Peter Graham states: "That a source is a source of defeaters for beliefs from another source, or even from itself, does not show that the other source depends for justification on inferential support from another source, or even itself. … The fact that my perception defeats your testimony does not show that testimony is inferential and not direct. Indeed, the fact that testimony-based beliefs sometimes defeat perceptual beliefs does not show that testimony is prior to perception."
Green argues that epistemic parity between testimony, memory, and perception is a more economical and likely true account of epistemic phenomena than accounts that distinguish sharply between the three sources.
Tomoji Shogenji states: "[B]y the time the epistemic subject is in possession of testimonial evidence by interpreting people’s utterances, her belief in the general credibility of their testimony is well supported. For, unless the hypothesis that testimony is generally credible is true, the epistemic subject is unable to interpret utterances and hence has no testimonial evidence. … The unintelligibility of testimony without general credibility is … not an objection to reductionism about testimonial justification, but a consequence of the dual role of the observation used for interpretation—the observation confirms the interpretation of utterances and the credibility of testimony at the same time. … [E]ven a young child’s trust in testimony can be justified by her own perception and memory. In order for people’s utterances to be testimonial evidence for her, the child must have interpreted the utterances, but the kind of experience that allows her to interpret the utterances is also the kind of experience that supports the general credibility of testimony."
The 'reactionary' epistemic position accepts only principles regarding a priori insight, internal experiences, and deduction, while rejecting principles related to memory, enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, perception, and testimony.
Green (2006) argues that it is unclear whether testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of higher-order beliefs about the source.
Some epistemologists view testimony as a mechanism for spreading knowledge rather than creating it, contrasting it with perception, which is viewed as a source of knowledge for the epistemic community as a whole.
Jennifer Lackey (2006) endorses the argument that testimony requires higher epistemic demands than perception because people can lie, whereas the physical environment cannot.
Treating a testifier as a machine, such as a telescope, transforms testimonially-based beliefs into perceptually-based beliefs by treating human beings as an environmental medium through which information passes.
Tomoji Shogenji argues that reductionists justifying trust in testimony cannot cite other people's perception and memory, but only the epistemic subject's own perception and memory.
Weiner (2003) states: "When we form beliefs through perception, we may do so automatically, without any particular belief about how our perceptual system works. When we form beliefs through testimony, at some level we are aware that we are believing what a person says, and that this person is presenting her testimony as her own belief."
Green argues that human agency is already potentially at stake in cases of perception, such as the possibility that someone has substituted a fake object.
Paul Faulkner argues that because testimony originates from a person rather than an inanimate object, one should be more demanding regarding testimonially-based beliefs than perceptually-based beliefs.
Green suggests that transforming perceptually-based beliefs into testimonially-based beliefs involves anthropomorphizing sense faculties by imagining a world where sense faculties are operated by individuals who present messages about the environment, resulting in the same structure of explanation for epistemic status.
Robert Audi (2006) asserts that testimony is operationally dependent on perception, noting that to receive testimony about the time, one must hear or otherwise perceive the speaker.
While some philosophers require positive reasons to believe in the reliability of a testifier, most do not insist that a subject must have a sufficiently large inductive base to justify an inference from other beliefs or reduce testimony to perception, memory, or inference.
In his 2000 work, Shogenji argues that the reliability of perception can be confirmed through the use of perception without circularity, using reasoning similar to his argument for the reliability of testimony.
Recipients of testimony do not necessarily form higher-order beliefs about the reliability of that testimony, just as perceivers do not necessarily form higher-order beliefs about their perceptual faculties.
Christopher Green argues that agency is potentially at stake in cases of perception, such as the possibility that someone has substituted a fake object for a real one.
Paul Faulkner (2000) argues that testimony requires more stringent epistemic demands than perception because testimony originates from a person capable of deception, whereas inanimate objects in the perceptual environment do not.
Peter Graham defines a "reactionary" as someone who accepts only principles of a priori insight, internal experiences, and deduction, while rejecting principles related to memory, enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, perception, and testimony.
The nature of perception does not necessarily inhibit higher-order beliefs, and the nature of testimony does not necessarily produce higher-order beliefs.
The 'conservative' epistemic position rejects only principles regarding perception and testimony.
Peter Graham (2004) states: “The central claim the Anti-Reductionist makes is that the epistemologies of perception, memory, and testimony should all look more or less alike.”
Conservatives in epistemology argue that transforming testimony into perception is not epistemically innocent because anthropomorphizing sense faculties introduces human agency, while treating a testifier as a perceptual device removes it.
Reductionism views testimony as akin to inference and places a relatively heavy burden on the recipient of testimony, whereas anti-reductionism views testimony as akin to perception or memory and places a relatively light burden on the recipient.
Matthew Weiner argues that testimonially-based beliefs are typically accompanied by beliefs about the teller, whereas beliefs formed through perception may occur automatically without specific beliefs about how the perceptual system functions.
A perceptually-based belief is formed when an individual observes an object, such as seeing a chair in a room.
Shogenji argues that the reliability of perception can be confirmed by the use of perception without circularity, using reasoning similar to his argument for the reliability of testimony.
Green argues that the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception follows from the epistemic innocence of transformations that turn instances of testimonially-based beliefs into instances of beliefs based on the other two sources, preserving the structure of the explanation of epistemic status.
Graham (2004) examines the argument that because free actions are indeterministic, the environment for testimonially-based beliefs cannot be as regular and law-governed as the environment for perceptually-based beliefs.
Peter Graham (2006) argues that the fact that one source of knowledge can defeat another does not imply that the defeated source depends on inferential support from the other, nor does it show that testimony is inferior to perception.
Peter Graham defines a "conservative" as someone who rejects only principles regarding perception and testimony, a "moderate" as someone who rejects only the principle regarding testimony, and a "liberal" as someone who accepts the principle for testimony.
Thomas Reid, a prototype non-reductionist, acknowledged significant disanalogies between beliefs based on perception and beliefs based on testimony.
Robert Audi states: "[W]e cannot test the reliability of one of these basic sources [that is, for Audi, a source like perception or memory, but not testimony] or even confirm an instance of it without relying on that very source. … With testimony, one can, in principle, check reliability using any of the standard basic sources."
Galen Strawson (1994) suggests that testimony as a source of belief requires other sources like perception, stating: "[T]he employment of perception and memory is a necessary condition of the acquisition and retention of any knowledge (or belief) which is communicated linguistically…"
Beliefs can be categorized based on their source or root, such as perceptual, deductive, inductive, memorial, or testimonial.
Alvin Plantinga (1993) and Robert Audi (2006) suggest that testimony differs from sources like perception because testimonially-based beliefs can be defeated or trumped by other sources of evidence in ways that perception cannot.
Green argues that it is not clear that testimony is fundamentally different from perception regarding the necessity of holding higher-order beliefs about the source of the information.
Green (2006) excludes beliefs that cannot be perceptually-based, such as mathematical facts, from his argument regarding the epistemic parity of testimony, memory, and perception.
Belief sources include perception (e.g., seeing a chair), deduction (e.g., concluding q from p entails q), induction (e.g., inferring future gravity from past gravity), and memory (e.g., remembering past events).
Beliefs can be based on multiple sources simultaneously, such as being partly testimonially-based and partly perceptually-based, or partly inductively-based and partly memorially-based.