Relations (1)

related 2.00 — strongly supporting 3 facts

Physicalism and phenomenal properties are related through debates regarding whether the latter can be reduced to the former, as seen in the rejection of physicalism by dualistic views [1], the reliance of weak reductionism on physicalism despite the lack of evidence for the physical nature of phenomenal properties [2], and the classification of Russellian monism based on how it relates these two concepts [3].

Facts (3)

Sources
Hard Problem of Consciousness | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy iep.utm.edu Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2 facts
claimWeak reductionism relies on a claim of parsimony and a commitment to physicalism, despite the lack of evidence that phenomenal properties are physical.
claimNonreductive and dualistic views agree with weak reductionism that phenomenal properties underwrite first-person access, but they reject the idea that these properties are physical.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness | Springer Nature Link link.springer.com Springer 1 fact
claimRussellian monism can be interpreted as physicalism, aspect dualism, or idealism depending on the presumed relationship between inscrutables (the intrinsic properties of relata) and phenomenal properties.