reductionism

non-reductionism

Justification not yet generated — showing supporting facts

• David Chalmers's father is a medical researcher and a reductionist, while his mother is a spiritual thinker and a non-reductionist.

testimony

Reductionism is a central theory in the epistemology of testimony that seeks to explain how testimonial belief is justified by reducing it to other sources like perception, memory, and induction {fact:1, fact:8, fact:10}. The debate over whether testimony requires positive reasons or is akin to perception is defined by the conflict between reductionist and anti-reductionist perspectives {fact:3, fact:6, fact:11}. — 11 supporting facts

consciousness

Consciousness and reductionism are interconnected through debates and theories where reductionist approaches seek to explain consciousness via physical processes, as in Koch's book 'Consciousness: Confessions of a romantic reductionist' [1], Frank Jackson's Mary argument in the reductionism versus emergentism debate [2], and Chalmers' arguments [3]. Reductionist views explicitly argue that mental phenomena of consciousness can be reduced to physical descriptions [4], with proponents like Ned Block [5], panqualityists [6], and Hans Flohr [7] advocating physicalistic reductionism. — 5 supporting facts

perception

Perception is linked to reductionism as a foundational source of epistemic justification [1] and as a comparative model for understanding testimony [2]. Furthermore, critics of reductionism argue that reductive accounts of perception fail to fully explain experiential properties [3], while epistemological reductionists restrict the use of perception to the subject's own experiences rather than relying on others' perception [4]. — 5 supporting facts

memory

Reductionism is defined as the view that testimonial belief justification relies on sources like memory [1], and it is contrasted with anti-reductionism, which compares testimony directly to memory [2]. Furthermore, debates regarding reductionist trust in testimony specifically address whether an epistemic subject can rely on their own memory [3]. — 4 supporting facts

panpsychism

Panpsychism and reductionism are opposing philosophical approaches to the nature of mind, presented as a dilemma for Presocratic philosophers [1], with panpsychism explicitly rejecting physicalist reductionism [2], and positioned by Thomas Nagel as a viable alternative if reductionism fails [3]. — 3 supporting facts

physicalism

Physicalism and reductionism are frequently discussed together as linked philosophical frameworks, as seen in critiques of their combined application in consciousness studies [1], their joint presence in specific approaches like that of Hans Flohr [2], and their shared status as concepts evaluated in the context of supervenience and ontic categories [3]. — 3 supporting facts

mind

The concepts 'mind' and 'reductionism' are philosophically linked, as Presocratic philosophers debated reducing mind to more fundamental elements versus treating it as elemental [1], and Thomas Nagel's rejection of reductionism implies mind's fundamental association with matter [2]. — 2 supporting facts

brain

The concepts 'brain' and 'reductionism' are related because Derek Parfit's reductionist claims explicitly state that 'a person’s existence consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events,' directly linking the brain to reductionist views of personal identity via [1]. — 1 supporting fact