David Chalmers uses two-dimensional semantics to argue that: (1) a philosophical zombie would only be able to understand secondary intentions; (2) there are logically possible scenarios where two non-zombies have the same primary intentions (such as the phenomenological realisation of red) that correspond to different secondary intentions (such as different wavelengths of light); (3) in such scenarios, the zombies' communication would face challenges not faced by the two non-zombies; (4) even if consciousness lacks causal influence, it still inserts itself into phenomenal judgements; (5) an adequate theory of consciousness must be able to reconcile this fact.

Authors

• Person: David Chalmers Organization: Oxford University Press
  The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia

Sources

• The Conscious Mind - Wikipedia en.wikipedia.org David Chalmers · Oxford University Press via serper

Referenced by nodes (4)

• David Chalmers entity
• consciousness concept
• philosophical zombies concept
• phenomenal judgments concept