Knowledge Tree
Peter Strawson
Also known as: P. Strawson, Peter Strawson, P.F. Strawson, Strawson
Facts (24)
Sources
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 20 facts
claimP.F. Strawson argues that the 'no-ownership view' is ruled out because it is inconsistent with the fact that psychological predicates maintain the same sense in both first-person and third-person usage.
claimP.F. Strawson argues that Cartesian dualism is ruled out because ascribing states of consciousness to others requires the ability to identify others, which is impossible with pure subjects of experience or Cartesian egos.
claimP.F. Strawson claims that one can only ascribe mental states to oneself if one is capable of ascribing them to others, which implies that the capacity to think of others' mental states cannot be gained through analogical reasoning from one's own case.
claimP.F. Strawson defines the concept of a person as 'primitive' by asserting it is logically prior to the concepts of 'subject' and 'body,' meaning persons are not compounds of subjects and bodies.
claimP.F. Strawson offers an account of persons that distances the notion from self-consciousness by defining a person as an entity to which both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable.
claimP.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans argue that the human capacity to refer to one's own experiences depends on the capacity to refer to oneself as oneself.
claimP.F. Strawson argues that others' observable behavior is a 'criterion' of their mentality rather than a 'sign' of it.
referenceIn chapter 3 of his book Individuals, titled 'Persons', P.F. Strawson examines the conditions of self-ascription and the use of the word 'I'.
referenceP.F. Strawson analyzed Immanuel Kant's philosophy in the 1966 book 'The Bounds of Sense'.
claimP.F. Strawson argues that an individual can only self-ascribe states of consciousness if they are also able to ascribe those states to others.
claimP.F. Strawson argues that the primitiveness of the concept of a person is a necessary condition for the possibility of self-consciousness.
claimP.F. Strawson, in his discussion of Immanuel Kant's transcendental deduction, articulates the claim that if different experiences are to belong to a single consciousness, the subject of those experiences must have the possibility of self-consciousness.
claimP.F. Strawson argues that the concept of a person is primitive, contrasting this position with Cartesian dualism and the 'no-ownership view'.
claimP.F. Strawson, Gareth Evans, and Quassim Cassam explored the relationship between the capacity for self-conscious thought and the possession of a conception of oneself as an embodied agent located within an objective world.
referenceP.F. Strawson discussed the concept of individuals in his 1959 book 'Individuals'.
claimP.F. Strawson argues that 'criterionless' self-ascription gives rise to the idea of a 'purely inner and yet subject-referring use for I,' which he identifies as the root of the 'Cartesian illusion.'
quoteP.F. Strawson argues that the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed.
claimP.F. Strawson's central idea regarding personhood is that persons are entities capable of self-ascribing both mental and physical predicates, a condition that likely excludes most non-human animals.
claimP.F. Strawson (1966), Evans (1982), Sutton Morris (1982), Ayers (1991), Brewer (1995), Cassam (1995, 1997), and Bermúdez (1998, 2011) maintain that even if introspection does not reveal the self as an object, bodily awareness is a form of perceptual experience that does reveal the self.
claimP.F. Strawson (1959) attacked the 'no-ownership' view of the self.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 2 facts
referenceDefenders of dual aspect theory, such as Baruch Spinoza (1677/2005), P. Strawson (1959), and Thomas Nagel (1986), argue that the hard problem of consciousness necessitates a rethinking of basic ontology without necessarily entailing dualism.
referencePeter Strawson authored the book 'Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics', which was published by Methuen in 1959.
Panpsychism: Conscious Rocks and Socks - Free Thinking Ministries freethinkingministries.com Nov 24, 2023 1 fact
claimStrawson believes that humans do not possess libertarian freedom and that libertarian freedom is logically impossible.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 1 fact
claimE. J. Lowe claims that his theory of substance dualism is close to P. F. Strawson's theory presented in 1959, though he acknowledges Strawson would not have labeled it substance dualism.