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Russellian monism
Also known as: Russell's monism, Russellian Panpsychism, Russellian panpsychism, Russellian neutral monism
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The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 13 facts
perspectivevon Stillfried argues that a priori entailment of macrophenomenal in microphenomenal properties is not a necessary requirement for a coherent naturalist interpretation of Russellian panpsychism.
claimDavid Chalmers has referred to aspect dualism using various terms, including 'Type-F monism' (2002), 'Russellian monism' (2010), and 'property dualism' (1995).
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that the intrinsic properties of the physical world are themselves phenomenal properties, an interpretation derived from the relationship between percepts and intrinsic essence in Russellian Monism.
claimIf David Chalmers's interpretation of Russellian monism is true, a modal argument based on the supposition of a parallel world that is physically identical to ours but lacks phenomenal properties would lose its logical basis, as such a world would be logically impossible.
claimOntological models are often categorized as 'monism' (including neutral monism, dual aspect monism, type-F monism, and Russell's monism) or 'dualism' (including aspect-dualism and naturalistic dualism) based on how they interpret properties as aspects or emergent ontic categories.
claimVon Stillfried proposes two options for understanding the involvement of consciousness: either physical and phenomenal properties are always intrinsically correlated (panpsychism), or the phenomenal is an intrinsic essence of the physical (Russellian monism/aspect dualism).
claimThe decisive requirement for Russellian panpsychism and the hard problem of consciousness is finding a logically necessary relation between physical and protophenomenal properties.
claimDavid Chalmers developed a naturalistic aspect dualist interpretation of Russellian Monism, referred to as 'Type-F Monism', which integrates elements of both interactionism and epiphenomenalism to address their respective limitations.
referenceAlter and Nagasawa (2012) interpret Russellian monism as a conjunction of three claims: [1.] Structuralism about physics: the basic properties physics describes are structural/relational properties. [2.] Realism about inscrutables: there are inscrutables, the natures of which are not wholly structural/relational. [3.] (Proto)phenomenal foundationalism: at least some inscrutables are either phenomenal or protophenomenal properties.
claimRussellian monism can be interpreted as physicalism, aspect dualism, or idealism depending on the presumed relationship between inscrutables (the intrinsic properties of relata) and phenomenal properties.
claimRussellian monism holds that nature consists of entities with intrinsic (proto)phenomenal qualities standing in causal relations within a space-time manifold.
claimRussellian monism is not affected by the conceivability argument or the knowledge argument, and it supports a naturalist view on consciousness while integrating phenomenal and physical properties.
claimDavid Chalmers's interpretation of Russellian monism suggests that the causal nexus bifurcates at the microlevel, moving from proto-/microphenomenal properties to both microphysical/macrophysical properties and macrophenomenal properties, which results in a form of parallelism at the macro-level.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 11 facts
claimRussellian monists argue that the problem of consciousness arises because physical science remains silent on the intrinsic, concrete, or categorical features of matter.
claimGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's inability to find an intrinsic nature for his basic elements other than a mentalistic one, modeled on perception and spontaneous activity, has been highly influential on the development of contemporary Russellian monism.
claimRussellian monism is a contemporary philosophical position that utilizes the panpsychist view of consciousness as an intrinsic nature of matter to address mental causation.
claimThe 'Intrinsic Nature Argument' for panpsychism is closely connected to the motivations behind Russellian monism.
claimThe growing prominence of Russellian monism has led to panpsychism being considered a serious philosophical option, as one paradigmatic form of Russellian monism is panpsychist.
referenceAlyssa Ney authored a physicalist critique of Russellian monism in 2015.
claimRussellian monism attempts to avoid the problems of dualism and physicalism by suggesting that conscious states are the intrinsic nature of brain states, meaning the causal action of brain states and conscious states are the same.
claimRussellian monism posits that information from the physical sciences is limited because physics only describes the extrinsic, relational, mathematical, or dispositional nature of matter, leaving its intrinsic, concrete, and categorical nature unknown.
referenceBarbara Montero authored 'A Russellian Response the Structural Argument Against Physicalism', published in the 'Journal of Consciousness Studies' in 2010 (Volume 17, Issue 3–4, pages 70–83).
claimRussellian panpsychism posits that the intrinsic nature of fundamental matter is itself consciousness-involving.
claimRussellian monism is a view motivated by the need to characterize the intrinsic nature of matter.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 8 facts
referenceHedda Hassel Mørch authored the 2019 paper titled "Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?" which was published in the journal Erkenntnis.
perspectivePhilosopher Hedda Hassel Mørch views Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as similar to Russellian monism.
claimRussellian monism is a type of neutral monism attributed to Bertrand Russell, also referred to as Russell's panpsychism or Russell's neutral monism.
claimRussellian panpsychism is the view that quiddities are a form of consciousness, while Russellian panprotopsychism is the view that quiddities involve proto-consciousness.
referenceTorin Alter and Yugin Nagasawa edited 'Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism', a collection of essays on Russellian monism.
referenceTorin Alter and Derk Pereboom authored the entry 'Russellian Monism' for The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and published by the Metaphysics Research Lab at Stanford University in 2019.
referenceRobert Howell discusses the problems Russellian monists face regarding mental causation in his 2014 paper 'The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation' published in The Philosophical Quarterly.
claimDavid Chalmers concludes that thoughts, actions, intentions, and emotions may be the quiddities of neurotransmitters, neurons, and glial cells, a position associated with Russellian monism.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Apr 1, 2024 8 facts
perspectiveRussellian panpsychism does not offer a superior explanation for adaptive-seeming correlations compared to physicalism or dualism.
perspectiveRussellian panpsychism posits that consciousness is intrinsic, whereas the sensational associative learning view posits that an overall experience depends on both the intrinsic nature of a sensation and its interpretation.
claimRussellian panpsychism, in both its constitutive and emergent versions, does not a priori predict specific patterns of associations between fitness contingencies and experiential characters, and therefore fails to explain the observed adaptive-seeming correlations.
perspectiveRussellian panpsychism avoids the problem of explaining the origin of consciousness, which physicalism fails to answer and dualism addresses by postulating undiscovered fundamental psychophysical laws.
claimIn Russellian panpsychism, macro-experiences can be considered adaptations either because they are constituted of micro-experiences with causal powers, or because they are emergent properties that exert downward causation on lower-level processes, similar to interactionist dualism.
claimRussellian panpsychism attributes consciousness to fundamental particles, which are unchanging micro-experiences that pre-date biological evolution.
claimRussellian panpsychism defines consciousness as the intrinsic nature or 'quiddity' of fundamental particles, distinguishing it from the particles' dispositions or behaviors described by standard laws of physics.
claimThe 'combination problem' in Russellian panpsychism, as identified by Chalmers (2017a), refers to the difficulty of explaining how complex, unified human consciousness arises from the micro-experiences of fundamental entities like quarks.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 7 facts
claimRussellian monism is increasingly regarded as a promising approach to addressing the problem of consciousness.
claimRussellian monism posits that the intrinsic, concrete, or categorical features of matter, which physical science does not describe, account for the existence of consciousness.
claimA recent revival of interest in the approaches of Bertrand Russell and Arthur Eddington has led to a view known as Russellian monism.
claimThe ability to integrate consciousness into a causally closed system is a motivation for the philosophical position of Russellian monism.
claimRussellian monism posits that conscious states are the intrinsic nature of brain states, which implies that the causal actions of brain states and conscious states are identical.
referenceThe Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on panpsychism cites various works on Russellian monism, including collections by Alter & Nagasawa (2015), and works by Feigl (1967), Maxwell (1979), Lockwood (1989), Strawson (1994, 2003, 2016), Chalmers (1996, 2015), Griffin (1998), Stoljar (2001), Pereboom (2011, 2015, 2019), and Goff (2015, 2017, 2019a), with critiques by Howell (2015), Pautz (2015), and Cutter (2019).
claimRussellian monism is proposed as a potential solution to the problems facing both dualism and physicalism by integrating consciousness into the material world and accounting for the causal role of human consciousness.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 2 facts
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that if the physical domain is a closed causal network, one must choose between views that make experience epiphenomenal or views like Russellian monism, which posits that the intrinsic properties of matter are proto-experiential.
perspectiveDavid Chalmers considers Russellian monism to be the most attractive and integrated view of consciousness, provided that the 'combination problem' can be solved.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 1 fact
claimDual-aspect monism is also known as Russellian monism, named after Bertrand Russell, who defended many of its central claims in his works published in 1927 and 1948.
Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism - jstor jstor.org 1 fact
referenceThe article 'Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism' includes a discussion on Russellian Monism and the Intrinsicness.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimGalen Strawson's general argument for panpsychism is a version of the intrinsic nature argument, which is akin to Russellian neutral monism, with the distinction that the substrate is explicitly taken to be experiential in nature rather than metaphysically neutral.