concept

Epistemology of Testimony

Also known as: Epistemological Problems of Testimony, epistemology of testimonially-based belief

Facts (48)

Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 25 facts
claimJennifer Lackey identifies a group of philosophers who support reductionist views on the epistemology of testimony, including Hume (1739), Fricker (1987, 1994, 1995, 2006a), Adler (1994, 2002), Lyons (1997), Lipton (1998), and Van Cleve (2006).
claimThe epistemology of testimony article in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines testimony for its purposes using the rough formulation: 'T told S that p'.
claimThe epistemology of testimonially-based belief concerns the epistemic status of a subject's belief, specifically evaluating whether the belief is justified, rational, warranted, supported by evidence, or constitutes knowledge.
claimThe epistemology of testimony involves analyzing the external conditions required for a recipient (S) to gain knowledge from a testifier (T), specifically questioning whether the testifier must know the proposition (p) herself, whether the testimony must be true, and whether the testifier must reliably testify.
claimThe earliest clear statements of the reductionist and non-reductionist positions in the epistemology of testimony appear in the works of David Hume and Thomas Reid.
claimThe epistemology of testimony investigates whether a testifier must possess knowledge of a statement for the recipient of that testimony to also know the statement.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony' in Mind in 1995, which served as a critical notice of C.A.J. Coady's 1992 work.
claimElizabeth Fricker is identified as a recent addition to the preservationist camp in the epistemology of testimony according to Jennifer Lackey.
claimThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the Epistemology of Testimony adopts the working definition of testimony as "T told S that p" to navigate disputes regarding the exact nature of testimony.
perspectiveThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the Epistemology of Testimony classifies approaches to testimonially-based justification as "Liberal" or "Conservative," where Liberals are less demanding and Conservatives are more demanding regarding what counts as justified belief or knowledge.
referenceSanford Goldberg and David Henderson published 'Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2005.
claimThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the Epistemology of Testimony focuses on the general epistemology of testimony rather than the specific epistemology of human testimony.
claimIn the epistemology of testimony, the basic case of testimonially-based belief is defined as a testifier (T) saying a proposition (p) to an epistemic subject (S), where S subsequently believes that p.
quotePeter Graham (2004) states: “The central claim the Anti-Reductionist makes is that the epistemologies of perception, memory, and testimony should all look more or less alike.”
claimThe epistemology of testimony focuses primarily on the general nature of testimonial knowledge and justification rather than specifically on human testimony.
claimJennifer Lackey classifies several philosophers as 'preservationists' (those who hold that if a testifier knows that p, then the hearer must know that p), including Welbourne (1979, 1981, 1994), Hardwig (1985, 1991), Ross (1986), Burge (1993, 1997), Plantinga (1993), McDowell (1994), Williamson (1996), Audi (1997), Owens (2000), and Dummett (1994).
claimThe epistemology of testimony concerns how individuals should evaluate beliefs acquired from what other people tell them.
claimElizabeth Fricker is considered a recent addition to the preservationist camp in the epistemology of testimony according to the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
claimThe epistemology of testimony investigates whether a recipient of testimony must possess beliefs about the reliability of the testifier or have inductive support for that reliability to be justified in their belief.
claimIn the context of the epistemology of testimony, 'Liberal' approaches are less demanding on testimonially-based justification, allowing beliefs to count as justified or as knowledge more easily, while 'Conservative' approaches are more demanding and dispense epistemic honors more conservatively.
claimThe most prominent debate in the epistemology of testimony is between 'reductionism' and 'non-reductionism,' terms coined by C.A.J. Coady in 1973.
referencePeter J. Graham published 'Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony' in the American Philosophical Quarterly in 2004.
referenceCoady (1973) introduced the terms 'reductionism' and 'anti-reductionism' to describe approaches to the epistemology of testimony.
referenceElizabeth Fricker published 'The Epistemology of Testimony' in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement in 1987.
claimJennifer Lackey identifies a group of philosophers who support non-reductionist views on the epistemology of testimony, including Austin (1946), Welbourne (1979, 1981, 1986, 1994), Evans (1982), Ross (1986), Hardwig (1985, 1991), Coady (1992, 1994), Reid (1764), Burge (1993, 1997), Plantinga (1993), Webb (1993), Dummett (1994), Foley (1994), McDowell (1994), Strawson (1994), Williamson (1996, 2000), Goldman (1999), Schmitt (1999), Insole (2000), Owens (2000), Rysiew (2002), Weiner (2003a), and Goldberg (2006).
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Apr 1, 2021 8 facts
claimSanford C. Goldberg and David Henderson argued in 2006 that anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony requires a monitoring mechanism.
claimJennifer Lackey proposes an alternative to reductionism and non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony in a 2006 chapter.
claimDuncan Pritchard's 2006 article 'A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony' argues for a quasi-reductionist approach to the epistemology of testimony.
claimA central question in the epistemology of testimony is whether testimony can generate new knowledge or if it merely functions to transmit existing knowledge.
referencePaul Faulkner published a reductionist account of David Hume's epistemology of testimony in 1998.
referenceMikkel Gerken analyzed the debate between internalism and externalism in the epistemology of testimony in a 2013 article.
claimB. J. C. Madison discussed internalism in the epistemology of testimony in a 2016 article in Erkenntnis.
claimPeter Lipton examined the epistemology of testimony in a 1998 article in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community William D. Rowley · Rebus Community 6 facts
claimThomas Reid, C.A.J. Coady, Matthew Weiner, Peter Graham, and Sanford Goldberg are representative proponents of non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.
claimThe epistemology of disagreement is distinct from the epistemology of testimony because not all evidence from disagreement is testimonial; for example, one can infer disagreement by observing another person's behavior.
referenceJonathan Adler authored the entry 'Epistemological Problems of Testimony' for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, published in 2017.
claimReductionism in the epistemology of testimony posits that testimony justifies belief because individuals learn through observation that testimony correlates with truth, similar to how one learns that smoke is caused by fire.
claimThe epistemology of testimony is considered central to social epistemology because individuals would be almost entirely ignorant of history, science, current affairs, and the inner lives of others without the information provided by others.
claimJack Lyons and Elizabeth Fricker defend reductionism in the epistemology of testimony by utilizing inference to the best explanation.
Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony | Episteme cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Jan 3, 2012 3 facts
claimThe author of the paper 'Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony' seeks to elucidate the nature of collective epistemic agency, citing Tollefsen (2006) as a reference for this concept.
claimThe author of the paper 'Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony' argues that group testimony cannot always be understood in a summative fashion as the testimony of some or all of the individual group members.
claimThe author of the paper 'Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony' argues that standard reductionist accounts regarding the justification of testimonial belief can be extended to cases of testimonial belief formed on the basis of group testimony.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Feb 26, 2001 3 facts
referenceDeborah Tollefsen's 2009 paper 'Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony' applies theories of testimony to the collaborative knowledge-building process found on Wikipedia.
referenceThomas Reid's 'Inquiry and Essays' (originally published 1764) is a foundational text in the epistemology of testimony.
claimThe central question in the epistemology of testimony is whether testimony should be regarded as a basic source of justification, meaning a source whose reliability can be taken for granted unless there are specific reasons for doubt.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 1 fact
claimChristopher R. Green authored the entry "Epistemology of Testimony" for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy in 2022.
The Epistemology of Collective Testimony - Journal of Social Ontology journalofsocialontology.org Journal of Social Ontology Mar 1, 2022 1 fact
referenceD. Tollefsen authored the article 'WIKIPEDIA and the Epistemology of Testimony,' published in the journal Episteme in 2009.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
referenceElizabeth Fricker published "Against Gullibility" in 1994, which discusses the epistemology of testimony and the conditions under which one should accept information from others.