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Alvin Goldman
Also known as: Alvin I. Goldman
Facts (56)
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Naturalistic Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 25 facts
claimAlvin Goldman and Philip Kitcher apply insights from both natural and social sciences to understand knowledge as a simultaneously cognitive and social phenomenon.
claimAlvin Goldman defines his naturalism as the view that epistemology 'needs help' from science.
perspectiveAlvin Goldman's approach to epistemology differs from W.V.O. Quine's because Goldman does not view epistemology as a part of science, but rather as a field that requires both a priori philosophy and the application of scientific results.
claimAlvin Goldman's current account of justification consists of two components: first, the epistemological task of clarifying and describing 'epistemic folkways' (commonsense epistemological concepts and principles), and second, developing a theory of what justified believing is based on the principles underlying those commonsense judgments.
claimAlvin Goldman hypothesizes that humans apply epistemic concepts to individual cases by judging how similar or different a particular case is to stereotypical instances of the concept.
claimAlvin Goldman's account of a priori knowledge is based on his reliabilist account of epistemic justification and the idea that a priori knowledge is based on processes of 'pure thought' that operate independently of experience or perception.
claimAlvin Goldman's theory of knowledge, known as causal reliabilism, asserts that a justified true belief constitutes knowledge only if it is caused in a suitably reliable way.
claimAlvin Goldman identifies true belief as one of the most important cognitive goals.
claimAlvin Goldman's approach to epistemic justification is reliabilist and grounded in science, asserting that justification is at least partly determined by beliefs being produced by reliable cognitive processes.
claimPhilip Kitcher and Alvin Goldman have advocated for a 'social epistemology' that is partly inspired by Thomas Kuhn.
referenceAlvin Goldman proposed a causal theory of knowing in his 1967 paper 'A Causal Theory of Knowing' published in The Journal of Philosophy.
claimAlvin Goldman contends that humans consider processes like perception or deduction to confer justification because humans perceive these processes to be reliable.
referenceAlvin Goldman published "Epistemology and Cognition" in 1986 through Harvard University Press, exploring the intersection of epistemology and cognitive science.
referenceAlvin Goldman published 'Knowledge in a social world' through Clarendon Press in 1999.
perspectiveAlvin Goldman believes that assessments of problem-solving power and speed are only loosely connected to epistemic justification, if they are connected at all.
claimAlvin I. Goldman published the article "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge" in The Journal of Philosophy in 1976.
claimIn Alvin Goldman's causal reliabilism, a 'suitably reliable' belief-forming process is defined as one that has a propensity to produce more true beliefs than false ones and whose causal ancestry has a greater propensity to produce reliable processes than unreliable ones.
referenceAlvin Goldman published 'Liasons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences' through MIT Press in 1992.
claimPhilip Kitcher and Alvin Goldman argue that social structures within science can be evaluated using reliabilist terms to determine how effectively those structures promote the production of true theories over false ones.
perspectiveAlvin Goldman believes epistemology needs aid from the empirical sciences.
claimAlvin Goldman suggests that if human beings possess reliable innate mechanisms of ratiocination and calculation, beliefs derived from these mechanisms without reliance on perception are candidates for a priori knowledge.
claimIn Alvin Goldman's theory of knowledge, psychology is necessary to identify and evaluate belief-forming processes and to judge their reliability, thereby making the determination of knowledge dependent on both philosophical and psychological considerations.
perspectiveAlvin Goldman supports externalism regarding the justification of beliefs.
claimAlvin Goldman is a prominent proponent of externalism within the field of naturalistic epistemology.
claimAlvin Goldman argues that it is necessary to construct a theory of what epistemic justification really is, distinct from how common sense perceives it, because commonsense assessments of belief-forming processes and their reliability often differ from the psychological truth.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Feb 26, 2001 8 facts
referenceAlvin Goldman's 1999 book, 'Knowledge in a Social World', developed a 'veritistic' approach to social epistemology, which focuses on the reliability with which various social practices produce true beliefs.
claimAlvin Goldman founded the journal 'Episteme: A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology' in 2004, originally focusing exclusively on social epistemology before expanding to include individual epistemology.
claimAlvin Goldman's 2001 work is considered the locus classicus for the question of how non-experts can identify experts.
claimThe "independence thesis" supports central claims of social epistemology previously espoused by Alvin Goldman (1999).
claimJennifer Lackey argues against Alvin Goldman's 2014 account of group justification and proposes an alternative account where a group G justifiedly believes that p if and only if (1) G believes that p, and (2) full disclosure of evidence relevant to p, accompanied by rational deliberation among members of G in accordance with epistemic normative requirements, would not result in further evidence that, when added to the bases of G's members' beliefs that p, yields a total belief set that fails to make sufficiently probable that p.
claimJessica Brown proposes an account of group justification that appeals to the testimony of group members but does not require the beliefs expressed in those testimonies to be justified for the group's belief to be justified, thereby avoiding objections raised by Jennifer Lackey against Alvin Goldman.
claimAlvin Goldman proposes modeling group justification by treating a group's belief as caused by a belief-forming process that aggregates member beliefs into a group belief, similar to how individual cognitive processes take inputs to produce outputs.
claimAlvin Goldman (2010) defined 'systems-oriented' social epistemology as the evaluation of the epistemic properties of democratic institutions and practices, where a 'system' is an entity with various working components and multiple goals.
Naturalized Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 5, 2001 6 facts
quoteAlvin Goldman states that purely doxastic, metaphysical, modal, semantic, or syntactic expressions are not epistemic.
referenceAlvin Goldman authored 'What is Justified Belief?' in 1979, published in 'Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology'.
referenceThe bibliography for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Naturalized Epistemology includes works by Robert Almeder (1998), Laurence BonJour (1994), Roderick Chisholm (1966, 1982, 1989), Richard Feldman (1999), Richard Foley (1994), Richard Fumerton (1994, 1995), Allan Gibbard (1990), Alvin Goldman (1979, 1992), Susan Haack (1993), Gilbert Harman (1977), Jaegwon Kim (1988), Philip Kitcher (1992), Hilary Kornblith (1988, 1994, 1999), Keith Lehrer (1997), William Lycan (1988), James Maffie (1990), John Pollock (1986), and W.V.O. Quine.
claimPhilosophers including Alvin Goldman (1992), Stephen Stich and Richard Nisbett (1980), Gilbert Harman (1986), and Hilary Kornblith (1994) have expressed sentiments similar to Susan Haack regarding the relevance of empirical results to epistemology.
claimAlvin Goldman identifies a list of non-epistemic terms, including: believes that, is true, causes, it is necessary that, implies, is deducible from, and is probable (either in the frequency sense or the propensity sense).
claimAlvin Goldman identifies a list of terms used to express paradigmatic epistemological facts, including: justified, warranted, has (good) grounds, has reason (to believe), knows that, sees that, apprehends that, is probable (in an epistemic or inductive sense), shows that, establishes that, and ascertains that.
Social Epistemology - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Jul 24, 2024 5 facts
claimAnthony Coady (1973, 1992), Alvin Goldman (1999), Steve Fuller (1988), Philip Kitcher (1990), and Edward Craig (1991) developed a less-political perspective on social epistemology in parallel to the political developments in the field.
claimIn the works of Coady, Goldman, Fuller, Kitcher, and Craig, the trustworthiness of testimony is analyzed in contexts ranging from lay conversations to specialized environments like news reporting, courtrooms, and academic publications.
claimAnthony Coady, Alvin Goldman, Steve Fuller, Philip Kitcher, and Edward Craig developed a less-political perspective on social epistemology in parallel to the development of political standpoint epistemology.
claimAlvin Goldman describes the 'two-expert problem' as a triadic context where a non-expert must decide which of two disagreeing experts to trust, noting that trusting one necessarily requires mistrusting the other.
procedureAlvin Goldman and Hugo Mercier suggest that while there is no surefire way to resolve the two-expert problem, non-experts can use heuristics such as testing for plausibility, observing track records, checking for conflicts of interest, looking for broader consensus, and verifying credentials from respected institutions.
Epistemology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 3 facts
referenceCailin O'Connor, Sanford Goldberg, and Alvin I. Goldman authored the entry 'Social Epistemology' for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in 2024.
claimAlvin I. Goldman and Matthew McGrath authored the book "Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction" in 2015.
claimReliabilism, developed by philosophers such as Alvin Goldman, asserts that knowledge requires reliable sources and shifts the focus of epistemology away from justification.
Naturalism in Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jan 8, 2016 3 facts
referenceAlvin Goldman published 'A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology' in the 1999 collection 'Philosophical Perspectives, v. 13'.
referenceAlvin Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb edited 'Social Epistemology: Essential Readings', published by Oxford University Press in 2011.
referenceAlvin Goldman published 'What is Justified Belief?' in the 1979 collection 'Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology'.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 1 fact
claimStandard versions of simulation theory, such as those by Jane Heal (1986) and Alvin Goldman (2006), argue that the capacity to attribute mental states to others is dependent on the capacity to attribute mental states to oneself.
Epistemic Justification – Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology press.rebus.community 1 fact
referenceAlvin Goldman and Bob Beddor authored 'Reliabilist Epistemology' for The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta in 2015.
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 1 fact
perspectiveAlvin Goldman and Cailin O'Connor include the analysis of group belief under the heading of social epistemology, though the author of the Rebus Press chapter classifies the analysis of group belief as a topic in metaphysics.
Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
claimAlvin Goldman's 1986 book 'Epistemology and Cognition' is considered a significant defense of reliabilism.
Virtue Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 1 fact
referenceAlvin Goldman's 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' (1992) is a cited work in virtue epistemology.
Epistemological Problems of Testimony plato.stanford.edu Apr 1, 2021 1 fact
referenceAlvin Goldman (2001) discusses methods for determining which experts to trust when there is disagreement among them.