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related 4.70 — strongly supporting 25 facts
The concepts are related because perceptual experiences are central to epistemological theories regarding the nature and source of justification, as seen in experiential foundationalism [1], [2], [3] and the compromise position [4], [5], [6]. Various theories debate whether perceptual experiences can provide justification independently [7], [8] or if they require additional conditions like reliability or belief [9], [10].
Facts (25)
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Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 22 facts
claimExperiential foundationalism posits that ordinary perceptual beliefs are justified by the perceptual experiences that give rise to them.
procedureTo test the claim that perceptual experience is necessarily a source of justification, one can use thought experiments to conceive of a possible world where a person sees an object that looks blue, but that experience provides no justification for believing the object is blue.
claimExperiential foundationalists who classify beliefs as basic cannot adopt the compromise position, as they must maintain that a perceptual experience (E) by itself is sufficient to make a belief (H) justified.
claimIndependence foundationalists argue that perceptual experiences are necessarily a source of justification, similar to how mathematical truths like 'the sum of two and two is four' are necessarily true.
claimExperiential foundationalism asserts that a belief is justified by a mental state that is not a belief, specifically the perceptual experience that the belief is about.
claimThe compromise position posits that justification for attributing reliability to perceptual experiences consists of memories of past perceptual success.
claimUnder the compromise position, the justification for a belief (H) is the conjunction of the perceptual experience (E) and the track-record memories (M).
claimAccording to the compromise position, a perceptual experience (E) alone is insufficient to justify a perceptual belief; it must be accompanied by track-record memories (M) that provide justification for considering the experience reliable.
claimA belief (H) can be considered 'basic' under Dogmatic Foundationalism (DB) if the justification for (H) is owed solely to a perceptual experience (E) and track-record memories (M), provided neither (E) nor (M) includes any beliefs.
claimPerceptual experiences do not arbitrate between dependence coherentism and independence foundationalism because both theories appeal to perceptual experiences to explain why perceptual beliefs are justified.
claimDemanding justification for a raw perceptual experience, such as why a headache or an itch is justified, is considered a misuse of the term 'justification'.
claimExplanatory coherentism is an epistemological approach where justification for a belief is derived from the belief being the best explanation for one's perceptual experiences.
claimTo test the validity of independence foundationalism, one can use thought experiments to conceive of a possible world where perceptual experience does not provide justification for belief, such as a scenario where seeing an object as blue provides no justification for believing it is blue.
claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer the EB (Experiential Basicality) definition of basicality cannot argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because one has a reason (R) for believing they are, as that reason would constitute justification for another belief, which contradicts the EB definition of basicality.
claimExperiential foundationalism is a theory in epistemology that posits perceptual experiences as a source of justification, which coherentists challenge by asking why perceptual experiences serve this function (the J-question).
claimThe 'compromise position' in epistemology asserts that for perceptual experiences to serve as a source of justification, an individual must possess justification for believing those experiences are reliable, rather than necessarily having considered and formed a belief about their reliability.
claimDependence coherentism rejects the requirement that justification must come in the form of beliefs, allowing instead for justification to come from introspective and memorial evidence, or from suitable perceptual experiences and memory content.
claimExperiential foundationalism is supported by citing cases like the blue hat example, which makes it plausible to assume that perceptual experiences are a source of justification.
claimThe 'compromise position' in epistemology attempts to bridge foundationalism and coherentism by arguing that perceptual experiences are a source of justification because a subject has justification for taking those experiences to be reliable, without requiring the subject to hold a belief that attributes reliability to those experiences.
claimInternalists argue that perceptual experiences can serve as a source of justification because it is a necessary truth that certain perceptual experiences justify certain perceptual beliefs, regardless of whether those experiences are reliable.
claimPrivilege foundationalism faces difficulty in accounting for the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs because such beliefs are typically not based on further beliefs about one's own perceptual experiences.
claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer Experiential Foundationalism (EB) can endorse externalism to argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification if, and only if, those experiences are of types that are reliably associated with true resulting beliefs.
Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu 2 facts
claimA common objection to the idea that perceptual experiences have propositional content is that they would then require justification themselves, potentially failing to stop the justificatory regress.
claimCoherentism asserts that for perceptual experiences to serve as a source of justification, an individual must have considered the matter and formed the belief that those experiences are reliable.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimExperiential foundationalists face the "J-question," which asks why perceptual experiences serve as a source of justification.