Knowledge Tree
proposition
Also known as: proposition, propositions
Facts (82)
Sources
Epistemic Justification – Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology press.rebus.community 26 facts
claim'Belief-in' is a form of belief that does not require a proposition as its object and contains an affective component such as hope or trust, distinguishing it from the purely cognitive 'belief-that.'
claimIt is justified to suspend judgment on a proposition p when it is justified neither to believe p nor to disbelieve p.
claimPhenomenal conservatism is an epistemological view asserting that if it seems to a person that a proposition p is true, then it is prima facie justified for that person to believe p.
claimExplanationism is a theory of epistemic justification which posits that justification is determined by which propositions provide the best explanations for a person's experiences.
claimInternalist theories of epistemic justification imply that if two individuals, Pat and Nat, have identical mental states and are introspectively identical, they are justified in believing the same propositions.
claimDisbelief is defined as the belief that a corresponding proposition is false.
claimFor evidentialists, a proposition p is probable for a person if their overall evidence supports p better than not-p, meaning p is more likely to be true than false given the information that person possesses.
claimSuspension of judgment is defined as remaining neutral about whether a proposition is true, neither believing nor disbelieving the proposition.
claimA rebutting defeater is a good reason to think that a proposition is false, thereby providing a defeater for one’s prima facie justification for believing the proposition.
claimTruth is a requirement for knowledge, but it is a distinct requirement from justification; one cannot know a proposition to be true if that proposition is false.
claimPermissivism is the view that if a person lacks reason to prefer believing a proposition p over not-p, they have two equally rational options; however, there are powerful reasons to reject this view.
claimExplanationism holds that a person is justified in believing a proposition if that proposition is part of the best explanation available to that person for their overall experiences.
claimThe commonsense view of knowledge implies fallibilism, which is the position that it is possible to be justified in believing a false proposition.
claimStrong foundationalists believe that justified basic beliefs include only those basic beliefs in propositions about which humans are infallible.
claimInternalism entails that given a person's mental states at a specific time, there is a necessary fact settling which doxastic attitude that person is justified in having toward any proposition at that time.
claimIt is justified to disbelieve a proposition p when it is justified to believe that p is false.
claimWhile induction and abduction do not guarantee the truth of a non-basic belief, they provide a plausible epistemic reason to believe a proposition is true.
claimHaving knowledge-level justification for believing a proposition does not require that the proposition is true, because justification for many common beliefs is consistent with the falsity of those propositions.
claimIn the context of the book 'Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology', 'belief' refers to 'belief-that', which is defined as the acceptance of a proposition’s truth.
claimTo suspend judgment on a proposition p is to consider p yet neither believe nor disbelieve it, meaning one is undecided on whether p is true or false.
claimEpistemic justification functions as a knowledge-contributing link between a person and their belief that a proposition is true.
claimTo disbelieve a proposition is to believe that the proposition is false, which is equivalent to believing the negation of that proposition.
claimHaving epistemic justification for a proposition provides a person with an entitlement, right, warrant, or good reason to believe that the proposition is true.
claimExplanationists are epistemologists who believe that justification is a matter of which propositions provide the best explanations for a person.
claimDoxastic attitudes, which are stances on the truth value of a proposition, include belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment.
claimTo believe a proposition p is to think that p is true, meaning one thinks reality is as p describes it.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 19 facts
claimDependence coherentism asserts that whenever a subject is justified in believing a proposition p1, the justification for believing p1 depends on the justification the subject has for believing some further propositions p1, p2, … pn.
perspectiveEmpiricists argue that a priori knowledge is limited to the realm of the analytic and consists of propositions that are not 'about the world'.
claimLow-standards or fallible knowledge of a proposition p requires adequate evidence for p, where evidence can be adequate without entailing p.
claimReliability coherentism posits that a subject is justified in believing a proposition (H) if they possess a link between the belief and its truth, specifically by believing that they are having a visual experience (E) and that experiences like (E) are reliable.
claimIn epistemology, an alternative to a proposition or state of affairs 'p' is defined as any proposition or state of affairs that is incompatible with 'p'.
formulaThe closure principle states that if an individual knows a proposition 'p', and they know that 'p' entails 'q', then they know that 'q'.
formulaNon-Deontological Justification (NDJ) is defined as: A subject S is justified in believing a proposition p if and only if S believes p on a basis that properly probabilifies S's belief that p.
claimA proposed solution to distinguish between better and worse explanations is to assert that if one explanation (E1) includes a proposition that a subject is not justified in believing, while another explanation (E2) does not, then (E2) is the better explanation.
claimDependence coherentism rests on the supposition that it is possible for a subject to have justification for a proposition without actually believing that proposition.
formulaEpistemic Basicality (EB) defines a subject's justified belief that p as basic if and only if the subject's justification for believing that p does not depend on any justification the subject possesses for believing a further proposition, q.
claimEvidentialism asserts that whether one is justified in believing a proposition depends on one's evidence regarding that proposition, and that this evidence consists of one's mental states.
claimA subject's justification for believing a proposition (p) is defined as possessing a link between the belief that p and the truth of p.
claimThe principle of Necessity asserts that a priori recognizable, necessary principles determine what is evidence for what, allowing one to recognize on reflection whether one's mental states are evidence for a proposition.
claimHaving justification for believing a proposition does not entail that a subject actually believes that proposition.
claimHigh-standards or infallible knowledge of a proposition p requires p-entailing evidence.
claimThe 'replacement objection' against the ambiguity response—which claims the response focuses on the word 'know' rather than knowledge itself—is misguided because the ambiguity response shifts focus to non-linguistic entities like concepts and propositions after the initial stage.
claimIndependence foundationalism defines a basic belief that p as a belief whose justification does not depend on having any justification for believing another proposition q, asserting that a basic belief's justification is completely independent of having justification for any other beliefs.
claimEpistemologists distinguish between 'remembering that p,' which entails the truth of the proposition p, and 'seeming to remember that p,' which does not entail the truth of p.
formulaA subject S is justified a priori in believing a proposition p if and only if the justification for believing p does not depend on any experience.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 6 facts
perspectiveThe conciliationist view holds that whenever one discovers that an epistemic peer disagrees about a proposition p, one is justified in conciliating, such as by decreasing one's confidence in p if the peer holds the opposite view with equal confidence.
claimThe principle of testimonial evidence states that whenever a person S1 has evidence that a person S2 has evidence in support of a proposition p, then S1 has evidence in support of p.
claimIn the context of disagreement about a proposition p, conciliation occurs when a person S1 changes their attitude toward p in the direction of a person S2's attitude toward p.
claimRational Permissivism (RP) is the principle that a body of evidence can support a range of attitudes toward a given proposition, and it denies Rational Uniqueness (RU).
claimRational Uniqueness (RU) is the principle that a body of evidence supports at most one attitude toward any proposition, and it denies Rational Permissivism (RP).
claimEpistemic peers regarding a proposition p are defined as individuals who are equally likely to believe the truth about p, meaning they are equally unbiased, intelligent, sober, and well-informed.
Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 5 facts
claimA proposition is defined as something that can be expressed by a declarative sentence and purports to describe a fact or a state of affairs, regardless of whether it is true or false.
claimCausal accounts of knowledge maintain that for someone to know a proposition, there must be a causal connection between the person's belief in that proposition and the fact that the proposition encapsulates.
claimEpistemologists typically define knowledge by seeking a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that determine whether a person knows a proposition.
claimA proposition is defined as something that can be expressed by a declarative sentence and purports to describe a fact or a state of affairs, regardless of whether the proposition is true or false.
claimA 'defeater' is a false proposition that, if realized by the believer, would undercut or defeat the justification for their belief.
Epistemology - Belief, Justification, Rationality | Britannica britannica.com Mar 13, 2026 5 facts
claimIf a person claims to know that a proposition p is true, but p turns out to be false, the person must withdraw the claim to know p.
formulaThe definition of knowledge accepted by both skeptics and non-skeptics implies two conditions: (1) if a person knows a proposition p, then p must be true, and (2) if a person knows a proposition p, then it is logically impossible for that person to be mistaken.
claimG.E. Moore argued that knowing that a proposition p is true is not a sufficient condition for the proposition p to be certain, as one can know a proposition without it being certain.
claimSome philosophers argue that if a person's knowledge that a proposition p is true is occurrent rather than merely dispositional, it implies certainty that p is true.
claimG.E. Moore argued that the statements "I know for certain that p" and "It is certain that p" cannot be true unless the proposition p is true.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 4 facts
claimDoubt involves questioning the validity or truth of a proposition, while certainty is a strong affirmative conviction indicating an absence of doubt.
claimIn epistemology, beliefs are often understood as subjective attitudes that affirm or deny a proposition, which can be expressed in a declarative sentence.
claimEpistemologists define propositional knowledge as a relation between a knower and a known proposition.
claimEvidence is primarily conceptualized as mental states, such as sensory impressions or known propositions, but can also include physical objects like bloodstains or financial records.
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
claimThe epistemology of testimony involves analyzing the external conditions required for a recipient (S) to gain knowledge from a testifier (T), specifically questioning whether the testifier must know the proposition (p) herself, whether the testimony must be true, and whether the testifier must reliably testify.
claimMoran (2005), Ross (1986), and Hinchman (2005, 2007) argue that because a testifier assumes responsibility for the truth of a proposition, the epistemic responsibilities of the recipient are necessarily lessened.
claimIn the epistemology of testimony, the basic case of testimonially-based belief is defined as a testifier (T) saying a proposition (p) to an epistemic subject (S), where S subsequently believes that p.
7.1 What Epistemology Studies - Introduction to Philosophy | OpenStax openstax.org Jun 15, 2022 3 facts
formulaThe statement 'A is B' is true if and only if A is B.
claimFor statements and propositions, there is only one truth value, meaning individuals cannot personally decide whether a statement is true or false.
claimPhilosophers describe propositional knowledge as 'knowledge that,' which refers to knowledge of true propositions.
Understanding epistemology and its key approaches in research cefcambodia.com Jan 21, 2023 2 facts
claimLemos (2007) states that when considering a proposition, a person can hold one of three mental attitudes: believing and accepting it as true, disbelieving it as false, or withholding belief for further judgment.
claimThe correspondence theory of truth, as cited by Lemos (2007), asserts that a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to facts, and false if and only if it fails to correspond to facts.
Naturalized Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 5, 2001 1 fact
claimWidely shared views in epistemology imply that for a person to know a proposition to be true, the person must have a well-justified belief in the proposition, and the proposition must in fact be true.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Apr 1, 2021 1 fact
claimA hearer (H) receives testimony that a proposition (p) by a speaker (S) making an act of communication (a) if and only if the hearer reasonably takes (a) as conveying the information that (p) in virtue of the communicable content of (a).
Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
claimAdvocates of the ambiguity response argue that the objection focusing on the word 'know' is misguided because the response only uses the word 'know' at the initial stage before shifting focus to non-linguistic entities like concepts and propositions.
Virtue epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimVirtue epistemology evaluates knowledge based on the properties of the persons or knowers who hold beliefs, rather than focusing solely on the properties of propositions and beliefs.
Not Minds, but Signs: Reframing LLMs through Semiotics - arXiv arxiv.org Jul 1, 2025 1 fact
perspectiveThe transition of Baruch Spinoza's philosophy into a TED talk format creates a clash of epistemic values, shifting from the systematic rigor of axioms, propositions, and deductive reasoning to a format favoring narrative, affective resonance, and performative clarity.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 1 fact
claimTyler Burge argues that a critical reasoner must possess the second-order ability to think about thought contents, propositions, and the rational relations among them to recognize reasons as reasons.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 1 fact
claimW. D. Hart argues that no clear example has been produced where one can imagine a proposition p is true while simultaneously providing a good argument that it is impossible for p to be true.
The Synergy of Symbolic and Connectionist AI in LLM ... arxiv.org 1 fact
referenceProgram-Proof-of-Thoughts (P2oT) is an agentic reasoning method that decomposes complex reasoning processes into a series of propositions organized in linear or tree structures, utilizing programming languages for program proofs, such as Dafny or Lean, to model and verify these propositions.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
claimThe traditional view in analytic philosophy defines thoughts as mental states that can be modeled as psychological attitudes toward specific propositions, such as believing, hoping, or fearing.