Knowledge Tree
physical objects
Also known as: material objects, physical object, physical things
Facts (28)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 12 facts
quoteGeorge Berkeley summarizes his view that physical objects consist in nothing more than collections of perceptions with the phrase: "esse est percipi" (to be is to be perceived).
claimPhenomenalism posits that physical objects have the potential to produce experiences even when unperceived, which allows physical objects to exist stably and appear in a regular way when perceived.
claimAccording to the classic version of phenomenalism, physical objects are defined as potentials to produce perceptions and nothing else.
claimPhenomenalism posits that physical objects are primarily potentials for physical effects, with some mental or perceptual effects in addition, rather than being potentials for perceptions primarily.
quoteBertrand Russell stated regarding physical objects that 'the truth must be strange,' a sentiment that is also applicable to theories of consciousness.
quoteJohn Stuart Mill defined physical objects as "permanent possibilities of sensation," meaning they are potentials for or dispositions to produce perceptions rather than collections of perceptions themselves.
perspectiveCritics argue that phenomenalism is implausible because it suggests fundamental potentials of physical objects are directed solely toward producing perceptions, which is viewed as anthropocentric and inconsistent with physics.
claimGeorge Berkeley argues that mental ideas and physical objects cannot resemble each other because they have fundamentally different natures, and things of fundamentally different natures cannot resemble each other.
claimThe ordinary view of physical objects posits that they primarily possess potentials to cause effects on other physical objects, such as movement or heat, rather than solely causing perceptions.
claimConsciousness is subjective because it is present only for the subject or from a particular point of view, whereas physical objects are objective because they can exist independently of any point of view or be perceived from multiple points of view.
claimIf consciousness influences the outcome of collapses in superposed macrostates involving the environment, it would imply that consciousness has an instant and direct influence over physical objects and other people.
claimGeorge Berkeley claims that physical objects do not disappear when not perceived by humans because they are always perceived by God.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 5 facts
claimPhysical objects are equally accessible to anyone in principle, whereas the possessor of mental states has privileged access to them that no one else can share.
claimConventionalist methods used to resolve identity problems for physical objects over time cannot be applied to counterfactuals concerning the identity of persons or minds.
claimIntentionality is the property of mental states being 'about' other things, including non-existent things like Zeus or the square root of minus one, which physical things cannot literally be.
claimThe numerical identity of ordinary physical objects, such as a table, becomes indeterminate in counterfactual scenarios involving changes to their material composition.
perspectiveSome philosophers argue that for complex physical objects, there is no further fact about whether two objects are 'really' the same beyond the overlap of their constitution, as the existence of a 'haecceitas' or 'thisness' to individuate objects is considered implausible or unintelligible.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 2 facts
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 2 facts
claimUnlike Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz or Baruch Spinoza, George Berkeley did not believe that material objects possessed minds, nor did he see a correspondence between the order of the material world and the mental order.
claimGeorge Berkeley concluded that all material objects are systems of possible conscious perceptions, rendering the notion of mind-independent matter incoherent, based on his 'doctrine of ideas' which restricts immediate perception to one's own states of consciousness.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 1 fact
claimThe distinction between third-person and first-person perspectives amounts to the subject-object dichotomy, which the author argues leads back to the problem of solipsism rather than providing an analytical distinction between phenomenal and physical objects.
What is open hardware? | Opensource.com opensource.com 1 fact
claimOpen hardware encourages the studying, troubleshooting, modifying, and improving of physical objects.
Self-Consciousness - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Jul 24, 2024 1 fact
claimIn the context of visual perception, bodily extremities are identified as self-specifying structural invariants because they subtend visual angles that cannot be reduced below a certain minimum, unlike non-bodily physical objects.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 1 fact
claimHigher-Order Perception (HOP) and Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness face the 'generality problem,' which questions why having a thought or perception of a mental state (like a desire or memory) makes that state conscious, when having a thought or perception of a physical object (like a rock or potato) does not make that object conscious.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 1 fact
quoteYujin Nagasawa states: "The existence of complex material objects requires us to acknowledge emergent properties that are not merely the sum of their parts."
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers distinguishes consciousness from physical objects like clocks or hurricanes, arguing that while a structural or functional description is a complete description for physical objects, knowing everything about the physical brain is not equivalent to knowing everything about consciousness.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 1 fact
perspectiveArthur Eddington proposed a theory of 'selective subjectivism,' which posits a tight link between physical objects and phenomenal perception, treating physical observation as a subjective act.