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judgment aggregation
Also known as: Judgement aggregation
Facts (11)
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Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Feb 26, 2001 10 facts
referenceFranz Dietrich's 2006 paper 'Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems' in the Journal of Economic Theory explores the theoretical possibilities and impossibilities within the field of judgment aggregation.
referenceThe impossibility theorems in judgment aggregation reflect Kenneth Arrow's 1951/1963 impossibility theorem for preference aggregation.
referencePauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006), and Mongin (2008) provided further generalizations of impossibility theorems in judgment aggregation.
referenceFormal epistemology uses proof-based methods to address questions of knowledge acquisition within a community, including topics like judgment aggregation and testimony.
referenceList and Pettit (2011) proposed ways to relax requirements in judgment aggregation so that majority voting satisfies collective rationality.
claimJudgement aggregation is a process that assumes individuals in a group hold binary opinions or attitudes on matters, such as factual claims or actionable decisions, and seeks to determine how these individual judgements should be combined to facilitate group action or create a rationally judging group.
referenceList and Pettit (2002) proved impossibility theorems demonstrating that reasonable constraints in judgment aggregation are often jointly unsatisfiable.
referenceChristian List and Philip Pettit demonstrate an impossibility result regarding the aggregation of individual judgments into a collective group judgment in their 2002 paper 'Aggregating sets of judgments: an impossibility result'.
referenceMarc Pauly and Martin van Hees published 'Logical Constraints on Judgment Aggregation' in the Journal of Philosophical Logic in 2006, which discusses the formal limitations of combining individual judgments into group decisions.
claimFormal epistemology literature addresses four key questions: 1) how should a group aggregate their judgements? 2) how should a group aggregate their fine-grained beliefs? 3) how should Bayesians update on the testimony of others? and 4) what sorts of aggregation methods create rational or effective groups?
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Aug 28, 2019 1 fact
claimThe 'doctrinal paradox' is a problem in judgment aggregation where a group of individuals with logically consistent beliefs can arrive at a group judgment that is logically inconsistent, originally formulated by Kornhauser and Sager in 1986 in the context of legal judgments.