Relations (1)
related 2.58 — strongly supporting 5 facts
Physicalism and interactionism are related as they are both categorized as primary positions on mental causation alongside epiphenomenalism [1], and are frequently compared by critics who argue that both theories face similar explanatory challenges regarding psychophysical laws {fact:1, fact:5} and are subject to specific refutations like the epistemic gap or physical causal closure {fact:2, fact:3}.
Facts (5)
Sources
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org 5 facts
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.
referenceCritics argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, specifically interactionism and physicalism, face the same explanatory challenges as epiphenomenalism regarding why specific psychophysical laws or constitution relations exist (Robinson 2007; Corabi 2014).
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, such as physicalism and interactionism, face the same improbability issues as epiphenomenalism because they must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws or identity relations to explain correlations between physical and mental states.
claimThere are four possible positions on mental causation: interactionism (which implies violation of physical causal closure), epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, and physicalism.