concept

Experiential foundationalism

Facts (11)

Sources

Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Matthias Steup, Ram Neta · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Dec 14, 2005 11 facts

claimExperiential foundationalism posits that ordinary perceptual beliefs are justified by the perceptual experiences that give rise to them.

claimExperiential foundationalism asserts that a belief is justified by a mental state that is not a belief, specifically the perceptual experience that the belief is about.

claimExperiential foundationalism is less restrictive than privilege foundationalism because it allows beliefs about external objects to qualify as basic beliefs.

claimExperiential foundationalism combines two crucial ideas: (i) when a justified belief is basic, its justification is not owed to any other belief; (ii) what in fact justifies basic beliefs are experiences.

claimUnder the compromise position, a belief (H) is not 'basic' in the sense defined by Experiential Foundationalism (EB) because its justification depends on having justification for believing something else, specifically that visual experiences are reliable.

claimExperiential foundationalism is a theory in epistemology that posits perceptual experiences as a source of justification, which coherentists challenge by asking why perceptual experiences serve this function (the J-question).

claimThe regress argument, even if sound, only demonstrates the necessity of doxastic basicality, which dependence coherentism allows for, meaning the argument only effectively defends experiential foundationalism against doxastic coherentism.

claimOne line of criticism against experiential foundationalism is that perceptual experiences lack propositional content, meaning the relationship between a perceptual belief and the experience that causes it is purely causal rather than justificatory.

claimExperiential foundationalism is supported by citing cases like the blue hat example, which makes it plausible to assume that perceptual experiences are a source of justification.

claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer Experiential Foundationalism (EB) over Dogmatic Foundationalism (DB) cannot argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because the individual has a reason for believing they are, as that reason would constitute a belief, which contradicts the EB definition of basicality.

claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer Experiential Foundationalism (EB) can endorse externalism to argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification if, and only if, those experiences are of types that are reliably associated with true resulting beliefs.