Relations (1)
related 2.58 — strongly supporting 5 facts
Perception is linked to reductionism as a foundational source of epistemic justification [1] and as a comparative model for understanding testimony [2]. Furthermore, critics of reductionism argue that reductive accounts of perception fail to fully explain experiential properties [3], while epistemological reductionists restrict the use of perception to the subject's own experiences rather than relying on others' perception [4].
Facts (5)
Sources
Epistemology of Testimony | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu 3 facts
quoteTomoji Shogenji states: "[B]y the time the epistemic subject is in possession of testimonial evidence by interpreting people’s utterances, her belief in the general credibility of their testimony is well supported. For, unless the hypothesis that testimony is generally credible is true, the epistemic subject is unable to interpret utterances and hence has no testimonial evidence. … The unintelligibility of testimony without general credibility is … not an objection to reductionism about testimonial justification, but a consequence of the dual role of the observation used for interpretation—the observation confirms the interpretation of utterances and the credibility of testimony at the same time. … [E]ven a young child’s trust in testimony can be justified by her own perception and memory. In order for people’s utterances to be testimonial evidence for her, the child must have interpreted the utterances, but the kind of experience that allows her to interpret the utterances is also the kind of experience that supports the general credibility of testimony."
claimTomoji Shogenji argues that reductionists justifying trust in testimony cannot cite other people's perception and memory, but only the epistemic subject's own perception and memory.
perspectiveReductionism views testimony as akin to inference and places a relatively heavy burden on the recipient of testimony, whereas anti-reductionism views testimony as akin to perception or memory and places a relatively light burden on the recipient.
Social Epistemology - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.stanford.edu 1 fact
claimReductionism in epistemology is the view that the justification of beliefs derived from testimony can be reduced to justifications provided by other sources such as perception, memory, and induction.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 1 fact
claimDavid Chalmers argues that Daniel Dennett's reductive accounts of phenomena like 'cuteness' and 'perception' fail to support reductionism about experience because they either lack plausibility or rely on experiential properties that reductive accounts omit.