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Peter Graham
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Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 23 facts
quotePeter Graham states: "That a source is a source of defeaters for beliefs from another source, or even from itself, does not show that the other source depends for justification on inferential support from another source, or even itself. … The fact that my perception defeats your testimony does not show that testimony is inferential and not direct. Indeed, the fact that testimony-based beliefs sometimes defeat perceptual beliefs does not show that testimony is prior to perception."
perspectiveLiberals such as Peter Graham and Alvin Plantinga argue that the possibility of interpreting testimonial utterances is insufficient to justify a belief in the reliability of testimony.
claimPeter Graham (2006) is lenient regarding "pro tanto" justification for testimonially-based beliefs but demanding regarding whether a subject has sufficient pro tanto justification to possess a justified belief.
perspectivePeter Graham (2004) argues that the presence of human freedom in testimonial cases is not a significant reason to prefer a conservative approach to testimony.
claimPeter Graham (2006) categorizes philosophers who support a non-direct view of testimony as including Adler (2002), Audi (1997, 2002, 2004, 2006), Hume (1739), Kusch (2002), Lackey (2003, 2006), Lehrer (1994), Lyons (1997), Faulkner (2000), Fricker (1987, 1994, 1995, 2002, 2006a), and Root (1998, 2001).
claimPeter Graham (2000c) argues that it is possible for testifiers to be generally unreliable even if they successfully interpret each other's statements, challenging the view that interpretation requires an assumption of reliability.
perspectivePeter Graham (2004) argues that if libertarianism regarding human freedom does not undermine the predictability of human actions, then testimonial liberalism is not threatened by human freedom because testimonial environments can be as predictable as perceptual environments.
perspectivePeter Graham holds a metaepistemological view that epistemic principles should be necessary a priori conceptual truths regarding the proper aim of beliefs.
referencePeter Graham provides lists of adversaries in the literature regarding inferential versus direct views of testimony in his 2006 work.
claimPeter Graham (2006) categorizes philosophers who support a direct view of testimony as including Burge (1993, 1997, 1999), Coady (1973, 1992), Dummett (1994), Goldberg (2006), McDowell (1994), Quinton (1973), Reid (1764), Ross (1986), Rysiew (2000), Stevenson (1993), Strawson (1994), and Weiner (2003a).
referencePeter Graham presents a thought experiment involving a testifier (T) raised in an environment where color words are swapped (e.g., "blue" means red), whose testimony is corrected by spectrum-reversing glasses, resulting in true reports despite the underlying errors.
claimPeter Graham argues that a speaker testifies if their statement that p is offered as evidence that p.
claimPeter Graham defines a "reactionary" as someone who accepts only principles of a priori insight, internal experiences, and deduction, while rejecting principles related to memory, enumerative induction, inference to the best explanation, perception, and testimony.
claimPeter Graham argues that the principle TEST, which states that a testifier's statement supplies pro tanto justification, is an a priori necessary conceptual truth, even though testifiers are not reliable in all possible worlds.
quotePeter Graham (2004) states: “The central claim the Anti-Reductionist makes is that the epistemologies of perception, memory, and testimony should all look more or less alike.”
claimPeter Graham (2006) argues that the fact that one source of knowledge can defeat another does not imply that the defeated source depends on inferential support from the other, nor does it show that testimony is inferior to perception.
claimPeter Graham defines a "conservative" as someone who rejects only principles regarding perception and testimony, a "moderate" as someone who rejects only the principle regarding testimony, and a "liberal" as someone who accepts the principle for testimony.
claimC.A.J. Coady, Tyler Burge, and Peter Graham argue that there is an a priori reason to accept testimonially-based beliefs, though they differ on whether to demand that such beliefs be based on specific reasons.
claimPeter Graham posits a scenario involving a group of people who are honest and skilled at interpreting each other's utterances but remain unreliable testifiers because perceptual or memory failures lead them to hold mostly false beliefs about the world.
referencePeter Graham (2006) classifies epistemic positions as "reactionary," "conservative," "moderate," and "liberal" based on which principles of epistemic justification they accept or reject.
claimPeter Graham (2000c) provides a counter-example to the necessity of reliability in interpretation by imagining a group of people who are honest and skilled at interpreting each other, but who hold mostly false beliefs about the world due to perceptual or memory failures.
perspectivePeter Graham argues that requiring individuals to reduce testimonial justification to other forms of justification is overly demanding and hyper-intellectualizes the process of testimonial justification.
claimPeter Graham (1997) defines testimony broadly, arguing that a speaker testifies if their statement that p is offered as evidence that p.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 2 facts
claimThomas Reid, C.A.J. Coady, Matthew Weiner, Peter Graham, and Sanford Goldberg are representative proponents of non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.
claimPeter Graham proposes a non-reductionist view where undefeated testimony that a proposition is true provides some reason to believe it, even if that testimony does not constitute sufficient evidence for belief.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Apr 1, 2021 1 fact
claimPeter Graham (2006b) provides an objection to the Inheritance View that is similar to Jennifer Lackey's 'Persistent Believer' case, challenging the idea that testimonial justification requires the transfer of the speaker's evidence.