phenomenal judgments ↔ consciousness

Relations (1)

related 2.00 — strongly supporting 3 facts

The relationship is established because phenomenal judgments are proposed as a mechanism to explain how individuals access their own consciousness [1], while the logical supervenience of these judgments on the physical domain creates a paradox regarding the non-supervenience of consciousness itself [2]. Furthermore, David Chalmers utilizes these concepts to explore the limits of understanding in philosophical zombies [3].

Facts (3)

Sources

Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1 fact

perspectiveIt is argued that non-physicalist theories should adopt David Chalmers' theory of phenomenal judgments to account for the direct and immediate access individuals have to their own consciousness.

The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org David Chalmers · Oxford University Press 1 fact

referenceDavid Chalmers uses two-dimensional semantics to argue that: (1) a philosophical zombie would only be able to understand secondary intentions; (2) there are logically possible scenarios where two non-zombies have the same primary intentions (such as the phenomenological realisation of red) that correspond to different secondary intentions (such as different wavelengths of light); (3) in such scenarios, the zombies' communication would face challenges not faced by the two non-zombies; (4) even if consciousness lacks causal influence, it still inserts itself into phenomenal judgements; (5) an adequate theory of consciousness must be able to reconcile this fact.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact

quote“The paradox is a consequence of the facts that (1) The physical domain is causally closed; (2) Judgments about consciousness are logically supervenient on the physical; (3) Consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical; and (4) We know we are conscious. From (1) and (2) it follows that judgments about consciousness can be reductively explained. In combination with (3), this implies that consciousness is explanatorily irrelevant to our judgments, which lies in tension with (4). Thus we have the paradox. One might try to escape the paradox by denying any one of these premises”