According to the compromise position, a perceptual experience (E) alone is insufficient to justify a perceptual belief; it must be accompanied by track-record memories (M) that provide justification for considering the experience reliable.

Authors

• Person: Matthias Steup, Ram Neta Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Person: Not available Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition)

Sources

• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper

Referenced by nodes (3)

• justification concept
• perceptual experience concept
• perceptual beliefs concept