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Relations (1)
related 2.81 — strongly supporting 6 facts
The concept of 'justification' is the central epistemic property being analyzed within the theory of 'Experiential foundationalism', which posits that perceptual experiences serve as the source of this justification [1], [2], and [3]. The theory specifically addresses how basic beliefs acquire justification through non-belief mental states [4] and explores conditions under which experiences reliably provide such justification [5].
Facts (6)
Sources
Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 6 facts
claimExperiential foundationalism posits that ordinary perceptual beliefs are justified by the perceptual experiences that give rise to them.
claimExperiential foundationalism asserts that a belief is justified by a mental state that is not a belief, specifically the perceptual experience that the belief is about.
claimExperiential foundationalism combines two crucial ideas: (i) when a justified belief is basic, its justification is not owed to any other belief; (ii) what in fact justifies basic beliefs are experiences.
claimExperiential foundationalism is a theory in epistemology that posits perceptual experiences as a source of justification, which coherentists challenge by asking why perceptual experiences serve this function (the J-question).
claimExperiential foundationalism is supported by citing cases like the blue hat example, which makes it plausible to assume that perceptual experiences are a source of justification.
claimExperiential foundationalists who prefer Experiential Foundationalism (EB) can endorse externalism to argue that perceptual experiences are a source of justification if, and only if, those experiences are of types that are reliably associated with true resulting beliefs.