Experiential foundationalists who prefer the EB (Experiential Basicality) definition of basicality cannot argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because one has a reason (R) for believing they are, as that reason would constitute justification for another belief, which contradicts the EB definition of basicality.

Authors

• Person: Matthias Steup, Ram Neta Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Person: Not available Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition)

Sources

• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper

Referenced by nodes (2)

• justification concept
• perceptual experience concept