The United States should support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring Iran's nuclear activities by providing diplomatic and financial support, technical resources, and information sharing.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson engaged with the Iranian government on the margins of the UN meetings in September 2017 to resolve implementation issues and demonstrate U.S. oversight of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The United States should press its partners in Yemen to improve the humanitarian situation, be more judicious about military strikes, and remain open to a negotiated outcome to the conflict similar to the U.S. road map proposal from the end of 2016.
The United States should not discourage allies and partners from engaging in civil nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as in safety, security, regulation, and nuclear medicine, provided such cooperation is permitted under the JCPOA.
Ilan Goldenberg wrote an article in Fortune on December 17, 2016, discussing how James Mattis could potentially prevent Donald Trump from withdrawing the United States from the Iran nuclear deal.
The United States should support IAEA access to military facilities under the Additional Protocol while leaving the public description of specific inspections to the discretion of the IAEA.
The United States must fully comply with its JCPOA commitments to ensure that the potential restoration of sanctions would effectively impact Iran's economy.
Unilateral U.S. sanctions against Iran are insufficient to moderate Iranian behavior and could trigger an Iranian response and a process of escalation.
Iran was forced to the nuclear negotiating table in large part because the United States designed and coordinated a broad multilateral coalition to sanction Iran.
Under the JCPOA, the United States is committed to lifting secondary sanctions and allowing non-U.S. entities to conduct business with Iran, with specific exceptions for U.S. industries in aviation, agriculture, and medicine.
The cornerstone of U.S. strategy regarding Iran should be to dissuade and prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state or a threshold state capable of acquiring nuclear weapons within a matter of weeks.
Tehran has imprisoned numerous U.S. citizens on trumped-up charges over the past decade, including a Princeton University doctoral student.
Coercion, including military operations, intelligence activities, and targeted sanctions, should serve as the backbone of the U.S. strategy to address Iranian nuclear and regional challenges.
The United States should limit the Iranian land bridge to the Mediterranean by positioning U.S.-supported forces to retake territory held by the Islamic State in eastern Syria.
The author argues that the United States can help strengthen independent Iranian economic activity to undermine opaque, regime-controlled economic conglomerates that facilitate the IRGC’s economic reach.
The White House issued a presidential proclamation titled 'Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats' on September 24, 2017.
The author notes that it will be legally and politically difficult for U.S. policymakers to certify that Iran has made the substantial progress necessary to allow limited U.S. commercial ties, and that private U.S. companies may avoid the Iranian market due to the high-risk business environment and due diligence costs.
The JCPOA functions by Iran accepting verifiable limits on its nuclear program in exchange for the United States and the European Union lifting sanctions that targeted the nuclear program.
The United States continues to support the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, despite the fact that U.S. interests are only marginally engaged and some Saudi actions have contributed to a humanitarian crisis.
The United States should maintain the possibility of future corporate involvement with Iran, despite the current political climate.
Increasing commercial ties with the United States is a polarizing topic in Tehran, where pragmatists welcome such ties, but hardliners are skeptical of U.S. motivations and prefer working with Asian and European partners who impose fewer restrictions and do not criticize Iran's domestic behavior.
The United States should dedicate more resources to identifying and sanctioning the leaders, businesses, bankers, and facilitators who aid Hezbollah’s violent operations.
The United States should maintain a channel for dialogue with Iran despite active counter-efforts, because Iranian cooperation is necessary to end civil wars and the two nations share common interests.
The United States should prioritize keeping Iran out of the Golan Heights and Israel's border areas over limiting Iranian control of lines of communication in Syria and Iraq.
While President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif would oppose abandoning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may view such a move as a necessary response to United States pressure.
Iran views cyber warfare as a credible retaliatory threat against the political and economic institutions of the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.
Iranian pragmatists view détente with the United States as a critical prerequisite for sustained economic growth in Iran.
Russia views intelligence provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by the United States and its allies as politically motivated and manipulative.
The United States should use its influence in Baghdad to weaken the Popular Mobilization Units, which are Shia militia groups often supported by Iran, and press the Iraqi government to decommission them or integrate them into the Iraqi security forces.
A small, enduring U.S. military presence in Iraq provides political influence that the United States can use to check Iran's policies and seek negotiated political outcomes.
The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush attempted to intimidate Iran militarily and support Iranian democracy activists between 2000 and 2008, yet during this period, Iran attacked U.S. forces in Iraq, causing approximately 1,000 U.S. casualties, and the Iranian reform movement withered.
Iran is more likely to be amenable to regional or global nuclear initiatives than to approaches that single it out, though Iran frequently cites double standards regarding the United States and Israel.
The United States would risk undermining its position by imposing sanctions on Iran without first establishing multilateral groundwork, even if such re-listing does not technically breach the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The effective use of engagement by the United States aims to: 1) provide a reliable and low-cost vehicle to issue warnings, clarify intentions, underscore bottom lines, and emphasize choices available to Iran’s leadership and the costs of those choices; 2) offer a mechanism for de-confliction and de-escalation, particularly in acute scenarios driven by miscalculation or inadvertent accidents; 3) demonstrate to U.S. partners, particularly those in Europe and Asia, that the United States is willing to engage constructively on issues of shared interests.
Russia acts as a significant check on United States efforts to counter Iran's nuclear and regional challenges, and even an improvement in U.S.-Russia bilateral relations would not fully eliminate tensions regarding Iran policy.
Russia condemns U.S. military actions against Iranian interests but maintains a higher tolerance for Israeli military actions.
The United States should actively encourage the respect of human rights in Iran.
The United States should scrutinize transfers of nuclear or dual-use items through the Procurement Channel established by the JCPOA and approve them only when consistent with the deal's limitations on Iran's nuclear program.
The most effective U.S. engagement strategy with Iran may require utilizing multilateral mechanisms and working in concert with international partners.
The author suggests considering limited options to allow direct U.S. corporate involvement with Iran in exchange for the moderation of Iran’s nuclear, missile, and regional policies.
Since the U.S. drawdown from Iraq in 2011, the United States has maintained a force presence of roughly 30,000–40,000 troops in the Middle East to conduct missions such as operations against the Islamic State, ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf, and deter destabilizing Iranian behavior.
The United States supports the Southern Front, a coalition of moderate fighters controlling parts of southwest Syria, primarily to protect Israel and Jordan.
Joint Commission meetings serve as important opportunities for the United States to pass messages to Iran on sensitive issues, given the restricted direct communications between the two nations.
The Oman channel, which was used to facilitate contact between U.S. and Iranian officials during the Obama administration, remains a reliable option for communication despite being strained by its association with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The United States should utilize its alliance with Syrian Kurds to prevent Iranian weapons shipments in northern Syria.
Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, warned on June 15, 2016, that if the United States tears up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will torch the agreement.
The success of U.S. policy options toward Iran depends on smart diplomatic leadership, vigilant intelligence gathering and analysis, and a credible deterrence posture backed by military capacity.
The United States faces a balancing act in its relationship with Saudi Arabia because it shares concerns about Iran but often disagrees with Saudi tactics, strategy, and threat perceptions.
Ayatollah Khamenei instructed Iranian poets to uncover what he characterized as United States treason in a meeting held on June 21, 2016.
U.S. policy efficacy is enhanced by providing Iran a path to develop a peaceful nuclear program while ensuring the United States retains sufficient warning time and evidence to respond to any Iranian attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.
If the United States breaches the JCPOA, it risks losing its leadership role in the Joint Commission, which would result in outcomes reflecting other participants' interests rather than those of the United States.
Absent unprovoked massive United States nuclear sanctions, Iran's nuclear response to a combined coercion and pressure campaign would likely be designed to undermine the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) itself and to split the P5+1.
The United States should ensure the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is prepared to expeditiously investigate any credible and specific information regarding Iran's compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including conducting inspections at any necessary sites, such as military sites.
The United States can reinforce its case against Iran by focusing on Iranian testing of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and arms sales that violate UN Security Council Resolution 2231.
Karim Sadjadpour analyzed the potential for the United States to inadvertently enter into a war with Iran in an article published in The Atlantic on February 9, 2017.
Iran has become increasingly adept at conducting cyber espionage and disruptive attacks against domestic and foreign critics as a result of being a target of destructive cyber attacks by the United States and its allies.
Sanctions circumvention by Iran is a significant risk without the support of U.S. allies, as partners may refuse to comply with or enforce sanctions if they perceive the United States is acting based on politics or ideology rather than evidence of an Iranian nuclear breach.
The Trump administration has exacerbated tensions with Iran, contrasting with the unsuccessful attempts by previous Iranian and American presidents, such as Hassan Rouhani and Barack Obama, to change the dynamics of the U.S.-Iran relationship.
The United States should maintain and in some cases increase military support for Gulf regional partners, particularly Saudi Arabia, while focusing on enabling these partners to conduct irregular warfare strategies that focus on low-end capabilities.
The United States should closely monitor Iran’s nuclear program in collaboration with friendly partners to detect any indication of activity to acquire nuclear weapons or otherwise violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The United States should support targeted maritime interdiction operations to intercept Iranian arms shipments to groups such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
If the United States takes significant steps beyond non-certification to abrogate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and unilaterally reimpose nuclear-related sanctions, it will foreclose the policy option of engagement and the ability to use diplomacy to engineer outcomes.
Russia would not support Iran if Iran initiated unprovoked military action against the United States or Israel.
Russia would likely oppose a U.S. initiative to conclude a follow-up nuclear agreement to the JCPOA if the terms of the agreement are too stringent.
Direct communication between senior U.S. and Iranian officials, including at the ministerial level, provides an unfiltered channel to deliver clear messages regarding nuclear and regional concerns, receive confidential responses, and negotiate.
The 'snapback' mechanism, which involves the threat to reapply lifted sanctions, serves as the United States' essential leverage for encouraging Iran's continued compliance with the JCPOA.
The United States should work with international counterparts to pre-plan for a coordinated, proportional response to an evident Iranian breach of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The author recommends reinstating the U-turn license to allow foreign businesses to use U.S. banks to conduct dollar-denominated transactions relating to Iranian entities as an incentive for Iran to make further nuclear commitments or other concessions.
The application of a strategy to normalize Iran's nuclear program faces domestic opposition within the Iranian regime, resistance from U.S. domestic political actors, skepticism from U.S. regional allies in the Middle East, and opposition from Russia, which views such rapprochement as a threat to its influence and nuclear market share in Iran.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that the U.S. administration should explore all policy options regarding Iran simultaneously, given the difficulty and time-consuming nature of negotiations.
The Joint Commission, which oversees the JCPOA, meets at the political director or ministerial level, and the United States should maintain that level of participation.
The United States' ability to maintain containment efforts and secure cooperation from third countries is contingent upon the perception that the United States is acting in good faith, which for many nations begins with the continued implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei regularly complains about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s (JCPOA) unmet economic expectations, blaming the United States for scaring away foreign business while denouncing foreign investment as a Trojan horse for Western imperialism.
Israel is shifting its mix of responses to the Iranian threat due to anxieties about the U.S. regional role, opportunities for collaboration with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and the reemergence of Russia as a major Middle East player.
The United States should maintain a small, long-term military presence in Iraq at current force levels to support Iraqi security forces and prevent the return of the Islamic State.
Tepid compliance with U.S. sanctions, particularly from Iran’s core energy customers, enables circumvention and undermines U.S. leverage and credibility.
The United States sought to sustain non-nuclear restrictions in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 because missile-related issues were not resolved by the JCPOA.
A proposed policy option for the United States is to negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) before the expiry of the JCPOA's uranium enrichment clauses, committing Iran not to scale up its infrastructure for developing nuclear weapons capabilities.
Increased bilateral ties between the United States and Iran have historically represented a double-edged sword for Iran.
The Swiss government has served as the U.S. protecting power in Iran since 1980 and could act as an interlocutor for U.S.-Iran communications beyond traditional consular duties.
Israel's preferred policy for confronting the Iranian threat is a combination of indigenous capabilities and operations, supported by intimate collaboration with the United States.
The United States should undermine Iranian asymmetric activities globally by publicizing them to embarrass and isolate Iran.
Containment efforts by the United States and its partners cannot prevent Iran from developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, but these efforts can slow the program and increase its costs.
Diplomatic engagement provides the United States with intelligence and insight into Iran's calculations, decision-making, and behaviors.
For the issue of American citizens detained in Iran, the United States must maintain direct communication using established mechanisms.
The United States holds Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on ships in the Bab al-Mandeb strait because the capability for such attacks is not indigenous to the Houthis.
The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama attempted to improve relations with Iran between 2009 and 2016, including through numerous letters written by Obama to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, yet Iran and its regional policies remained hostile toward the United States and U.S. interests.
Russia believes that a U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) due to Iranian actions unrelated to the nuclear program would be unjustified.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) permits Iran to maintain a limited nuclear program, which the United States supports as a means to gain insight and influence over Iran's nuclear activities.
The U.S. administration should consider enlisting a prominent international statesperson, such as former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, to act as a neutral interlocutor in U.S.-Iran relations.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated on April 27, 2016, that the United States had lifted sanctions against Iran only on paper.
During the 2016 crisis where American sailors were taken captive by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy, a direct communication line between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif was key in quickly de-escalating the situation.
The United States and Iran have a bilateral maritime communication hotline, but it is rarely used by Iranian forces, particularly those operating in close proximity to U.S. and partner naval assets.
The United States should maintain cordial and private contact with Iranian officials on the margins of multilateral forums to address pressing issues.
The United States should utilize national authorities to sanction Iranian human rights abusers and companies that provide technology designed to support human rights abuses in Iran.
Enabling partnerships between U.S. companies and independent Iranian firms could create learning opportunities that make Iranian firms more skilled, efficient, and profitable, which would over time undercut the IRGC’s economic position within Iran.
The United States has limited military leverage to prevent the buildup of Iranian influence in Syria without risking a significant and unwise escalation.
The United States should pursue four non-mutually exclusive options to constrain Iran's long-term nuclear capabilities, all of which rely on assertive diplomacy supported by carrots and sticks.
The United States has utilized educational and cultural exchanges with Iran to support initiatives including internet freedom, culture, health, education, science, the environment, public diplomacy, and broadcasting.
Russia would stand by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and considers any U.S. move to withdraw from the agreement as destabilizing.
The United States will gain credibility and authority among its allies if it demonstrates a willingness to accept positive outcomes in its discourse with Iran.
It is a fundamental U.S. interest to deny Iran the discretion to acquire nuclear weapons, both for nonproliferation purposes and for managing regional security and relations with Arab states and Israel.
The United States should make public details of illicit Iranian activity and share information about prior U.S. efforts to address this activity with security allies when sanctions are necessary.
The United States could strengthen its diplomatic position regarding Iran by highlighting Iranian failures to ratify and properly implement the IAEA Additional Protocol and to secure a robust Broader Conclusion from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirming that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.
The United States and Iran could find common ground in Iraq regarding political arrangements that maintain a strong central government while preventing Sunni alienation that could lead to renewed armed conflict.
Funding for U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs in the region has decreased, with only $15 million requested in the 2018 fiscal budget, which is half of the amount requested in the 2017 budget.
A challenge to the U.S. strategy of building a case against Iran's nuclear program is that Iran is unlikely to blatantly violate the JCPOA in a manner that would justify the snapback of all nuclear sanctions.
Russia views the United States as a hegemonic power seeking to perpetuate global dominance, while viewing Israel as a state protecting its vital security interests.
Maintaining a U.S. voice on human rights issues, particularly in multilateral forums, is a crucial component of a comprehensive diplomatic strategy regarding Iran.
The author suggests that the United States should consider extending the mandate of Combined Task Force 151 to address the increase in naval activities, incidents, and targeting resulting from the civil war in Yemen in the Gulf of Aden, the Somali Basin, and the Indian Ocean.
Unilateral U.S. pressure is likely to fail if Iran perceives escape routes in Europe, Russia, and Asia.
In response to greater United States efforts to counter Iran in the region and expose its malign behavior, senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and hardline clerics may publicly threaten to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or reduce cooperation with the IAEA.
The United States should sharpen its sanctions to respond if Iran violates the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and to target Iran’s destabilizing regional activities, but this requires bringing along partners that have economic leverage over Iran.
Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East.
Expanding people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Iran will empower Iranian constituencies that favor connectivity with the West and help mitigate mutual enmity fueled by restrictive travel prohibitions.
U.S. officials should aggressively identify, sanction, and counter Iranian missile procurement activities while coordinating with international counterparts to urge them to match U.S. sanctions designations.
The U.S.-sponsored TRIPP deal is driving the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process forward.
U.S. military deployments to Iraq since 2014 have acted as a force multiplier against the Islamic State, making the presence valued by the Iraqi government.
Iran's regional strategy centers on countering the United States and Israel, but it has increasingly focused on competition with Saudi Arabia, which Iran blames for the rise of Sunni radical groups like the Islamic State.
The United States' posture toward Iran requires making it clear that any Iranian decision to pursue nuclear weapons acquisition would be detected early and resisted powerfully.
The United States should provide intelligence and, in appropriate cases, military support to targeted interdiction operations that can be conducted in accordance with international law.
Most major countries, excluding the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, view Iran as a stable regional power and a tactical ally against radical Sunni jihadists like the Islamic State.
The United States should posture military forces to signal that any effort to disrupt trade through the Bab al-Mandeb strait will be met with firm U.S. resolve.
The United States should coordinate with the European Union and E3 partners, as well as Russia and China, to build consensus and maintain tools for addressing nuclear and related challenges involving Iran.
U.S. administration officials should work to shrink the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the Iranian economy by aggressively sanctioning IRGC front companies, banks, properties, and administrative leadership ranks to create financial constraints and signal macroeconomic incentives for a private sector.
The U.S. administration's strategy should focus on constraining Iran's nuclear activity after key JCPOA provisions expire, as agreed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program will slowly lift over time.
Ending the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) without clear evidence of significant Iranian violations would weaken the United States' ability to contest Iran's destabilizing regional actions because the U.S. would be blamed for the deal's failure, hindering multilateral cooperation.
For a coercion-based strategy against Iran to succeed, the United States would need the firm backing of the P5+1 and a strong consensus to penalize Iranian noncooperation, paired with positive incentives such as trade, investment, nonlethal equipment transfers, and peaceful nuclear cooperation.
United States sanctions officials should impose sanctions in response to Iranian provocations immediately rather than waiting for JCPOA reporting or certification deadlines to avoid the perception that sanctions are intended to undermine the nuclear deal.
U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia is complicated by the fact that pulling back can provoke Saudi Arabia to act more aggressively, while reassuring Saudi Arabia can make the United States appear complicit in Saudi actions, thereby increasing tensions with Iran.
The United States should coordinate with international partners to ensure that any potential snapback of sanctions against Iran is multilateral, as a unilateral U.S. response would likely fail to generate sufficient economic leverage and would signal a fractured international coalition.
Constructive engagement allows the United States to communicate positions to the Iranian government, demonstrate that the United States is not the enemy of the Iranian people, and build the multilateral support necessary to address nuclear and regional challenges.
The United States can leverage incidents of Iranian malfeasance to signal deterrence and reassurance more effectively than in the past by moving beyond low-profile USCENTCOM press releases to high-profile news conferences where senior officials stand in front of intercepted Iranian weapons.
The United States and China jointly chair a working group focused on modernizing the Arak heavy water reactor in Iran to prevent it from producing weapons-grade plutonium.
The United States aims to make the Iranian economy less susceptible to malign actors such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Russia shares the goal of nonproliferation with the United States.
Implementing a regional or subregional nuclear regime could help defuse concerns about Iran's nuclear activity while serving broader US regional and global nonproliferation interests.
A proposed policy option for the United States involves developing a regional Middle Eastern or subregional Gulf regime to manage nuclear fuel-cycle activities and potentially address nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
The United States should conduct contingency planning and joint exercises with regional allies to deter Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, particularly as enrichment restrictions expire and breakout times narrow.
The U.S. administration’s September 24 travel proclamation suspends and limits entry by Iranians to the United States, but stipulates exceptions for valid student and exchange visitor visas, provided they undergo enhanced screening and vetting.
Iran's reactions to increased United States efforts to counter and expose Iranian power and influence in the Middle East will likely vary based on the geopolitical importance of the specific area to Iran.
The United States should continue to engage international partners on the issue of human rights in Iran, including through coordination with European Union partners on sanctions and support for the UN special rapporteur on Iran.
In the face of serious pushback and a willingness to accommodate its interests, the Iranian government may be willing to tone down some of its ambitions and accept political settlements that the United States can accept.
Russia opposes any U.S. military intervention in Iran, although Russia is unlikely to respond to such an intervention with force.
Iranian foreign policy actions, ranging from activities in Syria to Venezuela, are framed by the Iranian government as efforts to resist the United States and Israel, while domestic unrest is frequently attributed to American and Zionist plots.
President Donald Trump delivered remarks regarding the United States' strategy on Iran on October 13, 2017.
The United States should press the Iraqi government to represent Sunnis more fairly to address their grievances and reduce opportunities for the Islamic State to gain support.
The United States should seek alternatives with partners to reduce the resource burden, particularly air support, associated with protecting the U.S. enclave at al-Tanf in Syria.
The United States and Iran have a history of working together to bring the post-Taliban government to power in Afghanistan and share an interest in stopping the opium trade and stabilizing the country.
If there is evidence that an Iranian entity de-listed under the JCPOA is conducting sanctionable activity, U.S. officials should work quietly and directly with Iranian officials and security allies to address the concerns, or consider other means such as covert action and law enforcement interdiction.
The United States should prioritize military steps to ensure that Iran-supported militias and Hezbollah are excluded from the Golan Heights and southwestern Syria as a key component of countering Iranian influence.
Pressure alone is insufficient as a strategy for the United States to address Iran's nuclear and regional challenges; true stability and security require a combination of pressure and engagement.
Excessive U.S. hostility toward the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is likely to discourage other participants in the deal and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from assertively monitoring Iran's nuclear program due to fears of triggering conflict within the IAEA Board of Governors or with Iran.
Pushing the IAEA to test its monitoring authorities under the JCPOA without legitimate information risks signaling to other participants that U.S. monitoring efforts are motivated by politics and ideology.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace operates a global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, India, and the United States.
Iran is likely to acquiesce to a long-term American military presence in Iraq if Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Iraqi leadership privately press the case in Tehran, provided the force levels are low enough that Iran does not perceive them as a threat.
The enmity toward the United States held by Iranian hardliners is driven by both the ideology of the 1979 revolution and the need for self-preservation, as the regime seeks external antagonism for internal political expediency.
The U.S. administration should maintain the policy allowing U.S. diplomats to meet with their Iranian counterparts at international meetings.
The United States should aggressively identify and sanction individuals and entities that Iran uses to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to prevent banks and companies from inadvertently facilitating Assad's aggression.
The United States serves its short- to medium-term strategic interests by maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) because scrapping the deal would remove existing constraints on Iran's nuclear program and weaken the U.S. position for future negotiations.
Security vacuums in eastern Syria will persist for years, providing Iran with opportunities to increase its influence and move materiel and personnel despite U.S. efforts to limit such movement.
Russia supports U.S. efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the future.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated in July 2014: "reconciliation between Iran and America is possible, but it is not possible between the Islamic Republic and America."
The United States should oppose Iranian conventional military buildups in Syria by interdicting weapons shipments, exposing Iranian behavior, assisting Israel in countering Iranian actions, and pressing Russia to diplomatically prevent such a buildup.
The U.S. military presence in the Middle East serves as a key point of leverage in nuclear negotiations and a deterrent against Iranian nuclear breakout.
The United States maintains forces at al-Tanf in Syria, which has successfully cut off Iranian use of the southern and most direct route from Baghdad to Damascus.
Publicizing details of illicit Iranian activity and sharing information with allies will bolster the credibility of U.S. foreign policy and demonstrate that the United States is pursuing its concerns in a manner consistent with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).