Knowledge Tree
disagreement
Also known as: disagreements
Facts (24)
Sources
Social Epistemology – Introduction to Philosophy - Rebus Press press.rebus.community 10 facts
quoteDavid Christensen characterizes disagreements as "opportunities for epistemic self-improvement."
claimThe epistemology of disagreement is distinct from the epistemology of testimony because not all evidence from disagreement is testimonial; for example, one can infer disagreement by observing another person's behavior.
claimPeer review is valuable because it allows individuals to identify others who are at least as likely to be correct, and if disagreement occurs, it prompts a decrease in confidence and a search for new evidence.
claimEncouraging individuals to voice disagreement within a group reduces the likelihood of the group falling into unjustified groupthink or other biases.
referenceAdam Elga authored the chapter 'How to Disagree about How to Disagree', published in the 2007 book 'Disagreement'.
referenceRichard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield edited the book 'Disagreement', published by Oxford University Press in 2010.
claimDisagreement functions as evidence about the world by providing information about the beliefs held by other people, which alters an individual's own body of evidence.
referenceCarey (2011) discusses the potential skeptical force of merely possible disagreement rather than actual disagreement.
referenceMatheson and Frances (2018) discuss conciliation and steadfast responses to disagreement.
referenceJonathan Matheson and Brian Frances authored the entry 'Disagreement' for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, published in 2018.
Social Epistemology - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science oecs.mit.edu Jul 24, 2024 5 facts
perspectiveConciliationists argue that when an epistemic peer disagrees with you, you are under a rational obligation to change your view, suspend judgment, or reopen the inquiry.
claimSome philosophers argue that the conditions for epistemic peerhood are so stringent that they are rarely met, and the fact that someone disagrees with you may be evidence that they are not your epistemic peer.
perspectiveAnti-conciliationists argue that the conciliationist approach to disagreement may be too flexible or lack integrity in contexts involving high-stakes issues, such as the Holocaust, or identity-constituting commitments, such as the existence of God.
claimSome critics argue that the conditions for epistemic peerhood are so stringent that they are rarely met, and the mere fact of disagreement may serve as evidence that the other person is not an epistemic peer.
perspectiveAnti-conciliationists argue that individuals are not always under an epistemic obligation to revise their beliefs in light of disagreement with an epistemic peer.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Feb 26, 2001 4 facts
referenceAdam Elga's 2007 paper 'Reflection and Disagreement' in Noûs examines the epistemic implications of disagreement between individuals.
referenceKenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock, and Joel D. Velasco's 2016 paper 'Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy' in Philosopher’s Imprint discusses how individuals update their beliefs based on the credences of others.
claimDavid Christensen argued that disagreement can serve as evidence in his 2009 paper 'Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy'.
referenceHilary Kornblith published 'Is philosophical knowledge possible?' in the 2013 book 'Disagreement and skepticism', edited by D. Machuca.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Aug 28, 2019 2 facts
claimBright et al. (2018) argue that consensus is not always necessary or possible in scientific reporting, and that majority voting is a valid method for deciding what statements a report will endorse when disagreement exists.
referenceThomas Kelly published 'Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence' in the book 'Disagreement', edited by Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, in 2010.
Virtue Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 9, 1999 2 facts
referenceJ. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard's 2016 chapter, 'Intellectual humility, knowledge-how, and disagreement', discusses the roles of intellectual humility and knowledge-how in the context of disagreement.
claimAllan Hazlett's conception of intellectual humility is considered most pertinent in the context of disagreement.
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Dec 14, 2005 1 fact
referenceTom Kelly's 2005 essay 'The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement' discusses how disagreement between individuals affects the rationality of their beliefs.