Dependence coherentism asserts that whenever a subject is justified in believing a proposition p1, the justification for believing p1 depends on the justification the subject has for believing some further propositions p1, p2, … pn.
Externalists argue that animals and small children possess knowledge and justified beliefs, which they claim cannot be justified in the way evidentialists conceive of justification.
Explanatory coherentism and reliability coherentism, as versions of doxastic coherentism, are criticized for making excessive intellectual demands on ordinary subjects who are unlikely to hold the specific background beliefs required for justification.
Experiential foundationalism posits that ordinary perceptual beliefs are justified by the perceptual experiences that give rise to them.
Experiential foundationalists argue that perception is a source of justification, which necessitates answering the 'J-question' regarding why perception serves as a source of justification.
The belief 'It appears to me that that hat is blue' serves as an example of a potentially basic belief under the Doxastic Basicality (DB) definition, provided it does not owe its justification to any other beliefs held by the subject.
To test the claim that perceptual experience is necessarily a source of justification, one can use thought experiments to conceive of a possible world where a person sees an object that looks blue, but that experience provides no justification for believing the object is blue.
For a foundationalist account of justification to be plausible, it must explain what makes basic beliefs justified and how basic beliefs justify nonbasic beliefs.
Experiential foundationalists who classify beliefs as basic cannot adopt the compromise position, as they must maintain that a perceptual experience (E) by itself is sufficient to make a belief (H) justified.
Epistemological questions regarding memory include whether memorial seemings provide prima facie justification for a proposition, or if memory only provides justification if it is coherent or objectively reliable.
Explanatory coherentism accounts for a lack of justification by noting that if an alternative explanation for an experience (E) is as good as or better than the hypothesis (H), the subject is not justified in believing (H).
The regress argument concludes that if justified beliefs exist, there must be basic beliefs that do not derive their justification from other beliefs.
Independence foundationalists argue that perceptual experiences are necessarily a source of justification, similar to how mathematical truths like 'the sum of two and two is four' are necessarily true.
Reliabilists hold that a belief is justified if and only if it results from a cognitive origin that is reliable, meaning an origin that tends to produce true beliefs and properly probabilifies the belief.
Reliabilism is a view in epistemology which asserts that a belief is justified if and only if it originates in reliable cognitive processes or faculties.
Experiential foundationalism asserts that a belief is justified by a mental state that is not a belief, specifically the perceptual experience that the belief is about.
The compromise position posits that justification for attributing reliability to perceptual experiences consists of memories of past perceptual success.
John Greco argued in his 2005 paper "Justification is Not Internal" that justification is not an internal property, contrasting with internalist views.
When discussing the nature of justification, epistemologists must distinguish between the definition of the word 'justification' and the factors that make beliefs justified to avoid mere verbal disputes.
Accessibility internalism posits that justification is internal because J-factors are always recognizable on reflection.
According to explanatory coherentism, the justification for a belief (H) is structured by two beliefs: (1) the subject has a visual experience (E) of a hat looking blue, and (2) the subject's experience (E) is best explained by the assumption that the hypothesis (H) is true.
Reliability coherentism posits that for a subject to be justified in believing a hypothesis (H), the subject need not believe anything about the reliability of the belief's origin, but must have justification for believing that the belief's origin is reliable, specifically by having justification for propositions (1) and (3).
The regress argument for foundationalism posits that for any justified belief (B1), if it is not basic, it must be justified by another belief (B2), which in turn requires justification, leading to an infinite chain or a loop unless the chain terminates in a basic belief.
In the 'barn-facades' thought experiment, Henry drives through a rural area filled with barn facades that look like real barns, but he happens to look at the one and only real barn and forms the belief that there is a barn there. While his belief is justified by his visual experience (according to TK) or by the reliable cognitive process of vision (according to NTK), it is widely agreed by epistemologists that Henry's belief does not qualify as knowledge because it is true merely by luck; had he looked at a facade, he would have formed the same belief.
Independence foundationalism is a theory that views the status of perception as a source of justification as a matter of brute necessity, adopting an epistemic conception of basicality.
Attempting to define a better explanation by appealing to whether a person is already justified in believing the components of that explanation creates a circular argument, as explanatory coherentism is intended to explain the source of justification itself.
Under the compromise position, the justification for a belief (H) is the conjunction of the perceptual experience (E) and the track-record memories (M).
A proposed solution to distinguish between better and worse explanations is to assert that if one explanation (E1) includes a proposition that a subject is not justified in believing, while another explanation (E2) does not, then (E2) is the better explanation.
Non-traditional knowledge (NTK) theories conceive of the role of justification as ensuring that a subject's belief has a high objective probability of truth, thereby ensuring that if the belief is true, it is not true merely because of luck.
Dependence coherentism rests on the supposition that it is possible for a subject to have justification for a proposition without actually believing that proposition.
Some Non-traditional knowledge (NTK) theorists bypass the justification condition entirely by conceiving of knowledge as reliably produced true belief, rendering justification unnecessary.
Philosophers such as Descartes, Locke, Moore, and Chisholm historically utilized a deontological understanding of the concept of justification.
Experiential foundationalism combines two crucial ideas: (i) when a justified belief is basic, its justification is not owed to any other belief; (ii) what in fact justifies basic beliefs are experiences.
Epistemic Basicality (EB) defines a subject's justified belief that p as basic if and only if the subject's justification for believing that p does not depend on any justification the subject possesses for believing a further proposition, q.
When evaluating the justification of beliefs, the relevant obligations are those that arise from the pursuit of truth, rather than moral or prudential obligations used to evaluate actions.
Advocates of deontological justification (DJ) argue that a lack of control over beliefs does not prevent the use of the term 'justification' in a deontological sense.
The dispute over whether justification is internal or external is a disagreement regarding the nature of J-factors.
Epistemology as the study of justified belief addresses the concept of justification, what makes beliefs justified, and whether justification is internal or external to the mind.
Privilege foundationalism asserts that a belief is justified if it possesses an epistemic privilege such as infallibility, indubitability, or incorrigibility, which makes the belief impossible to be false, doubted, or corrected by others.
A moderate version of naturalistic epistemology aims to identify how knowledge and justification are anchored in the natural world, similar to how physics explains natural phenomena like heat or thunder.
A subject's justification for believing a proposition (p) is defined as possessing a link between the belief that p and the truth of p.
According to the compromise position, a perceptual experience (E) alone is insufficient to justify a perceptual belief; it must be accompanied by track-record memories (M) that provide justification for considering the experience reliable.
The role of justification in epistemology is to ensure that a true belief is not true merely by accident, which is accomplished when a true belief instantiates the property of proper probabilification.
The traditional approach to knowledge (TK) asserts that knowledge requires justification to ensure that a subject's correct belief is not merely a matter of luck.
Coherentism characterizes knowledge and justification as a structure resembling a web, where the strength of any specific area depends on the strength of the surrounding areas.
The dominant contemporary view in epistemology is that the deontological understanding of justification is unsuitable for the purposes of the field.
Doxastic Coherentism asserts that every justified belief receives its justification from other beliefs located within its epistemic neighborhood.
Having justification for believing a proposition does not entail that a subject actually believes that proposition.
A belief (H) can be considered 'basic' under Dogmatic Foundationalism (DB) if the justification for (H) is owed solely to a perceptual experience (E) and track-record memories (M), provided neither (E) nor (M) includes any beliefs.
Perceptual experiences do not arbitrate between dependence coherentism and independence foundationalism because both theories appeal to perceptual experiences to explain why perceptual beliefs are justified.
Demanding justification for a raw perceptual experience, such as why a headache or an itch is justified, is considered a misuse of the term 'justification'.
Explanatory coherentism is an epistemological approach where justification for a belief is derived from the belief being the best explanation for one's perceptual experiences.
Explanatory coherentism posits that for a subject to be justified in believing a hypothesis (H), it is not necessary that the subject actually believes the supporting propositions (1) and (2), but it is necessary that the subject has justification for believing (1) and (2).
A posteriori or empirical knowledge is defined as justification and knowledge that is not a priori.
To test the validity of independence foundationalism, one can use thought experiments to conceive of a possible world where perceptual experience does not provide justification for belief, such as a scenario where seeing an object as blue provides no justification for believing it is blue.
Experiential foundationalists who prefer the EB (Experiential Basicality) definition of basicality cannot argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because one has a reason (R) for believing they are, as that reason would constitute justification for another belief, which contradicts the EB definition of basicality.
Experiential foundationalism is a theory in epistemology that posits perceptual experiences as a source of justification, which coherentists challenge by asking why perceptual experiences serve this function (the J-question).
Reliabilists reject access internalism because they argue that if the justification of beliefs is determined by the reliability of belief sources, justification is not always recognizable upon reflection.
Foundationalism characterizes knowledge and justification as a structure resembling a building, where a superstructure rests upon a foundation of basic beliefs.
An argument for the internality of justification posits that because a subject (Tim*) who is internally the same as another subject (Tim) but externally different shares the same justificational status for their beliefs, internal factors must be what justify beliefs.
The proposal to define better explanations by referencing justified beliefs is criticized for circular reasoning, as explanatory coherentism is intended to explain the source of justification itself.
Externalists argue that the justification of beliefs is external, meaning it results from origination in reliable processes rather than the possession of evidence.
The 'compromise position' in epistemology asserts that for perceptual experiences to serve as a source of justification, an individual must possess justification for believing those experiences are reliable, rather than necessarily having considered and formed a belief about their reliability.
Typical coherentism, as construed by its advocates, requires that for a given belief to be justified, the subject must have certain further beliefs that constitute reasons for that given belief.
Mentalist internalism posits that justification is internal because J-factors are always mental states.
Dependence coherentism rejects the requirement that justification must come in the form of beliefs, allowing instead for justification to come from introspective and memorial evidence, or from suitable perceptual experiences and memory content.
In epistemology, the term 'justification' is often used in a technical sense that deviates from ordinary usage to better suit the needs of the field.
Independence foundationalism defines a basic belief that p as a belief whose justification does not depend on having any justification for believing another proposition q, asserting that a basic belief's justification is completely independent of having justification for any other beliefs.
One argument for the internality of justification is that justification is deontological, meaning it is a matter of duty-fulfillment, and duty-fulfillment is an internal process.
In contemporary epistemology, there is an ongoing debate between internalists and externalists regarding whether justification is internal or external.
A priori knowledge consists of beliefs that are true, justified a priori, and not 'gettiered'.
Experiential foundationalism is supported by citing cases like the blue hat example, which makes it plausible to assume that perceptual experiences are a source of justification.
Foundationalists typically define the justificatory relation between basic and nonbasic beliefs as non-deductive, meaning a basic belief B justifies a nonbasic belief B* if B makes B* likely to be true, rather than requiring B to entail B*.
The 'compromise position' in epistemology attempts to bridge foundationalism and coherentism by arguing that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because a subject has justification for taking those experiences to be reliable, without requiring the subject to hold a belief that attributes reliability to those experiences.
Reliabilism asserts that justification is not necessary for knowledge, and that reliably produced true belief is sufficient for knowledge, provided the notion of reliability is refined to rule out Gettier cases.
Explanatory coherentism faces a circularity problem if it attempts to define what makes one explanation better than another by using the concept of justification, as this would make the account uninformative.
Internalists argue that perceptual experiences can serve as a source of justification because it is a necessary truth that certain perceptual experiences justify certain perceptual beliefs, regardless of whether those experiences are reliable.
Reliabilism asserts that the justification of beliefs is a function of the reliability of belief sources, such as memorial, perceptual, and introspective states and processes, rather than evidence.
According to the theory of knowledge (TK), a subject's belief that a proposition is true is justified when it is reasonable or rational from the subject's own point of view to take that proposition to be true, ensuring the belief is not true merely because of luck.
Externalists assert that justification requires external conditions because those conditions provide the objective probability necessary for knowledge.
Privilege foundationalism faces difficulty in accounting for the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs because such beliefs are typically not based on further beliefs about one's own perceptual experiences.
Reliabilism exists in two forms: as a theory of justification, which views justification as an important ingredient of knowledge grounded in reliability, and as a theory of knowledge, which defines knowledge as reliably produced true belief without requiring justification.
A subject S is justified a priori in believing a proposition p if and only if the justification for believing p does not depend on any experience.
Standard reliabilism asserts that justification is derived from the reliability of the types of processes in which beliefs originate, such as perception, introspection, memory, and rational intuition, rather than the mere possession of evidence.
Both the traditional approach (TK) and the non-traditional approach (NTK) to knowledge agree that the role of justification is to ensure that a subject's belief is not true merely because of luck.
Experiential foundationalists who prefer Experiential Foundationalism (EB) can endorse externalism to argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification if, and only if, those experiences are of types that are reliably associated with true resulting beliefs.