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Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 14 facts
claimDual-aspect monism, also known as Russellian monism, posits that reality consists of one kind of substance with two complementary aspects: the physical and the mental or protomental.
claimLangton (1998) and Lewis et al. (2009) concluded that the intrinsic properties of the physical are forever unknowable.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that the physical and mental (or protomental) are two complementary aspects of a single underlying substance, where physical properties appear from a third-person, scientific perspective, and mental properties appear from a first-person, introspective perspective.
claimThe strong version of the argument from non-emergence asserts that consciousness cannot emerge from non-conscious entities, implying that fundamental particles must be conscious rather than merely protoconscious.
claimProtophenomenal properties are defined as intrinsic properties that are neither physical nor phenomenal, but are capable of constituting or causally producing phenomenal properties when combined appropriately.
claimDualism is defined by two core tenets: (1) the mental and the physical are both fundamental, meaning neither is constituted by the other, and (2) the mental and the physical stand in a causal relation to each other.
claimThomas Nagel and Galen Strawson argue that consciousness cannot be constituted by the physical due to the epistemic gap or related considerations.
claimThomas Nagel and Galen Strawson argue that if consciousness emerges from the physical, it must occur through causal production or a dualist psychophysical law, but they reject this possibility by invoking the interaction problem, which posits that such causal relations are unintelligible and impossible.
claimGalen Strawson claims that the emergence of consciousness from the physical is an instance of 'brute emergence,' which he defines as emergence that is unintelligible in principle, even to God, because there is nothing about the physical, if understood as devoid of consciousness, that allows for the emergence of consciousness.
claimPanpsychism is typically based on the idea that the mental and the physical are complementary, such that neither could exist without the other.
claimSubstance dualism, the traditional version of dualism defended by René Descartes, regards the mental and the physical as two different fundamental substances or kinds of stuff.
referenceGottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argued that extension, which René Descartes considered the essential property of the physical, is simply the behavior of occupying an area, which is defined as resisting or preventing other things from entering that area.
perspectiveDualists argue that while physicalism may be simpler and more elegant than dualism, the epistemic gap between the mental and the physical is a datum that is incompatible with physicalism but compatible with dualism.
referenceDual-aspect monism can be defended based on the problem of explaining the intrinsic nature of the physical, as argued by Seager (2006) and Adams (2007).
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 8 facts
claimThe physical cannot be reduced to the phenomenal because it is conceivable that a world equal to the one perceived could exist with different physical properties or no physical properties at all.
claimDavid Chalmers discussed the natural supervenience of the physical on the phenomenal (panprotopsychism) as a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
claimSubstance dualism theories, including interactionism and epiphenomenalism, fail to explain the emergence of phenomenal properties from the physical as a distinct ontic substance.
claimvon Stillfried (2018) argues that a logical implication of the existence of one ontic category by another does not necessarily imply that the one must supervene on the other, meaning logical entailment of the phenomenal by the physical does not automatically equal reductionism or physicalism.
claimThe conceivability of a phenomenal world without a physical correlatum implies the non-existence of the physical as a logical corollary, rather than necessarily implying the irreducibility of the physical.
claimThere is a fundamental difference between the hard problem of consciousness and the hard problem of the physical, as there are more arguments for the incorrigibility or intrinsicness of the phenomenal than for an a priori proof of the existence of the physical.
quoteAs regards the world in general, both physical and mental, everything that we know of its intrinsic character is derived from the mental side, and almost everything that we know of its causal laws is derived from the physical side. But from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal.
claimDavid Chalmers interprets the 'reality' within the 'Matrix' scenario as being as real as the reality outside of it, with the two realities operating under different metaphysical premises regarding the ontological nature of the phenomenal and the physical.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 4 facts
claimThe Lorber Revelations state that specifica, which resemble Leibniz's monads, form the most basic, irreducible substance of all physical and metaphysical creation.
claimRussellian physicalism is the view that quiddities can be physical without having any consciousness-like aspect, while still remaining relevant to explaining consciousness.
claimProtophenomenal properties are defined as properties that logically entail phenomenal properties (a functional definition) and are themselves neither physical nor phenomenal (a negative definition).
perspectiveGalen Strawson argues that "the experiential considered specifically as such" is the definition of what it means for something to be physical.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 4 facts
claimWilliam James's panpsychism originated from his "neutral monism," which posits that the fundamental nature of reality is neither mental nor physical, but a third form that can be regarded as either mental or physical from different viewpoints.
claimThe phenomenal concept strategy, advocated by Brian Loar (1990), David Papineau (1998), and Eva Diaz-Leon (2010), is a form of physicalism that asserts there is no explanatory entailment from the physical to the mental.
referenceErnst Mach authored 'The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of Physical to the Psychical', translated by C.M. Williams and published by Open Court in 1984 (originally published in 1886).
referencePeter Unger authored 'The Mystery of the Physical and the Matter of Qualities: A paper for Professor Schaffer', published in Midwest Studies in Philosophy in 1999.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 4 facts
claimThe 'hard problem of consciousness' is defined as the challenge of closing the 'explanatory gap' between consciousness and the physical.
claimDualism is the claim that consciousness is ontologically distinct from anything physical.
claimTemporary mysterians and permanent mysterians agree that there is a real gap between consciousness and the physical, and that current science seems unable to solve the problem.
claimDualism reasons from the explanatory, epistemological, or conceptual gaps between the phenomenal and the physical to the metaphysical conclusion that the physicalist worldview is incomplete and needs to be supplemented by the addition of irreducibly phenomenal substance or properties.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 2 facts
perspectiveDualist views assert that both the mental and the physical are real and that neither can be assimilated to the other.
claimNon-reductive physicalism is a label used for versions of materialism that attempt to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 1 fact
claimThe Pauli-Jung conjecture posits that correlations between the mental and physical are non-causal, maintaining the causal closure of the physical against the mental, while acknowledging a formal causal relationship between the psychophysically neutral monistic level and the distinguished mental/material domains.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimWilliam James's panpsychism originated from his 'neutral monism,' which posits that reality is neither inherently mental nor physical but possesses a basic character that can be viewed as either.
Do all non-physicalist theories of consciousness face the interaction ... philosophy.stackexchange.com Nov 17, 2025 1 fact
claimPhysicalists do not propose multiple fundamental categories of existence, such as physical and non-physical, and therefore do not have the burden of explaining the link between such categories.
The Compatibility of Christianity with Panpsychism, Part 1 theologycommons.gcu.edu Sep 2, 2025 1 fact
perspectiveChristian philosophers almost universally accept that Cartesian dualism, a form of substance dualism, is incompatible with Christianity because it creates too hard of a distinction between the physical and non-physical.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Dec 11, 2019 1 fact
claimDualism is defined as the philosophical view that the mental and the physical are equally fundamental, with neither being reducible to the other or to a third entity.