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• William James's panpsychism originated from his "neutral monism," which posits that the fundamental nature of reality is neither mental nor physical, but a third form that can be regarded as either mental or physical from different viewpoints.
• Dualist views assert that both the mental and the physical are real and that neither can be assimilated to the other.
• Dual-aspect monism, also known as Russellian monism, posits that reality consists of one kind of substance with two complementary aspects: the physical and the mental or protomental.
• Dual-aspect monism posits that the physical and mental (or protomental) are two complementary aspects of a single underlying substance, where physical properties appear from a third-person, scientific perspective, and mental properties appear from a first-person, introspective perspective.
• The Pauli-Jung conjecture posits that correlations between the mental and physical are non-causal, maintaining the causal closure of the physical against the mental, while acknowledging a formal causal relationship between the psychophysically neutral monistic level and the distinguished mental/material domains.
• William James's panpsychism originated from his 'neutral monism,' which posits that reality is neither inherently mental nor physical but possesses a basic character that can be viewed as either.
• Non-reductive physicalism is a label used for versions of materialism that attempt to tie the mental to the physical without explicitly explaining the mental in terms of its behaviour-modifying role.
• Dualism is defined by two core tenets: (1) the mental and the physical are both fundamental, meaning neither is constituted by the other, and (2) the mental and the physical stand in a causal relation to each other.
• The phenomenal concept strategy, advocated by Brian Loar (1990), David Papineau (1998), and Eva Diaz-Leon (2010), is a form of physicalism that asserts there is no explanatory entailment from the physical to the mental.
• Panpsychism is typically based on the idea that the mental and the physical are complementary, such that neither could exist without the other.
• Substance dualism, the traditional version of dualism defended by René Descartes, regards the mental and the physical as two different fundamental substances or kinds of stuff.
• Dualists argue that while physicalism may be simpler and more elegant than dualism, the epistemic gap between the mental and the physical is a datum that is incompatible with physicalism but compatible with dualism.
• Dualism is defined as the philosophical view that the mental and the physical are equally fundamental, with neither being reducible to the other or to a third entity.
• As regards the world in general, both physical and mental, everything that we know of its intrinsic character is derived from the mental side, and almost everything that we know of its causal laws is derived from the physical side. But from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal.