused economic relations between the United States and China to become less complementary and more competitive.
The reputation of the West in China has been eroded by the global financial crisis, United States military interventions in the Middle East, and the political style of Donald Trump.
Any military conflict between the United States and China would have enormous regional and global impacts.
China has threatened to sell off its holdings of United States treasury securities, a move that would place severe pressure on United States interest rates.
The United States government and society view China as a revisionist power with a long-term goal of achieving global supremacy.
China established its first foreign military base in the Horn of Africa in August 2017, and the United States anticipates that China will establish additional foreign bases.
Central actors like the United States and China can leverage technological dependencies to exert political and economic influence over dependent states and businesses.
The human rights situation in China has historically been a source of intermittent friction in US-China relations.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China obstructs vital decision-making processes within the United Nations.
The US-China trade conflict is politically instrumental and closely bound up with the development of the world order.
China is politically and economically integrated into the Western-inspired international system and does not present itself as a systemic alternative.
The normative dimension of American criticism regarding China's threat to human rights and democratic values has been central to the US debate since the 1989 suppression of the student movement on Tiananmen Square.
The United States perceives China's activities in the South China Sea as aggressive, objects to its mercantilist trade practices, and is concerned by the hardening of authoritarian tendencies in China.
The United States views China's growing military capabilities as a threat to its military bases in Japan, South Korea, and the US territory of Guam.
Both China and the United States bypass multilateral organizations and rules, prioritizing bilateral negotiations for resolving pressing conflicts, which harms international organizations.
The United States has become reluctant to transfer technology to China.
Chinese official and published statements suggest that both the United States and China need to seek compromise in their economic disputes to avoid mutual harm.
The 'comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination' between China and Russia is manifested through arms cooperation and joint military manoeuvres.
American criticisms of China are categorized into normative, security, and economic dimensions.
Donald Trump's communication style and emotional political appeals are perceived as incompatible with Chinese etiquette and cause disconcertion among the Beijing leadership, particularly when China is involved in US election campaigns.
China intends to introduce new intercontinental missiles, develop a new air-launched ballistic missile, and establish a missile early warning system with the support of Russia.
Since the 2002 National Security Strategy, US Administrations have explicitly raised concerns regarding the modernization of the Chinese armed forces.
China under President Xi Jinping presents itself as a champion of multilateralism while simultaneously subverting the work of multilateral institutions.
US companies negatively affected by import tariffs on semi-finished products or counter-tariffs from China and other trading partners—including the retail sector, farm sector, car-makers, and IT and communications companies—oppose the escalation of trade sanctions.
The Chinese development model demonstrates to state leaders and development planners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that economic progress and globalization do not necessarily require adherence to the Western paradigm.
Concerns regarding who benefits more from economic exchange and the security implications of economic interdependence have become increasingly important in the relationship between the United States and China.
The United States maintains ambiguity regarding the principle of mutually assured destruction in relation to China.
Beijing accuses the United States of attempting to suppress China and impede its progress.
The European Union views China as an economic competitor because China is strategically attempting to acquire segments of the European Union's high-tech research and manufacturing sectors, specifically artificial intelligence, robotics, and biotechnology.
President Xi Jinping initiated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to secure and guarantee markets and resources in a politically stable and China-friendly international environment.
China strictly observes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and refrains from actively promoting authoritarian regimes.
China responded to being blocked from expanding its influence in the International Monetary Fund and World Bank by using its resources to establish new formats and organizations where it acts as the largest single donor.
The United States government has tightened state controls on foreign direct investment in security-relevant sectors using administrative measures and legislation, resulting in a significant decline in Chinese investment in the United States.
The struggle over techno-political spheres of influence may lead the United States to impose further sanctions and supplier boycotts against Chinese companies, potentially forcing third-party companies to choose between US and Chinese business standards.
China historically accumulated surpluses by exporting to the United States and reinvested those funds into United States treasury bonds, thereby co-financing the American consumption-driven economic boom.
China utilizes a diaspora policy to mobilize approximately sixty million ethnic Chinese living abroad, regardless of their citizenship, to support China's positions and interests.
The author argues that the European Union should maintain an independent position in trade disputes and defend rules-based multilateralism, despite security reasons preventing equidistance between the United States and China.
Washington fears that China could establish a military presence in the Arctic, in addition to competing for resources in the region.
The United States increasingly views the rise of China as a danger to its own dominant position in the international system.
A consolidated, lasting global strategic rivalry between the United States and China could trigger deglobalization, potentially resulting in two parallel world orders dominated by the United States and China respectively.
China has expanded its international media presence through outlets such as newspapers and the China Global Television Network (CGTN) to promote pro-China coverage and policy abroad.
The European Union faces a threat of a global collapse of the digital commons if it fails to work with major powers, including China, to establish security- and confidence-building measures for cybersecurity and Industry 4.0.
The Trump Administration shifted US policy by demanding that China implement economic reforms that would have fundamentally altered its economic model, contrasting with the Obama Administration's approach of criticizing China's neo-mercantilist policies while maintaining multilateral rules.
China is the world's largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity.
From the Chinese perspective, the ideological dimension of the US-China relationship is highly salient because Western concepts of liberal democracy and freedom of expression threaten the ideological dominance of the Chinese Communist Party.
Warnings about the Thucydides Trap in US-China relations contradict the Chinese government's rhetoric regarding its 'peaceful rise'.
China characterizes itself as an advocate for emerging economies and developing countries rather than as a systemic adversary of the United States and the West.
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, American decision-makers became increasingly concerned that China's economic success would create a geopolitical challenge.
Foreign-controlled social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google are effectively blocked and inaccessible within China.
The United States perceives China's growing military capabilities as a threat to U.S. military bases in the Pacific, the U.S. system of partnerships and alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, and the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
The European Union's relationship with China is not focused on geostrategic containment and decoupling, unlike the United States' approach.
Chinese discourse questions whether the United States' primary interest is maintaining American supremacy or if the U.S. would cede influence in specific areas if China underwent fundamental democratic change.
In 2005, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick demanded that China act as a 'responsible stakeholder' in the international system.
Ted Piccone authored a report titled 'China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations' published by The Brookings Institution in September 2018.
The Trump Administration shifted U.S. policy toward China by demanding reforms that would have fundamentally altered China's economic model, departing from the approach of the Obama Administration which criticized China's neo-mercantilist policies while maintaining multilateral rules.
China has worked to establish its own ideological ideas within the UN Human Rights Council, such as relativizing the importance of individual human rights.
From the perspective of Washington and the West, the global geostrategic center of gravity shifted toward Asia and China over the decade preceding 2020.
Highlighting ideological conflict is a strategy used to mobilize domestic support in the United States for a power competition with China, despite the associated economic costs.
The United States administration believes that protecting national interests requires United States strategic industries to possess supply chains that are independent of China.
The trajectory and outcome of the systemic competition between China and the West are fundamentally open, though it is unlikely that two different systems can coexist in a networked global economy in the long run.
China responded to blocked influence in existing institutions by using its resources to establish new formats and organizations where it acts as the largest single donor.
China faces potential systemic crisis if it fails to address internal debt, industrial overcapacity, growing inequality, pollution, and corruption.
The Trump Administration’s strategy documents characterize China as a revisionist power seeking regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and long-term global supremacy.
Following threats by President Donald Trump to raise tariffs in two stages by the end of 2019, the Trump Administration agreed to a limited 'Phase One Deal' with China instead of imposing new tariffs, due to pressure from US businesses, Republicans in Congress, and trade unions.
Chinese firms operating social media platforms, providing cloud services, and selling network technologies have achieved growing global importance as part of China's technopolitical strategy.
The European understanding of multilateralism and international rules differs fundamentally from the 'Sinocentric multi-bilateralism' practiced by China.
A consolidated strategic rivalry between the United States and China could lead to deglobalization and the creation of two parallel international orders, one dominated by the United States and the other by China.
The strategic rivalry with China is expected to shape US foreign policy regardless of whether Donald Trump was reelected or a Democrat assumed the presidency in January 2021.
Even if a second trade agreement occurs, the fundamental political conflict between the United States and China will likely persist, leaving the possibility of further trade policy escalation.
Following the 2008 global financial crisis, American decision-makers became increasingly concerned that China's economic success posed a geopolitical challenge.
The multilateral order is in crisis as China's rise as a global power collides with the 'America First' political approach in the United States.
Critics outside the Trump administration blame China for deindustrialization and other economic and social problems in the United States, though these issues are also attributed to policy failures and technological change.
A balanced US policy toward China that weighs both cooperation and confrontation would alleviate pressure on European capitals to choose sides between the United States and China.
The US-China conflict forces Germany and the European Union to determine the extent and terms of their support for the United States against China.
Hanns Günther Hilpert argues that the material benefits of economic cooperation between the United States and China have declined compared to the period between 1990 and 2015.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is increasingly understood as a system-to-system conflict.
Western expectations that China would become economically and politically liberal following its accession to the World Trade Organisation have not been met.
Between 2004 and 2010, China implemented school and textbook reforms that propagate less favorable views of Western democracy and liberal capitalism.
The Obama administration criticized China's neo-mercantilist economic policy while maintaining multilateral trade rules, whereas the Trump administration demanded reforms that would have fundamentally altered China's economic model.
In recent decades, China has peacefully resolved many of its border conflicts.
A US China policy that balances cooperative and confrontative approaches would reduce the pressure on Berlin and other European capitals to choose between the United States and China.
China contradicts the liberal expectation that growing economic prosperity will automatically lead to political liberalization, democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law.
The European Union rejects the option of equidistance between China and the United States due to significant differences regarding values, political systems, and the rules-based international order.
The United States accuses China of engaging in unfair competition.
China operates a pilot project for smart city technology in Duisburg, Germany.
The United States believes that China is seeking to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in East Asia.
The Trump Administration and the United States Congress both maintain a hard-line policy toward China but disagree on the specific methods to implement this strategy.
China's rise as the world's leading industrial manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural economic change in the United States and triggered social upheavals in the American "Rust Belt" region.
President Xi Jinping has stated that the fate of China is dependent on the use of the seas.
China possesses the world's largest navy in terms of the number of vessels.
Chinese elites feel insecure and threatened by liberal values and world views, despite China having disproven the Western expectation that economic development and prosperity would automatically lead to democracy and the rule of law.
The conflict between United States and Chinese leadership styles creates opportunities for third-party states to gain influence by balancing their relationships with both powers.
Europe is largely dependent on the United States and China for core digital technologies.
The global geostrategic center of gravity has shifted toward Asia, specifically China, over the past decade according to the United States and Western perspectives.
The international presence of Chinese state media, including newspapers and programming from China Global Television Networks (CGTN), has expanded.
The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the past two years, shaping strategic debates and real political, military, and economic dynamics.
Economic competition and conflicts over trade and financial policy between the United States and China predate the protectionist policies adopted by the United States under President Donald Trump.
The trajectory and outcome of the systemic competition between China and the West are fundamentally open, with the long-term possibility that one system will prevail or displace the other.
Critics outside of the Trump administration attribute American deindustrialization and economic problems to China, though these issues are also linked to policy failures and technological change.
China does not currently fear a 'colour revolution' due to its economic development, but the state still views the liberal world view as a subversive challenge.
The 1995/1996 Taiwan crisis, during which the United States deployed two aircraft carriers to force China to back down, served as the trigger for China's military capability-building process.
China has peacefully resolved many of its border conflicts in recent decades.
A conflict over global decision-making participation between the United States and China dates back to the early 2000s, when China began demanding a larger say in Bretton Woods institutions commensurate with its economic importance.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is understood as a system-to-system conflict.
China has 22,000 kilometers of land borders touching fourteen neighboring states.
The United States Administration and Congress view China as a 'revisionist power' that seeks to challenge the dominance of the United States and undermine the rules-based international order.
United States lawmakers are pushing President Donald Trump to take action against China regarding the detention of Uighurs.
Decision-makers abroad are influenced by China through a spectrum of instruments, ranging from attractive invitations and the intermediation of lucrative business deals to intimidation, bribery, and blackmail.
China emerged from the 2008 global financial crisis largely unscathed and utilized its fiscal resources to expand its influence in multilateral organizations.
The United States and China are the primary protagonists in the current conflict of values, while Europe and Russia play independent roles.
Since the 2002 National Security Strategy, United States Administrations have explicitly raised concerns regarding the modernization of the Chinese armed forces.
Beijing has historically suspected the United States of seeking to internally corrupt and transform China and the Communist world through 'peaceful evolution,' which China interprets as infiltration and subversion.
Donald Trump's uninhibited communication style and emotional political appeal are incompatible with Chinese etiquette and cause disconcertion among the Beijing leadership, particularly when China is involved in United States election campaigns.
Shahryar Pasandideh, in his 2019 article 'The End of the INF Treaty and the US-China Military Balance', raises the question of where the United States could station ground-launched intermediate-range missiles on the territory of alliance partners and which targets in China could be reached from those locations.
The 'century of humiliation' (1840–1949) shapes China's strategic culture and serves as an important element of the Chinese nationalism that connects the Chinese nation and the Chinese Communist Party.
China has increased its presence on the multilateral stage through organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (BRICS Bank) to enhance its international status.
Weak compliance regarding the implementation of agreements, such as in the trade sector, prevents the development of a viable relationship between the United States and China.
China's combination of economic growth and political stability offers developing countries and emerging economies an alternative development model to the Western democratic paradigm.
The post-1945 liberal world order and the globalization process enabled China to industrialize, modernize, eliminate absolute poverty, and acquire international power and prestige.
China attempts to establish its own political terms and values within the language of the United Nations.
The European Union shares a broad range of economic, security, and normative interests with the United States, while maintaining a fundamental distance from China.
The European Union views China as a systemic rival that promotes alternative models of governance, in addition to being a negotiating partner and economic competitor.
The strong personalization of politics under President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump shapes relations between China and the United States.
The private sector and both major political parties in the United States are concerned that the trade conflict with China will negatively impact American consumers and the agricultural sector.
The rivalry between the United States and China has become a paradigm of international relations over the two years preceding 2020.
The strategic competition between the United States and China is framed as 'consultation and cooperation,' but is driven by the unspoken model of governance China claims for itself.
The growing rivalry between the United States and China is prominently displayed in the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.
The United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies, despite Europe's dependence on them for digital technologies.
China is developing military competence and capabilities in space and cyberspace.
The US-China rivalry has global consequences, affecting relationships with other powers, regional dynamics in Europe, and the functioning of international organizations like the G20 and the United Nations.
Many states and societies in Asia and Africa value China's economic engagement and its Belt and Road Initiative, but fear one-sided dependencies.
The United States views China’s military capabilities in space and cyberspace as an imminent danger.
United States companies face increased difficulty in increasing sales and profits in the Chinese market due to rising administrative restrictions and the closure of service sectors where United States businesses hold competitive advantages.
China views the post-1945 liberal world order and its associated institutions with ambivalence.
The Chinese government and public view China's recent economic and political growth as a natural and inevitable resurgence rather than a threat.
The European Union shares broad economic, security, and normative interests with the United States, while maintaining a fundamental distance from China.
As part of the Phase One agreement, China promised better protection of intellectual property, an end to forced technology transfer, and better market access in financial services.
Western expectations that China would become economically and politically liberal following its accession to the World Trade Organisation have not been met.
Lindsay Maizland authored an article titled 'Is China Undermining Human Rights at the United Nations?' published by the Council on Foreign Relations on July 9, 2019.
It is unlikely that the United States and China will resolve outstanding trade disputes in a second partial agreement before the US presidential elections.
The United States accuses China of unfair competition, specifically citing the closure of markets through protectionist measures, discrimination against foreign suppliers, and direct, arbitrary influence on markets and businesses.
China operates a smart city pilot project in Duisburg, Germany.
Donald Trump's use of trade sanctions to force compliance violates Chinese principles of status recognition and respect, which necessitates a harsh response from China.
Both Republicans and Democrats in the United States Congress criticize the Trump Administration's use of unilateral import tariffs, arguing that these measures alienate American allies in Europe and Asia and weaken the US position against China.
The European Union's negotiating power and ability to pursue its interests regarding China increase as the member states become more unified.
In the United States, the rise of China is widely perceived as a threat to the dominant position of the United States in the international system.
In the United States, President Donald Trump minimized the influence of the State Department, while in China, the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping took control of foreign policy decisions.
China utilizes Confucius Institutes and the Chinese Students’ and Scholars’ Association as channels to expand its influence abroad.
The rivalry between the United States and China is beginning to structure international relations and has the potential to create a new 'geo-economic world order'.
China contradicts the liberal expectation that growing economic prosperity automatically leads to political liberalization, democracy, pluralism, and the rule of law.
The 'Chinese Dream' of a great renaissance of the Chinese nation involves shifting focus from the Yellow River to the ocean and the outside world.
China opened its first foreign military base in the Horn of Africa in August 2017.
China's rise as the world's leading industrial manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural economic change in the United States and triggered social upheavals in the American 'Rust Belt'.
The United States did not perceive China as an ideological antagonist as long as China's rise was not viewed as a global challenge and there was hope for China's eventual liberalization.
American decision-makers became increasingly concerned after the 2008 global financial crisis that China's economic success would pose a geopolitical challenge.
Chuck Schumer, Democratic Senate Minority Leader, stated in May 2019: "We have to have tough, strong policies against China or they’ll continue to steal millions of American jobs and trillions of American dollars."
Alastair I. Johnston argues in 'The Failures of the “Failure of Engagement” with China' that while the interpretation of 'failed engagement' with China predominates in the United States, alternative perspectives exist.
The European Union views cooperation and competition as legitimate modes for a policy of self-assertion, alongside self-protection through a modern industrial policy designed to close the technology gap.
Strategic interdependence is a more promising approach to dealing with China than economic decoupling.
Weak compliance between the United States and China regarding agreements, such as those in the trade sector, makes it impossible to develop a viable relationship.
The rivalry between the United States and China is prominently displayed in the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.
Heribert Dieter authored the SWP study "Chinas Verschuldung und seine Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen: Peking exportiert ein gefährliches Modell" (China's Debt and its Foreign Economic Relations: Beijing Exports a Dangerous Model), published by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in August 2019.
One camp of Chinese America analysts hopes that the United States and China will return to pragmatic and constructive relations, either through a trade agreement with President Donald Trump or his loss in the next election.
Central actors can conduct "politics by default" by defining normative standards through their technologies, as technologies are not value-neutral and contain embedded political ideas, values, and norms.
The student movement in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region defends liberal values against political pressure from China.
Chinese official narratives claim that the United States is seeking to weaken the Chinese system and achieve regime change in Beijing by intervening in Hong Kong, which China views as a core national interest involving territorial integrity.
The material benefits accruing to both the United States and China from their economic cooperation have declined in comparison to the period between 1990 and 2015.
The Chinese state-affiliated newspaper Global Times asserts that the United States has adopted a policy of containment against China, which is manifested in the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy.
Chinese views of the United States are ambivalent, characterized by respect and admiration for American innovation, economic strength, universities, military capabilities, and political system, alongside mistrust stemming from historical negative experiences.
China operates primarily in the geo-economic arena, which aligns with the European Union's own power resources.
Beijing does not expect the United States to grant China a voice commensurate with its economic and political weight.
Yevgen Sautin revisits the concept of a 'New Type of Great Power Relations' in the context of China's 'New Era' under Xi Jinping.
The German government, in collaboration with France, the European Commission, and Eurozone states, should explore a transatlantic trade agreement to remove industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers to increase bargaining power against Beijing regarding investment protection agreements.
The political debate in the United States regarding China is characterized by a fear of China's rise and the possibility of the United States being overtaken.
China, Russia, and the European Union are pursuing data localization initiatives to repatriate their citizens' data from the United States as a means of regaining control.
If China acquires dominant global influence, the United States would lose its ability to guarantee its current level of security and prosperity.
The European Union experiences direct and indirect negative impacts from the United States' policy of punitive tariffs against China, specifically regarding aluminum and steel directly, and diverted trade flows such as soybeans indirectly.
The United States National Security Strategy published in December 2017 identifies China’s trade and economic policies as one of America’s central foreign policy and security challenges and threats.
China supports the international expansion of its enterprises while strictly regulating and limiting foreign access to its domestic markets.
China currently heads more United Nations specialized agencies than any other member state.
The United States Trade Representative published findings from an investigation into China’s acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Samuel Bendett and Elsa B. Kania published 'A New Sino-Russian High-tech Partnership' in October 2019, which discusses high-tech cooperation between China and Russia.
China transports 90 percent of its trade in goods and 40 percent of its imported oil by sea, making the security of sea routes a national interest.
The United States has declared that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are administered by Japan but claimed by China, fall under the bilateral defense agreement between the United States and Japan.
China will not be able to match the United States on the high seas and in complex operations involving carrier groups until long after the conclusion of the Chinese military modernisation programme in 2035.
Donald Trump has labeled China a 'currency manipulator' and a 'rule breaker' regarding trade rules and intellectual property rights.
The European Union and other powers must focus on upholding international rules and institutions, which are being harmed by both the United States and China.
Unlike the United States, the European Union does not treat China as an arch-enemy in a structural global conflict, nor does it focus its relationship on geostrategic containment and decoupling.
Jessica Chen Weiss authored "A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics", published in Foreign Affairs in 2019, which discusses China's rise and the future of global politics.
European nations are developing instruments for a prudent policy towards China, including foreign investment screening and national legislation.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is politically instrumental and closely bound up with the development of the world order.
Until the late eighteenth century, China's per capita income exceeded that of Western Europe or North America, and China was the leading power in Asia.
The United States government is convinced that China's growing global economic and political presence comes at the expense of the United States.
The rivalry between the United States and China is currently most openly confrontational at the economic level.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established a global narrative supporting China's claim to an outstanding international role, encouraging actors that previously operated nationally to expand internationally.
The United States government accuses China of unfair competition, citing practices such as closing markets with protectionist measures, discriminating against foreign suppliers, and exerting direct and arbitrary influence on markets and businesses.
The United States questions whether the Chinese economic model, characterized as a politically authoritarian, interventionist, and mercantilist state capitalism, is compatible with a world trade and finance system based on liberal principles.
The United States views China's ongoing naval expansion and military upgrades as a threat to its security because these developments could allow China to restrict United States Navy access to the Asia-Pacific region and challenge America's status as a global power.
China questions whether the United States would accept China's rise and leading role in new technologies like artificial intelligence and 5G if China were a democracy based on the Western model.
China exerts pressure on foreign companies operating within its borders to align with its political positions, such as requiring United Airways and Christian Dior to depict Taiwan as part of China, forcing Daimler and Leica to remove politically sensitive advertising, compelling Cathay Pacific to restrict staff who participated in Hong Kong demonstrations, and pressuring the National Basketball Association to avoid critical political statements.
The European Union is developing instruments for a confident European policy towards China, including foreign investment screening complemented by national legislation.
China is attempting to shape the economic affairs of other states by leveraging the global reach of the Alibaba Group and the marketplace functions of WeChat.
China is the world's largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity.
China has expanded its data access requirements to include encrypted communications from Western companies utilizing Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).
China's development model, characterized by a symbiosis of economic growth and authoritarian political stability, offers developing countries and emerging economies an alternative to the Western democratic market model.
China has threatened to sell off its US treasuries.
The United States Department of Commerce has implemented controls on the export and licensing of security-relevant technologies to China.
Units within the United States State Department responsible for monitoring China's behavior reportedly suffer from shortages of funding and personnel.
Chinese universalism is based on the conviction that Chinese civilization, rooted in Confucian morality, is superior to all others, rather than being based on Western values and norms.
China holds more than $1 trillion in United States treasury securities.
China's threat analysis focuses on the expandability of the US missile defense system, specifically regarding flexibly deployable Aegis vessels and land-based systems.
The United States and China frequently categorize status conflicts, such as the Huawei case, within their broader, conflict-laden bilateral relationship model.
China's 'Great Firewall' utilizes IP range bans and keyword filtering to censor the internet and suppress information the regime wishes to restrict.
President Xi Jinping has stated that the fate of China is dependent on the use of the seas.
Beijing views the United States as a frustrated power attempting to maintain its supremacy by geopolitically containing China and hindering its economic, technological, and military development.
The reputation of the West in China has been eroded by the global financial crisis, American military interventions in the Middle East, and the political style of Donald Trump.
Since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China has failed to implement several promised reforms, particularly regarding market opening, market-distorting subsidies, and the protection of intellectual property.
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer called for a solution to trade issues with China in May 2019.
The rivalry between the United States and China obstructs vital decision-making processes within the United Nations.
Chinese firms have achieved early success in the "Made in China 2025" strategy by expanding their global presence in social media, cloud services, and network technologies.
The rivalry between the United States and China is beginning to structure international relations and has the potential to create a new geo-economic world order.
Clemens Fuest authored the ifo Standpunkt 200 titled 'Der dritte Systemwettbewerb' (The Third System Competition) in 2018, which provides a European perspective on the US-China trade conflict.
Both the United States and China have violated the rules of the World Trade Organization.
Xi Jinping's 'Chinese Dream' concept posits that China must move beyond the Yellow River, which serves as a metaphor for parochialism and stagnation, and turn toward the ocean and the outside world.
Technological competition between the United States and China runs deeper than trade disputes and will outlast any resolution of those disputes, as it involves securing long-term economic advantages and defining technical standards.
A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that imports from China accounted for approximately 25% of the decline in manufacturing jobs in the United States between 1990 and 2007.
A consolidated, lasting global conflict between the United States and China could trigger deglobalization, potentially resulting in two parallel international orders dominated by the United States and China respectively.
Social networks like Facebook (US-based) and WeChat (China-based) are influenced by the values and legal frameworks of their respective home countries, particularly regarding freedom of expression and personal data protection.
Hilpert identifies a global competition between liberal democratic paradigms and authoritarian paradigms as a key dimension of the US-China rivalry.
Legislative proposals and initiatives in the US Congress reflect a shift in sentiment within the US business community and society regarding China.
China responded to being blocked from expanding its influence in the Bretton Woods institutions by using its resources to establish new organizations and formats where it acts as the largest single donor.
Following President Donald Trump's threat to increase tariffs in two stages by the end of 2019, significant criticism from United States businesses, Congressional Republicans, and trade unions led the Trump Administration to agree to a limited 'Phase One Deal' with China instead of implementing new tariffs.
China will not be able to match the United States on the high seas and in complex operations involving carrier groups until long after the conclusion of the Chinese military modernisation programme in 2035.
The rivalry between the United States and China in East Asia is dominated by perceptions of military threats and the American belief that China is seeking to establish an exclusive sphere of influence in the region.
The acronym BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
Between 2004 and 2010, China implemented a school and textbook reform that promotes less favorable views of Western democracy and liberal capitalism.
In the United States, the rise of China is widely perceived as a threat to America's dominant position in the international system.
Equidistance between China and the United States is not a viable option for the European Union due to significant gaps regarding values, political systems, and the rules-based international order.
The United States views China's developing military capabilities in space and cyberspace as an imminent danger.
A strategic policy could aim to shape economic interdependence between the European Union, the United States, and China to incentivize all parties to avoid escalation, conflict, and the severance of relations.
China's 'Great Firewall' censors the internet by using IP range bans to prevent access to specific websites and content filtering to block information the regime wishes to suppress.
China's authoritarian state capitalism has become a powerful alternative to the democratic capitalist societies of the West.
Future conflicts over digital technologies between the United States and China are expected to include technologies for intelligent traffic management, smart cities, and smart grids.
European Union member states are currently unwilling to relinquish powers or central coordination regarding China policy to the European Union level, which hinders the Union's ability to formulate coherent policies, particularly on human rights.
China is actively working to expand its influence within the United Nations and its associated agencies and programs, rather than withdrawing from them.
Both the United States and China utilize trade policy as an instrument for technology competition, foreign policy, and security purposes.
In March 2019, Italy became the first G7 state to sign on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the New Silk Road.
In the United States, President Donald Trump minimized the influence of the State Department, while in China, the Communist Party under President Xi Jinping took control of foreign policy decisions.
The United States and China rely on European skills and expertise in sectors such as chemical research, medical research, and industrial manufacturing technologies.
Diandian Guo wrote an article titled '“Congratulations, It’s a Boy!” – China’s (Mixed) Reactions to President Trump’s Election Victory' regarding Chinese media responses to Donald Trump's 2016 election.
China's rise as the world's foremost industrial manufacturer and exporter has accelerated structural change in the United States and triggered social upheavals in America's 'Rust Belt' regions and sectors.
The United States and China have damaged the World Trade Organization (WTO); China by disregarding non-discrimination and transparency principles, and the United States by violating core treaty terms and imposing punitive tariffs.
China currently holds the largest gross fixed capital formation and the largest industrial value creation when measured at market prices.
The Trump Administration's strategy documents characterize China as a revisionist power that seeks regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and long-term global supremacy.
The Pentagon's annual report on China's military strength reviews Chinese investments in security-relevant areas, reflecting a perceived convergence of economic and security components in the US-China rivalry.
China refused to recognize the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague regarding its dispute with the Philippines and violates fundamental World Trade Organization principles such as non-discrimination and transparency.
Rush Doshi and Robert D. Williams published an article on the Lawfare blog discussing whether China is interfering in American politics.
Human rights groups in the United States feel their concerns about China are validated by Beijing's expansion of its surveillance state and the construction of reeducation camps in the Xinjiang autonomous region.
China uses the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative to create a technopolitical sphere of influence as a counterweight to the United States.
The United States and China both perceive themselves as defensive, peaceful powers while suspecting the other of having aggressive offensive intentions, which creates a security dilemma.
Germany and Europe have a vital interest in upholding liberal values internally and preserving a liberal order internationally, and therefore must prioritize these values in their relations with China.
The European strategy for managing competition with China involves strengthening social and technological resilience while simultaneously maintaining cooperation and economic interdependency.
President Xi Jinping's course of authoritarianism and nationalism has boosted American fears and rejection of China.
Proponents of 'smart competition' in US-China relations advocate for a policy shift that increases pressure and deterrence to counter China's mercantilist economic policies and assertive foreign policy, while maintaining some cooperation.
The US Treasury Department accused China of currency manipulation in August 2019 following a significant devaluation of the renminbi.
Chinese leaders believe the 'responsible stakeholder' role primarily strengthens American hegemony without benefiting China's economic or political development.
Official Chinese media state that ongoing trade disputes have bolstered China's determination to resist American pressure and defend its rights and interests.
China has damaged the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the multilateral trading system by disregarding fundamental principles of non-discrimination and transparency.
The rise of China and its increasing influence across various policy areas and global regions have intensified fears and rejection within the United States.
Since the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96, the United States and China have viewed each other as potential military adversaries and have aligned their military planning accordingly.
United States retail importers, the farm sector, car manufacturers, and IT and communications companies are among the sectors that oppose the escalation of trade sanctions due to negative impacts.
China’s development model has been successful, and liberal values remain attractive to young, well-educated, and mobile members of Chinese society.
China identifies mutual respect as the central value in its relationship with the United States, specifically regarding territorial integrity and the recognition of different development models.
The United States views China's ongoing naval expansion as a challenge to its role as a world power.
The power rivalry between China and the United States is increasingly affecting the interests of the European Union and Germany.
China and Russia have acquired hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) technologies.
China attempts to integrate its own political terms and values into the language used by the United Nations.
China is expanding its military capabilities to project power through and beyond the first and second island chains.
China, under President Xi Jinping, claims to support multilateralism while simultaneously undermining the effectiveness of multilateral institutions.
The historical process described by Thucydides, where the rise of Athens made war with Sparta inevitable, is considered a real risk in the current relationship between China and the United States.
The US-China trade, economic, and technology conflict has caused economic harm to both the United States and China, as well as third-party nations.
China's economic rise has challenged the Western self-image of the democratic market economy as the most successful and humane system.
Michael Paul and Marco Overhaus note that China is transitioning its military doctrine from coastal defence to maritime 'active defence' as it expands its radius of action.
In September 2019, China attempted to prevent opposition activists from Hong Kong from appearing before the Human Rights Council to report on violence by security forces against demonstrators.
In response to perceived U.S. containment efforts, Chinese leadership adopted rhetoric of 'win-win' cooperation and the concept of a 'new type of great power relations' based on mutual respect for core national interests.
Skeptics argue that China could acquire dominant global political, economic, and technological influence, set international rules and standards, and establish an 'illiberal sphere of influence', potentially preventing the United States from guaranteeing its current level of security and prosperity.
Washington views the world and Europe through a 'China lens', which may lead the United States to prioritize competition in the Indo-Pacific and treat crises in Europe and its periphery as secondary.
China views the United States as a paradigm for modernization and believes it must reduce the development gap with the United States to make the world a fairer place.
The United States views China's development of military capabilities in space and cyberspace as an imminent danger.
Beijing views the United States with mistrust, suspecting the U.S. of attempting to corrupt and transform China through 'peaceful evolution,' defined as internal infiltration and subversion.
For the United States, strategic rivalry with China has replaced the 'War on Terror' as the prevailing paradigm for viewing international developments and events, a paradigm that had been dominant since 2001.
Proponents of 'smart competition' in US-China relations advise against ending all cooperation with China or attempting to block all increases in Chinese influence.
To stand up to China in the long term, the European Union must strengthen its capabilities for supranational geopolitics, ideally with transatlantic coordination and backing.
Europe is currently developing policy instruments to manage its relationship with China, specifically focusing on foreign investment screening and complementary national legislation.
China's strategic culture and nationalism are shaped by the historical experience of vulnerability during the 'century of humiliation' (1840–1949).
The European Union could utilize its expertise in non-digital economic sectors as a bargaining chip during times of escalating political conflict with the United States and China.
A study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) found that imports from China accounted for approximately 25% of the decline in manufacturing jobs in the United States between 1990 and 2007.
The United States maintains intentional ambiguity regarding the principle of mutually assured destruction with respect to China, which increases Chinese threat perceptions.
The European Union considers China a vital cooperation partner for addressing global challenges, particularly regarding climate protection.
China faces the risk of a systemic crisis if it fails to address internal debt, industrial overcapacity, growing inequality, pollution, and corruption.
Ninety percent of China's trade in goods and 40 percent of its imported oil are transported by sea, making the security of sea routes a political imperative for the Chinese economy.
The US government views China as a threat to US and Western interests in regions outside the Indo-Pacific, specifically in Africa, the Middle East, and most notably the Arctic, where the US fears Chinese resource competition and the establishment of a Chinese military presence.
The 'Thucydides Trap' is an interpretive framework used in public debate in both the United States and China to discuss the implications of power transition theory.
Both the United States and China have violated World Trade Organization rules, and the Trump Administration has sought to impair the function of the World Trade Organization.
The Trump Administration withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia partly to better counter the Chinese military threat.
The Chinese leadership believes that the United States uses the threat of North Korean missiles as a pretext to install missile defense systems intended to neutralize Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrents during a military conflict.
Xue Li questioned whether China and the United States are rivals or enemies in an article published in the Global Times on August 20, 2019.
The disregard for World Trade Organization (WTO) rules by the United States and China threatens the future viability and legitimacy of the WTO as a multilateral system.
It is unlikely that the United States and China will resolve outstanding trade points in a second partial agreement before the US presidential elections.
Donald Trump labeled China a 'currency manipulator' and a 'rule breaker' regarding trade rules and intellectual property rights.
Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives, advocates for a hard economic course against China, including import tariffs, based on human rights concerns.
The Chinese industrial policy strategy known as 'Made in China 2025' outlines Beijing's intention to achieve global market leadership in ten key high-value-added sectors.
The rivalry between the United States and China does not determine all international problems and conflicts, but it increasingly forms the lens through which other actors view important developments and events.
The Chinese political elite believes the United States is attempting to prevent the further expansion of Chinese influence.
The competition for influence between the United States and China is combined with an ideological antagonism.
The Chinese discourse emphasizes the North/South dimension, focusing on the global development and power gap between the West and the rest of the world, more than the ideological East/West divide.
The United States believes that as China upgrades its armed forces, it is increasingly able to restrict US Navy access to the Asia-Pacific region, thereby challenging America's status as a global power.
The Trump Administration's 2017 National Security Strategy stated: "For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China."
China currently holds the world's largest gross fixed capital formation and the largest industrial value creation when measured at market prices.
The Global Times expresses cautious optimism that a solution to the US-China trade dispute can be found and characterizes the idea of a new Cold War as unrealistic.
The Trump administration imposed incremental and escalating extraordinary tariffs of up to 25 percent on approximately half of United States imports from China.
The US-China relationship functions as a classical security dilemma, where efforts by each side to increase its own security result in increased insecurity for both.
Both China and the United States are concerned with protecting strategically important routes to safeguard supplies in the event of a crisis.
Units within the United States State Department that are responsible for monitoring China's behavior reportedly suffer from shortages of funding and personnel.
The human rights situation in China has prompted bipartisan initiatives in the US Congress to urge the Administration to impose sanctions against Chinese officials for the repression of the Uigurs.
The European Union's strength in dealing with China and other great powers is derived from the democratic disposition of its member states, its supranational institutional order, its autonomous legal order, the size and potential of the Single Market, the common currency area, and its common trade and competition policy.
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Gudrun Wacker report that from the Chinese perspective, the United States will never voluntarily cede significant international influence to China.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China will continue to exert decisive influence on international politics for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether Washington and Beijing resolve trade issues or conclude a trade agreement before upcoming US presidential elections.
China increased its financial contributions to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) from approximately €300,000 annually to more than €2 million in 2018.
China has responded to US dominance in internet infrastructure by enhancing its ability to monitor important fiber-optic internet exchange points.
The European Union's reliance on imported, strategically crucial technologies and resources causes sensitivity among member states, which delays decision-making in the Council and hinders the formulation of a coherent policy towards China, particularly on human rights issues.
Ninety percent of China's trade in goods and 40 percent of its imported oil are transported by sea, making the security of sea routes a political imperative and national interest.
Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell stated that the trade conflict with China could harm the United States.
The Pentagon's annual report on China's military strength reviews Chinese investments in security-relevant areas and expresses concern regarding the convergence of economic and security components of the rivalry.
In August 2019, the United States Treasury Department accused China of currency manipulation following a significant devaluation of the renminbi throughout that year.
Beijing views the United States as a frustrated power seeking to preserve its own supremacy by geopolitically containing China and hindering its economic, technological, and military development.
China supports repressive regimes through loans, investment, arms, surveillance technology, and, in some cases, the use of its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.
The United States Department of Commerce implemented controls on the export and licensing of security-relevant technologies to China.
Both the United States and China undermine the global order by flouting multilateral rules and using institutions for displays of power.
China works to establish its own ideas within the UN Human Rights Council, such as relativizing the importance of individual human rights.
In September 2019, China attempted to prevent Hong Kong opposition activists from appearing before the United Nations Human Rights Council to report on violence by security forces against demonstrators.
The author argues the European Union must demand adequate concessions in bilateral talks with the United States regarding trade and tariffs, and with China regarding investment.
China mandates that foreign companies store customer data within Chinese territory, granting Chinese security authorities access to that data.
Internal political debates in regions like Europe are codetermined by the polarization between the United States and China.
Since 2013, China has used the United Nations Human Rights Council as a platform for its own propaganda, including justifying the internment of approximately one million Uigur minority members in the Xinjiang autonomous region as a necessary measure for fighting Muslim extremism.
The United States and China both perceive themselves as defensive, peaceful powers while suspecting the other of having aggressive, offensive intentions, which creates a security dilemma.
In a strategy paper published in March 2019, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, defined China as an important partner in international cooperation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival for the European Union.
China’s development model has been successful, and liberal values remain attractive to young, well-educated, and mobile members of Chinese society.
Chuck Schumer, the Democratic Senate Minority Leader, stated in May 2019: "We have to have tough, strong policies against China or they’ll continue to steal millions of American jobs and trillions of American dollars."
The future development of US and Chinese spheres of influence depends on domestic factors and the bilateral relationship between the two nations.
China is transitioning its military strategy from coastal defence to 'active defence', which prioritizes controlling the space within the 'first island chain' including the Yellow Sea, the western part of the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
European Union member states are currently unwilling to relinquish central coordination or powers regarding policy towards China to the EU level.
The Trump Administration imposed incremental and escalating extraordinary tariffs of up to 25 percent on approximately half of United States imports from China.
Beijing and Moscow share a congruent threat perception regarding US, South Korean, and Japanese radar systems, which they believe can track the trajectories of Chinese and Russian missiles.
The emergence of a Chinese technopolitical sphere of influence creates new political challenges for states that are technologically dependent on the United States or China.
The United States and China have overlapping spheres of influence, particularly in Europe, where services from both nations are present.
Beijing's fear that the United States seeks regime change in China intensified following the 'colour revolutions' of the 2000s and the 2011 Arab Spring.
The European Union's relationship with China is characterized by a mix of cooperation, competition, and conflict, requiring the reconciliation of diverging interests among member states and market participants.
The United States government views China as a threat to United States and Western interests in regions beyond the Indo-Pacific, specifically including Africa, the Middle East, and the Arctic.
In the early 2000s, China began demanding a larger say in the Bretton Woods institutions that was commensurate with its economic importance.
Western governments have expressed concerns that China could use Huawei technology to sabotage new 5G mobile networks.
The rise of China and its increasing influence across various policy areas and world regions has strengthened fears and rejection within the United States.
Economic relations between the United States and China have shifted from cooperation to confrontation due to objective economic causes, status competition in the context of great power rivalry, and increasingly critical perceptions on both sides.
Chinese leaders are convinced that the United States and the West will never voluntarily grant China greater influence at the international level.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China is beginning to structure international relations and may lead to a new 'geo-economic world order'.
The growing rivalry between the United States and China is prominently displayed in the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations.
China provides the highest number of personnel for peacekeeping missions among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, with 2,500 soldiers and police deployed as of 2020, primarily in Africa.
China ignores fundamental WTO principles of non-discrimination and transparency in its external economic policy and ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in its territorial dispute with the Philippines.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established a global narrative supporting China's claim to an outstanding international role.
The United States does not openly recognize the principle of mutually assured destruction regarding China, maintaining intentional ambiguity on the subject.
The European Union accuses the Chinese government of systematically subsidizing private and state-owned enterprises to provide them with global competitive advantages.
The Chinese Communist Party asserts that it is the only force capable of averting chaos, separatism, and demise in China.
The emergence of a Chinese technopolitical sphere of influence creates political challenges for states that are technologically dependent on the United States or China.
The Sino-American trade, economic, and technology conflict has caused economic harm to both the United States and China, as well as third-party nations.
The United States Department of Defense (Pentagon) expresses concern regarding the strategic benefits of Chinese investments in foreign infrastructure, specifically port facilities associated with the Belt and Road Initiative.
Diandian Guo reported on mixed reactions within China to the election victory of U.S. President Donald Trump.
China is the largest contributor to world economic growth, the largest exporter, and the largest trading nation in absolute terms.
Since the Taiwan crisis of 1995/96, the United States and China have viewed each other as potential military adversaries and have aligned their military planning accordingly.
Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb published a timeline and guide regarding the trade war between the United States and China.
China regards Europe as a useful entity that presents little obstacle to its own development, unlike the United States.
China increases its influence in UN peacekeeping operations by assuming greater responsibility and a larger share of the associated costs.
Shoshana Zuboff posits that major internet platforms, whether American or Chinese, potentially enable surveillance capitalism.
The United States has become reluctant to transfer technology to China.
The Chinese leadership justifies its claim on the South China Sea by invoking a narrative of historical victimhood and moral exceptionalism.
Under the Trump administration, security logic has come to dominate US rhetoric and practice regarding China, driven by concerns over the relative distribution of economic gains and the belief that economic interdependence negatively impacts the technological basis of US military superiority.
Hilpert outlines that Chinese elites feel insecure and threatened by liberal values and world views, despite China having disproven the Western expectation that economic development and prosperity would automatically lead to democracy and the rule of law.
The next EU-China summit is scheduled for the second half of 2020, during the German EU presidency, and should be supplemented by a parliamentary component.
The transactional leadership style of Donald Trump and the transformative leadership style of Xi Jinping are incompatible, which undermines trust, restricts diplomacy, and exacerbates bilateral conflicts between the United States and China.
The trade conflict between the United States and China is understood as a system-to-system conflict.
Official Chinese representatives argue that US accusations of unfair trade practices are a pretext for a foreign policy of containment against China.
An Gang authored the article 'Time for China to Forge a New Strategy towards the US' in China-US Focus.
Spheres of influence allow central actors like the United States and China to exert political and economic influence over dependent states and businesses.
Third-party states have three primary options for navigating the technological rivalry between the United States and China: aligning fully with one sphere of influence, selectively relying on technologies from both spheres, or attempting to maintain independence.
Chinese leaders concluded after the collapse of the Soviet Union that they must avoid open competition with the United States, including arms races or direct confrontation.
The Economist published an article titled 'How China’s Sharp Power Is Muting Criticism Abroad' on December 14, 2017.
China is integrated into the Western-inspired international system and does not present itself as a systemic alternative.
China is pursuing a twofold goal of becoming independent from the United States in core digital technologies and subsequently disseminating its own technologies globally.
In China, successful economic development has strengthened the power vertical and serves as a narrative component of identity-building Chinese nationalism.
Four of China's neighboring states possess nuclear arms: Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
The Chinese government accuses the United States of attempting to suppress China's development and impede its progress.
The Belt and Road Initiative, initiated by President Xi Jinping, is intended to secure and guarantee markets and resources in a politically stable and China-friendly international environment, while enabling economic, political, and cultural networks.
Germany and Europe have a vital interest in upholding liberal values internally and preserving a liberal order internationally in the context of systemic competition with China.
Since 2018, the work of domestic and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China has been subject to sweeping legal and administrative restrictions.
China and the United States may be tempted to use currency devaluation to stimulate their domestic economies in the event of declining economic growth or recession.
China is using the South China Sea as a protected bastion for nuclear-armed submarines to safeguard its second-strike capability against the United States.
The development and export of surveillance and social control technologies by Chinese high-tech firms assists authoritarian regimes and promotes the spread of illiberal governance concepts.
The United States did not perceive China as an ideological antagonist as long as China's rise was not viewed as a global challenge and there was hope that China would eventually liberalize.
At the April 2019 EU-China summit, certain European Union member states opposed a common stance on China due to fears that Beijing might respond with economic reprisals or sanctions regarding human rights criticisms.
C. Fred Bergsten published the article 'China and the United States: The Contest for Global Economic Leadership' in the journal China and World Economy in 2018.
The 'comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination' between China and Russia is founded on shared threat perceptions and is manifested through arms cooperation and joint military maneuvers.
The United States government regards China as a 'revisionist power' and a 'rival' that seeks to displace the United States and restructure the world order to be antithetical to US values and interests.
The US government believes that China possesses the political, economic, and military capabilities to expand its global influence, distinguishing it from Russia.
Chinese leaders believe the role of a 'responsible stakeholder' would primarily strengthen American claims to hegemony rather than benefit China's economic development or political rise.
Charter 08, a manifesto for political reform in China, was drafted with the central involvement of Liu Xiaobo, who was a recipient of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize.
Dennis Shea, representing the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, stated that China's economic model is trade-disruptive and has negative implications for the World Trade Organization.
China is the second-largest individual contributor to the United Nations, regarding both the regular budget and funding for peacekeeping missions.
Approximately fifty thousand censors in China monitor online discussions and intervene when individual complaints appear to be coalescing into collective dissatisfaction.
Beijing does not expect the United States to concede the international voice that China's economic and political weight would merit.
Since 2018, the operations of both domestic and foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China have been subject to sweeping legal and administrative restrictions.
Japan regards China's regional policy as incompatible with the existing international order and as a serious security concern for the region.
China presents itself as a trailblazer and advocate for emerging economies and developing countries rather than a systemic adversary of the United States and the West.
The United States Trade Representative published an investigation report under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 in March 2018, which describes China's industrial and technology policy as 'unfair and inequitable'.
Feng Lu provided an overview of the trade disputes between China and the United States that occurred in 2018.
Chinese leaders believe the United States and the West will not voluntarily grant China greater international influence.
China supports repressive regimes through the provision of loans, investment, arms, surveillance technology, and the use of its veto power in the United Nations Security Council.
China presents itself as a defender of multilateralism against the Trump Administration's attacks on the international order.
The European Union's efforts to implement rules for the Digital Single Market face limitations when dealing with China and the United States.
China strictly observes the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and refrains from actively promoting authoritarian regimes abroad.
The Phase One agreement between the United States and China left previous special tariffs in place and failed to resolve controversies regarding subsidies, state enterprises, and technology.
A trade environment governed by arbitrary political power may benefit the United States and China while harming other nations.
The European Union must consider compensating for its dependency on the United States and China in core digital technologies by leveraging its strengths in other economic sectors.
The United States government tightened state controls on foreign direct investment in security-relevant sectors through administrative measures and legislation, resulting in a significant decline in Chinese investment in the United States.
German and European interests would benefit if US critics of a one-sidedly confrontative China policy gained more influence in Washington, as a balanced US policy would reduce pressure on European capitals to choose between the United States and China.
Both the United States and China claim their own intentions are defensive while accusing the other of being aggressive.
Chinese elites feel insecure and threatened by liberal values and world views, a sentiment that persists despite China's economic development.
The clash between the leadership styles of the United States and China erodes trust between the two nations and complicates the resolution of global issues like climate protection and arms control.
United States businesses historically generated profits from exports to and investments in China while transferring capital, management expertise, and technology to the Chinese market.
China's growing power has caused American concerns regarding the United States' status as the sole international superpower.