epistemic gap ↔ physicalism

Relations (1)

related 2.32 — strongly supporting 4 facts

The epistemic gap is a central argument used to challenge the validity of physicalism, as it suggests a fundamental disconnect between physical knowledge and phenomenal consciousness [1], [2], [3], and [4].

Facts (4)

Sources

Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 4 facts

perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.

claimNon-physicalist arguments against physicalism, as summarized by David Chalmers in 2003, assert that there is an epistemic gap between our knowledge of phenomenal consciousness and our knowledge of the physical, which implies an ontological gap in reality.

perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.

perspectiveDualists argue that while physicalism may be simpler and more elegant than dualism, the epistemic gap between the mental and the physical is a datum that is incompatible with physicalism but compatible with dualism.