The 'compromise position' in epistemology attempts to bridge foundationalism and coherentism by arguing that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because a subject has justification for taking those experiences to be reliable, without requiring the subject to hold a belief that attributes reliability to those experiences.

Authors

• Person: Matthias Steup, Ram Neta Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Person: Not available Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition)

Sources

• Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper

Referenced by nodes (6)

• epistemology concept
• justification concept
• belief concept
• foundationalism concept
• Coherentism concept
• perceptual experience concept