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epistemic gap
Also known as: Epistemic gaps, epistemological gap
Facts (18)
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Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 14 facts
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.
claimNon-physicalist arguments against physicalism, as summarized by David Chalmers in 2003, assert that there is an epistemic gap between our knowledge of phenomenal consciousness and our knowledge of the physical, which implies an ontological gap in reality.
claimEpistemic gaps, defined as the divide between physical knowledge and mental knowledge, suggest that consciousness may not be purely physical.
claimThomas Nagel and Galen Strawson argue that consciousness cannot be constituted by the physical due to the epistemic gap or related considerations.
claimEmergent panpsychism is compatible with the existence of an epistemic gap because it treats microconsciousness and macroconsciousness as distinct cause and effect, which implies an ontological gap.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.
claimPanprotopsychists who regard the nature of the protophenomenal as unknown might argue that the epistemic gap to consciousness could be closable if that nature were known, though this appeal to ignorance is often considered unconvincing.
claimThere is an epistemic gap between microconsciousness and macroconsciousness, meaning it is difficult to conceive how micro-entities combine to form a unified macroconsciousness.
claimDual-aspect monism is compatible with the epistemic gap because it regards consciousness as non-physical, similar to dualism.
claimPanprotopsychists who define the nature of the protophenomenal, such as panqualityists, face the same epistemic gap problem as constitutive panpsychists.
claimProponents of the phenomenal bonding view argue there is no epistemic gap between microexperiences related by a physical relation with the intrinsic nature of co-consciousness and a unified macroexperience.
claimThe 'epistemic gap' argument posits that intentional facts about meaning cannot be deduced from or explained by physical facts alone.
perspectiveDualists argue that while physicalism may be simpler and more elegant than dualism, the epistemic gap between the mental and the physical is a datum that is incompatible with physicalism but compatible with dualism.
claimIf an epistemic gap undermines the physicalist claim that consciousness is constituted by the physical, it should also undermine the dual-aspect panpsychist claim that consciousness is constituted by microconsciousness.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 2 facts
claimThe author asserts that the 'hard problem of consciousness' is the fundamental challenge of modern science because there is no established theory of mind and matter, which creates an epistemic gap between objective description and phenomenal experience.
claimVon Stillfried concludes that there are valid reasons for David Chalmers's transition from an epistemological gap to an ontological gap regarding consciousness.
Non-Reductive Physicalism - Theories of Consciousness theoriesofconsciousness.com 1 fact
claimThe explanatory gap in non-reductive physicalism suggests that even complete physical knowledge may not fully explain subjective experience, indicating an epistemic rather than an ontological gap.
Panpsychism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu Jul 18, 2017 1 fact
referenceThe article "Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain the Epistemic Gap?" by E. Diaz-Leon was published in the journal Mind in 2010, volume 119, issue 476, pages 933–951.