concept

Interactionism

Also known as: interactionist

Facts (54)

Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 18 facts
perspectiveVon Stillfried expresses discomfort with substance-like concepts of consciousness, such as those found in interactionism and substance dualism, because they imply that physical systems might behave differently depending on whether they interact with 'mind-stuff'.
claimEpiphenomenalism attempts to avoid the problems of interactionism by denying consciousness any causal role, but it fails to explain how consciousness emerges from physical processes without reducing the former to the latter.
claimThe central problem of interactionism is explaining how two irreducible substances, each following its own intrinsic principles, can act upon each other.
perspectiveArguments against interactionism exist, but none are currently strong enough to prove the theory invalid.
claimRecourse to indeterministic quantum processes with no net energy exchange is a proposed method to outline the possibility of a causal role for consciousness within interactionism.
claimVon Stillfried (2018) observes that a radical interpretation of Bertrand Russell's ideas regarding protophenomenal properties might be necessary to explain direct phenomenal judgements, potentially solving problems that epiphenomenalism and interactionism cannot.
perspectiveSome authors argue that interactionism is improbable, suggesting that there is no interaction or no phenomenal influence on the physical world.
claimInteractionism refers to approaches that attribute a causal role to consciousness, implying that mind and body influence each other, whereas epiphenomenalism refers to approaches that deny any influence of the mind on the body.
perspectiveThe author argues that if David Chalmers and his followers are correct that panpsychism avoids the serious problems faced by monist materialism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism, then further investment in solving the combination problem is warranted.
claimSubstance dualisms, such as interactionism and epiphenomenalism, are logically possible but face significant objections.
claimInteractionism faces the problem of identifying a non-causal mechanism that could explain how consciousness influences physical processes, given the lack of a clear causal connection.
claimThe combination problem is not restricted to panpsychism, but also applies to interactionism and epiphenomenalism.
claimDavid Chalmers developed a naturalistic aspect dualist interpretation of Russellian Monism, referred to as 'Type-F Monism', which integrates elements of both interactionism and epiphenomenalism to address their respective limitations.
claimSubstance dualism theories, including interactionism and epiphenomenalism, fail to explain the emergence of phenomenal properties from the physical as a distinct ontic substance.
claimInteractionists and epiphenomenalists face the challenge of explaining how phenomenal experience emerges from physical processes, as both are considered irreducible to each other.
claimInteractionism does not solve the hard problem of consciousness because it fails to explain the mechanism of how interaction occurs.
claimConstitutive pan(proto)psychism is viewed as a potential solution to the hard problem of consciousness because it avoids the specific problems associated with substance dualism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism.
claimInteractionism faces the specific challenge of explaining how two fundamentally different and irreducible substances interact across an ontological boundary, due to its basis in substance dualism.
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press Dec 20, 2023 14 facts
claimInteractionism that posits consciousness affects the physical world by influencing the outcome of quantum collapse strongly suggests libertarianism, because quantum collapse is an indeterministic process.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that their position is less unattractive than the alternatives, specifically claiming that physicalism is refuted by the epistemic gap and interactionism is refuted by physical causal closure.
perspectivePhysicalists argue that the interactionist use of strong emergentism is a speculative possibility lacking clear evidence, and that even if strongly emergent properties exist, they could potentially be explained by the laws of biology and neurology.
referenceCritics argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, specifically interactionism and physicalism, face the same explanatory challenges as epiphenomenalism regarding why specific psychophysical laws or constitution relations exist (Robinson 2007; Corabi 2014).
claimThe viability of interactionism as a theory of consciousness depends on empirical developments in quantum physics and the physics of strong emergence.
claimInteractionists may propose that consciousness causes strongly emergent physical properties or behaviors when they occur within the brain.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that the lack of elegance in their theory is a moot point if competing theories like physicalism and interactionism are already refuted by the epistemic gap and physical causal closure.
claimInteractionists suggest that non-physical consciousness may play a causal role in quantum mechanics by influencing the outcome of wave function collapse, either by narrowing down the possibilities or by causing the collapse itself.
perspectiveEpiphenomenalists argue that non-epiphenomenalist theories, such as physicalism and interactionism, face the same improbability issues as epiphenomenalism because they must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws or identity relations to explain correlations between physical and mental states.
claimInteractionism does not inherently imply libertarianism because the psychophysical laws governing the interaction between consciousness and the physical world could theoretically be deterministic.
claimThere are four possible positions on mental causation: interactionism (which implies violation of physical causal closure), epiphenomenalism, overdetermination, and physicalism.
claimInteractionism must posit specific two-way psychophysical laws where pain causes avoidance and pleasure causes pursuit to explain fitting correlations between conscious states and physical behavior.
claimInteractionism is incompatible with the principle of physical causal closure because it denies that physical behavior has sufficient physical causes.
claimInteractionism poses concrete challenges to mainstream physics.
Dualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2016 Edition) plato.stanford.edu Howard Robinson · Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 19, 2003 10 facts
referenceE. Mills authored the article 'Interactionism and physicality', published in the journal Ratio in 1997.
claimInteractionism is the view that the mind and body, or mental events and physical events, causally influence each other.
referenceK. von Rooijen authored the article 'Interactionism and evolution: a critique of Popper', published in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science in 1987.
claimInteractionism violates the principle of physical closure if physical closure is assumed to be true, because there is no feature of a purely physical effect that is not contributed by a purely physical cause.
claimA common scientific objection to interactionism is that if mental causal power flows into the physical system, it would violate the fundamental scientific law of the conservation of energy.
claimThe assumption that interactionism is incompatible with the world being 'closed under physics' is not necessarily justified if causal overdetermination of behavior is possible, allowing for both a complete physical cause and a mental cause of behavior.
claimMills argues that the argument claiming interactionism violates physical closure is invalid because a physical event can possess features that are not explained by the event which serves as its sufficient cause.
claimInteractionism faces a significant objection because mental properties, states, or substances are often considered to be of radically different kinds from physical ones, which supposedly prevents the communality necessary for interaction.
claimThe naive objection to interactionism often relies on a 'billiard ball' model of causation, which questions how material and immaterial entities can impact one another.
claimKarl R. Popper authored 'Language and the mind-body problem: a restatement of interactionism', presented at the 11th International Congress of Philosophy in 1953 and reprinted in 'Conjectures and Refutations' in 1962.
Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org Wikipedia 4 facts
claimDavid Chalmers has defended versions of both interactionism and epiphenomenalism as plausible positions.
claimInteractionism and epiphenomenalism are the most common dualist accounts of the causal relationship between the mental and the physical.
claimInteractionism is a philosophical position that posits the mental and physical causally impact one another, a view associated with the thought of René Descartes.
claimMartine Nida-Rümelin has defended interactionism in contemporary philosophy.
Resolving the evolutionary paradox of consciousness link.springer.com Springer Apr 1, 2024 4 facts
claimInteractionism, a form of dualism, proposes that conscious states are caused by physical events and also exert causal influence on physical events.
claimInteractionism faces the problem of overdetermination, as it suggests physical events are caused by both sufficient physical causes and conscious events, which challenges the assumption that physics is causally closed.
claimInteractionism posits the existence of undiscovered psychophysical laws that govern how physical arrangements produce consciousness and how conscious events influence physical events.
claimInteractionism is compatible with the view that conscious states are adaptations because it allows for the possibility that consciousness provides fitness advantages by influencing behavior in ways that might be more efficient than nonconscious computational processes.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 facts
referenceE. Mills authored the paper 'Interactionism and overdetermination,' which was published in the American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, pages 105-115, in 1996.
claimDavid Chalmers suggests that interactionists can solve the epiphenomenalism problem by arguing that certain nodes in the causal network, such as psychons, are intrinsically experiential, meaning they are experiential through and through even if the causal story can be told without mentioning experience.
The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org David Chalmers · Oxford University Press 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers proposes that a theory of consciousness should dispel epiphenomenalism without relying on interactionism.
Theories and Methods of Consciousness biomedres.us Paul C Mocombe · Biomedical Journal of Scientific & Technical Research Jan 29, 2024 1 fact
claimInteractionism or dualism, in the Cartesian sense, is considered a post-materialist understanding of consciousness constitution rather than a widely utilized approach in the scientific understanding of how consciousness emerges.