concept

mental

Facts (24)

Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 10 facts
claimDual-aspect monism, also known as Russellian monism, posits that reality consists of one kind of substance with two complementary aspects: the physical and the mental or protomental.
claimDual-aspect monism posits that the physical and mental (or protomental) are two complementary aspects of a single underlying substance, where physical properties appear from a third-person, scientific perspective, and mental properties appear from a first-person, introspective perspective.
claimDualism is defined by two core tenets: (1) the mental and the physical are both fundamental, meaning neither is constituted by the other, and (2) the mental and the physical stand in a causal relation to each other.
claimPure panpsychism posits that reality is fundamentally and exclusively mental.
claimPanpsychism is typically based on the idea that the mental and the physical are complementary, such that neither could exist without the other.
claimSubstance dualism, the traditional version of dualism defended by René Descartes, regards the mental and the physical as two different fundamental substances or kinds of stuff.
perspectiveDualists argue that while physicalism may be simpler and more elegant than dualism, the epistemic gap between the mental and the physical is a datum that is incompatible with physicalism but compatible with dualism.
claimThe argument that causal powers are mental or protomental leads to panpsychism or panprotopsychism.
claimUnder phenomenalism, the mental is either epiphenomenal (does not affect physical potentials), affects physical potentials in an overdetermining way, or requires denying physical causal closure.
referenceAugustin Mørch and William Seager (2019a) provide an overview of philosophers who argue that causal powers should be regarded as mental or protomental, and Mørch (2018) provides a defense of this argument.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 19, 2003 5 facts
perspectiveDualist views assert that both the mental and the physical are real and that neither can be assimilated to the other.
perspectiveIdealist views assert that physical states are actually mental, because the physical world is an empirical world and an intersubjective product of collective experience.
claimNon-reductive physicalism is a label used for versions of materialism that attempt to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role.
claimPsychology is classified as an irreducible special science, which implies that it presupposes the existence of the mental.
claimCritics of dualism identify two main problems: the 'queerness' of the mental if conceived as non-physical, and the difficulty of explaining the unity of the mind.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jul 18, 2017 2 facts
claimWilliam James's panpsychism originated from his "neutral monism," which posits that the fundamental nature of reality is neither mental nor physical, but a third form that can be regarded as either mental or physical from different viewpoints.
claimThe phenomenal concept strategy, advocated by Brian Loar (1990), David Papineau (1998), and Eva Diaz-Leon (2010), is a form of physicalism that asserts there is no explanatory entailment from the physical to the mental.
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Jun 18, 2004 1 fact
claimBetween the mid-17th and late 19th centuries, consciousness was widely regarded as the essential or definitive characteristic of the mental.
Mind and Consciousness - St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology saet.ac.uk St Andrews Encyclopaedia of Theology Jun 20, 2024 1 fact
claimIn philosophical discourse, the term 'mental' refers to an aspect or property of a substantial individual, such as the assertion that humans possess both mental and physical properties.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Nov 30, 2004 1 fact
claimThe Pauli-Jung conjecture posits that correlations between the mental and physical are non-causal, maintaining the causal closure of the physical against the mental, while acknowledging a formal causal relationship between the psychophysically neutral monistic level and the distinguished mental/material domains.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Nov 30, 2004 1 fact
claimDavid Bohm and Basil Hiley (Bohm 1990; Bohm & Hiley 1993; Hiley 2001) proposed a theory of consciousness referring to an implicate order that unfolds into separate explicate domains of the mental and the material.
Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2015 Edition) plato.stanford.edu William Seager, Sean Allen-Hermanson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy May 23, 2001 1 fact
claimWilliam James's panpsychism originated from his 'neutral monism,' which posits that reality is neither inherently mental nor physical but possesses a basic character that can be viewed as either.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Capturing Christianity Dec 11, 2019 1 fact
claimDualism is defined as the philosophical view that the mental and the physical are equally fundamental, with neither being reducible to the other or to a third entity.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
quoteAs regards the world in general, both physical and mental, everything that we know of its intrinsic character is derived from the mental side, and almost everything that we know of its causal laws is derived from the physical side. But from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal.