Jennifer Lackey (2009) argues that the virtue epistemology credit thesis faces a dilemma: if creditworthiness is defined strictly enough to exclude Gettier subjects, it excludes too much testimonial knowledge, but if it is defined loosely, it is refuted by Gettier cases.

Authors

• Person: John Greco, John Turri Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Person: Not available Organization: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Sources

• Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu John Greco, John Turri · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper
• Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy via serper

Referenced by nodes (3)

• Virtue epistemology concept
• Jennifer Lackey entity
• testimonial knowledge concept