Panpsychists claim that by giving matter an experiential dimension, they achieve a unified theory of reality where the mental is woven into the fabric of existence.
Panpsychism is considered a philosophically coherent possibility because no clear contradiction has been demonstrated in the proposition that matter possesses experiential attributes.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's 'Monadology' (1714) posits that every substance possesses perception, describing a world of living creatures existing even in the least part of matter.
Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) advanced a form of dual-aspect monism, holding that there is only one substance—identified with God or Nature—which possesses infinite attributes, of which mind (thought) and matter (extension) are the two accessible to humans.
Panpsychism posits that intrinsic properties of matter are or include experiential ones, arguing that because humans are instances of consciousness, this provides a substantive and non-arbitrary explanation for how matter feels from the inside and manifests as consciousness in complex brains.
Contemporary panpsychists, such as Philip Goff, argue that while modern science excels at modeling the mathematical relationships and behavior of matter, it fails to explain why matter behaves in that way or what underlies those patterns.
Galen Strawson contends that humans lack sufficient knowledge of what matter is intrinsically, apart from its extrinsic behavior.
Panpsychism avoids the interaction problem of Cartesian substance dualism because it posits that mind and matter are not two independent substances, but rather two facets of the same thing.
Galen Strawson contends that many self-described physicalists make a fatal mistake by assuming they possess sufficient knowledge of matter to declare the mind as something fundamentally separate.
Panpsychism is characterized by the ontological commitment that everything is alive or mind-endowed, serving as a historical alternative to the Cartesian bifurcation of reality into separate mind and matter.
Panpsychism posits consciousness or proto-consciousness as the hidden internal aspect of matter, suggesting that physics has a blindspot regarding the subjective reality behind equations.
Philip Goff recounts that Galileo Galilei established a sharp distinction between the quantitative, mathematically describable aspects of matter and the qualitative aspects like colors, sounds, and feelings, stipulating that physics would confine itself to the former.
Dual-aspect monism, also known as neutral monism or Russellian panpsychism, posits that matter has two aspects: a quantitative, scientific aspect from the outside, and a conscious aspect from the inside.
Panpsychism proposes that consciousness is the hidden inner nature of matter, thereby attempting to integrate consciousness into the physical world.
Baruch Spinoza proposed that matter and mind are two attributes of the same underlying substance, which serves as a historical precedent for panpsychist thought.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz proposed that the difference between matter and mind is a difference in the degree of clarity of perception rather than an absolute difference in kind, suggesting an intrinsic, perceiving nature to all matter.
Materialism assumes that physical structure is all that exists, dualism assumes the existence of two substances, and panpsychism assumes an underlying continuity of mind in matter.
The intrinsic nature argument asserts that panpsychism provides a satisfying answer to the gap in the scientific worldview where physics describes matter only in terms of structure, relations, and behavior, but fails to describe what matter is like in itself.
Philip Goff argues that by limiting physics to the quantitative aspects of matter, science rendered consciousness invisible to physical theory by design, leaving physics to describe what matter does rather than what it is intrinsically.
Russellian panpsychism differs from traditional dualism because it does not posit a separate substance of mind, and it differs from standard physicalism because it asserts that current physical science cannot fully describe matter without including consciousness.
Panpsychism posits that all matter possesses some mind-like quality, even if it is exceedingly minimal.
Some physicalists hold a 'dispositional essentialist' view, claiming that matter may possess only dispositions and no separate intrinsic properties at all.
The intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism posits that because physical science only describes extrinsic properties of matter, and because conscious experience is the only known intrinsic property, it is hypothesized that the intrinsic nature of matter is mental or proto-mental.
Philip Goff and Galen Strawson advocate for a neo-Russellian monist view of consciousness, which is based on Bertrand Russell's insight that physics reveals the structure of matter but not its intrinsic character.
Galen Strawson proposes that matter itself may possess an experiential aspect, meaning that experiential phenomena should be accepted as physical phenomena.
A functionalist perspective on matter suggests that asking "what is matter in itself?" is a wrong question, as matter is defined by its causal role, rendering the alleged gap between matter and consciousness illusory.
The intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism is based on the epistemic gap between the extrinsic, relational properties of matter described by science and the unknown intrinsic nature of matter.
The combination problem in panpsychism refers to the challenge of explaining how complex human consciousness, such as thoughts and perceptions, arises from the simpler forms of consciousness attributed to basic matter.
Panpsychism attempts to achieve explanatory closure by redefining 'physical' to include intrinsic experiential being, thereby identifying the felt qualities of mind with the intrinsic properties of matter.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz stated: “all things — even mere aggregates — possess mind, if only in their parts,” declaring “we see that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls in the least part of matter”.
In its contemporary form, panpsychism is presented as a response to the perceived failure of reductive physicalism to account for consciousness, proposing that consciousness is an intrinsic feature of matter.
Galen Strawson characterizes the theory that consciousness emerges from non-conscious matter as 'brute emergence' or 'magic,' which he considers an incoherent approach.
Critics argue that panpsychism is a form of property dualism because it posits that matter possesses both physical properties and irreducible mental properties.
Panpsychism eliminates the need to explain how consciousness emerges from non-conscious matter by asserting that consciousness exists in a basic form in all matter.
Establishing a reliable indicator of minimal consciousness in a simple organism or an artificial micro-system could indirectly support the hypothesis that consciousness pervades matter.
In Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's view, while every portion of matter contains a hierarchy of monadic minds, only organized beings with a dominant monad, such as humans, animals, or plants, possess a unified consciousness.