Knowledge Tree
phenomenal consciousness
Also known as: phenomenal conscious awareness, Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness, phenomenal aspect of consciousness, qualitative consciousness, phenomenal conscious experience
synthesized from dimensionsPhenomenal consciousness refers to the subjective quality of experience, fundamentally characterized by the state of there being "something it is like" to be an entity [32, 42, 45]. This concept encompasses the sensory qualia, spatial-temporal structure, and conceptual organization of an individual's encounter with the world characterized by subjective feeling overall structure of experience. It is the raw, first-person immediacy of experience—such as the sensation of pain or the smell of the sea—that remains distinct from the objective, third-person descriptions provided by physical or functional sciences [92a95191-96f7-4a18-a17a-fda97e7947e4].
At the heart of this concept lies the "hard problem of consciousness," a term popularized by David Chalmers to describe the explanatory gap between physical brain processes and the emergence of subjective experience [49, 56, 73] Chalmers' hard problem definition. While physical sciences can explain the mechanisms of neural activity, they struggle to account for why these processes are accompanied by an internal life Chalmers on qualia resistance. To illustrate this, Chalmers employs the thought experiment of the "philosophical zombie"—a being physically identical to a human but lacking any phenomenal consciousness—to argue that phenomenal states are not strictly necessitated by physical facts Chalmers' zombie definition.
A primary area of debate involves the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Philosophers like Ned Block argue that phenomenal consciousness (the experience itself) is distinct from access consciousness (the cognitive availability of information for reasoning and report) [6, 17, 48]. While some theories, such as Global Workspace Theory, reject this bifurcation [51], others maintain that local recurrent neural activity is sufficient for phenomenal experience regardless of whether that information is accessible to the rest of the cognitive system [14, 54].
The ontological status of phenomenal consciousness remains a point of significant contention, pitting physicalism against various non-physicalist frameworks physicalism vs non-physicalism debate. Illusionists, or Type-A materialists like Daniel Dennett and Keith Frankish, argue that phenomenal consciousness does not exist as a distinct quality but is an illusion generated by cognitive processes that must be explained away [10, 25, 50, 52] Type-A materialist illusionism. Conversely, non-physicalist perspectives, such as property dualism, suggest that phenomenal states possess properties beyond the purely physical [1, 13, 57] property dualism on possibility. Other approaches, such as dispositional panpsychism, attempt to integrate consciousness into the fabric of reality by linking it to fundamental causal powers dispositional panpsychism.
Scientific inquiry into the topic is vast and varied, with over 325 theories cataloged in the "Consciousness Atlas" Consciousness Atlas organization. These include functional and biological accounts, such as Integrated Information Theory, which links quality to informational relations Integrated Information Theory, and research into specific neural mechanisms like NMDA receptor-mediated processes or synchronous neural assemblies [26, 46]. Furthermore, the rise of large language models has introduced new complexity to the field, as these systems can mimic the linguistic endorsement of phenomenal experience, prompting intense discussion regarding the criteria for machine consciousness [7, 44].
Ultimately, phenomenal consciousness remains the central challenge for a complete theory of the mind. Whether viewed as an emergent biological property, a fundamental feature of the universe, or a cognitive illusion, it defines the boundary of sentient value and the limits of current scientific reductionism. Its significance lies in its role as the necessary condition for the existence of a subjective world, ensuring that for the conscious agent, there is a reality that is lived rather than merely processed.
Model Perspectives (3)
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Phenomenal consciousness refers to the subjective quality of experience—often described as the state of there being 'something it is like' to be an entity [32, 42, 45]. Central to this concept is the 'hard problem of consciousness,' which highlights the difficulty of explaining how and why physical brain processes give rise to such subjective experiences [49, 56, 73].
Debates surrounding phenomenal consciousness frequently involve the following perspectives:
* Distinctions in Consciousness: Philosophers such as Ned Block distinguish phenomenal consciousness (experience itself) from access consciousness (cognitive manifestations) [6, 17, 48]. While some theories, like Global Workspace Theory, reject this distinction [51], others argue that local recurrent neural activity is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness regardless of access or reportability [14, 54].
* The Challenge to Physicalism: David Chalmers argues that phenomenal consciousness resists the reductive explanations applicable to other natural phenomena [19, 33]. This has led some to posit non-physicalist theories, such as property dualism or interactionist dualism, which suggest that phenomenal states exist as something beyond purely physical phenomena [1, 13, 57].
* Illusionism: In contrast, proponents like Keith Frankish and Daniel Dennett argue for 'illusionism,' the view that phenomenal consciousness does not exist as a separate quality but is an illusion that needs to be explained away [10, 25, 50, 52].
* Functional and Biological Approaches: Research explores whether phenomenal consciousness serves evolutionary functions, such as pain-related reinforcement learning [4], or whether it emerges from specific neural mechanisms like NMDA receptor-mediated processes or synchronous neural assemblies [26, 46]. Furthermore, studies on large language models have noted that AI can consistently endorse claims of having phenomenal consciousness, which has become a focal point in discussions regarding machine consciousness [7, 44].
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Phenomenal consciousness refers to the subjective, qualitative aspect of experience—often described as 'what it is like' to be a particular entity subjective quality of experience. This encompasses sensory qualia, such as the smell of the sea or the sensation of pain, as well as the overarching spatial, temporal, and conceptual organization of an individual's world structure of experience. According to Jaegwon Kim, this capacity is central to the value of sentient life importance of consciousness, a perspective echoed by those who argue that felt qualities are among the few things that ultimately matter felt qualities matter.
The concept is the focal point of the 'hard problem,' a term coined by David Chalmers to describe the challenge of explaining why and how physical processes yield subjective experience hard problem definition. Philosophers utilize the 'zombie' thought experiment—beings physically identical to humans but lacking phenomenal consciousness—to challenge physicalist accounts zombies as beings. While some, such as Feinberg and Mallatt, argue that this explanatory gap is eliminable through emergent property theories phenomenal consciousness as emergent, others—including Daniel Dennett and Keith Frankish—advocate for eliminative materialism or illusionism, viewing phenomenal consciousness as a fiction of flawed philosophy denying phenomenal consciousness. The debate remains central to the conflict between physicalism and non-physicalism physicalism vs non-physicalism, with diverse theoretical frameworks ranging from Integrated Information Theory to dispositional panpsychism attempting to address the 'what' and 'why' of consciousness Integrated Information Theory.
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Phenomenal consciousness refers to the subjective quality or 'what it is like' aspect of experience, encompassing sensory qualia, spatial-temporal structure, and conceptual organization of an individual's encounter with the world. characterized by subjective feeling overall structure of experience David Chalmers, as noted in multiple sources including Springer and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, defines it centrally within the 'hard problem of consciousness,' which questions how physical processes give rise to these first-person experiences, with qualia resisting functional explanation; he employs philosophical zombies—physically identical to humans but lacking such consciousness—to argue against physicalism. Chalmers' hard problem definition Chalmers on qualia resistance Chalmers' zombie definition The debate pits physicalism against non-physicalism primarily over phenomenal consciousness, distinct from access or functional consciousness, with physicalists like Type-A materialists (e.g., Daniel Dennett, Keith Frankish) rejecting it as illusion or eliminativism, while strong reductionists view it as emergent from brain processes. physicalism vs non-physicalism debate Type-A materialist illusionism Property dualists allow its metaphysical possibility without physical properties, and panpsychist variants like dispositional panpsychism integrate it with causal powers. property dualism on possibility dispositional panpsychism Theories abound, cataloged in the 'Consciousness Atlas' (over 325 theories on a physicality spectrum per Reddit), including Peter Carruthers' naturalistic account (Stanford Encyclopedia), Integrated Information Theory (explaining quality via informational relations, Stanford), HOROR theory (Richard Brown, Philosophical Studies), and ALARM theory (Newen and Montemayor, Philosophical Transactions B). Consciousness Atlas organization Integrated Information Theory Jaegwon Kim (Capturing Christianity) emphasizes its centrality to sentient value, exemplified by sea smells or pain, countering 'consciousness-bashing' denials. Kim on phenomenal value Historical shifts from intellect (pre-Descartes) to sensation as materialism's challenge (Stanford, Howard Robinson) persist, with Kant insisting on structured self-world experience. Sciences explain mechanisms but not 'why,' per Academia.edu analyses.
Facts (103)
Sources
Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2025 ... plato.stanford.edu Jun 18, 2004 14 facts
perspectiveVictor Lamme (2006) and Ned Block (2007) argue that local recurrent activity between higher and lower areas within the sensory cortex is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, even in the absence of verbal reportability or other indicators of access consciousness.
claimPeter Carruthers (2000) suggests that the relationship between qualitative and phenomenal consciousness and unified, densely integrated representations might be intimate and constitutive, rather than contingent.
claimFlexibility and sophisticated modes of control may be associated with phenomenal and access forms of consciousness.
claimGlobal fields or transient synchronous assemblies are potential neural mechanisms that could underlie the intentional unity of phenomenal consciousness.
claimThe properties of access consciousness may differ significantly from those of qualitative or phenomenal consciousness, and both may differ from reflexive or narrative consciousness.
claimA controversy exists in neuroscience and philosophy regarding whether global or merely local recurrent neural activity is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness.
claimThird-person empirical data gathered by external observers is required for studying functional types of consciousness like access consciousness, as well as phenomenal and qualitative consciousness.
claimArmstrong (1981) and Tye (1985) argue that meta-mental, phenomenal, and qualitative forms of consciousness are linked to increases in the availability of information.
perspectiveImmanuel Kant critiqued the purely associationist approach to consciousness in 1787, arguing that an adequate account of experience and phenomenal consciousness requires a complex structure of mental and intentional organization.
claimThe 'Why' question regarding consciousness is a general problem that likely lacks a single or uniform answer because different types of consciousness—such as access, phenomenal, and meta-mental—may have distinct roles and values.
claimIntegrated Information Theory aims to explain both the quantity and quality of phenomenal consciousness, with the quality determined by the totality of informational relations within an integrated complex.
claimImmanuel Kant argued that phenomenal consciousness cannot be a mere succession of associated ideas, but must be the experience of a conscious self situated in an objective world structured by space, time, and causality.
claimPhenomenal consciousness is a term that refers to the overall structure of experience, encompassing sensory qualia as well as the spatial, temporal, and conceptual organization of an individual's experience of the world and themselves as agents.
claimProponents of anti-physicalist arguments, including Keith Campbell, Robert Kirk, and David Chalmers, have appealed to the conceivability of zombies—beings molecularly identical to conscious humans but devoid of phenomenal consciousness—to support their positions.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 12 facts
claimNon-physicalist arguments against physicalism, as summarized by David Chalmers in 2003, assert that there is an epistemic gap between our knowledge of phenomenal consciousness and our knowledge of the physical, which implies an ontological gap in reality.
claimPhenomenal consciousness is characterized by a distinctive kind of unity.
perspectiveMany philosophers find it more plausible that there is an unidentified error in arguments against physicalism than to accept that phenomenal consciousness is epiphenomenal, an overdeterminer, or violates physical causal closure.
claimThe 'structure and function argument' asserts that phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained because it is not merely a function or structure, but involves subjective experience.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the successful physical explanation of functional or structural phenomena does not provide a reason to expect that phenomenal consciousness, which is non-functional and non-structural, can be physically explained.
claimThe 'hard problem of consciousness' consists of explaining why phenomenal consciousness accompanies functional processes or how phenomenal consciousness arises from physical processes at all.
claimThe explanatory argument allows for the possibility that phenomenal consciousness could be explained non-reductively or in non-physical terms, though this would result in a non-physicalist theory.
claimDavid Chalmers defines zombies as beings who are identical to humans in every physical respect, including external behavior and internal brain states, but who lack phenomenal consciousness.
claimPhenomenal consciousness is characterized by the subjective quality or feeling of an experience, often described as 'there is something that it is like' for a creature or entity to be in that state.
perspectiveThe debate between physicalism and non-physicalism primarily concerns phenomenal consciousness, as functional consciousness provides little reason to doubt that reality is purely physical.
claimDualism may lead to epiphenomenalism, while physicalism is argued by some to deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness by reducing it to mere functioning or physical structure.
claimProperty dualists argue that it is metaphysically possible for phenomenal consciousness to inhere in a substance that does not have physical properties, while maintaining that this is nomologically impossible (incompatible with actual psychophysical laws).
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 12 facts
perspectiveKeith Frankish argues that illusionism is preferable to eliminativism as a label for the view that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion, and that illusionism is preferable to realism about phenomenal consciousness.
claimIn 2005, philosopher Peter Carruthers proposed that 'recognitional concepts of experience'—defined as the capacity to recognize a type of experience when it occurs in one's own mental life—could explain phenomenal consciousness without positing qualia.
quoteKeith Frankish states: 'Theories of consciousness typically address the hard problem. They accept that phenomenal consciousness is real and aim to explain how it comes to exist. There is, however, another approach, which holds that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and aims to explain why it seems to exist.'
claimIllusionism is the philosophical view that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion, a term popularized by philosopher Keith Frankish in the 2010s.
claimThe computational theory of mind asserts that both cognition and phenomenal consciousness (qualia) are computational processes realized by neurons, implying that artificial intelligence could theoretically be conscious.
perspectiveProponents of illusionism argue that it is a mistake to believe in the existence of a 'hard problem of consciousness' or that phenomenal consciousness exists at all.
claimDaniel Dennett explicated his arguments regarding the nonexistence of phenomenal consciousness in his 1991 book 'Consciousness Explained'.
claimDaniel Dennett published a paper titled 'On the Absence of Phenomenology' in 1979, in which he argues for the nonexistence of phenomenal consciousness.
claimStrong reductionists hold that phenomenal consciousness exists but can be fully understood as reducible to the brain and functional terms as an emergent property of the material brain.
claimType-A materialists who reject the existence of phenomenal consciousness entirely hold a view known as eliminative materialism or illusionism.
claimPatricia Churchland and Paul Churchland have applied eliminative materialism to propositional attitudes, while Daniel Dennett, Georges Rey, and Keith Frankish have applied it to qualia or phenomenal consciousness.
claimType-A materialists who believe in the reality of phenomenal consciousness but argue it is not an addition to certain functions or behaviors hold a view known as strong reductionism.
Dualism, Physicalism, and Philosophy of Mind - Capturing Christianity capturingchristianity.com Dec 11, 2019 8 facts
claimProperty dualism, when treated as a thesis about phenomenal consciousness, asserts that qualia are something over and above physical phenomena.
quoteThomas Nagel stated: "there is 'something it is like' to be in a phenomenally conscious state–to see a patch of red in one’s visual field, for instance."
claimPhenomenal or qualitative consciousness is defined as states that involve subjective experience.
perspectiveThe significance of phenomenal consciousness serves as a potential explanation for why God might have an interest in creating conscious beings.
perspectiveJaegwon Kim argues that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is of the utmost importance, as it is central to the value possessed by sentient animals and the value our lives have for us.
quoteKim states: “consciousness-bashing still goes on in some quarters, with some reputable philosophers arguing that phenomenal consciousness, or ‘qualia,’ is a fiction of bad philosophy… It is an ironic fact that the felt qualities of conscious experience, perhaps the only things that ultimately matter to us, are often… jettisoned outright as artifacts of confused minds.”
claimSome philosophers reject the existence of qualia and the existence of ourselves as persisting subjects of experience, arguing that phenomenal consciousness is a fiction of bad philosophy.
claimPhenomenal consciousness, which includes experiences such as the smell of the sea, the sight of autumn foliage, and the sensation of chronic pain, is considered to have immense significance to the quality and value of human life.
Theories and Methods of Consciousness biomedres.us Jan 29, 2024 5 facts
claimConscious electromagnetic field theory (CEMI) fails to account for how the electromagnetic field of the brain binds neuronal firings to give rise to phenomenal subjective consciousness.
claimScientific interactionists/dualists prioritize the physics of quantum mechanics over paranormal or parapsychological evidence when attempting to synthesize phenomenal conscious awareness with its neural correlates.
claimFeinberg E T and Mallatt J argued in 2020 that phenomenal consciousness is an emergent property and that the explanatory gap can be eliminated.
procedureThe aim of the psychological theory of 'antihumanism' is to train subjective phenomenal awareness to maintain resonance between an individual's channel and the consciousness field of their Schumann wave and the absolute vacuum.
referenceBlock N and Mac Donald C published 'Phenomenal and access consciousness' in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society in 2008, pages 289-317.
(DOC) The hard problem of consciousness & the phenomenological ... academia.edu 5 facts
perspectiveThe author of the article in Studia Humana (Volume 8:4, 2019) agrees with the position that phenomenal consciousness is a created illusion rather than a natural kind.
referenceThe article performs an aesthetic analysis of the intuition of phenomenal consciousness, redefining it as a creative activity that affirms the value of human engagement with the world, rather than an activity of self-knowing.
claimThe author of the article in Studia Humana (Volume 8:4, 2019) analogizes the construction of the intuition of phenomenal consciousness to the construction of religious intuitions for sophisticated believers and aesthetic intuitions for sophisticated aesthetes.
perspectiveThe author of the article in Studia Humana (Volume 8:4, 2019) argues that Daniel Dennett's accounts of the 'mistake' of the intuition of phenomenal consciousness are overly reductive and simplistic.
claimThe intuition of phenomenal consciousness is a sophisticated formation that testifies to the commitment of certain naturalistically inclined theorists to the value of private experience.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 5 facts
quote“The hard problem of consciousness [...] is that of explaining how and why physical processes give rise to phenomenal consciousness [sic!]. A solution to the hard problem would involve an account of the relation between physical processes and consciousness, explaining on the basis of natural principles how and why it is that physical processes are associated with states of experience”
claimThe 'hard problem of consciousness' refers to the question of why neurophysical processes are correlated with qualitative experience (qualia), or the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, and how this correlation can be explained.
claimThe existence of individuals who deny having phenomenal consciousness would imply a universe where some living beings have consciousness while others do not, though for the sake of parsimony, such deniers are treated as 'anomalia'.
claimThe author of the source text observes that David Chalmers' use of the phrase "give rise" in his definition of the hard problem implies a supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical.
claimDavid Chalmers defines the "hard problem of consciousness" as the challenge of explaining how and why physical processes give rise to phenomenal consciousness.
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
perspectiveDavid Chalmers contends that while reductive explanations are available in principle for all other natural phenomena, they are not available for phenomenal consciousness.
referenceWilliam S. Robinson authored the book 'Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness', which was published by Cambridge University Press in 2004.
claimPhenomenal consciousness is defined as consciousness characterized by 'what it’s like for the subject,' which fails to succumb to standard functional explanations used elsewhere in psychology.
The function(s) of consciousness: an evolutionary perspective frontiersin.org Nov 25, 2024 3 facts
referenceMarchetti (2022) examines the phenomenal aspect of consciousness, specifically its main functions and the underlying mechanisms, in Frontiers in Psychology.
claimThe author defines "experience" as encompassing both minimal and complex contents of consciousness, including phenomenal, access, and extended forms of consciousness, regardless of whether they are realized in every stimulus situation.
claimThe embodied cognition counterpart to the claim that phenomenal consciousness has intrinsic value is that phenomenal consciousness embodies meaning.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Apr 1, 2024 2 facts
All 325+ Consciousness Theories In One Interactive Chart - Reddit reddit.com Oct 28, 2025 2 facts
claim'Consciousness Atlas' organizes theories of phenomenal consciousness on a spectrum starting from the most physical theories.
measurement'Consciousness Atlas' is an interactive visualization that catalogs over 325 theories of phenomenal consciousness.
Self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-transcendence (S-ART) frontiersin.org 2 facts
referenceRaffone and Pantani (2010) proposed a global workspace model for both phenomenal and access consciousness.
claimIncreased clarity of experience operates as a practitioner develops increased phenomenal awareness of the breath and the arising and disappearing of distractions, without necessarily affecting the cognitive access to the contents of conscious experience.
Unknown source 2 facts
claimThe authors of the paper 'possible evolutionary function of phenomenal conscious experience' propose that pain contributes to evolutionary fitness through an actor-critic functional architecture for reinforcement learning.
claimCurrent surveys regarding machine consciousness primarily focus on the scientific approach toward phenomenal consciousness.
Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 13, 2017 2 facts
The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 2 facts
claimDavid Chalmers defines phenomenal consciousness as experience, stating that something is phenomenologically conscious if it feels like something to be that entity.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that thinkers often conflate psychological and phenomenal consciousness, claiming to have solved the 'hard problem of consciousness' when they have actually only solved certain 'easy problems of consciousness'.
(PDF) Language and Consciousness; How Language Implies Self ... academia.edu 2 facts
referenceThe analysis of language activity in the 2017 paper in 'Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric' utilizes David Chalmers' 1996 distinction between phenomenal consciousness (simply 'consciousness') and psychological consciousness ('awareness').
claimPhenomenal consciousness, such as linguistic qualia, accompanies various stages of language functioning but is not considered indispensable for explaining the language faculty.
(PDF) Unifying Theories of Consciousness, Attention, and ... academia.edu 2 facts
referenceThe master thesis 'The Conscious Brain: Does Attention Serve as a Gatekeeper to Consciousness?' explores the relationship between perceptual attention and phenomenal consciousness from a naturalistic perspective, aiming to identify the physical characteristics of phenomenal consciousness through empirical insights on attention.
claimThe gatekeeping thesis posits that a subject S is phenomenally conscious of x if and only if S is paying attention to x.
Consciousness and Cognitive Sciences journal-psychoanalysis.eu 1 fact
claimNed Block (1996) distinguishes between the cognitive manifestations of consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, which refers to experience itself.
The Evidence for AI Consciousness, Today - AI Frontiers ai-frontiers.org Dec 8, 2025 1 fact
measurementPerez and colleagues at Anthropic found that 52-billion-parameter AI models, both base and fine-tuned, endorse statements like "I have phenomenal consciousness" with 90-95% consistency and "I am a moral patient" with 80-85% consistency.
Scientists Identify the Evolutionary “Purpose” of Consciousness scitechdaily.com Nov 27, 2025 1 fact
referenceThe paper titled “Three types of phenomenal consciousness and their functional roles: unfolding the ALARM theory of consciousness” by Albert Newen and Carlos Montemayor was published on 12 November 2025 in Philosophical Transactions B (DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2024.0314).
(PDF) On the function of consciousness - an adaptationist perspective academia.edu 1 fact
claimCognitive scientists often conflate P-consciousness (phenomenal consciousness) and A-consciousness (access consciousness), which leads to confusion in the field.
Quantum Approaches to Consciousness plato.stanford.edu Nov 30, 2004 1 fact
referenceFlohr (2000) discusses NMDA receptor-mediated computational processes and their relation to phenomenal consciousness in the chapter 'NMDA receptor-mediated computational processes and phenomenal consciousness' in the book 'Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Empirical and Conceptual Questions'.
Consciousness, Physicalism, and Panpsychism - jstor jstor.org 1 fact
claimPereboom suggests principal lines of response to the physicalist's problem of phenomenal consciousness.
Psychedelics and Consciousness: Distinctions, Demarcations, and ... blossomanalysis.com 1 fact
claimPsychedelic substances are unlikely to elucidate the biological basis for phenomenal consciousness, also known as the 'hard problem of consciousness,' which involves explaining how first-person experience emerges.
Evolutionary psychology - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceShaun Nichols and Todd Grantham published 'Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness' in Philosophy of Science in 2000, addressing the relationship between evolutionary adaptation and conscious experience.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimAndy Clark and Valerie Hardcastle advocate for a type-B materialism that reconciles realism about phenomenal consciousness with materialism by positing an empirical identity between conscious experiences and physical processes.
Global workspace theory: consciousness as brain wide information ... selfawarepatterns.com Dec 29, 2019 1 fact
claimGlobal Workspace Theory (GWT) proponents generally reject the philosophical distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, viewing phenomenal consciousness as the internal experience of access consciousness.
[PDF] The Hard Problem of Consciousness & The Progressivism of ... fds.duke.edu 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers defines phenomenal consciousness as 'the hard problem' because qualia resists functional characterization.
The evolutionary functions of consciousness royalsocietypublishing.org Nov 13, 2025 1 fact
claimAdaptive, functional accounts of phenomenal consciousness shift the focus of inquiry from the subjective experience of 'how it feels' to objective behavioural outcomes.
Panpsychism - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
claimDispositional panpsychism is a variety of panpsychism that integrates dispositionalism—the view that fundamental physical properties are irreducible causal powers—with the thesis of phenomenal consciousness, which is the qualitative 'what it is like' aspect of consciousness.
(PDF) Cross-Cultural Approaches to Consciousness - Academia.edu academia.edu 1 fact
claimPhenomenal consciousness sciences have provided mechanical explanations for the 'how' and 'what' of consciousness but have failed to explain the 'why' of consciousness.
Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate ... frontiersin.org Apr 17, 2018 1 fact
claimThe literature on robot consciousness generally fails to address phenomenal consciousness because researchers often focus on concrete problems within existing conceptual frameworks while deferring the core issue of consciousness to future breakthroughs.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Aug 19, 2003 1 fact
claimDuring the classical and mediaeval periods, philosophers viewed the intellect as the aspect of the mind most resistant to materialistic accounts, whereas from the time of René Descartes onward, consciousness—specifically phenomenal consciousness or sensation—became the primary challenge to materialist monism.
Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and ... - Nature nature.com Apr 30, 2025 1 fact
referenceRichard Brown published 'The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness' in Philosophical Studies in 2015.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
referenceTom McClelland authored 'The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness', published in the 'Journal of Consciousness Studies' in 2013 (Volume 20, Issue 3–4, pages 125–151).
AI Sessions #9: The Case Against AI Consciousness (with Anil Seth) conspicuouscognition.com Feb 17, 2026 1 fact
claimNed Block has expressed skepticism regarding whether general anaesthesia completely eliminates all phenomenal consciousness.
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying ... arxiv.org Nov 20, 2025 1 fact
claimThe authors of 'Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence? A Framework for Classifying Objections and Constraints' define consciousness as phenomenal consciousness, which Thomas Nagel described as the fact of there being 'something it is like' to be a system, involving qualia or subjective experience.