concept

Virtue epistemology

Also known as: Virtue epistemologists

synthesized from dimensions

Virtue epistemology is a contemporary philosophical movement that shifts the focus of epistemic evaluation from the properties of individual beliefs or propositions to the character, cognitive traits, and intellectual performance of the epistemic agent [13, 22, 43]. By prioritizing the knower as an agent, the field seeks to move beyond the traditional analytic focus on abstract logical structures, instead treating epistemology as a normative discipline that examines the "good" and "bad" ways of forming beliefs [27, 45]. This approach draws significant inspiration from historical traditions, including the works of Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, and Descartes, while aligning with the revival of virtue ethics to address questions of justification and knowledge [17, 37, 44ad0751-e1bd-4853-a9e6-0f0c352a5197].

The field is broadly categorized into two primary, though often overlapping, frameworks: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism [26, 58]. Virtue reliabilists emphasize the reliability of an agent’s cognitive faculties and belief-forming methods, often seeking to resolve traditional problems like skepticism through an interplay of internalist and externalist perspectives [26, 54]. Virtue responsibilists, by contrast, focus on normative character traits—such as intellectual humility, courage, and perseverance—that characterize an excellent inquirer [8, 54, d9f3844f-5e09-434d-b46d-8d4340252cea]. Many contemporary practitioners reject a strict dichotomy between these camps, preferring to blend elements of both to provide a more comprehensive account of human inquiry [12].

A central objective of virtue epistemology is to address the "value problem"—the challenge of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief [14, 0ea3817c-256d-44cd-8fbf-4e39ee782629]. Proponents often invoke the "credit thesis," which posits that knowledge is a form of achievement for which the agent deserves credit because their true belief is the result of their own intellectual virtues [e2f256d3-0b59-4fca-9296-12bfddebe016]. By framing knowledge as an act of intellectual virtue rather than a passive state of causal transmission, the theory offers a distinct alternative to foundationalism and coherentism, providing a potential solution to the Gettier problem by requiring that an agent’s success be attributable to their cognitive competence [10, 0c9a11a6-9721-4706-9108-cf5af239395f, d70b6502-a529-4e42-84bf-7f5f34d5cab8].

Despite its influence, the field faces significant critical scrutiny. Scholars such as Jennifer Lackey have challenged the credit thesis, arguing that it struggles to account for the value of knowledge in cases involving testimonial evidence or specific Gettier-style scenarios [46, e37c44db-71ea-4b7a-8bf5-3b241ce5c2c9]. Furthermore, the "problem of epistemic situationism" questions the assumption of stable intellectual dispositions, citing empirical evidence that suggests human cognition is often sensitive to trivial situational factors rather than consistent character traits [15, 37]. Critics also point to the "generality problem"—the difficulty of precisely classifying the belief-acquiring episodes that constitute a virtue—and argue that some virtue-based solutions to epistemic problems remain overly vague [6, d6250791-ec5b-47ea-adae-b03421fc2755].

The significance of virtue epistemology extends beyond abstract theory into practical and interdisciplinary applications. Many researchers advocate for an ameliorative approach, integrating empirical findings from cognitive psychology and the social sciences to refine our understanding of heuristics, biases, and cognitive training [15, 18, e1da3093-2079-4657-bb9d-59b11c538106]. This has led to proposals for redesigning educational environments to foster intellectual virtues, moving away from purely Cartesian projects toward the development of practical wisdom (phronesis) [19, 55, e3a43893-f9dd-4c84-8293-0a5ea3ea6a29]. By bridging the gap between moral and intellectual inquiry, virtue epistemology continues to evolve as a robust framework for understanding the role of the agent in the pursuit of knowledge [4, 33, 59].

Model Perspectives (5)
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Virtue epistemology is a branch of philosophy that shifts the focus of epistemic evaluation from individual beliefs or propositions to the character and cognitive traits of the epistemic agent [13, 22, 43]. Emerging as a distinct movement in the 1980s through the work of Ernest Sosa [20, 52], the discipline posits that knowledge and justification are best understood through the lens of intellectual virtues—defined as 'good' ways of forming beliefs—and epistemic vices, which are 'bad' ways of forming beliefs [8, 9, 45]. Proponents argue that this approach offers several advantages, including the ability to bypass traditional impasses between internalism and externalism or foundationalism and coherentism [1]. By prioritizing the agent, virtue epistemology incorporates social context and cognitive development into the framework of inquiry [3, 16, 31]. It is often broadly categorized into two camps: virtue reliabilism, which emphasizes the reliability of belief-forming methods, and virtue responsibilism, which focuses on normative character traits [26, 58]. However, many practitioners reject this strict dichotomy, preferring to blend various elements of the field [12]. Central to the theory is the 'value turn' in epistemology, which seeks a unified theory of value that can potentially link cognitive performance with moral properties, similar to how virtue ethics evaluates actions [4, 33, 59]. Despite its potential, the field faces challenges such as the 'generality problem'—the difficulty of classifying belief-acquiring episodes—and criticism regarding its overall efficacy [6, 30]. Contemporary research continues to evolve, incorporating empirical findings from cognitive psychology to study heuristics and biases [15, 60], and drawing on historical traditions ranging from Aristotle to Islamic philosophers like Avicenna [17, 37, 58].
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Virtue epistemology (VE) represents a shift in contemporary philosophy that centers on the intellectual agent rather than traditional abstractions [1, 27]. Defined by the commitment to treating epistemology as a normative discipline where intellectual agents and communities are the primary focus of evaluation [27], VE seeks to analyze knowledge as a state of belief generated by acts of intellectual virtue [22, 40]. Practitioners are generally categorized into two groups: virtue reliabilists, who focus on the reliability of cognitive faculties, and virtue responsibilists, who emphasize excellent character traits [8, 54]. A central goal of this framework is to address longstanding issues such as the Gettier problem by asserting that knowledge requires a belief to be true specifically because of an agent’s intellectual virtues [10, 60]. Furthermore, VE is positioned to address the 'value problem'—explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief—by highlighting the internal agency of the knower [14]. However, the field faces significant critiques and internal debates. Scholars like Jennifer Lackey challenge the 'credit thesis,' arguing that it fails to account for the value of knowledge in all cases [46]. Additionally, the 'problem of epistemic situationism' highlights a potential tension between the assumption of stable intellectual dispositions and empirical evidence suggesting cognition may be sensitive to trivial situational factors [15, 37]. Beyond traditional knowledge analysis, the field is expanding into interdisciplinary and practical applications. Researchers advocate for developing VE in coordination with cognitive, social, and life sciences [18, 47], and suggest that educational settings, such as the Intellectual Virtues Academy, should be redesigned to foster these cognitive traits [55]. Early contributors like Linda Zagzebski and Lorraine Code helped broaden the scope by emphasizing the social, developmental, and moral dimensions of intellectual virtues [59], with Zagzebski notably proposing a neo-Aristotelian model that unifies moral and intellectual virtues through practical wisdom (phronesis) [19, 31].
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Virtue epistemology represents a shift in philosophical focus from individual beliefs and inferences to the cognitive character of the knower intellectual qualities of individuals. By centering on the agent rather than the belief, practitioners aim to address traditional problems such as justification and reliabilism focusing on the knower. This approach, which draws inspiration from historical figures like Aristotle and Descartes historical philosophical inspiration, contrasts with 20th-century analytic philosophy that prioritized belief-based models cognitive character of individuals. Key figures such as Ernest Sosa and Linda Zagzebski utilize the concept of intellectual virtues—including humility, courage, and perseverance—to analyze belief formation intellectual virtues and competencies. A central component of this framework is the "credit thesis," which posits that knowledge requires an agent to deserve credit for their belief credit-worthy state of agent. However, this thesis faces significant scrutiny; for instance, Jennifer Lackey argues that it struggles to handle Gettier cases effectively without either excluding valid testimonial knowledge or failing to resolve the problem dilemma of creditworthiness. Furthermore, the field faces a "situationist challenge," which questions the stability of virtues in a manner similar to debates in virtue ethics situationist challenge analogy. Despite these critiques, some theorists advocate for an ameliorative approach that uses empirical findings to improve epistemic training improving cognitive training, while others suggest the field's primary value lies in its ability to redefine the fundamental questions of epistemology redefining central questions.
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Virtue epistemology represents a diverse collection of contemporary approaches within modern analytic epistemology, emphasizing intellectual virtues and the epistemic agent over belief properties alone diverse approaches. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), edited by John Greco and John Turri, it argues that understanding emerges from acts of intellectual virtue rather than mere causal knowledge transmission understanding via virtues, and offers a straightforward solution to the value problem in epistemology value problem solution. It shifts focus to the knower as an agent, akin to virtue ethics' emphasis on moral agents, addressing issues like justification and reliabilism agent-focused solutions. Person-based rather than belief-based, it prioritizes the intellectual qualities of individuals person-based focus, differing from foundationalism and coherentism by starting with personal intellectual virtues such as humility, courage, and perseverance differs from foundationalism intellectual virtues listed. Historical precursors include Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and figures like Plato, Hume, and Nietzsche historical precursors, with development inspired by virtue ethics revival via Roger Crisp and Michael Slote virtue ethics inspiration. Key proponents like Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski, John Greco, Duncan Pritchard, and Heather Battaly analyze belief formation through cognitive competencies Sosa/Zagzebski analysis; Sosa's version circumvents skepticism via externalism-internalism interplay, while responsibilism (e.g., Zagzebski-influenced by King) emphasizes motivated inquiry. Applications include critical thinking practices per Massimo Pigliucci critical thinking application and aiding scientific crises. Criticisms note uninformative Gettier solutions due to vague 'because of virtue' Gettier criticism and situationist challenges akin to virtue ethics. SEP highlights robust variants, epistemic anti-individualism (Kallestrup/Pritchard), and extensions to embedded virtues.
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Virtue epistemology is a distinct field in philosophy, recognized in encyclopedias like the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Social Sciences and detailed in entries by John Greco and John Turri for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Jason S. Baehr for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It contrasts with late 20th-century analytic philosophy's focus on individual beliefs and inferences by emphasizing agents' cognitive character. Practitioners draw from historical philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes and oppose W.V.O. Quine's call to naturalize epistemology by abandoning normative questions. A core idea is the credit thesis, where knowledge requires the agent deserving credit for true belief, but Jennifer Lackey argues it faces a dilemma excluding either Gettier subjects or testimonial knowledge. Some favor an ameliorative approach using empirical findings for cognitive training, while Jonathan Kvanvig urges focusing virtues on education over Cartesian projects. Key works include Linda Zagzebski's Virtues of the Mind (1996), the DePaul-Zagzebski edited Intellectual Virtue (2003), and Fairweather's Virtue Epistemology Naturalized (2014), with critiques like Christoph Kelp on Duncan Pritchard and Olin-Doris on cognition-skepticism intersections.

Facts (149)

Sources
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jul 9, 1999 40 facts
referenceStephen E. Napier published 'Virtue Epistemology: Motivation and Knowledge' with Continuum Press in 2008, which explores the relationship between motivation and knowledge in virtue epistemology.
claimVirtue ethics explains an action’s moral properties in terms of the agent’s properties, whereas virtue epistemology explains a cognitive performance’s normative properties in terms of the cognizer’s properties, such as whether a belief results from hastiness or excellent eyesight.
perspectiveVirtue epistemologists argue that understanding is a special status that arises from acts of intellectual virtue, rather than just the communication of causal knowledge.
claimMichael Levin argued against the efficacy of virtue epistemology in his 2004 article 'Virtue Epistemology: No New Cures' published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
claimVirtue Epistemology provides a straightforward solution to the value problem, assuming the basic line on knowledge is correct.
claimThe taxonomy dividing virtue epistemology into reliabilists and responsibilists has been criticized by Fleisher (2017) on the grounds that it is unclear why practitioners must choose between faculty-virtues and trait-virtues.
claimMany practitioners of virtue epistemology blend conventional and alternative elements or see value in conventional virtue epistemology, rather than adhering to a strict dichotomy between the two approaches.
claimPeter L. Samuelson and Ian M. Church argue in their 2015 article 'When cognition turns vicious: Heuristics and biases in light of virtue epistemology' that virtue epistemology provides a useful framework for understanding cognitive heuristics and biases.
claimIslamic philosophy contains precursors to contemporary virtue epistemology, specifically in al-Kindī and al-Fārābī's discussions on the epistemic value of imagination and Avicenna's social epistemology regarding testimony.
claimContemporary virtue epistemology is a diverse collection of approaches to the field of epistemology.
referenceJohn Greco published 'Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of ‘Relevant Possibility’' in the Southern Journal of Philosophy in 1994, which connects virtue epistemology to the concept of relevant possibility.
claimVirtue epistemology faces a version of the generality problem, which involves determining how to classify belief-acquiring episodes, as noted by Alvin Goldman in 1986 and Linda Zagzebski in 1996.
claimVirtue epistemology shifts the focus from what an individual knows at a given time to questions about cognitive development and learning.
claimVirtue epistemology is a central component of the recent 'value turn' in epistemology, which emphasizes the study of epistemic norms, value, and evaluation.
claimVirtue epistemology finds historical precursors in the works of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Peirce, Hume, Reid, Russell, and Sellars.
claimA central tendency in virtue epistemology is to view intellectual agents and communities as the primary source of epistemic value and the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, including the traits constitutive of their cognitive character.
claimKing (2014a) defends responsibilism by arguing that, based on Linda Zagzebski's (1996) version of virtue epistemology, knowledge does not need to manifest virtue but only needs to arise from the type of motivated inquiry a virtuous person would engage in.
claimIn Virtue Epistemology, belief-formation is treated as a psychological performance where accuracy is identified with truth, adroitness is identified with manifesting intellectual competence, and aptness is identified with a belief being true because it is competent.
claimLinda Zagzebski argues that the generality problem in virtue epistemology should be answered empirically, with a preference for coarse individuation of epistemic virtues.
claimContemporary virtue epistemology began as a distinctive movement in the early 1980s with the work of Ernest Sosa.
claimVirtue epistemology is divided by four main issues: the nature and scope of intellectual virtues, the questions to address, the methods to use, and the relations among epistemic virtue, knowledge, and epistemic credit.
claimPractitioners of virtue epistemology tend to recognize the importance of empirical findings about cognition and inquiry, partly due to a predilection for naturalism and because virtue epistemology is a normative discipline that accepts a version of the "ought implies can" principle.
claimPractitioners of Virtue Epistemology (VE) may be able to provide aid, comfort, or an accurate description of the malaise experienced by scientists during crises.
claimConventional virtue epistemology (VE) utilizes the resources of virtue epistemology to address standard questions in contemporary Anglophone epistemology, such as providing analyses or definitions of knowledge and justification, solving puzzles like the Gettier problem and the lottery problem, constructing counterexamples, and confronting the skeptic.
perspectiveLinda Zagzebski (2003) argues that an adequate account of knowledge must explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, and that virtue epistemology is well-positioned to solve this 'value problem' by focusing on the internal agency of the knower.
claimThe literature on embedded, scaffolded, and extended epistemic virtues is a development of virtue epistemology's emphasis on intellectual agents and communities.
perspectiveJohn Turri (2015a) argues that the kernel of truth in virtue epistemology is best developed in an interdisciplinary context that draws on the methods and findings of the cognitive, social, and life sciences.
claimVirtue Epistemology facilitates the recovery of interest in and the analysis of understanding and wisdom.
claimPritchard (2014) argues for a version of virtue epistemology that recognizes the essential role of the environment in the acquisition of knowledge.
perspectiveJonathan Kvanvig argues that Virtue Epistemology should move away from the modern epistemological focus on individuals and particular beliefs, and instead focus on social and historical factors.
claimIn virtue epistemology, a competence is defined as a disposition resident in an agent that would ensure or make highly likely the success of a relevant performance under appropriately normal conditions.
perspectiveJennifer Lackey argues that the credit thesis is false because we do not deserve credit for everything we know, which implies that standard Virtue Epistemology definitions of knowledge are incorrect and that the framework is not ideally suited to explain the value of knowledge.
claimPractitioners of virtue epistemology suggest that educational institutions should be redesigned to help students cultivate intellectual virtues, such as the Intellectual Virtues Academy.
claimLorraine Code, James Montmarquet, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Linda Zagzebski contributed early work to virtue epistemology, arguing that Ernest Sosa's approach did not sufficiently emphasize the central role of virtues like responsibility or conscientiousness, their social and developmental bases, or the relationships between intellectual and ethical virtues.
claimVirtue Epistemology solves the Gettier problem by asserting that knowledge requires an agent to believe the truth because of their intellectual virtues, whereas Gettier subjects do not believe the truth because of their virtues.
claimThe situationist challenge to virtue epistemology is analogous to the situationist challenge to virtue ethics, as discussed by Doris (1998, 2002), Flanagan (1991), Harman (1999), and Merritt, Doris, and Harman (2010).
perspectiveCritics argue that the Virtue Epistemology solution to the Gettier problem is uninformative because there is a lack of adequate understanding regarding what it means to believe 'because of' or 'out of' virtue.
perspectiveJonathan Kvanvig (1992) argues that virtue epistemology will flourish only by relinquishing the Cartesian epistemological project and instead focusing on the role that virtues play in training and education.
claimVirtue epistemologists oppose the suggestion made by W.V.O. Quine in 'Epistemology Naturalized' that philosophers should abandon questions about reasonable belief and restrict themselves to cognitive psychology.
claimVirtue epistemology practitioners draw inspiration from historical philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Descartes.
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu John Greco, John Turri · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jul 9, 1999 28 facts
referenceThe book 'Moral and Epistemic Virtues', edited by Michael S. Brady and Duncan H. Pritchard and published in 2003 by Basil Blackwell, is a collection of works regarding virtue epistemology.
referenceHeather Battaly provides an overview of virtue epistemology in her 2008 paper 'Virtue Epistemology', published in Philosophy Compass, 3(4): 639–663.
referenceDuncan Pritchard published 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck' in Metaphilosophy in 2003, which examines the intersection of virtue epistemology and epistemic luck.
referenceThe book 'Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue', edited by Abrol Fairweather and Owen Flanagan and published in 2014 by Cambridge University Press, is a collection of works regarding virtue epistemology.
referenceThe book 'Current Controversies in Virtue Theory', edited by Mark Alfano and published in 2015 by Routledge, is a collection of works regarding virtue epistemology.
accountMark Alfano conducted research for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology while serving as a Visitor at the School of Philosophy at the Australian National University.
claimMark Alfano framed the problem of epistemic situationism as an inconsistent triad consisting of anti-skepticism (the view that humans have knowledge), epistemic situationism (the view that intellectual dispositions are sensitive to trivial situational factors), and virtue epistemology.
referenceJ. Kvanvig published 'Virtue Epistemology' in the 'Routledge Companion to Epistemology' in 2011, which provides an overview of virtue epistemology.
referenceGuy Axtell and J. Adam Carter argue for a 'second-wave' approach to virtue epistemology in their 2008 paper 'Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology', published in Philosophical Papers, 37(3): 413–434.
referenceJason S. Baehr's book 'The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology', published by Oxford University Press in 2011, provides a comprehensive look at intellectual virtues.
claimIf empirical studies suggest that people's beliefs usually manifest cognitive defects or incompetence, virtue epistemology would be led to the conclusion that most human true beliefs do not count as knowledge.
referenceThe book 'Epistemic Situationism', edited by Abrol Fairweather and Mark Alfano and published in 2017 by Oxford University Press, is a collection of works regarding virtue epistemology.
claimVirtue epistemology practitioners generally agree that knowledge is defined as true belief that manifests virtue.
referenceJohn Turri authored the chapter 'From virtue epistemology to abilism: theoretical and empirical developments' in the 2015 book 'Character: new directions from philosophy, psychology, and theology', edited by Christian B. Miller, R. Michael Furr, Angela Knobel, and William Fleeson and published by Oxford University Press.
claimVirtue Epistemology (VE) is developing in four new directions: virtues in epistemic communities, profiles of specific virtues and vices, philosophizing about epistemic statuses other than knowledge, and the relationship between intellectual virtues and epistemic emotions.
accountJohn Turri's research for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation, and the Canada Research Chairs program.
referenceThe book 'Knowledge, Belief and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology', edited by Guy Axtell and published in 2000 by Rowman and Littlefield, is a collection of works regarding virtue epistemology.
referenceJason S. Baehr examines the relationship between character, reliability, and virtue epistemology in his 2006 paper 'Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology', published in The Philosophical Quarterly, 56(223): 193–212.
referenceLauren Olin and John M. Doris examined the intersection of virtue epistemology, cognition, and skepticism in their 2014 paper 'Vicious minds: Virtue epistemology, cognition, and skepticism'.
claimPractitioners who favor an ameliorative or educative approach to virtue epistemology use empirical findings to identify common cognitive defects and to suggest improvements for cognitive and epistemic training.
claimThe 'credit thesis' in Virtue Epistemology posits that knowledge is a credit-worthy state of the agent, meaning an individual knows a proposition only if they deserve credit for believing the truth.
referenceChristoph Kelp published 'Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology' in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies in 2009, which critiques Duncan Pritchard's work on virtue epistemology.
claimJennifer Lackey (2009) argues that the virtue epistemology credit thesis faces a dilemma: if creditworthiness is defined strictly enough to exclude Gettier subjects, it excludes too much testimonial knowledge, but if it is defined loosely, it is refuted by Gettier cases.
referenceJ.S. Blumenthal-Barby discusses dilemmas regarding the 'rarity thesis' in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology in her 2015 paper published in Philosophia, 44(2): 395–406.
referenceThe book 'Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology', edited by Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski and published in 2003 by Oxford University Press, is a collection of works regarding virtue epistemology.
referenceJohn Turri authored the chapter 'Bi-level virtue epistemology' in the 2013 book 'Virtuous thoughts: the philosophy of Ernest Sosa', edited by John Turri and published by Springer Netherlands.
referenceThe book 'Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science', edited by Abrol Fairweather and published in 2014 by Springer International Publishing, is a collection of works regarding virtue epistemology.
referenceThe article 'The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Epistemology' by Guy Axtell was published in The Monist in 1998.
Virtue epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 25 facts
claimVirtue epistemology is considered more accessible due to its flexibility and the connection between internal and external factors, which allows for the exploration of social conditioning and influence within an epistemological framework.
claimVirtue epistemology differs from other areas of epistemology by taking the state of an individual's intellect into account, which allows social context to alter knowledge.
claimLinda Trinkaus Zagzebski includes the notion of "reliable success" in her model of virtue epistemology to address the problem of well-intentioned agents who desire truth but employ ineffective methods to pursue it.
claimVirtue epistemology evaluates knowledge based on the properties of the persons or knowers who hold beliefs, rather than focusing solely on the properties of propositions and beliefs.
claimMassimo Pigliucci applies virtue epistemology to critical thinking, suggesting that a virtuous individual should practice non-dismissive consideration of arguments, charitable interpretation of opposing arguments, awareness of one's own presuppositions, consultation of expert knowledge, verification of source material reliability, and prioritizing knowledge over repeating others' opinions.
claimAlvin Plantinga's theory of knowledge, which is related to virtue epistemology, asserts that knowledge is warranted if an individual's intellectual faculties are operating as they were designed to operate.
claimVirtue epistemology replaces formulaic expressions for knowledge, such as 'S knows that p', by applying virtue theory to the intellect, making virtue the fulcrum for assessing knowledge candidates.
claimVirtue epistemology is a development within the modern analytic tradition, though the concept of intellectual virtue has been a subject of philosophy since the work of Aristotle.
claimVirtue responsibilism is a variety of virtue epistemology that contains normative elements and can provide a unified framework of normativity and value.
referenceThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, contains an entry titled 'Virtue epistemology' (ISSN 1095-5054, OCLC 429049174).
claimVirtue epistemology attempts to simplify the analysis of knowledge by replacing certain abstractions with flexible and contextual instances, which allows for cognitive relativism.
claimA criticism of virtue epistemology focuses on its characterization of human cognition as being grounded in stable character dispositions, such as the disposition to use reliable faculties or excellent character traits.
claimVirtue epistemology is a philosophical approach to epistemology that emphasizes the importance of intellectual and epistemic virtues.
claimVirtue epistemology stresses 'epistemic responsibility,' a concept where an individual is held responsible for the virtue of their knowledge-gathering faculties.
claimErnest Sosa's account of virtue epistemology can circumvent Cartesian skepticism by requiring the interaction of externalism and internalism.
claimIn Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski's model of virtue epistemology, the "characteristic motivation" of an intellectual virtue is the desire for truth, understanding, and other forms of cognitive contact with reality.
claimVirtue epistemology has a parallel in the theory of unity of knowledge and action proposed by the Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming.
claimLinda Trinkaus Zagzebski proposed a neo-Aristotelian model of virtue epistemology that emphasizes phronesis (practical wisdom) as an architectonic virtue that unifies moral and intellectual virtues more radically than Aristotle's original proposal.
claimUnder the view of virtue epistemology, a well-functioning intellectual faculty is a necessary condition for the formation of knowledge.
claimVirtue epistemology was inspired by a renewal of interest in virtue concepts among moral philosophers and as a response to the intractability of competing analyses of knowledge that arose following the work of Edmund Gettier.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, contains an entry titled 'Virtue epistemology' (ISSN 2161-0002, OCLC 37741658).
claimJohn Greco's theory of virtue epistemology incorporates intellectual virtues typically associated with the responsibilist camp by framing them as stable, reliable dispositions of character.
claimVirtue epistemology attempts to solve problems in modern epistemology, such as justification and reliabilism, by focusing on the knower as an agent, similar to how virtue ethics focuses on moral agents.
claimVirtue epistemology is person-based rather than belief-based, focusing on the intellectual qualities of the individual rather than the quality of the belief.
claimAI epistemology is a field that explores how artificial intelligence systems generate, structure, and transform knowledge, building on the foundations of virtue and social epistemology.
Virtue Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 17 facts
claimThe development of virtue epistemology was partly inspired by a renewal of interest in virtue concepts among moral philosophers, such as the work of Roger Crisp and Michael Slote in 1997.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology cites Ernest Sosa's 1980 article 'The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge' as a key reference in the field.
referenceGuy Axtell's 'Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology' (1997) and 'Knowledge, Belief, and Character' (2000) are key texts in the field of virtue epistemology.
referenceAristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (1985) is a foundational text for virtue epistemology.
referenceLorraine Code's 'Epistemic Responsibility' (1987) is a cited work in virtue epistemology.
claimVirtue epistemologists are divided into two groups, virtue reliabilists and virtue responsibilists, based on their differing conceptions of what constitutes an intellectual virtue.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology cites Christopher Hookway's 1994 article 'Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations' as a key reference in the field.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology cites Alvin Plantinga's 1993 book 'Warrant and Proper Function' as a key reference in the field.
referenceLaurence BonJour's 'Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and ‘Aptness’' (1995) is a cited work in virtue epistemology.
claimVirtue epistemology addresses a wide range of philosophical issues, including the Gettier problem, the internalism/externalism debate, and skepticism.
referenceJohn Greco's works 'Virtue Epistemology' (1992), 'Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology' (1993), and 'Agent Reliabilism' (1999) are cited works in virtue epistemology.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology cites John Greco's 2002 work 'Virtues in Epistemology' as a key reference in the field.
referenceRoger Crisp and Michael Slote's 'Virtue Ethics' (1997) is a cited work in virtue epistemology.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology cites James Montmarquet's 1993 book 'Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility' as a key reference in the field.
referenceAlvin Goldman's 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' (1992) is a cited work in virtue epistemology.
referenceThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Virtue Epistemology cites Linda Zagzebski's 1996 book 'Virtues of the Mind' as a key reference in the field.
referenceMichael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski's 'Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology' (2003) is a cited work in virtue epistemology.
Virtue epistemology - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy rep.routledge.com Routledge 9 facts
perspectiveProponents of virtue epistemology claim that it offers advantages such as bypassing disputes between foundationalists and coherentists regarding cognitive structure, avoiding skeptical worries, avoiding the impasse between internalism and externalism, and broadening the range of epistemological inquiry to include values like understanding and wisdom.
claimVirtue epistemology is a class of theories that focus epistemic evaluation on the good epistemic properties of persons rather than on the properties of beliefs.
claimVirtue epistemology theories posit that epistemic evaluation rests on virtuous qualities of persons that enable them to act in a cognitively effective and commendable way.
claimIntellectual virtues are the good epistemic properties of persons, or a subset thereof, which virtue epistemology uses as the basis for epistemic evaluation.
claimLater versions of virtue epistemology add requirements for virtue intended to capture the idea that it is a quality which makes an epistemic agent subjectively responsible as well as objectively reliable.
claimVirtue epistemology holds the promise of a unified theory of value because it can be blended with virtue ethics.
claimSimple reliabilism can be treated as either a precursor to virtue epistemology or as an early form of it.
claimSome virtue epistemology theories propose that traditional concepts of justification or knowledge can be analyzed in terms of intellectual virtue, while others argue that traditional concepts are defective or uninteresting and should be replaced by the notion of intellectual virtue.
perspectiveSome theorists argue that the real virtue of virtue epistemology is its ability to permit the redefinition of the central questions of epistemology.
Virtue Epistemology, Anyone? - The Philosophers' Magazine - philosophersmag.com The Philosopher's Magazine 9 facts
claimVirtue epistemology has a philosophical pedigree that includes Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, and Bertrand Russell.
claimVirtue epistemology shifts the focus of epistemic evaluation away from a 'point of view from nowhere' and onto specific individuals and communities treated as epistemic agents.
perspectiveVirtue epistemology is not mutually exclusive with foundationalism or coherentism, but rather offers a different perspective on debates regarding the nature and security of knowledge.
claimKnowledge is defined in virtue epistemology as a state of belief generated by acts of intellectual virtue.
claimVirtue epistemology is defined by two shared commitments: first, that epistemology is a normative discipline, and second, that intellectual agents and communities are the primary source of epistemic value and the primary focus of epistemic evaluation.
claimLinda Zagzebski introduced a Neo-Aristotelian approach to virtue epistemology that proposes a unified account of epistemic and moral virtues, analyzing right beliefs in terms of virtuous character.
quoteVirtue epistemology explains a cognitive performance’s normative properties in terms of the cognizer’s properties, such as whether a belief results from hastiness or excellent eyesight, or whether an inquiry manifests carelessness or discrimination.
claimIntellectual humility, intellectual courage, and perseverance are considered intellectual virtues within the context of virtue epistemology.
claimVirtue epistemology differs from foundationalism and coherentism by beginning with the notion of personal intellectual virtue to build a normative account of beliefs, whereas the other two focus on the properties of beliefs themselves.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 5 facts
claimEpistemic virtues contrast with epistemic vices and serve as foundational concepts of virtue epistemology.
claimInterest in epistemic virtues has increased since Ernest Sosa formulated virtue epistemology in the 1980s.
claimVirtue epistemology asserts that a belief is justified if it manifests intellectual virtues, which are capacities or traits that perform cognitive functions and help people form true beliefs.
claimVirtue epistemologists, including Ernest Sosa and Linda Zagzebski, analyze the process of belief formation by examining the intellectual virtues or cognitive competencies involved.
referenceJason S. Baehr authored the entry 'Virtue Epistemology' for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences sk.sagepub.com SAGE Publications 5 facts
claimVirtue epistemology is an approach to understanding the evaluative and metaphysical dimensions of cognition that emphasizes the role of cognitive agents and their intellectual traits.
claimThe metacognitive task of suspending judgment on a question is a significant but poorly understood set of dispositions in virtue epistemology.
claimIn the tradition of virtue epistemology, traits that promote good cognition or intellectual flourishing are defined as intellectual, cognitive, or epistemic virtues, a concept derived from the Aristotelian tradition.
claimThe Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences includes 'Virtue Epistemology' as a distinct topic of study within its philosophical framework.
claimVirtue epistemology contrasts with the mainstream approach in the analytic philosophy of the late 20th century, which focuses on individual beliefs and inferences rather than the cognitive character of individuals.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Dec 14, 2005 3 facts
claimIn virtue epistemology, epistemic virtues are defined as 'good' ways of forming beliefs, such as careful and attentive reasoning, while epistemic vices are defined as 'bad' ways of forming beliefs, such as jumping to conclusions.
claimVirtue epistemology proposes that the order of analysis in epistemology should be reversed, starting with the assessment of the subject's epistemic virtues and vices rather than focusing primarily on the epistemic quality of individual beliefs.
claimVirtue epistemology, when conceived through the externalist lens of reliability, is a form of reliabilism.
Epistemic Justification – Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology press.rebus.community Todd R. Long · Rebus Community 3 facts
referenceVirtue Epistemology is a field of study addressed in works by Jason S. Baehr, Heather Battaly, and the collaborative team of John Turri, Mark Alfano, and John Greco.
claimVirtue epistemology holds that epistemically justified beliefs are those resulting from intellectually virtuous character traits.
claimVirtue epistemology defines justification as a matter of having one’s beliefs produced by a properly functioning, reliable, truth-aimed cognitive system.
Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
claimVirtue epistemology, when defined by the reliability of belief-forming methods, is a form of reliabilism.
Berit Brogaard, Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Responsibility philarchive.org PhilArchive 1 fact
claimVirtue epistemologies are traditionally divided into two distinct camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Feb 26, 2001 1 fact
referenceJesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard published the article 'Robust virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualism' in the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in 2012.
[PDF] Virtue Epistemology digitalcommons.lmu.edu Loyola Marymount University 1 fact
claimVirtue epistemology is a collection of recent approaches to the philosophical study of knowledge that gives a primary role to the concept of an intellectual.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Apr 1, 2021 1 fact
claimJesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue for a robust virtue epistemology and epistemic anti-individualism in their 2012 paper.