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phenomenal judgments
Also known as: theory of phenomenal judgments, phenomenal judgments, phenomenal judgements, phenomenal judgment, phenomenological judgments
Facts (11)
Sources
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com 6 facts
claimVon Stillfried (2018) observes that a radical interpretation of Bertrand Russell's ideas regarding protophenomenal properties might be necessary to explain direct phenomenal judgements, potentially solving problems that epiphenomenalism and interactionism cannot.
quote“In The Conscious Mind I called this ‘the paradox of phenomenal judgment’ and argued that, while it is strange (many strange things happen in other possible worlds), it does nothing to undermine the coherence of zombies. [...] I argue that an appropriate account of the content and epistemology of our phenomenal judgments shows that there is no problem here”
perspectiveIn later publications, David Chalmers shifted his terminology from 'the paradox of phenomenal judgment' to 'phenomenal beliefs' and argued that an appropriate account of the content and epistemology of phenomenal judgments shows there is no problem.
claimEpiphenomenalism cannot explain the correspondence between direct phenomenal judgments and phenomenal states, leaving proponents to suggest either an 'outrageous coincidence' or a fundamental 'law of correspondence'.
claimIn his 2018 discussion of the 'Meta-Problem of Consciousness,' David Chalmers attributes a central role to 'phenomenal reports,' which are closely related to his earlier notion of phenomenal judgments.
quote“The paradox is a consequence of the facts that (1) The physical domain is causally closed; (2) Judgments about consciousness are logically supervenient on the physical; (3) Consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical; and (4) We know we are conscious. From (1) and (2) it follows that judgments about consciousness can be reductively explained. In combination with (3), this implies that consciousness is explanatorily irrelevant to our judgments, which lies in tension with (4). Thus we have the paradox. One might try to escape the paradox by denying any one of these premises”
Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness cambridge.org Dec 20, 2023 2 facts
claimDavid Chalmers argues that phenomenal judgments are unique because they do not require causal connection to the experience; instead, the experience is a constituent part of the thought or judgment, allowing for a non-causal theory of justification.
perspectiveIt is argued that non-physicalist theories should adopt David Chalmers' theory of phenomenal judgments to account for the direct and immediate access individuals have to their own consciousness.
Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness - David Chalmers consc.net 2 facts
claimDavid Chalmers asserts that phenomenological judgments are reliable if they are made with careful, patient attention and critical introspection.
claimDavid Chalmers argues that the potential for error in phenomenological judgments does not invalidate phenomenology, noting that judgments about external data can also be wrong while science still functions effectively.
The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org 1 fact
referenceDavid Chalmers uses two-dimensional semantics to argue that: (1) a philosophical zombie would only be able to understand secondary intentions; (2) there are logically possible scenarios where two non-zombies have the same primary intentions (such as the phenomenological realisation of red) that correspond to different secondary intentions (such as different wavelengths of light); (3) in such scenarios, the zombies' communication would face challenges not faced by the two non-zombies; (4) even if consciousness lacks causal influence, it still inserts itself into phenomenal judgements; (5) an adequate theory of consciousness must be able to reconcile this fact.