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substance dualism
Also known as: dualism of substances, substance dualisms, substance dualist, Substance dualists
Facts (86)
Sources
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 17 facts
claimThe 'ectoplasm' account of substance dualism is criticized for failing to clearly distinguish 'immaterial stuff' from an aberrant form of physical stuff that simply falls outside current scientific accounts.
referenceR. Swinburne authored the chapter 'From mental/physical identity to substance dualism' in the book 'Persons Human and Divine', edited by P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman and published by Oxford University Press in 2007.
claimSubstance dualism faces the problem of explaining the nature of an immaterial substance that accounts for the unity of the mind.
claimE. J. Lowe is a substance dualist who holds that a normal human being involves two substances: a body and a person.
claimThe 'ectoplasm' account of substance dualism posits that immaterial substance is a form of immaterial stuff.
claimE. J. Lowe's theory of substance dualism differs from René Descartes's because Lowe does not define the person as a purely mental substance defined solely by thought or consciousness.
claimE. J. Lowe claims that his theory of substance dualism is close to P. F. Strawson's theory presented in 1959, though he acknowledges Strawson would not have labeled it substance dualism.
referenceJaegwon Kim authored the chapter 'Lonely souls: causality and substance dualism' for the book 'Philosophy of Mind: contemporary readings', edited by T. O'Connor and D. Robb and published by Routledge in 2003.
referenceK. E. Himma authored the article 'When a problem for all is a problem for none: substance dualism, physicalism and the mind-body problem', published in the American Philosophical Quarterly in 2005.
claimA primary objection to René Descartes' 'consciousness' account of substance dualism is that it implies the subject ceases to exist during periods of unconsciousness.
claimSubstance dualism posits that the mind is an immaterial substance that exists over and above its immaterial states, rather than being merely a collection of thoughts.
claimDualism is categorized into three primary types: substance dualism, property dualism, and predicate dualism.
claimThe 'ectoplasm' account of substance dualism is criticized because it fails to explain why this specific 'stuff' supports consciousness any better than ordinary matter does.
claimRené Descartes was a substance dualist who believed in two distinct kinds of substance: matter, which is defined by spatial extension, and mind, which is defined by the property of thinking.
claimRadical empiricists attacked René Descartes' conception of a dualism of substances, finding it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance itself.
claimRené Descartes' 'consciousness' account of substance dualism posits that consciousness itself is the immaterial substance.
referenceR. Swinburne authored the chapter 'What makes me, me? A defense of substance dualism' in the book 'Contemporary Dualism: a Defense', edited by A. Lavazzo and H. Robinson and published by Routledge in 2014.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 14 facts
perspectiveVon Stillfried expresses discomfort with substance-like concepts of consciousness, such as those found in interactionism and substance dualism, because they imply that physical systems might behave differently depending on whether they interact with 'mind-stuff'.
claimThe central problem of interactionism is explaining how two irreducible substances, each following its own intrinsic principles, can act upon each other.
claimDavid Chalmers holds that 'substance dualism' leads to implications comparable to 'property dualism'.
claimSome approaches to the mind-body problem assume that the physical world might be the manifestation of a ubiquitous phenomenal or protophenomenal essence, which contrasts with substance dualism that presupposes consciousness emerges from a physical substrate.
claimSubstance dualism explains consciousness either by postulating its emergence from nowhere or by assuming strong emergence of consciousness from physical structures.
claimNon-constitutive panpsychism inherits many of the problems associated with substance dualism because it must presume some form of strong emergence.
claimSubstance dualisms, such as interactionism and epiphenomenalism, are logically possible but face significant objections.
claimSubstance dualism assumes that mind and matter represent two fundamentally different kinds of 'stuff' or 'substance' that coexist independently while representing two complementary properties of an individual.
claimOntological models regarding the hard problem of consciousness can be classified into monist ontologies and dualisms, with monisms further divided into materialisms and idealisms, and dualisms into substance dualisms and aspect dualisms.
claimSubstance dualism theories, including interactionism and epiphenomenalism, fail to explain the emergence of phenomenal properties from the physical as a distinct ontic substance.
claimThe author defines 'monism' exclusively as eliminative monisms (referred to as 'negative approaches' by von Stillfried in 2018) and classifies all non-eliminative ontologies (von Stillfried's 'positive approaches') as types of dualism, specifically distinguishing between substance and aspect dualism.
claimSuggesting non-constitutive versions of panpsychism to avoid the combination problem leads to difficulties similar to those faced by substance dualism.
claimConstitutive pan(proto)psychism is viewed as a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness because it avoids the specific problems associated with substance dualism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism.
claimInteractionism faces the specific challenge of explaining how two fundamentally different and irreducible substances interact across an ontological boundary, due to its basis in substance dualism.
The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1 theologycommons.gcu.edu Sep 2, 2025 12 facts
perspectiveLanell M. Mason argues that substance dualism, at a minimum, views the non-physical as causally efficient outside of any dependence relation with the physical.
referenceBrandon Rickabaugh and J.P. Moreland argue in 'The Substance of Consciousness' that emergentism is a non-reductionist theory that should be classified as substance dualist.
claimSubstance dualism is the philosophical position that there are two distinct kinds of being: physical and non-physical.
claimContemporary substance dualism maintains the principle that there is at least some material in existence that is completely described by the laws of physics.
claimSubstance dualism posits that the mind is non-physical while the body is, at least in part, physical.
perspectiveThe author of 'The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1' argues that passages often cited by substance dualists, such as Romans 8:10-11 where the Apostle Paul states the Holy Spirit will give life to mortal bodies, do not necessarily require a substance dualist interpretation.
perspectiveChristian philosophers have largely adopted substance dualism as their view of the mind-body relationship.
perspectiveThe author of 'The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1' suggests that the Apostle Paul affirms a form of substance dualism by asserting the death of the physical body alongside the continued existence of the soul.
claimSubstance dualism rejects the claim that physical effects always have physical causes, asserting instead that at least some physical effects can have non-physical causes.
perspectiveChristian philosophers almost universally accept that Cartesian dualism, a form of substance dualism, is incompatible with Christianity because it creates too hard of a distinction between the physical and non-physical.
perspectiveThe author of 'The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1' suggests that panpsychism should be considered as an alternative monist view of the soul and body that might resolve difficulties better than substance dualism.
perspectiveLanell M. Mason argues that the substance dualist claim that conscious entities are distinct is compatible with non-reductive physicalism and does not sufficiently define substance dualism as a distinct view of the mind and body.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 12 facts
claimWilliam Lycan and Dean Zimmerman argue that property dualism shares most of the same problems as substance dualism.
claimSubstance dualism, subjective idealism, and emergent panpsychism may have an advantage in accommodating unity arguments against physicalism, provided that the deflationary view of subjects is rejected.
claimProperty dualism is considered more parsimonious than substance dualism because it posits fewer fundamental things or kinds of things.
claimDavid Chalmers is open to substance dualism, despite his preference for property dualism.
claimSubstance dualism is compatible with arguments from unity, which posit that the unity of consciousness and identity across time must be accounted for by a distinct subject rather than a mere bundling of experiences.
claimUnity arguments are regarded as supporting substance dualism specifically, rather than non-physicalism in general.
claimSusan Schneider and Galen Strawson argue that property dualism implies substance dualism.
claimSubstance dualism, the traditional version of dualism defended by René Descartes, regards the mental and the physical as two different fundamental substances or kinds of stuff.
claimSubstance dualism is compatible with René Descartes' argument from disembodiment, which posits that consciousness is conceivable without the body or the external world.
referencePhenomenalism faces a conflict with the principle of physical causal closure that is essentially identical to the conflict faced by substance dualism, according to Pelczar (2019).
perspectiveReligiously oriented philosophers view the possibility of disembodied minds allowed by substance dualism as an advantage because it allows for an afterlife.
claimMartine Nida-Rümelin supports substance dualism on purely non-religious grounds.
Panpsychism: Conscious Rocks and Socks - Free Thinking Ministries freethinkingministries.com Nov 24, 2023 7 facts
referenceKenneth Himma authored a paper titled 'What Is a Problem for All Is a Problem for None: Substance Dualism, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem', which discusses the interaction problem in the context of various mind-body theories.
claimPhilip Goff rejects substance dualism primarily due to Ockham's razor and the interaction problem.
claimJoshua Ryan Farris, author of 'The Creation of Self: A Case for the Soul', argues that the interaction problem is a challenge for both substance dualists and panpsychists, as both must explain the bridge between physical and mental events.
perspectiveDr. Tim Stratton asserts that substance dualism provides the best explanation for the nature of human existence, defining it as the belief that humans are immaterial souls with material bodies.
claimDr. Tim Stratton suggests that Philip Goff may prefer substance dualism or panpsychism over materialism because of the philosophical challenge known as 'the hard problem' of consciousness.
claimPhilip Goff argues that materialism is incoherent and finds substance dualism unsatisfactory.
perspectiveThe author asserts that Philip Goff prefers substance dualism over materialism, but prefers panpsychism over substance dualism because he views materialism as incoherent and panpsychism as simpler than dualism.
Mind and Consciousness - St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology saet.ac.uk Jun 20, 2024 4 facts
claimTheological anthropology that recognizes both souls and bodies is often referred to as substance dualism.
claimSubstance dualism, which recognizes the distinct reality of the soul or mind and the body, has been developed by Clement of Alexandria, Origen of Alexandria, Augustine of Hippo, the Florentine Academy, John Calvin, the Cambridge Platonists, René Descartes, John Locke, Thomas Reid, Richard Swinburne, and Alvin Plantinga.
claimThe term 'substance dualism' is potentially misleading because 'dualism' implies only two kinds of things, whereas many substance dualists believe there are an indefinite number of substances.
perspectiveCharles Taliaferro argues that many thinkers classified as substance dualists actually affirm the goodness of material embodiment.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Dec 11, 2019 4 facts
claimSubstance dualism identifies the subject of experience as the soul, which is the entity that experiences qualia, thereby implying that the self is an immaterial substance.
perspectiveThe author of the Capturing Christianity article argues for property dualism, though they acknowledge that some philosophers view property dualism as an unstable position that should logically lead to substance dualism.
claimSubstance dualism is the philosophical claim that conscious beings are composed of two distinct substances: physical matter and an immaterial soul.
claimThe specific form of substance dualism defended by the author of the Capturing Christianity article is known as "Cartesian dualism," named after René Descartes.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 3 facts
claimSubstance dualists and property dualists are required to develop theories that articulate the specific natures of the non-physical features of reality they equate with or use to explain consciousness.
claimWhile substance dualism is currently largely out of favor, it maintains some contemporary proponents, including Richard Swinburne (1986) and John Foster (1989, 1996).
claimSubstance dualism, such as traditional Cartesian dualism proposed by René Descartes in 1644, asserts the existence of both physical and non-physical substances, implying that consciousness inheres in non-physical minds or selves.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
claimInteractionist dualism, encompassing both substance and property types, holds that consciousness is causally efficacious in the production of bodily behavior.
claimSubstance dualism holds that consciousness makes up a distinct fundamental stuff which can exist independently of any physical substance.
claimRené Descartes proposed a form of substance dualism.
Critique of Panpsychism: Philosophical Coherence and Scientific ... thequran.love May 7, 2025 2 facts
perspectiveProponents of panpsychism view the theory as a 'third way' that avoids the limitations of both substance dualism and reductive materialism.
claimPanpsychism avoids the bifurcation of reality found in substance dualism by positing that there is only one kind of physical stuff with two inseparable aspects: the inner experiential aspect and the outer physical aspect.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 2 facts
perspectiveNancey Murphy argues for a physicalist view of human nature that accounts for mental and spiritual phenomena without resorting to substance dualism, bridging neuroscience and theology.
claimSubstance Dualism posits that consciousness is a non-physical substance separate from the body, which accounts for subjective experience directly but faces the interaction problem and conflicts with neuroscience.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimWeak reductionists use the "phenomenal concepts strategy" to explain the difference between third-person scientific observation and first-person introspection, arguing that the hard problem of consciousness arises from a dualism of concepts rather than a dualism of properties or substances.
Philosophical perspectives on consciousness | Humans - Vocal Media vocal.media 1 fact
claimRené Descartes articulated substance dualism, which proposes that the mind and body are fundamentally different substances where the mind is a non-physical entity responsible for thoughts and awareness, and the body is a material structure governed by physical laws.
David Chalmers on the meta-problem of consciousness selfawarepatterns.com Apr 6, 2019 1 fact
perspectiveThe author of the article argues that the most plausible solutions to the 'hard problem of consciousness' frame it as a psychological issue, specifically a difficulty in accepting that data provides no support for substance dualism or a 'ghost in the machine'.
Episode 19, Mind, Body and Consciousness (Part I) - The Panpsycast thepanpsycast.com Jun 5, 2017 1 fact
procedureThe Panpsycast episode 19, 'Mind, Body and Consciousness (Part I)', is structured into four parts: Substance Dualism (starting at 09:20), Materialism (starting at 33:45), Panpsychism (starting at 00:10 in Part II), and Further Analysis and Discussion (starting at 16:40 in Part II).
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
perspectivePhilip Goff calls panpsychism an alternative to both physicalism and substance dualism.
The Functionalist Case for Machine Consciousness: Evidence from ... lesswrong.com Jan 22, 2025 1 fact
claimMany in the rationalist/naturalist community embrace functionalism and reject substance dualism, yet often retreat to skepticism when confronted with artificial systems that appear to implement the functional architecture of consciousness.