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perceptual experience
Also known as: perceptual experience, perceptual experiences
Facts (56)
Sources
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 38 facts
claimDoxastic coherentism is criticized for being insensitive to the epistemic relevance of perceptual experiences, as illustrated by the case of Kim, who continues to believe a chameleon is blue even after it changes color to purple.
claimExperiential foundationalism posits that ordinary perceptual beliefs are justified by the perceptual experiences that give rise to them.
claimDoxastic coherentism fails to explain changes in the justificatory status of a belief based on perceptual experience because it does not attribute epistemic relevance to perceptual experiences by themselves.
procedureTo test the claim that perceptual experience is necessarily a source of justification, one can use thought experiments to conceive of a possible world where a person sees an object that looks blue, but that experience provides no justification for believing the object is blue.
claimExperiential foundationalists who classify beliefs as basic cannot adopt the compromise position, as they must maintain that a perceptual experience (E) by itself is sufficient to make a belief (H) justified.
claimIndependence foundationalists argue that perceptual experiences are necessarily a source of justification, similar to how mathematical truths like 'the sum of two and two is four' are necessarily true.
claimExperiential foundationalism asserts that a belief is justified by a mental state that is not a belief, specifically the perceptual experience that the belief is about.
claimThe compromise position posits that justification for attributing reliability to perceptual experiences consists of memories of past perceptual success.
claimAccording to evidentialism, evidence consists of perceptual, introspective, memorial, and intuitional experiences.
perspectiveCoherentists argue that if a belief system contains beliefs such as 'Many of my beliefs have their origin in perceptual experiences' and 'My perceptual experiences are reliable', it is reasonable for the subject to think that their belief system brings them into contact with external reality.
claimUnder the compromise position, the justification for a belief (H) is the conjunction of the perceptual experience (E) and the track-record memories (M).
claimAccording to the compromise position, a perceptual experience (E) alone is insufficient to justify a perceptual belief; it must be accompanied by track-record memories (M) that provide justification for considering the experience reliable.
claimDependence coherentism, also known as the compromise position, occurs when foundationalists attempt to answer the J-question by appealing to evidence that warrants the reliability of perceptual experiences.
claimPerceptual experiences, such as a hat looking blue to an observer, possess propositional content (e.g., the hat is blue) and can therefore play a justificatory role in belief formation.
claimA belief (H) can be considered 'basic' under Dogmatic Foundationalism (DB) if the justification for (H) is owed solely to a perceptual experience (E) and track-record memories (M), provided neither (E) nor (M) includes any beliefs.
claimPerceptual experiences do not arbitrate between dependence coherentism and independence foundationalism because both theories appeal to perceptual experiences to explain why perceptual beliefs are justified.
claimDemanding justification for a raw perceptual experience, such as why a headache or an itch is justified, is considered a misuse of the term 'justification'.
claimExplanatory coherentism is an epistemological approach where justification for a belief is derived from the belief being the best explanation for one's perceptual experiences.
claimTo test the validity of independence foundationalism, one can use thought experiments to conceive of a possible world where perceptual experience does not provide justification for belief, such as a scenario where seeing an object as blue provides no justification for believing it is blue.
claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer the EB (Experiential Basicality) definition of basicality cannot argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because one has a reason (R) for believing they are, as that reason would constitute justification for another belief, which contradicts the EB definition of basicality.
claimExperiential foundationalism is a theory in epistemology that posits perceptual experiences as a source of justification, which coherentists challenge by asking why perceptual experiences serve this function (the J-question).
claimThe 'compromise position' in epistemology asserts that for perceptual experiences to serve as a source of justification, an individual must possess justification for believing those experiences are reliable, rather than necessarily having considered and formed a belief about their reliability.
claimPerceptual experience is fallible because the world is not always as it appears to an observer.
claimFoundationalists argue that doxastic coherentism fails by being insensitive to the epistemic relevance of perceptual experiences, illustrated by the case of Kim observing a chameleon that changes color from blue to purple while Kim continues to believe it is blue.
claimDependence coherentism rejects the requirement that justification must come in the form of beliefs, allowing instead for justification to come from introspective and memorial evidence, or from suitable perceptual experiences and memory content.
claimIntrospection is of special interest to foundationalists because it reveals how the world appears to individuals in their perceptual experiences.
claimOne line of criticism against experiential foundationalism is that perceptual experiences lack propositional content, meaning the relationship between a perceptual belief and the experience that causes it is purely causal rather than justificatory.
claimExplanatory coherentism posits that a subject is justified in believing a hypothesis (H) when that hypothesis provides the best explanation for the subject's perceptual experiences.
claimExperiential foundationalism is supported by citing cases like the blue hat example, which makes it plausible to assume that perceptual experiences are a source of justification.
claimDependence coherentism allows for the possibility that a belief is justified solely by suitable perceptual experiences and memory content, rather than by receiving justification from other beliefs.
claimAccording to privilege foundationalism, basic beliefs are restricted to introspective beliefs about a subject's own mental states, such as perceptual experiences, having a headache, being tired, feeling pleasure, or having a desire.
claimThe 'compromise position' in epistemology attempts to bridge foundationalism and coherentism by arguing that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because a subject has justification for taking those experiences to be reliable, without requiring the subject to hold a belief that attributes reliability to those experiences.
claimInternalists argue that perceptual experiences can serve as a source of justification because it is a necessary truth that certain perceptual experiences justify certain perceptual beliefs, regardless of whether those experiences are reliable.
claimThe debate between dependence coherentism and independence foundationalism centers on which theory provides a more satisfying answer to the J-question regarding why perceptual experiences justify beliefs.
claimPrivilege foundationalism faces difficulty in accounting for the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs because such beliefs are typically not based on further beliefs about one's own perceptual experiences.
claimThe argument that perceptual experiences cannot stop the justificatory regress because they would require their own justification is rejected by the observation that in actual epistemic practice, individuals are never expected to justify the way things appear to them in perceptual experiences.
claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer Experiential Foundationalism (EB) can endorse externalism to argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification if, and only if, those experiences are of types that are reliably associated with true resulting beliefs.
claimDirect realists argue that perceptual experiences can provide foundational knowledge of external objects because those experiences place the observer in direct contact with the objects.
Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 5 facts
claimA common objection to the idea that perceptual experiences have propositional content is that they would then require justification themselves, potentially failing to stop the justificatory regress.
claimIn standard epistemic practice, it is considered absurd to demand justification for the way things appear to an individual in their perceptual experiences.
claimCoherentism asserts that for perceptual experiences to serve as a source of justification, an individual must have considered the matter and formed the belief that those experiences are reliable.
claimEvidentialists categorize perceptual, introspective, memorial, and intuitional experiences as forms of evidence.
claimIn a strict sense, a priori justification is restricted to justification derived solely from the use of reason, where 'experience' in the definition includes perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 3 facts
claimJosé Luis Bermúdez claims that various forms of perceptual experience constitute a non-conceptual form of self-consciousness.
claimP.F. Strawson (1966), Evans (1982), Sutton Morris (1982), Ayers (1991), Brewer (1995), Cassam (1995, 1997), and Bermúdez (1998, 2011) maintain that even if introspection does not reveal the self as an object, bodily awareness is a form of perceptual experience that does reveal the self.
referenceThe 'sense of ownership' or 'sense of mineness' is a concept in cognitive science and philosophy where a subject is aware of their thoughts, actions, emotions, perceptual experiences, memories, and bodily experiences as being their own.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
claimThe perceptual experience of rain serves as evidence for the belief that it is raining.
claimInternalism asserts that justification depends only on factors within the individual, such as perceptual experience, memories, and other beliefs.
claimWhen evaluating the belief that a cup of coffee stands on a table, externalists focus on objective factors such as the quality of the person's eyesight, their ability to differentiate coffee from other beverages, and the circumstances of the observation, rather than the subjective perceptual experience.
Global Versus Local Theories of Consciousness and the ... link.springer.com 2 facts
claimThe moral significance of perceptual experience in microconscious organoids remains an open ethical question, specifically regarding whether the capacity for experience without valence or pain warrants restrictions on research use.
quotePatients affected by specific defects of their visual system are capable of a more elementary perceptual experience of the relevant attributes than normals but are nevertheless able to experience something of the relevant attribute.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Apr 1, 2024 1 fact
quoteTye (2021) defines qualia as: “(1) Perceptual experiences, for example, experiences of the sort involved in seeing green, hearing loud trumpets, tasting liquorice, smelling the sea air, handling a piece of fur. (2) Bodily sensations, for example, feeling a twinge of pain, feeling an itch, feeling hungry, having a stomach ache, feeling hot, feeling dizzy. Think here also of experiences such as those present during orgasm or while running flat-out. (3) Felt reactions or passions or emotions, for example, feeling delight, lust, fear, love, feeling grief, jealousy, regret. (4) Felt moods, for example, feeling elated, depressed, calm, bored, tense, miserable.”
AI Sessions #9: The Case Against AI Consciousness (with Anil Seth) conspicuouscognition.com Feb 17, 2026 1 fact
claimPerceptual experiences of the self and the world are brain-based 'best guesses' regarding the causes of sensory inputs.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 1 fact
claimMental properties, which include consciousness (such as perceptual and emotional experience) and intentionality (such as beliefs and desires), are private to the subject and involve a form of privileged access that no one else has to the physical.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
claimExperiential foundationalists face the "J-question," which asks why perceptual experiences serve as a source of justification.
7.1 What Epistemology Studies - Introduction to Philosophy | OpenStax openstax.org Jun 15, 2022 1 fact
claimSense data are defined as sensations gained from perceptual experience, representing the raw data obtained through the senses such as seeing, smelling, and feeling.