Knowledge Tree
Jennifer Lackey
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Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 41 facts
quoteJennifer Lackey (2005) states: “non–reductionists maintain that testimony is just as basic a source of justification (knowledge, warrant, entitlement, and so forth) as sense-perception, memory, inference, and the like”.
claimJennifer Lackey (2006b) defends a hybrid view of testimony that distinguishes between 'hearer testimony' and 'speaker testimony.' Hearer testimony occurs if a hearer reasonably takes a speaker's act of communication as conveying information that p in virtue of the communicable content of that act. Speaker testimony occurs if a speaker reasonably intends to convey the information that p in virtue of the communicable content of an act of communication.
claimJennifer Lackey identifies Austin (1946), Welbourne (1979, 1981, 1986, 1994), Evans (1982), Ross (1986), Hardwig (1985, 1991), Coady (1992, 1994), Reid (1764), Burge (1993, 1997), Plantinga (1993), Webb (1993), Dummett (1994), Foley (1994), McDowell (1994), Strawson (1994), Williamson (1996, 2000), Goldman (1999), Schmitt (1999), Insole (2000), Owens (2000), Rysiew (2002), Weiner (2003a), and Goldberg (2006) as proponents of non-reductionist theories of testimony.
claimJennifer Lackey describes a case where a person retains perceptually-based beliefs despite having evidence that their perception is radically unreliable.
claimJennifer Lackey defines 'hearer testimony' as occurring when a hearer reasonably takes a speaker's act of communication as conveying the information that p in virtue of the communicable content of an act of communication.
claimJennifer Lackey provides lists of testimonial reductionists and non-reductionists in her 2006 work, 'The Nature of Testimony' (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87:177-97).
claimJennifer Lackey defends a hybrid view of testimony that distinguishes between 'hearer testimony' and 'speaker testimony'.
claimJennifer Lackey identifies a group of philosophers who support reductionist views on the epistemology of testimony, including Hume (1739), Fricker (1987, 1994, 1995, 2006a), Adler (1994, 2002), Lyons (1997), Lipton (1998), and Van Cleve (2006).
claimJennifer Lackey defends a conservative approach to testimony against the 'infants-and-young-children' objection by examining whether similar problems afflict any approach to testimonial-based justification that includes a non-defeater condition.
claimA second liberal route to resist Jennifer Lackey's argument is to claim that young children are in principle capable of appreciating reasons or defeaters, but possess a poor inductive base regarding confirmed reports.
claimJennifer Lackey argues that a hearer (S) is unjustified in believing a diary written by an extraterrestrial alien (T) because the hearer lacks positive reasons to believe the diary is written in English, is not ironic, or is otherwise reliable.
claimJennifer Lackey (2006) endorses the argument that testimony requires higher epistemic demands than perception because people can lie, whereas the physical environment cannot.
perspectiveJennifer Lackey disputes the account of knowledge as the norm of assertion, as proposed by Timothy Williamson, by arguing that it is proper for a testifier to assert a proposition even if they do not know or believe it, provided the testimony is reliable.
claimJennifer Lackey asserts that individuals who cannot understand a reason for a belief presumably cannot understand a conflict in beliefs, which is required to appreciate doxastic defeaters.
quoteRobert Audi argues against the possibility of gaining knowledge from the biology teacher in Jennifer Lackey's example, stating: “If … [the students] simply take [the teacher’s] word, they are taking the word of someone who will deceive them when job retention requires it…. It is highly doubtful that this kind of testimonial origin would be an adequate basis of knowledge.”
referenceJennifer Lackey provides lists of adversaries in the literature regarding reductionism versus nonreductionism in her 2006 work.
claimElizabeth Fricker is identified as a recent addition to the preservationist camp in the epistemology of testimony according to Jennifer Lackey.
claimJennifer Lackey (2006) identifies Welbourne (1979, 1981, 1994), Hardwig (1985, 1991), Ross (1986), Burge (1993, 1997), Plantinga (1993), McDowell (1994), Williamson (1996), Audi (1997), Owens (2000), and Dummett (1994) as preservationists, defined as those who hold that for a speaker to transmit knowledge, the speaker must know the proposition in question.
claimJennifer Lackey defines 'speaker testimony' as occurring when a speaker reasonably intends to convey the information that p in virtue of the communicable content of an act of communication.
referenceGreen (2006) defends responses to Jennifer Lackey's examples by arguing that a hearer takes the testifier as an agent, and therefore the hearer is responsible for the testifier's misbehavior if they trust a misbehaving testifier.
perspectiveJennifer Lackey (2006a) argues that a subject (S) requires positive reasons to believe the testimony of a testifier (T), despite her criticism of reductionism.
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission' in The Philosophical Quarterly 49:471-490 in 1999.
claimJennifer Lackey provides examples where a testifier is gripped by skeptical worries or believes their perceptual abilities are faulty.
claimThe 'Not-Testimony' response to Jennifer Lackey's biology teacher example suggests that the teacher is not actually testifying, but rather acting as a conduit for the school board, which is the true testifier.
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'Testimony and the Infant/Child Objection' in Philosophical Studies 126:163-90 in 2005.
claimJennifer Lackey (2003) identifies a group of thinkers known as 'testimonial knowledge-preservationists' who argue that for a testifier to transmit knowledge to a subject, the testifier must either know the proposition themselves or know it on a non-testimonial basis.
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony' in the 2006 collection 'The Epistemology of Testimony'.
claimA liberal response to Jennifer Lackey's argument posits that young children are justified in their beliefs because they lack the epistemic obligations associated with normative defeaters, as they do not possess the capacity to appreciate reasons or resolve conflicting claims.
claimJennifer Lackey presents a second thought experiment involving a person who suffers from matching misperceptions and pathological lies, where the person consistently misidentifies zebras as elephants but has a pathological urge to tell people that what she sees are zebras.
claimJennifer Lackey presents examples where a testifier (T) suffers from skeptical worries or believes their perceptual abilities are faulty, which challenges whether a hearer (S) can acquire knowledge from that testifier's testimony.
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'Learning From Words' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73:77-101 in 2006.
claimJennifer Lackey argues that a general inductive basis for belief in testimony fails because the category of testimonially-based beliefs is too heterogeneous to support a single, relevant induction.
claimJennifer Lackey classifies several philosophers as 'preservationists' (those who hold that if a testifier knows that p, then the hearer must know that p), including Welbourne (1979, 1981, 1994), Hardwig (1985, 1991), Ross (1986), Burge (1993, 1997), Plantinga (1993), McDowell (1994), Williamson (1996), Audi (1997), Owens (2000), and Dummett (1994).
claimJennifer Lackey defends a conservative approach to testimony against the objection that it places improper epistemic demands on young children who lack the capacity to evaluate the reliability of testifiers.
claimJennifer Lackey argues that if young children or animals cannot satisfy a 'positive-reasons demand' for testimony-based beliefs because they cannot appreciate reasons, they are also unable to satisfy a 'no-defeater condition' regarding normative or doxastic defeaters.
claimTestimonial knowledge-preservationists, as listed by Jennifer Lackey in 2003, argue that for a subject S to know a proposition p via testimony, the testifier T must themselves know that p, or satisfy a similar non-testimonial condition.
claimJennifer Lackey argues that hearers need positive reasons to acquire testimonial justification to avoid gullibility and intellectual irresponsibility, using an example where a subject (S) encounters an extraterrestrial (T) with a diary written in English.
claimJennifer Lackey presents a thought experiment involving a biology teacher who does not believe in evolution but teaches it reliably because the school board requires her to do so, arguing that students can still gain knowledge from this testimony.
claimJennifer Lackey identifies a group of philosophers who support non-reductionist views on the epistemology of testimony, including Austin (1946), Welbourne (1979, 1981, 1986, 1994), Evans (1982), Ross (1986), Hardwig (1985, 1991), Coady (1992, 1994), Reid (1764), Burge (1993, 1997), Plantinga (1993), Webb (1993), Dummett (1994), Foley (1994), McDowell (1994), Strawson (1994), Williamson (1996, 2000), Goldman (1999), Schmitt (1999), Insole (2000), Owens (2000), Rysiew (2002), Weiner (2003a), and Goldberg (2006).
referenceJennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa edited the book 'The Epistemology of Testimony', published by Oxford University Press in 2006.
claimJennifer Lackey rejects the argument that children lack epistemic obligations, asserting that young children become unjustified in holding a belief if they are exposed to sufficient counterevidence.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Apr 1, 2021 9 facts
claimHybrid views of testimonial justification explain how young children acquire testimonial knowledge while avoiding gullibility by requiring both speaker reliability and weaker positive reasons from the hearer, as discussed by Jennifer Lackey (2008).
referenceErnest Sosa authored the essay 'Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial,' published in the 2006 volume edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa.
claimThe author of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry 'Epistemological Problems of Testimony' received feedback on the project from Jennifer Lackey and Sandy Goldberg.
claimJennifer Lackey (2008), Joseph Owens (2006), and Frederick Schmitt (2010) have raised concerns regarding the epistemic status of assurances in testimonial justification.
claimJennifer Lackey's 'Persistent Believer' case (2008) argues that the Inheritance View is false because it implies a hearer cannot acquire testimonial justification from a speaker if the speaker's total evidence does not justify the speaker in believing the proposition, whereas intuitively, such justification can be acquired.
claimJennifer Lackey defends a view compatible with the idea that a group's testimony can generate knowledge and justification, rather than merely transmitting it.
claimJennifer Lackey defends a reliabilist account of group testimony, which posits that an individual's belief is justified by the reliability or truth-conduciveness of a group's statement that a proposition is true.
referenceJennifer Lackey (2008) presents a thought experiment involving aliens dropping a notebook containing testimony about tigers eating their friends to argue that Non-Reductionism fails to account for the need for positive reasons in testimonial justification.
accountIn the 'Creationist Teacher' case described by Jennifer Lackey (2008), a teacher named Stella, who is a creationist, does not believe or know that homo sapiens evolved from homo erectus. Despite her lack of belief, she teaches this fact to her fourth-grade students, who come to know the fact based on her testimony. This case is used to argue that the Transmission View's necessity condition (TV-N) is false because testimonial knowledge can be generated from a speaker who lacks the knowledge in question.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Feb 26, 2001 8 facts
referenceJennifer Lackey authored the book 'The Epistemology of Groups', published by Oxford University Press in 2021.
claimJennifer Lackey argues against Alvin Goldman's 2014 account of group justification and proposes an alternative account where a group G justifiedly believes that p if and only if (1) G believes that p, and (2) full disclosure of evidence relevant to p, accompanied by rational deliberation among members of G in accordance with epistemic normative requirements, would not result in further evidence that, when added to the bases of G's members' beliefs that p, yields a total belief set that fails to make sufficiently probable that p.
claimJessica Brown proposes an account of group justification that appeals to the testimony of group members but does not require the beliefs expressed in those testimonies to be justified for the group's belief to be justified, thereby avoiding objections raised by Jennifer Lackey against Alvin Goldman.
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'Credibility and the distribution of epistemic goods' in the 2018 book 'Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New essays on evidentialism', edited by K. McCain.
referenceJennifer Lackey authored the book 'Criminal Testimonial Injustice', published by Oxford University Press in 2023.
quoteJennifer Lackey adopts a 'Group Agent' account of group belief, which she defines as: A group, G, believes that p if and only if: (1) there is a significant percentage of G’s operative members who believe that p, and (2) are such that adding together the basis of their beliefs that p yields a belief set that is not substantively incoherent.
claimJennifer Lackey's 'Group Agent' account of group belief is considered Summativist without being reductive because it includes a normative requirement (condition 2) that governs the collective to avoid ascribing belief when members' reasons cannot be coherently combined.
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'Epistemic duties regarding others' in the 2020 book 'Epistemic Duties', edited by K. McCain and S. Stapleford.
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 9, 1999 4 facts
accountIn the 'Chicago Visitor' case, a character named Morris asks a passerby for directions to the Sears Tower at a Chicago train station. The passerby provides accurate directions, and Morris forms a true belief based on this information. Jennifer Lackey argues that because the passerby's contribution is the most salient part of the explanation for why Morris learned the truth, Morris does not deserve credit for the belief, yet he still possesses knowledge, which Lackey uses to argue that the credit thesis is false.
referenceJennifer Lackey argued that individuals do not deserve credit for everything they know in a 2007 article.
claimWayne Riggs (2009) argues that Jennifer Lackey's objections to the credit thesis are flawed because they misinterpret the requirements for knowledge, rely too heavily on John Greco's account of credit, and ignore the possibility of group effort in achievements.
claimJennifer Lackey (2009) argues that the virtue epistemology credit thesis faces a dilemma: if creditworthiness is defined strictly enough to exclude Gettier subjects, it excludes too much testimonial knowledge, but if it is defined loosely, it is refuted by Gettier cases.
Wikipedia and the Epistemology of Testimony | Episteme cambridge.org Jan 3, 2012 3 facts
referenceRichard Moran's 2006 essay 'Getting Told and Being Believed' is published in the book 'The Epistemology of Testimony', edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa.
referenceJennifer Lackey's 2018 article 'Group Assertion' was published in the journal Erkenntnis.
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'Group Belief: Lessons from Lies and Bullshit' in Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 94, Issue 1, p. 185 in 2020.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 2 facts
referencePhilosophers define testimony as the act of telling others about the world, which can take the form of speech, text, or other communication methods, as noted by Jennifer Lackey in 2006.
referenceDavid Christensen and Jennifer Lackey edited the book 'The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays', published by Oxford University Press in 2016.
The Epistemology of Collective Testimony - Journal of Social Ontology journalofsocialontology.org Mar 1, 2022 2 facts
referenceJennifer Lackey's 2014 chapter 'A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony' was published in the book 'Essays in Collective Epistemology,' edited by Jennifer Lackey and published by Oxford University Press.
referenceJennifer Lackey's 2006 article 'The Nature of Testimony' was published in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (Volume 87, Issue 2, pages 177–97).
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
referenceJennifer Lackey authored the book 'Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge', published by Oxford University Press in 2008.
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 9, 1999 1 fact
referenceJennifer Lackey's 2009 article 'Knowledge and credit' was published in the journal Philosophical Studies.
Naturalism in Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jan 8, 2016 1 fact
referenceJennifer Lackey edited the collection 'Essays in Collective Epistemology', published by Oxford University Press in 2014.
Pluralism About Group Knowledge: A Reply to Jesper Kallestrup ... social-epistemology.com Jan 20, 2023 1 fact
claimAvram Hiller and R. Wolfe Randall agree with Jennifer Lackey's 2020 assertion that knowledge is connected to action.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Aug 28, 2019 1 fact
referenceJames Van Cleve published 'Reid on the Credit of Human Testimony' in the book 'The Epistemology of Testimony', edited by Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa, in 2006.
Epistemology of Testimony - Bibliography - PhilPapers philpapers.org 1 fact
referenceSignificant contemporary works in the epistemology of testimony include C. A. J. Coady’s 'Testimony: A Philosophical Study' (1992), Tyler Burge’s 'Content Preservation' (1993) and 'Interlocution, Perception, and Memory' (1997), Elizabeth Fricker’s 'Against Gullibility' (1994) and 'Second-Hand Knowledge' (2006), Jennifer Lackey’s 'Learning from Words' (2008), and Sanford Goldberg’s 'Relying on Others' (2010).
Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2019 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
referenceJennifer Lackey published 'A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony' in the journal Noûs in 2003.