entity

Lithuania

Facts (32)

Sources
Independence play: Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy ecfr.eu European Council on Foreign Relations Jul 18, 2019 17 facts
claimBecause they limit the scope of European strategic autonomy to Europe’s neighborhood, Lithuanians believe that the military capacity they need most is highly deployable light equipment.
claimA group of countries including Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the UK view United States concerns regarding European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) as strange, based on a misunderstanding, or economically motivated.
perspectiveExperts in Estonia view European Strategic Autonomy as unnecessary and damaging to NATO, while experts in Lithuania view it as potentially delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between NATO and European Union activities.
perspectiveLithuania would oppose any attempt to delink Europe from NATO.
perspectiveLithuanian policymakers believe that European strategic autonomy efforts should extend to regions neighboring Europe and sub-Saharan African countries, focusing on post-conflict stabilization, crisis management, and first-entry missions.
claimLithuanians see autonomy of action as more important than decision-making autonomy or information autonomy within the context of European strategic autonomy.
claimDiscussions of European strategic autonomy in Lithuania are often limited to the issues of a proposed European army or the initiative’s potential to clash with NATO.
claimLithuania advocates for greater investment in intelligence capabilities and prioritizes cybersecurity as a key field of action.
perspectiveLithuania opposes any attempts to delink, duplicate, or discriminate between European strategic autonomy efforts and NATO activities, viewing the United States as a key partner in defending against Russia.
perspectiveLithuanian officials perceive European strategic autonomy as a pragmatic tool for managing Europe's neighborhood, but they explicitly reject it as a substitute for NATO.
claimLithuania believes that Europe should make a greater effort to consider United States sensitivities when developing European strategic autonomy.
perspectiveLithuania is supportive of European integration and does not oppose collaboration within the framework of European strategic autonomy.
perspectiveLithuanian policymakers and policy experts emphasize that NATO must remain the main guarantor of European defense and strongly oppose proposals to create a European army.
perspectiveLithuanian officials conceive of European strategic autonomy as Europe’s freedom to conduct operations, but they are skeptical about framing it as autonomy in relation to other powers.
claimLithuania views NATO as an indispensable pillar of its security policy because it considers Russia to be the main threat it faces.
claimLithuanian policymakers and policy experts define European strategic autonomy as encompassing a wide range of non-military issues, including foreign policy, the threat of secondary sanctions, civilian capabilities, energy security, and hostile information operations.
measurementIn an ECFR survey, Estonia and Lithuania expressed concern about the compatibility of NATO and European Strategic Autonomy, citing risks of delinking, duplicating, or discriminating between their activities.
Quest for Strategic Autonomy? Europe Grapples with the US - China ... realinstitutoelcano.org Real Instituto Elcano Jun 26, 2025 14 facts
claimLithuania, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy have adopted national dual-use control lists that extend beyond the scope of the European Union Dual-Use Regulation.
claimAustria, France, Denmark, Lithuania, Spain, and Italy support strengthening dual-use export control frameworks within the European Union.
claimChina's coercive economic measures against Lithuania prompted Lithuania to reorient its investment and trade flows.
measurementIn Greece, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Hungary, exports to China accounted for less than 3% of total national exports.
claimDenmark, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden show a slight trend towards greater support for European strategic autonomy, reflecting increased engagement with the idea amid evolving regional security concerns.
accountEstonia and Lithuania chose not to renew their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) after they expired in 2022.
claimFrance (2018, updated 2020), Germany (2020), the Netherlands (2020), the European Union (2021), Czechia (2022), Lithuania (2023), and Sweden (2024) have adopted Indo-Pacific strategies.
claimChina's coercive economic measures against Lithuania between 2021 and 2022 accelerated the European Union's adoption of the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI).
measurementLithuania experienced a surge in outward foreign direct investment stock to the United States, rising from 0.3% to 40.4% of its total outward investment stock, which represents an increase from USD 13 million to USD 4.8 billion.
measurementLithuania's outward investment to China declined from USD 52 million to USD 6 million.
claimChina ranks ahead of the United States as a source of goods imports for most European countries, with the exceptions of Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Lithuania.
claimRomania, Sweden, and Lithuania have adopted explicit bans on Chinese providers in their 5G networks.
claimLithuania has shifted from being previously sceptical towards European strategic autonomy to showing signs of an ambivalent stance, influenced by the prospect of Donald Trump's return to power.
measurementLithuania's share of imports from the United States rose by 392% since 2018, although US imports accounted for 6.4% of Lithuania's total imports.
The EU's Open Strategic Autonomy and the challenge of ... globalpolicyjournal.com Eugenia Baroncelli · Global Policy Journal Aug 27, 2025 1 fact
accountThe Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) was designed to protect EU Member States from economic coercion, specifically following China's economic targeting of Lithuania in 2021 after Lithuania opened a Taiwanese diplomatic mission.