Perceptual experiences do not arbitrate between dependence coherentism and independence foundationalism because both theories appeal to perceptual experiences to explain why perceptual beliefs are justified.

Authors

• Person: Matthias Steup, Ram Neta Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Person: Not available Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition)

Sources

• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper

Referenced by nodes (4)

• justification concept
• perceptual experience concept
• perceptual beliefs concept
• Dependence coherentism concept