The first-person pronoun 'I' is widely recognized as the paradigmatic linguistic expression of self-consciousness in English, allowing a speaker to refer to oneself as oneself.
The interpretation that success on metacognitive opt-out tests indicates self-consciousness is controversial, with some researchers suggesting that the opt-out response reflects first-order environmental judgments rather than metacognitive uncertainty monitoring.
Self-representationalism, Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory, and Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theory all support the view that a form of self-consciousness is a necessary condition of consciousness.
David Rosenthal claims that phenomenal consciousness entails self-consciousness.
Some views suggest that self-consciousness and the capacity to think about others are two aspects of a more general capacity to think about the mind, rather than prioritizing the first-person case.
A common philosophical supposition is that self-consciousness is fundamentally a conscious awareness of the self, where introspection reveals a thing presented as oneself.
Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang argue that there is a relationship between self-consciousness and immunity to error through misidentification in their 2011 paper 'Self-Consciousness and Immunity'.
B. Williams (1973), Reynolds (1989), and Velleman (1996) discuss the relationship between self-consciousness and imagination.
Udo Thiel examined the history of self-consciousness and personal identity from René Descartes to David Hume in his 2011 book 'The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume'.
Hilary Kornblith and Doris (2015) express skepticism regarding the claim that there is a constitutive connection between self-consciousness and rationality.
Elizabeth Anscombe (1975) proposed a thought experiment where individuals have two names: one (ranging from "B" to "Z") printed on their chest for attributing actions to others, and one ("A") printed on their wrist for describing their own actions. Anscombe argues this scenario demonstrates that using a specific term to report one's own actions does not guarantee that the individuals possess self-consciousness, as they may not be thinking of those actions as things they themselves are performing.
Christopher Peacocke discussed subjects, consciousness, and self-consciousness in his 2014 book 'The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, & Self-Consciousness'.
François Recanati and Lucy O'Brien maintain that experience involves self-consciousness in the mode of conscious experience rather than in the content of conscious experience.
George Bealer published 'Self-Consciousness' in the Philosophical Review in 1997.
The 'Heidelberg School' interprets Johann Gottlieb Fichte as claiming that previous accounts of self-consciousness by René Descartes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant are 'reflective' because they regard the self as an object rather than a subject.
C. Thomas Powell analyzed Immanuel Kant's theory of self-consciousness in his 1990 book 'Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness'.
David Lewis claims that all belief is self-locating or 'de se', meaning every belief involves the self-ascription of a property and is therefore an instance of self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness is defined as a form of consciousness where a subject is aware of themselves as themselves, rather than merely being aware of something that happens to be themselves.
A philosophical tradition argues that an awareness of subjects other than oneself is a necessary condition of self-consciousness, with historical variations found in the works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, G.W.F. Hegel, and George Herbert Mead.
A Kantian argument for self-consciousness being a necessary condition of consciousness posits that conscious experience is necessarily unified, and that this unity of consciousness depends on self-awareness.
Christine Korsgaard's account of the relationship between self-consciousness and the perspective of practical reason is discussed by Nagel (1996), Fitzpatrick (2005), and Soteriou (2013).
Indian philosophical traditions, including Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist schools, engaged in extensive debates during the ancient and medieval periods regarding the nature of self-consciousness and its relationship to sensory perception and bodily awareness.
Critics including O'Brien (1994, 1995a), Garrett (1998), Campbell (1994), and Peacocke (2008) argue that the Self-Reference Rule (SRR) was not intended to explain the connection between self-consciousness and the first-person pronoun, but rather to account for the character of "I".
The Kantian view posits that the unity of the self guarantees that co-conscious experiences are jointly self-ascribable, and that this unity requires self-consciousness.
Gordon Gallup and colleagues claim that the capacity to recognize oneself in a mirror is a marker of self-consciousness.
Sebastian Rödl authored the book 'Self-Consciousness', published by Harvard University Press in 2007.
Sydney Shoemaker argues that rational subjects must be self-conscious to avoid being self-blind regarding their beliefs, as rational belief revision requires awareness of one's own belief-desire system.
The 'just more content' objection, raised by B. Williams (1978) and S. Hurley (1994, 1998), challenges the view that self-consciousness is the factor that unifies consciousness, arguing that self-conscious thoughts are themselves just additional contents that require unification with first-order experiences.
The case of the patient known as K.C., who lost episodic memory due to an accident but appeared to remain otherwise self-conscious, suggests that episodic memory is not the only form of self-consciousness.
Christine Korsgaard states: "Self-consciousness... is the source of reason. When we become conscious of the workings of an incentive within us, the incentive is experienced not as a force or a necessity but as a proposal, something we need to make a decision about."
Manfred Frank authored 'Fragments of a History of the Theory of Self-Consciousness from Descartes to Kierkegaard' in the journal 'Critical Horizons' in 2004.
Episodic memory, defined as the capacity to recollect particular episodes from one's own past experience, is considered a potential marker of self-consciousness.
Several philosophers, including Bermúdez (1998), Hurley (1998), Zahavi (2005), Peacocke (2014), and Musholt (2015), maintain that self-consciousness is present in various forms of sensory and non-sensory experience, in addition to its manifestation in first-personal thinking.
Some philosophers argue that reductionism is incompatible with self-consciousness, and because humans are self-conscious, reductionism must be false.
Higher-Order Thought (HOT) and Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories can be understood as holding that consciousness entails self-consciousness because they require an individual to represent themselves as being in a specific first-order state.
P.F. Strawson offers an account of persons that distances the notion from self-consciousness by defining a person as an entity to which both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable.
Aristotle claims that when a person perceives any object, they must also perceive their own existence, suggesting that consciousness entails self-consciousness.
Non-reflective creatures are considered by some theorists to lack the capacity for fully rational deliberation because they lack self-consciousness, even if they possess some degree of rationality.
Rocco Gennaro authored the book 'Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness', published by John Benjamins in 1996.
Sydney Shoemaker argues that a rational creature in pain will typically desire to be rid of that pain, which requires the creature to believe that it is in pain, a belief that is inherently self-conscious.
A family of views posits that both self-consciousness and awareness of others emerge from a primitive 'adualist' state where the self and other are not distinguished.
Self-consciousness is defined as a subject's capacity to entertain conscious thought about oneself, specifically thinking of oneself as oneself rather than merely thinking about a person who happens to be oneself.
In Sophocles' play 'Oedipus', the protagonist Oedipus moves from knowing facts about himself (such as the prophecy that he would kill Laius) to realizing that he himself is the subject of those facts, which serves as an example of self-consciousness.
Thomas Metzinger (2003) claims that the variety of ways in which self-consciousness can break down poses a challenge to the idea that the sense of ownership is a universal characteristic of experience.
Ernst Tugendhat explored self-consciousness and self-determination in his 1979 book 'Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination', which was translated by Paul Stern in 1986.
A philosophical view of self-consciousness posits a 'pre-reflective' form that does not involve awareness of the self as an object.
One empirical proposal suggests that self-consciousness emerges as a self-directed form of mindreading, derived from early social interaction and the capacity to understand others.
Passing the mirror test is arguably associated with phenomena linked to self-consciousness, such as experiencing shame and embarrassment, as noted by M. Lewis (2011).
The necessity of an active agent possessing some form of self-awareness is argued to follow from the connection between action and self-consciousness, a connection established by considerations of the essential indexical.
Cecilia Heyes (1994) critiques the claim that mirror test success indicates self-consciousness, arguing that success only requires the ability to distinguish between novel bodily feedback and other incoming sensory data to guide behavior.
If self-consciousness were merely being conscious of what is in fact oneself, then seeing oneself in a mirror would constitute self-consciousness, even if one were unaware that the object seen was oneself.
Hector-Neri Castañeda identified an ambiguity in belief ascriptions containing 'he' or 'she', noting that 'Jane believes that she is F' does not necessarily imply that Jane realizes she is the person who is F.
Several philosophers, including Shoemaker (1988, 1994), Burge (1996), Moran (2001), Bilgrami (2006), and Boyle (2009, 2011), have argued that rationality requires self-knowledge, which implies self-consciousness.
Tim Bayne published 'Self-Consciousness and the Unity of Consciousness' in The Monist in 2004.
Cappelen and Dever argue that cases like Perry's shopper, often cited to show a special connection between self-consciousness and action, actually demonstrate that action explanation contexts are opaque and do not allow for substitution salva veritate.
Self-consciousness is paradigmatically expressed in the English language through the use of the first-person pronouns and possessives 'I', 'me', and 'my'.
Some philosophers argue that knowledge of other minds is a necessary condition for the possibility of self-consciousness, prioritizing the awareness of others over the first-person case.
During the early modern period, self-consciousness became a central topic in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, particularly through the work of Immanuel Kant and the post-Kantians.
P.F. Strawson argues that the primitiveness of the concept of a person is a necessary condition for the possibility of self-consciousness.
Evidence regarding the development of self-consciousness can potentially shed light on both phylogenetic and ontogenetic development, as discussed by Ferrari & Sternberg (1998) and Terrace & Metcalfe (2005).
P.F. Strawson, in his discussion of Immanuel Kant's transcendental deduction, articulates the claim that if different experiences are to belong to a single consciousness, the subject of those experiences must have the possibility of self-consciousness.
The phenomenon of self-consciousness involves fundamental questions regarding its relation to consciousness, its semantic and epistemic features, its realization in conceptual and non-conceptual representation, and its connection to the conception of an objective world populated with others.
Some philosophers, such as Bermúdez (1998), argue that determining which forms of experience have first-personal content is equivalent to determining which forms of experience are themselves forms of self-consciousness.
Cappelen and Dever hold the view that the capacity for self-consciousness does not possess a philosophically deep relation to the capacity for action.
The core issue regarding self-consciousness is whether one can be conscious of oneself as oneself, a form of awareness where it is manifest to the subject that the object of awareness is oneself.
Robert B. Pippin analyzed G.W.F. Hegel's views on self-consciousness, desire, and death in his 2010 book 'Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit'.
A philosophical view of self-consciousness claims that various forms of experience involve a 'sense of ownership,' where individuals are aware of their own states as their own.
Manfred Frank authored 'Is Subjectivity a Non-Thing, an Absurdity [Unding]? On Some Difficulties in Naturalistic Reductions of Self-Consciousness' in 1995, published in 'The Modern Subject: Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy'.
Transcendental arguments regarding self-consciousness and knowledge of other minds are potentially open to general criticisms of that form of argument, according to Stroud (1968) and R. Stern (1999, 2000).
Hilary Kornblith expresses skepticism regarding the role of self-consciousness in rationality, a position discussed by Pust (2014), M. Williams (2015), and Smithies (2016).
One philosophical view posits that there is a perceptual or quasi-perceptual consciousness of the self as an object of experience.
Donald Davidson's triangulation argument connects self-consciousness, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of the external world, asserting that for thoughts to have determinate content, there must exist another subject who is able to interpret the thinker.
Josef Parnas and Louis A. Sass analyzed the structure of self-consciousness in the context of schizophrenia in their 2011 chapter 'The Structure of Self-Consciousness in Schizophrenia'.
Brian Garrett authored the book 'Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness', published by Routledge in 1998.
Elizabeth Anscombe argues that any reformulation of the Self-Reference Rule intended to entail self-consciousness presupposes a prior grasp of self-conscious reference to oneself, creating a circular definition.